The development of the Tasmanian wood industries : a radical analysis by Dargavel, John Brunton
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TASMANIAN WOOD INDUSTRIES : 
A RADICAL ANALYSIS
by
John Brunton Dargavel 
B.Sc. Forestry (Edinburgh), 1956 
M.SCo Forestry (Melbourne), 1970
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy of the 
Australian National University
June 1982
iDECLARATION
This thesis is based upon original research conducted 
by the author, except where acknowledged.
j> jL_ 0—I —^ 1
7  ^ tes'v
ii
ABSTRACT
Modernisation theories of development have been widely 
criticised for their failure to account for continuing under­
development on. a world scale. Alternative radical theories have 
been used to analyse the development of many regions and economic 
sectors, but not for the Australian wood industries. The thesis of 
this work is that radical theories provide rational and effectual 
bases for analysing the development of the wood industries in 
Tasmania.
Three radical theories are employed. Firstly, world-systems 
theory is used to provide an overview of the changes operating at a 
world scale that affect regional development. It explains such
changes in terms of stages, each characterised by salient features 
and by shifts in hegemony. Secondly, a recent theory of structural 
change is used that enables regional and sectoral development to be 
examined in detail. This provides a level of abstraction and
analysis between the 'mode of production' as defined by Karl Marx, 
and the specific concrete society being studied. Thirdly, because 
the state is particularly important in wood industries, a Marxist 
theory of the state is used.
The history of wood production, from pit-sawing by convicts in 
1804 to the export of woodchips in 1980, is narrated in the main body 
of the work. The salient features of and changes in the capitalist 
world-system are described for each of its stages, and their effects 
traced through its successive levels? that of world capitalism, 
Britain, Australia, and Tasmania. Within the Tasmanian wood
industries, development is analysed in terms of changes to twelve 
materially and socially different structures of production, and in 
terms of the state's construction of each of forestry's major 
industrial functions: production, reproduction, and integration.
The findings above are then reviewed. World-systems theory 
reveals that many determinants of Tasmanian development operated on a 
world scale, but that many of the salient global changes affected the
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Tasmanian wood Industries only indirectly or at a much later date. 
The theory of structural change adopted here is found to be 
especially powerful because of the laggard pattern of the development 
in this particular case«. On many occasions the actions of the state 
can be explainel by simple models, but on others more complex ones 
are required« The state's implementation of forestry's various 
functions can De explained in terms of the needs of the main 
structures of wcod production.
Finally, a brief comparison is made between the issues that are 
raised for the future by an analysis like this one, based on radical 
theory, and those based on modernisation theory. It is shown that 
the differences between the two approaches are so substantial that 
they would lead to quite different development strategies.
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VPREFACE
This is an historical investigation undertaken to meet what I 
believe to be a nost pressing need: the adoption of a fresh framework 
for the development theory within which to construct policies for 
Australia's contemporary forestry and wood industries. I am
persuaded that modernisation theory, which has provided the main 
basis for policy during the third quarter of the twentieth century, 
is too limited to provide that basis for the future. The intent of 
this work is to demonstrate that an alternative framework, 
constructed from radical theory, provides a superior rationale for 
understanding past development and for constructing policies for 
future progress.
Two quite general features provide the setting for this work.
Firstly, the paradoxes, contradictions and crises within and between
capitalist countries deepened during the third quarter of the
twentieth century. Politically this resulted in calls for new
policies (such as that for a New International Economic Order) and
intellectually it resulted in a resurgence of radical scholarship
(that now competes with liberal scholarship in a very wide range of
fields, such as development studies, sociology, political science,
education, criminology and so forth) . Secondly, the prevailing
paradigm of Western forestry conforms closely to liberal beliefs, as
I have shown elsewhere for Australia, and at the time of writing
(1982) this sector has hardly been considered by studies in the
radical tradition.1 Yet the contradictions and failures of
modernisation policies are felt as strongly here as elsewhere.
Consider for instance the conclusions of the distinguished forest
economist, Jack Westoby, who in 1978, looking back at the
modernisation policies of industrial development that he had so
ardently advocated in the 1960's as an attack on underdevelopment,
could only declare '... that very, very few of the forest industries
that have been established in underdeveloped countries.. .have in any
2way promoted socio-economic development'. If, as Frank has written 
in the very first sentence of his historical studies of development
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in Chile and Brazil, it is capitalism, both world and national
that produced underdevelopment in the past, and which st-.ill generates 
underdevelopment in the present . ..', then how are the prevailing 
Australian policies of encouraging capitalist industries through 
public expenditure on activities such as forestry to be understood ?
In this study, the development of the Tasmanian wood industries 
and the forestry practices that support them is linked with unfolding 
structural changes to capitalism as a world-historic process. This 
approach differs from studies conducted within the framework of 
modernisation theory which often take a nation or region as a 
discrete unit for analysis. An historical investigation is made in 
order to detect the patterns and processes of development. Again, 
this contrasts with many development studies conducted under 
modernisation theory which confine themselves to one point in time. 
This study is still confined to one region however, in order to 
permit a detailed examination to be made of events at the level of 
organisations - firms, unions, government departments and so forth - 
which are obvious actors in the development process« Tasmania was 
selected because it is a clearly defined region in which the wood 
industries are well developed and economically important. The
European invasion in 1803 is taken as a starting point, partly 
because the expansion of industrial capitalism was particularly rapid 
from the beginning of the nineteenth century, partly because it 
permitted two systems of manual production to be included thus
increasing the number of structural changes that could be studied, 
and partly because it was a dramatic and clear-cut conjuncture.
With regard to the disciplines engaged in this study, three
points should be made. Firstly, the study is essentially one of 
development. The wood sector was chosen because of personal
experience and because its expansion is often proposed in under­
developed regions. Secondly, broad notions of development encompass 
various disciplines; thus we have development economics, development 
sociology, development geography and so forth. The position taken 
here is that of Wallerstein who argues for the essential unity of the 
social sciences and history.4 That is to say, the student of
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development has to be concerned with a vast area that can not be 
logically disciplined within tidy partitions. I have drawn from the 
work of sociologists, political scientists, political economists, 
economists, foresters and geographers as well as from work which 
spans such divisions. Thirdly, whereas investigations in the natural 
sciences, such as many forestry studies, can be conducted within an 
almost universally accepted paradigm of shared definitions, beliefs 
and practices, investigations in the social sciences can not. 
Although certain perspectives may dominate, multiple and conflicting 
paradigms persist that reflect different ideologies, political 
positions, assumptions about the nature of humanity and so forth - 
matters which can not be 'settled'. This last point is elementary to 
the conduct of social science inquiries, particularly within the 
radical tradition, yet is all too often ignored in studies concerned 
with management, economics, or development in the forestry and wood 
industries sector. A small glossary of forestry, wood industry, and 
social science terms has been included to help bridge the 
disciplinary gaps~ -
The broad view taken in this study has meant that a number of 
aspects of the topic which the reader might expect to find herein are 
not included. Three will be mentioned, all of which are worthy of 
detailed study but none of which, I believe, can be sensibly 
considered until a sound framework is established. Firstly, and 
perhaps most surprisingly for a study conducted within a university 
Department of Forestry, there is no mention of biological or 
environmental aspects. This is not because these are considered
unimportant, but because they are seen more as constraints and 
effects than as determinants of development. Secondly, and again 
surprisingly in an historical treatment, few individuals are named. 
Again this is not because individuals are considered unimportant, but 
because development is seen as rooted in material and social 
conditions rather than in personalities. Lastly, the work is
qualitative rather than quantitative for it is held that processes 
must be defined and conceptual models built, as in this study, before 
their coefficients may be estimated usefully.
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Finally, the scope and limitations of the source materials used 
need to be born in mind continuously for they are grossly biased 
towards official sources and public companies, while small businesses 
are almost totally unrepresented. More seriously, the experiences 
of most of the people who have worked in the mills and forests have 
been scarcely touched, and although archival records of the timber 
worker's unions have been invaluable, I am conscious of the weight of 
unrecorded, forgotten and sometimes illiterate dead whose struggles 
have been washed out of the pale reports and bare statistics that 
remain.
Tasmania has frequently been mentioned in Australian histories 
as an exception, but far less frequently considered in detail. No 
general history of the State up to the present has been published. 
The single book on the economic history of the island covers only the 
period to 1850, while Butlin's compendium of Australian economic 
statistics, 1861-1938/39, an invaluable source for the mainland 
States, virtually ignores Tasmania. Similarly, no authoritative
history of the forest industries in Australia has been published. A 
few unpublished theses and journal articles, together with part of a 
manuscript of a forthcoming history of the public administration of 
Australian forests being prepared by Dr L.T. Carron, were the main 
secondary sources for this sector.
The history of this sector was constructed largely from primary 
sources. The work involved was inescapable yet absorbed a
disproportionately large share of the study. I examined, as far as I 
can ascertain, all the legislation, and every extant parliamentary 
paper and published report dealing with Tasmanian forestry and wood 
industries. Fortunately, the State Archives of Tasmania hold an 
extensive collection of official files with relevant material dating 
from 1826. From those files available for research, the records of 
the Colonial Secretary's Office, the Lands and Survey Department, the 
Forestry Department and later Commission, and some other series were 
consulted. The minute books and records of the Australian Timber 
Workers Union - No.6 Tasmanian Branch and its predecessor were 
examined in the Archives of Business and Labour of the Australian
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National University, and similar material for the Tasmanian Timber 
Association and its predecessor were examined in the offices of the 
Association in Launceston.
Pariamentary debates, normally a fruitful source, were not 
recorded officially until a Tasmanian Hansard service was established 
in 1979. Newspaper reports were not searched systematically as the 
task was too great for the long period covered in this study. 
However many newspaper sources were located from clippings files held 
in the State Archives and branches of the State Library of Tasmania, 
and from some limited searches conducted for specific events.
Except for quotations and certain notes, all quantities recorded 
in imperial units have been converted to their metric equivalents, 
and money values have been shown in units of Australian dollars. A 
table of conversion factors is provided.
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1Chapter 1
DEVELOPMENT THEORIES AND POLICIES
Peojle, in their struggle to improve the material and social 
conditions of existence, commonly construct development policies and 
plans to guide their actions. They may attempt to do so rationally 
by searching the historical record for the processes at work, 
examining the patterns in their current situation, and evaluating the 
likely outcomes of alternative endeavours. That is, actions can be 
planned rationally from analyses of the past and forecasts of the 
future; from a fusion of experience with intent. But people may 
also simply follow outdated guides or accept prevailing ideologies 
unquesticningly. Either way the development policies adopted differ 
widely eccording to the analyses conducted, the conceptions of 
desirable futures or the prevailing ideologies on which they are 
based, end the resulting strategies can range from evolution to 
revolution.
Popularly in Australia, development means expansion, economic 
growth, Industrialisation and modernisation, and from Wentworth to 
Whitlam las been equated with capitalist investment.^ This meaning 
of development has been so firmly held to be an unassailable good as 
to constitute an ideology - 'developmentalism' - and one that has 
often camouflaged the equation, legitimated state policies of 
industrial 'encouragement', and justified their costs. In no State 
is this more apparent than in Tasmania where, since the early 
nineteenth century, development has been pursued by state policies of 
land graats, hydro-industrialisation, concession and encouragement to 
industries, such as the wood industries. Yet popular development 
policies have not always worked? Australian poverty exists with
Australian prosperity and Tasmanian development has now become the 
'Tasmanian Problem' of regional decline. At times the struggle for 
development requires fresh theoretical studies that make new
assumptions, reappraise experience, find different patterns, and 
suggest lew guides.
2This work takes a fresh theoretical approach to the study of the 
wood industries and forestry in Australia. It is held that the
modernisation theories which have prevailed as the basis for analysis 
and policy in this sector have been found elsewhere to have numerous 
failings in theory and in practice. The thesis of this work is that 
radical theories provide a rational and effectual base from which to 
analyse the historical development of the sector, and hence to plan 
its future.
The thesis is argued in three parts. Firstly, theories of
progress or development are discussed and three radical theories 
elaborated. Secondly, a case study is made of the wood industries in 
Tasnania over the period 1803-1980, using the radical theories
described in the first chapter. This lengthy study occupies the bulk 
of the work and is divided approximately chronologically between 
Chapters 2 and 8. In each of the chapters, the development of the
different structures of production, the links between them and their 
relationships with the state are described. Particular attention is 
given to the construction of forestry as a state activity. Finally, 
the whole case study is reviewed to see how well it fits the radical
theories, and what is particular to the case and sector. The
strengths and weaknesses of modernisation theory are briefly 
revisited and it is shown that radical theories do provide a rational 
alternative; development can be seen in a different way.
In this chapter we first review the idea of progress or 
development. This is done at some length for the complexity of the 
idea, particularly as it envisages structural change, goes far beyond 
the popular conception. Secondly, contemporary theories of
development are categorised into two simplified camps - modernisation 
and radical. A brief account is given of the assumptions and
criticisms of modernisation theories. The content and assumptions of 
the radical approach are then established by considering Marx's model 
of social structure and change and some criticisms of it. This is
also done at some length as the approach is uncommon in studies of 
this sector. Three radical theories to be employed in the case study 
are then elaborated. These are;
3- the world-systems theory, that provides a world-historic 
perspective within which to see the overall course of Tasmanian 
development;
a recent theory of structural change within capitalism that 
provides an additional level of abstraction and analysis to 
those normally used; and
- a Marxist theory of the capitalist state, required because of 
the great importance of the state in this sector.
Lastly, the particular nature and functions of forestry are 
established.
PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT
The idea of progress in the modern secular sense only became a 
significant concern of those whom we now call social scientists, as 
the pace of change in Europe began to quicken in the late eighteenth 
century. The clear evidence that rational enquiry could yield a
cumulative advance of knowledge, and particularly of science, created
an optimistic outlook. Incessant inventions and the spread of
manufacturing showed that radical changes to material production were 
possible. New social relations emerged in the growing cities that 
differed markedly from traditional village life- A new world was 
seen to throw off the old as the United States asserted her 
independence (1776), and the French suddenly created a new political 
order (1789).
Over the next sixty years, the expansion of industrial
capitalism in Europe and the emergence of bourgeois liberal societies 
has been described by Hobsbawm '...as the greatest transformation in 
human history since remote times...a revolution which transformed and 
continues to transform the entire world ...'. Intense theoretical 
studies were essential to understand this changing world and led to
Othe founding of both political economy and modern sociology.
The scientific and technological triumphs of the nineteenth
4progress put forward in the eighteenth, so that the idea that the
tumult of social changes constituted a cumulative advance, or
progress, became part of the general outlook in the western 
w o r l d T h e  idea was accompanied by doubts and refutations but 
these did not capture the general outlook until after 1914. The
First World War and the depressions of the 1920's and 1930's
transformed the common outlook to one of profound pessimism. Yet the 
idea of progress, renamed development, enjoyed a remarkable revival 
during the boom of rising Western prosperity and production in the 
1950's and 1960's. The United Nations declared the 1960's to be the 
'Decade of Development' during which poverty, hunger and disease in 
'underdeveloped' countries would be attacked with enlightened 
policies and projects. The revival was accompanied by cogent 
criticism from environmentalists, neo-Malthusians and millions who 
saw progress achieved elsewhere at their expense. With the recession 
of the 1970's, criticisms heightened and there was a resurgence of 
theoretical enquiry into the nature and process of development.
We can consider the content of the idea of progress or 
development further by examining its ebb and flow under the headings
5of optimism, rationality and endeavour.
Optimism
The idea of progress rests on an optimistic interpretation that 
history contains a trend to improvement and the trend depends not on 
Providence or chance but on human endeavour. The trend to
improvement is held, with varying degrees of acceptance, to extend 
over knowledge, the material conditions of life, the social and 
political organisation of society, morals and even the human 
constitution.
The optimism with which progress was espoused in the eighteenth 
century rested on the new advances of science, and their application 
in medicine, engineering, transport and so forth. Condorcet (1743- 
1794) believed that:
5... we shall find in the experience of the past* in the 
observation of the progress that the sciences and civilisation 
have made thus far* in the analysis of the advance of the human 
mind and the development of its faculties* the strongest motives 
for believing that nature has set no limits to our hopes.7
This belief in unlimited development - of the perfectibility of
humankind - was totally rejected in 1798 by Thomas Malthus with his
famous analysis of the limits placed on a geometrically expanding
population by the arithmentic rate at which he thought natural
production could be increased. Malthus concluded that:
... no possible form of society could prevent the almost 
constant action of misery* upon a great part of mankind* if in a 
state of inequality* and upon all* if all were equal.8
The optimistic view prevailed in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries for the Malthusian prediction was clearly not
born out by European experience. Industrial production grew by leaps
and bounds as did food production in the new lands of North America
and Australia, while the birth rate in most industrialised countries
declined as prosperity increased.
The debate revived during the 1960's and 1970's because the 
population on a world scale was increasing at an almost Malthusian 
rate* the finite character of many of the natural mineral and energy 
resources became better understood* and it became abundantly clear 
too that misery did act constantly on a substantial part* perhaps 
one-third* of mankind in spite of progress overall. Several studies 
attempted to match forecasts of population against those for the 
limits of food* energy and material production* and forecast 
catastrophes as the limits were reached. Echoing earlier optimism* 
others retorted that human scientific ability and technological 
ingenuity held the potential to avert them.^ Counterposed to both* 
Galtung argued that the whole debate was misdirected because the 
urgent world problem was not to ensure that material consumption 
could be maintained in rich advanced countries in the future* but to 
distribute it more evenly in the present.^
Condorcet's optimism about the beneficial contribution of 
science and technology to the human condition has been severely 
modified by malignant applications and effects. Hiroshima and global
6pollution are too well known to need further elaboration. Few would 
now share his belief in moral progress. Examples such as 
international humanitarian aid or welfare policies are matched by 
those of concentration camps or apartheid. Yet moral claims do
persist in political debate within and between states and have been
1 2held to exert some influence on development and other policies.
Similarly, evidence of improvement in the human constitution is 
contradictory. Better nurture has certainly increased life
expectancy and even the height of successive generations in many 
countries, yet starvation and disease shorten and stunt the lives of 
millions.
Overall, we can perhaps conclude that the optimism of the idea 
of progress abides in human potential yet is constrained by the 
physical world and often thwarted by people's own constructions.
Rationality
The idea of progress as an historic trend toward improvement
contains not only an optimistic but also a rational and secular
assumption that discoverable patterns exist in human history. From
the middle of the eighteenth century, the need to understand a
changing world was met rationally. Principles of order and unity
were sought along new lines that led to sociology, the history of
civilisations and the philosophy of history. By the end of the
century, the idea of progress was being analysed in three distinct
streams of thought - political economy in Britain, radical political
1 Stheory in France and idealist philosophy in Germany
The search was divided between the analysis of societies at one
time {social statics in Comte's term) and the analysis of change
{social dynamics). ® Two simplifying and generalizing concepts were
adopted, each of which created a number of difficulties. The first
was that of the social system whose parts could only be understood in
terms of the whole. This was an idea propounded strongly by Hegel
and it recurs, almost as a defining characteristic, through the work
17of the classical founders of sociology from Comte on. Although it 
is often necessary to consider structures or functions individually,
7yet the sociological perspective maintains that such analyses are 
partial. Comte, for example, specifically rejected the autonomy of 
the economic. The concept of the social whole is difficult to
maintain academically against disciplinary fragmentation however, and 
the boundaries of a society are not coincident for all its aspects. 
Tasmania, for example, is unique geographically, legally, and
politically, yet it is also part of the Australian nation, the 
English-speaking world, and is integrated through trade and
investment into the world-wide capitalist system.
The second concept was one of idealised stages through which
19the progress of societies could ostensibly be described. Stages
were conceived as consecutive social states, so that the task of
Comte's social dynamises was to discover laws governing the succession
20from one stage to the next. For example, Marx recognised four
stages in Western history from primitive communal hordes to the
present stage of capitalism, which he envisaged would evolve through
a transitionary stage of a socialist society to an ultimately
21classless communist one. This concept generated two substantial
difficulties. First, the notion of a unilinear succession has been
found to be wrong as some nations have simply skipped stages, passing
straight from primitive to industrial for example. Secondly, whereas
each nation was expected to progress, it has become clear that the
progress of some has been inhibited or reversed by others in a
situation that Frank has termed the 'development of
27underdevelopment'.
The idea of progress assumes not only that rational enquiry can 
detect development processes but that they may continue. Whereas the 
concept of progress through successive stages, each structurally 
different from the last, was virtually unanimously accepted for 
historical studies (though with great differences in emphasis and 
causal explanation), its application to the future was not. The 
dividing issue was whether progress stops with capitalism. Pollard 
traces the origins of this divisive issue to the separation between 
political economy and economics that occurred in the nineteenth 
century.
8In Britain, the classical political economists had a historical
component to all their work. For example, Adam Smith devoted one-
fifth of The Weatth of Nations, 1776, to analysing the economic
policies of earlier stages. His work attacked the mercantilist and
aristocratic institutions then current by arguing that the increased
division of labour and deregulation of trade required for the
emerging capitalist manufacturing order would be of advantage
overall. He advocated changing the social order to a new stage that
would provide continuous progress in economic matters^ The
economists that followed Smith did not take his historic vision and
claimed for their laws well nigh timeless applications. When the old
order had been finally vanquished:
Around 1870, political economy was transformed into marginalist 
economics, and with it a key social science became a
mathematics, irrefutable as long as it was internally 
consistent, but utterly lacking in a historical dimension,
increasingly divorced from the other social sciences and unable 
to escape from its assumptions that capitalist categories,
values and mores are alone and eternally valid. ...by making 
economics a-historical,- the economists made social conservatism 
orthodox. To advocate further progress by basic social change, 
was not only politically deplorable, but economically
nonsensical.
Both French and German political economy went through similar
transitions at similar stages in their national development; first
arguing for the civilising influence of capitalism on the grounds of
historical change, and then switching to its defence by a-historic 
25assertion. The resulting notion that the economy as an
untrammelled market could be separated from other aspects of life
was, as Gellner describes it, '...highly eccentric, historically and
26sociologically.. . '
Not all agree that liberal democratic industrial capitalism is 
the final stage of progress which human endeavour can only aim to 
perfect. Gandhian and anarchist thoughts reject the capitalist ideal 
outright. There are theories of a 'Post-Industrial' stage that could 
evolve from industrial capitalism. Most notably, the Marxist 
tradition views it at best as a stage to be overcome in the socialist 
transition to communism. For societies such as Australia the
9dividing issue has been posed in terms of whether future changes
will, or should, be continued growth, adjustment and reform within
the present institutions, or radical change to such economic, social,
27and political structures.
The assumptions about rationality that underpin assertions about 
supposed sciences of society and history have been repeatedly 
assailed. From the very complex issues involved, Pollard has
abstracted the main objections that reflect on the central idea of 
progress. At one extreme, it is held that social and cultural
enquiry is so far divorced from natural science as to preclude the 
possibility of objective study or of discovering laws. In other 
attacks, the influence of accidents or 'Great Men' on the course of 
history has been held to show that determining factors can not exist 
(but these objections are readily dismissed if we recognise them as 
operating on a different level of abstraction from 'society'). 
Lastly, there is the common failure of predictions based on
historical generalizations.
Belief in rational assumptions of progress has been modified not 
only by these assaults, but also by a widespread rejection of
positivism in all branches of knowledge. Few would now assert the
predictive reliability of the social sciences with the confidence
expressed by their founders.
Endeavour
The point of the historical analysis of and debates about the
idea of progress, particularly in its contemporary garb as purposive
theories of development, is not merely to interpret the world but, as
29Marx proclaimed, to change it. However the extent to which
endeavour can change the social and natural world is limited by
existing conditions, the strength of established trends and the
inertia of tradition. The rationality assumptions inherent in the
idea of progress enable the future to be prophesied on the basis that
the laws or trends, detected by the analysis of past and present, 
will determine the future; yet development policies are plotted on 
the basis that Voluntary endeavours can alter outcomes.
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In considering this seeming dichotomy between voluntarism and 
determinism (which originates in the ancient question of free will), 
it is essential to clarify issues of abstraction and scale. 
Individual endeavour takes many different, voluntarily chosen, paths 
which seen alone appear tangled and unregulated, yet which in social 
aggregate reveal those definite trends that support the idea of 
progress. In turn the social aggregate acts back on the individual 
creating the subjective reality within which endeavours are 
conceived. With this in view, the apparent dichotomies between the 
individual and society, and between voluntarism and determinism, 
appear to be false, and the components of each are seen to stand not 
in opposition but in dialectical relationship with one another.
Moreover, endeavours for more desirable futures are conducted by 
social groups able to take stronger actions than individuals. Their 
scale sets the reach of their endeavours but this is often not far 
enough. The world market for commodities exceeds the reach of any 
nation to control, and the spread of industrialisation has created,
so Pettman argues, global norms which pervade local organisation,
31culture and values. By contrast, guides to practical endeavours 
such as the Tasmanian wood industries are prepared on a much smaller 
scale.
The ability of any social group to progress thus depends on its 
power to bring the major determinants of its future within its reach. 
This is a dynamic matter. For example, the successive incorporation 
of more and more production deeper into the world economic system
often means that critical factors slip from the reach of poor
countries or small regions such as Tasmania. By contrast, wider
social groupings may be formed to reach further, such as the European 
Economic Community or transnational corporations.
In a similar way to our conclusion about the assumptions of 
optimism in the idea of progress, we can see that the assumption that 
endeavours can create better futures must often be taken more as 
potential or a goal than practice.
In summary/ the optimism of thinkers/ such as Condorcet in the 
eighteenth century, that human endeavour based on rational analysis 
would create a better world must be qualified substantially in the 
twentieth» What possibilities of rational progress persist only do 
so in the shadow of irrational nuclear endings.
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT
Theories of development, underdevelopment and social change have 
proliferated since the Second World War. They differ in their
initial assumptions, disciplinary or spatial concerns, and analytic 
frameworks and, because they are directed to purposive change serve 
social, political and ideological functions in different ways; their 
content and context are closely related. Most of the reviews of the 
extensive literature distinguish a fundamental dichotomy, labelled in 
various ways» On one side are theories developed mainly in the
tradition of liberal thought. These are based on concepts such as 
competition between groups, consensus and equilibrium. They see
liberal democratic industrial capitalism as the highest stage of 
human civilisation and seek development by reform and adjustment. 
They have been variously described as pluralist, equilibrium, liberal 
or consensus theories; we will take the label of modernisation 
theories to embrace this group. On the other side are theories 
developed mainly in the radical or Marxist tradition. They are based 
on concepts such as modes of production and conflict between 
classes. They see capitalism as a stage to be overcome and seek 
development by structural change. They have been variously classed 
as structuralist, conflict, Marxist or neo-Marxist theories; we will 
label this group as radical theories.
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MODERNISATION THEORIES
This label covers a large number of development theories, whose 
central concern since the Second World War has been the economic
development of poorer countries or regions. The theories are
diffused through many disciplines and sectors, including forestry.
On one bound of this rich and extensive literature are psychodynamic 
theories leading to attempts to raise the level of individual enter­
prise and motivation; on the opposite bound are theories of invest­
ment and trade that lead to aid, tariff and monetary recommendations
O Oat the international level, as in the Brandt report. These
disparate theories share common assumptions and a common political 
context.
They are modernization theories because they rest on the 
assumption that traditional societies or impoverished regions can be 
developed towards desirable goals, commonly conceived in images 
derived from modern Western industrial capitalist societies. It is 
assumed that individual units, regions or nations can advance within 
the whole without disadvantaging others in the process. The second 
common assumption is that modern societies operate by continual 
adjustment to maintain an equilibrium between competing forces or 
groups. This assumption is shared by structural-functional theory in 
sociology, neo-classical economics, and political theories of 
pluralism. The third common assumption is that the social or 
economic effects generated in the modernised sector or 'growth-pole' 
will diffuse through its surrounds. Thus modernisation theorists see 
major changes to society in the transition to the modern industrial 
stage, followed by incremental minor changes as growth proceeds.
These assumptions were so firmly and widely held by Western 
social scientists during the 1950's and 1960's as to constitute a 
rarely questioned base of belief that allowed them to concentrate on 
detailed studies characterised by disciplinary fragmentation, 
empirical data collection and, particularly in the case of economics, 
a high level of quantitative sophistication. The results were 
presented with an imprimatur of scientific objectivity as if they
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were value-free. One illustration will suffice. In 1958, Hirschmann 
put forward an economic development strategy based on deliberately 
upsetting the pattern of a regional or national economy.^ He 
advocated concentrating interventionist investment in those partic­
ular industries that required large ammounts of materials from other 
sectors - through backward linkages - and which sold their products 
for further processing or to many outlets - through forward 
linkages. Hirschmann held that the temporary imbalance caused by the 
new industry would induce development, by which he meant productive 
investment, in the supplying and receiving sectors, which in turn 
would call forth expansion in further sectors. To estimate the 
magnitude of these effects, economists called on matrices, designed 
by Leontieff, showing the purchases and sales between each sector in 
a national economy in a particular year (input/output tables). The 
economists assumed that the new investment would represent a marginal 
addition that would not upset the pattern of transfers displayed by 
the matrix coefficients. They then calculated with great precision 
the 'multiplier effects' forecast to occur in the remainder of the 
economy.
While such analyses illumine the present state of an economy and 
provide estimates that seem impeccable for small investments and 
short-term changes, they have three major failings when applied to 
the many or large-scale investments designed to stimulate sustained 
development. Firstly, they provide little causal explanation of the 
effects they forecast. Hirschmann, for example, having rejected the 
notion of a prime force for economic development, resorted to an 
almost metaphysical concept of 'development as the key to 
development'. Secondly, they ignore historical trends that may be 
altering the pattern of transfers between sectors to a far greater 
extent than the investments being appraised. Thirdly, they ignore 
the world-wide setting within which trade and investment occur which 
may overwhelm any purely regional study.
Policies derived from modernisation theory have taken markedly 
different lines. One line, acting in the belief that increasing 
trade will benefit all, has sought to remove the 'imperfections' of
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tariffs, quotas and the like that impede access to the world's 
markets. A more common line has been to attract industrial
investment (in the expectation of the diffusion of benefits) by 
providing cheap resources, specific subsidies, infrastructure, or a 
docile labour force; or direct investment by the state. Along this 
line, increased tariffs are often advocated to protect domestic 
industries from the world market.
The proliferation of modernisation theories and policies during 
the 1950's and 1960's correlates not only with the economic boom in 
Western industrialised nations but also with the political realities 
of the time. To the United States and Western nations such as 
Australia, modernisation theory provided the vision of a civilising 
mission for capitalism, one that they could proffer to the Third 
World during the Cold War. To elites in decolonised or poor 
countries it proffered glimpses of a path to affluence, and of course 
it was used to clothe many policies of more or less naked exploit­
ation implemented by the powerful for real not theoretical interests.
Such contextual correlations do not prove or disprove the value 
of the content of modernisation theories. However as modernisation 
policies have commonly failed to redress either international or 
inter-regional imbalances, they have come under increasing attack. 
Reviews of the development literature summarize six main criticisms 
of modernisation theories;
- They fail to explain the increasing gap between rich and poor
nations and fail to provide corrective policies.
“ They are biased toward static descriptions of structure and
neglect the historic analysis of structural change; or when neo­
evolutionary stage theories are presented, they fail to theorise 
the change process or allow for the dynamics of change within 
stages.
They neglect to theorise the causes either of structural 
persistence or change.
They neglect real conflicts and dissent.
They are politically biased toward the maintenance of the status 
quo.
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- They neglect the international economic and political relation­
ships that bear on the nation-state.
Such criticisms are not necessarily accepted by modernisation 
theorists. Indeed the range of theory is so wide, and much of it so 
flexible, that many of the criticisms have been deflected by or 
incorporated into the modifications of it. However, even if they 
are admitted, modernisation theories are still left with two 
substantial strengths which presumably account, apart from their 
contextual correlations, for their resilience. Firstly, as theories 
of social statics they have generated an enormous amount of precise 
description about how societies appear at particular times. 
Leontieff's input/output tables, for example, do give highly resolved 
instantaneous pictures of economies. Although some of the topics 
chosen and the categories selected may not suit other paradigms, a 
great amount of general utility remains. Secondly, as Pettman has 
argued for the world level of nation-states, the pluralist perspect­
ive does provide a penetrating framework within which to consider the
O  (Lbalance of power between competing political groups. Thus in
Australia, for example, the several States do act as separate and 
competing entities in ways not readily covered by the class-oriented 
perspective of radical theories.
RADICAL THEORIES
The domain we have labelled as radical is bounded by much the
same concerns as modernisation theories, while sharing markedly
different assumptions and political contexts. It contains rather
more in the way of grand theories at the world-historic level, but
also has theories for particular sectors, such as education or law.
Some sectors, such as that of forestry, have been almost completely
neglected. Reviewers classify development theories differently, but
all agree that the centre of the radical camp is occupied by a host
37of often conflicting theories which draw heavily on Marx. We will 
omit any consideration of the few non-Marxist radical theories in 
order to keep our attention on the central ground.
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The label radical reflects the essential assumption that one 
should seek development by changing the basic structure of society, 
rather than by preserving it with adaptations and reforms, as the 
modernisers would do. Because of this assumption, radical theories 
are held to be in permanent and essential opposition to both 
modernisation theories and the existing order. Instead of an 
equilibrium of and consensus between competing groups, modern society 
is seen in terms of conflicting classes. Instead of progress from 
traditional to modern and a steady adaptive growth thereafter, 
development is seen as a stepwise process not yet completed. Instead 
of ascribing the cause of development to a host of different reasons 
(capital investment, human enterprise, prior development, etc), 
development is seen as the outcome of contradictions and conflicts 
originating from the property relations of production, extended by 
some theories to embrace the inequalities that arise from the 
exchange of commodities.
Before elaborating the content of radical theories , some
comments must be made about their context and analytical structure.
The multiplication of development studies conducted under
modernisation theory in the 1950's and 1960's was paralleled by 
radical critiques and alternatives. The resurgence of Marxist 
scholarship in Western and Third World countries occurred in the 
context of the failure of the United Nations' First Decade of
Development and the widening rift between rich and poor. It was not 
confined to international studies but spread to regional and sectoral 
studies. In contrast to the generally a-theoretic, a-historic, 
empirical orientation of modernisation studies, radical studies were 
characterised by their consciously theoretic concerns. In
particular, in attempting to build alternative theoretical models 
their proponents 're-discovered' Marx. As the Marxist method of 
analysis focusses on the interactions between spheres, such as 
between the economy and the state, an inherently holistic approach 
was adopted in which the disciplinary separations of modernisation 
studies had little meaning. Further, the search for causes of
structural change required historical analysis.
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The content of radical theories will be elaborated in the 
following sections in terms of Marx's theory of social structure and 
change, and in terms of a discussion of some criticisms of historical 
materialism. Each of the three theories that provide the framework 
for the subsequent case study will then be described.
MARX'S MODEL OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CHANGE
Marx drew ideas, often rebutting them, from three streams of
thought about progress current at the beginning of the nineteenth
century - German idealist philosophy, French socialism and British
political economy; and constructed a new model of social structure
and change - dialectical historical materialism. The model was not
fully expounded by Marx in a single text but was presented explicitly
38and implicitly through many writings. The interpretation of
Marx's work and the elaboration of this model has created a vast
literature of its own in which the original features and subtleties
39are often altered, expanded or lost. In spite of the danger of
trivialising the complexity of Marx's model, and the impossibility of 
reviewing its subsequent modifications, interpretations and critiques 
concisely, the main components must be detailed, and some of the main 
limitations (as summarised by a major contemporary authority 
Kolakowski) must be considered.
1. Dialectical process and progress
Marx inherited and accepted the concept of the dialectic from 
Hegelian philosophy as a universal model of change. The dialectic is 
a conception of a state of tension or conflict existing between two 
opposing elements (thesis and antithesis) which is resolved in the 
creation of a new state (synthesis) which calls forth fresh 
opposition, and so progressively on. Thus the process of conflict 
between opposite elements of the whole results in progress to a new 
state of the whole which is qualitatively different from its
predecessor. Hence the elements of dialectical relationship can
1 40only be understood in terms of the whole.
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Hegel and Marx, using the notion of struggle and tension to 
account for movement between successive characteristically different 
stages, applied the dialectic interrelation to their analyses of the 
long course of social history and to project its future. Hegel 
argued that progress must have a terminus, which he saw as freedom of 
the human spirit (improbably realised in many institutions of the 
Prussian state !), and which Marx saw as the self-realisation of the 
individual in communist society.4  ^ To Marx, the dialectic progress 
of human history from one epoch or stage to another was effected by 
the struggle between classes, and marked by revolutionary upheavals.
2. Material basis
Although Marx accepted the dialectic as method, he rejected
Hegel's idealist view that '... history is an account of the spirit's
42search for freedom through the variety of past events'. Instead
Marx viewed ' ... universal history [as] nothing but the formation of 
man by human labour. ..' , thus locating the dynamic of progress in the 
material world in which human society struggles to survive by the 
subjugation of nature.43 Human reason and incessant inventiveness, 
applied to improving production methods (technology) and organisation 
(the technical division of labour), enables more than the basic needs 
for survival and reproduction to be met. The existence of a surplus 
creates the potential for conflict about its division and the 
possibility of a class society in which some people appropriate the 
labour of others. In Marx's view, the legal and political forms of 
society arose from the productive sphere that created the surplus. 
Moreover looking at the development of civilisation from the earliest 
times, Marx held that each particular technical form of production 
was intimately related to its own particular relations of production 
in a unity which he termed the 'mode of production'. The surplus 
also permits leisure and cultural development through intellectual 
and artistic work. In sum, Marx held that the entire set of social 
relations, institutions, cultural and spiritual practices - the 
'superstructure', and the socially constructed consciousness, rested 
on the material 'base'.
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3. Two types of change
In Marx's model, the dynamic for great changes originated when
advances made in production, which called for new social relations,
conflicted with the relations of an old social order« Thus:
At a certain stage of their development, the material productive 
forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations 
of production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same 
thing - with the property relations within which they have been 
at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive 
forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an 
epoch of social revolution. With the change of economic formul­
ation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly 44transformed.
This mechanism was held to apply to the macro changes in Western
societies between ' ... ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois ...
45epochs in the economic formation of society'.
The European invasion of Tasmania was certainly an epochal 
change, but the transition from the tribal society to the invading 
society was extremely short, the last aborigine being rounded up 
within thirty years of the invasion. The new society was a product 
of the industrial and social revolution in Britain, and the epoch 
with which this study is concerned is clearly the bourgeois one of 
capitalism.
Marx's model was developed, especially in Capital, to consider 
change within capitalism, which he considered to be a unique epoch 
distinguished from all earlier ones by the '. . . constant revolution­
ising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social
I Aflconditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation ... Marx
considered that the dynamic for this foment originated from:
a) Inter-class struggle. Struggle between classes arose over the 
extent and division of the value created by labour beyond the 
amount needed to continue the system - 'surplus value'.
b) Intra-class competition. Competition occurred primarily between 
capitalists in the market, but also occurred between the 
employed and the unemployed.
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4. Classes
Classes, as elaborated in Marxist theory, are social groups 
whose fundamental economic, political and ideological interests 
conflict (or at least are discrete) as a result of the manner in 
which production is organised socially. Any society of which they 
are part becomes polarized. ^  Marx used the concept of class on two 
levels of abstraction. In theoretical works, he differentiated 
classes according to: ownership of the means of production (tools,
factories, raw materials etc.), control over the products (sales), 
and a distinction he made between directly productive and 
unproductive work. For capitalism he recognised 'the two great 
hostile classes' as being the bourgeoisie, who own the means of 
production and/or control the exchange of products, and the 
proletariat, who are forced by necessity to sell their labour 
power. In historical studies, Marx added ideological, social and 
employment criteria to describe empirical classes whose behaviour he 
related to the theoretic classes. An essential feature of Marx's 
concept of class was that its members should become conscious of 
their common interests in opposition to other classes even though 
such members might be in competition with each other.
Within the bourgeoisie, various fractions were identified 
according to the manner in which capital was deployed by merchants, 
industrialists, financiers, rentiers etc. The proletariat was 
divided between the employed and the unemployed or 'reserve army of 
labour'.
5. Marxist economics: Laws of motion of capital
The two interactions of inter-class struggle and intra-class 
competition provided the foundations on which Marx constructed the 
detailed model of change within the capitalist mode of production 
that he presented in Capital.
Marx held that value originated only from labour. Under 
capitalism, workers sold their labour power as a commodity to 
capitalists who bought more than they paid for; the difference, or
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surplus value, constituting the sole source of capital accumul­
ation. Marx traced the paths through which surplus value, created in 
production, circulated through the economy and he identified the 
points at which it accumulated as capital. Four major types of 
capital were defined by differences in the paths of circulation: 
industrial, commercial, banking and landed capital.
The capital accumulated at these points could be reinvested to 
expand the production with which individual capitalists could attempt 
to capture greater shares of the market. The resulting competition 
constantly bore down on prices and profits so that individual 
survival depended on a ceaseless striving to reduce production 
costs. To this end new technologies were sought and larger factories 
built to achieve economies of scale. This process inevitably drove 
out the smaller more expensive producers and led to the concentration 
and centralisation of production and capital into fewer and fewer 
hands.
Profits were also determined by the outcome of struggles between 
capital and labour over wages, hours and the organisation of work. 
Capitalists adjusted to changing outcomes by introducing new 
production methods which offered them one or more possible 
advantages;
- Machines could replace labour to reduce production costs.
Labour could be displaced into the reserve army of labour which 
exerted a downward pressure on wages.
- Craft and skilled work could be divided into simpler tasks which 
could be performed by less skilled and cheaper workers 
(deskilling).
The intensity of labour could be increased by scientific 
management (ie. Taylorism) or by pacing the tempo of work to a 
production line (ie. Fordism, eg. sawmills).
Changing markets and labour relations continually required 
capitalists to adjust their investments between old and new
technologies, between various sectors, between regions and between
countries. Their ability to adjust depended on the mobility of money
capital, the possibility of realising on unwanted physical assets
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such as old machines, and the speed with which new investments could 
be made. Overall, capital flowed to the most profitable investments 
producing a tendency for the rate of profit, suitably adjusted for 
expectations of risk, to equalise.
Marx's model considered that gradual adjustments to the economy 
were possible, through movements of wages, prices and profits, but 
only up to certain limits. Inability to adjust beyond these limits 
induced crises leading to the recomposition of capital through 
structural change. The model also envisaged that the periodic crises 
and structural changes within capitalism would lead eventually to a 
deepening crisis in which capitalism itself would be changed.
6. Civilisation and alienation
Marx saw progress in the dialectical form of two opposing 
elements - civilisation and alienation. I-fe regarded the passage of 
human societies through * successive epochs as a progressive and 
civilising movement towards the desirable terminus in which man would 
regain full control over his own powers and energies. Thus he saw 
capitalism as a progressive advance on feudalism which brought 
socialism one stage closer. He also saw capitalism, in much the same 
way that modernization theorists do, as liberating traditional 
societies from outmoded relationships, and providing a stupendous 
increase to human productive powers through industrialisation.
In contrast to the classic expositions of the idea of progress 
as change towards increasing freedom (or the views of contemporary 
modernisers), Marx regarded the passage of societies through 
capitalism and their development within it as one that entailed 
increasing degradation, dehumanisation and alienation. Alienation 
means a condition in which people's works, as generally expressed in 
their social institutions (like the state or private property) take 
on a life of their own and come to control them. He traced its 
primary source to the division of labour. Marx considered that 
capitalism represented the extreme development of alienation and that 
this was epitomised by the expropriation of surplus value by the
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bourgeoisie (from the proletariat). He forecast that the continuous 
operation of capitalism would result in increasing alienation and 
falling living standards - 'progressive immiseration* - for the 
working class. Moreover he rejected the liberal notion that social 
harmony could be created or restored by legislative reform to balance 
the conflicting forces. He believed that it could only come about 
when the causes of alienation were removed.
CRITICISMS OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
The Marxist model of development has been attacked, altered and
defended repeatedly. Here, two main issues only will be discussed:
dialectic method and determinism. The discussion is based primarily
on the substantial analysis by Kolakowski, and to a lesser degree on
49the work of Mills and Berlin.
The dialectic
Mills has described the dialectic method as '... either a mess 
of platitudes, a way of doubletalk, a pretentious obscurantism - or 
all three ...' on the grounds that the method was not an explicative
c ntheory and was often applied more to obscure than clarify.
In defence, Mills did note that in Marx's hands it had been a
powerful tool to rebutt earlier theories and with it he:
. . . achieved a sense of the fluidity and many-sided nature of 
history making; saw the 'universal interconnection' of all its 
forces; consistently maintained an awareness of perennial 
change, of genuine conflict, of the ambiguous potentialities of 
every historical situation ...^
At this level, Mills' criticism serves as a salutary warning and 
his defence provides a list of desirable attributes in historical 
research. However, the Marxist concept of the dialectic, as 
Kolakowski points out, refers specifically to the conscious struggle 
between classes and captures the idea of the unity of theory and 
actual change as one which can not be reduced merely to a rule for 
research.^
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Determinism
Kolakowski, like many before him, has criticised historical
S1materialism on the grounds of determinism. His main arguments are 
these:
~ The notion that the economic base determines the superstructure 
is a truism if taken loosely to cover just some phenomena, and 
absurd if taken rigidly to cover all.
-  The conventional qualification that the base determines the 
superstructure only 'in the last instance' does not provide any 
criteria to explain which elements are determined.
Similarly, there are no criteria for selecting between the 
historical phenomena which were determined and those which were 
contingent. Hence historical materialism is unable to establish 
laws from which forecasts might be made.
- The universal model can not explain all the diverse wealth of 
social phenomena, such as the different paths that have been 
taken in national development, the influence of great men, the 
inertia of tradition and so forth. Attempts to introduce 
secondary factors weaken the model to the point that it becomes 
too vague to be useful.
In spite of these criticisms, both Kolakowski and Berlin have
emphasised the value of historical materialism in developing research
principles and the questions that have now become the foundations of
S4economic history and sociology.
Such criticisms have fuelled the debates and stimulated the 
theoretical studies that have greatly expanded and diversified 
Marxist models of development. Two examples - of work by Gramsci and 
Wright - illustrate the point; one which is further elaborated in 
later discussions of the changes within capitalism and the nature of 
the state.
Gramsci sought to remove the priority of the base over the 
superstructure on the grounds that interaction between them was 
continuous. He extended the concept of hegemony to capture the
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Situation in which privileged classes maintain their political power 
not just by controlling the coercive institutions of the state but 
also by attaining an intellectual supremacy that enables them to
s simpose their values and standards on society at large.
Wright elaborated the simple model of the base and super­
structure to incorporate the sort of interactions prompted by state 
policies and class struggle. He extended the simplistic notion of 
economic determination of the sort Kolakowski criticises, to 
encompass five further modes of determination.56 This extension 
emphasises the subtle and dynamic nature of social change such a 
model allows, without weakening it.
A FRAMEWORK OF RADICAL THEORIES
Marx described capitalism in terms of general laws derived 
during the rise of industrial capitalism in Britain and constructed 
his development model at a high level of abstraction. Later 
theorists built on the model to explain new features of capitalism, 
extended it to different societies or sectors, and elaborated or 
modified it in hotly disputed ways. Among the many paths along which 
radical theory has been advanced, there are three that provide a 
framework within which to study in detail the development of a small 
sector like the Tasmanian wood industries.
A major task for radical theorists has been to explain 
structural changes within capitalism, as these have developed 
historically and spatially, in terms of Marx's general laws of 
capital. To do this many theorists have divided the epoch of 
capitalism into stages. For examples, Lenin, writing in 1916, linked 
the emergence of monopolies and imperialism and described the latter 
as 'the highest stage of capitalism'; Mandel described the 
contemporary period as an age of 'late capitalism'. Such divisions 
depict changes to the salient features of capitalism on a world- 
historic scale and, given the holistic approach of radical theory, 
provide the necessary setting for regional studies.
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The division of capitalism into world-historic stages, however 
necessary, is too coarse for detailed regional studies over short 
periods» On this scale, it is the shifting changes between the 
features of different stages that constitute the processes of 
development. Radical theorists have advanced a model of the inter­
actions, or 'articulations', between pre-capitalist and capitalist 
modes of production within certain Third World countries to analyse
the persistence of primitive forms of production in the presence of 
58capitalism. This approach has been extended recently, by Gibson
and others, to analyse structural change within the capitalist mode
of production, and provides the second body of radical theory applied
59to the case study here.
The structural changes in capitalism have been accompanied by
superstructural ones, most particularly the emergence of the modern
state. This has been essentially a progressive change, as the state
has become a rationally designed institution adopted and adapted for
development rather than just rule; it has acquired more functions
and undertaken ever greater projects, such as reproducing 
60forests. Radical theorists have added considerable subtlety to
Marx's simplest depiction of the state as nothing but '.. a committee
6 1for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie ...'
We will now elaborate in turn each of these three bodies of 
radical theory that provide the framework of the subsequent case 
study.
THE WORLD-HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE
We will first elaborate the world-historic perspective. Four 
closely related bodies of radical theory are relevant: those of
dependency, world-systems, imperialism and underdevelopment. Each 
describes world development as occurring in stages, and seeks to 
explain the combined but unequal development of the metropolitan 
'core' of rich industrialised nations in relation to the 'periphery' 
of poor and generally rural ones. They give little attention to
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countries such as Australia which do not match the world pattern, but 
they do essay a world-historic view within which to place the 
Tasmanian experience.
1. Dependency
Dependency theory seeks to rest the explanation of unequal
development primarily on the structure of international trade.
Following studies that revealed a supposed long-term trend to
worsening terms of trade for primary produce exporters in developing
countries in their exchanges with industrialised countries, Frank
produced his model of the 'development of underdevelopment'; one
6 2which has been widely described, emulated and criticised. Frank
depicted the rise of the world commercial network as one which built 
a series of chains, transmitting the surplus from the periphery to 
the metropolitan core. The periphery was held in dependent status by 
being restricted to the export of those raw materials required by the 
dominant core. The situation was maintained, despite the political 
independence of such satellites, by the hegemonic influence of 
metropolitan capital acting through the special interests of privil­
eged local elites. Frank's model effectively stood the diffusionist 
notion of modernisation theory on its head, however it failed to 
provide causal explanations of the lack of accumulation in the 
peripheries, and it most notably failed to explain cases like
Australia or Canada in which dependence was accompanied by
63development.
2. World-systems
The most ambitious of several world-systems theories is the
project being undertaken by Wallerstein to analyse the development of
the 'modern world-system' which he defines in terms of the reach of
the capitalist world-economy that originated in Europe in the
64sixteenth century. Wallerstein defines the capitalist world-
economy in turn in terms of ' ... the essential feature of ... 
production for sale in a market in which the object is to realise
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maximum profit. ' He thus sees capitalism as a system with a single 
division of labour but with multiple polities and c u l t u r e s . F o r  
him, wage labour is an example not a condition of capitalism, and 
mercantilism is a response to the conditions of the world-system at 
the time rather than a transitory stage that capitalism overcame.
In Wallersteinss analysis, the nature of the states formed at 
the core, the periphery and an intermediate layer - the semi­
periphery - are an intrinsic part of his model of the world-system:
Once [after 1640] we get a difference in the strength and state 
machineries, we get the operation of 'unequal exchange' which is 
enforced by strong states on weak ones, by core states on 
peripheral ones. Capitalism involves not only appropriation of 
surplus value by an owner from a labourer, but an appropriation 
of surplus of the whole world-economy by core areas. And this 
was as true in the stage of agricultural capitalism [1650-1730] 
as it is in the stage of industrial capitalism [1740 —1917]
In documenting the development of the modern world-system, 
Wallerstein sees changes of political structure in both core and
peripheral states in terms of responses to changes in the system as a 
whole, as defined by the economy of trade«
This model has been critically reviewed by Brenner and Skocpol, 
among others. Among the many complex issues raised, Brenner claims 
that it fails to provide an adequate explanation of economic 
development, because it does not examine fully the creation of value 
and has missed the essential expansionary feature of capitalism, seen 
as the serial rise in labour productivity, which generates accumulat­
ion and the imperative to reinvest. Skocpol claims that the model 
fails adequately to theorise the processes of state formation and 
structural change.
Alexander has given an interesting interpretation of 
Wallerstein's work as providing a theory of 'unequal development' 
structured by unequal social relations that he claims does not depend 
on the inequality of actual exchanges.^ Although Wallerstein's 
major work has so far (to 1981) only covered the development of the 
world-system to 1750, Alexander has foreshadowed how a Wallersteinian 
explanation would view the subsequent period with which this study is 
concerned. Briefly, the model is concerned with the long waves of
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expansion and crisis in the world-system. Expansion is related to 
periods of unassailed hegemony, first of Britain, then the United 
States. Periods of crisis, such as that bounded by the First and 
Second World Wars, are related to changes in the balance of power 
caused by the excessive costs to the old hegemonic power of maintain­
ing its dominance.
As Alexander points out, the virtue of Wallerstein's work lies 
in its insistence on viewing world development as a whole. With this 
perspective we are encouraged to consider the structure of the 
Tasmanian state in terms of its functioning within first the British 
empire and later a wider economy dominated by the US. While we must 
wait for detailed work by Wallerstein on the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the periods he envisages using appear to correspond 
closely to those adopted by Marxist theorists of imperialism and neo­
imperialism. 70
3. Imperialism
Radical theories of imperialism seek to explain the global 
spread of European control, wars between major powers, the expansion 
of trade and the movement of labour and capital out from the core, in
materialist rather than strategic or ideological terms.71 The main
72stages and features appear to be widely agreed.
From the fifteenth century the leading European nations sailed
across the world in search of gold and trade in high quality
products. The first European knowledge of Tasmania came from the
restless search for more Eastern trade. In 1642, Abel Tasman sailed
from Batavia for Holland's United East India Company:
... to discover, the partly known and still unreached South and 
Eastern land [Australia] , and also consequently to seek out any 
important lands, or at least convenient places to known rich 
places, and to use these at a more convenient time for the 
improvement and increase of the Campany's general welfare.7"*
He visited and named Van Diemen's Land, now Tasmania, but failed to
discover riches and sailed on. He did not even see the Aborigines, a
people who had made no external contacts for at least 7000 years.74
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By the end of the eighteenth century, British prosperity 
depended not so much on plunder as on trade in her manufactures. 
European powers searched the world not just for riches but for raw 
materials, markets and new opportunities. These broader aims brought 
a succession of explorers to Van Diemen's Land. A French expedition 
landed briefly in 1772 and gave the Aborigines their first and 
ominously bloody contact with Europeans. The next visits were by 
Furneaux (from Cook's second southern voyage) in 1773 and Cook 
himself in 1777. Not only were Cook's voyages of commercial and 
strategic importance but they epitomised (very concretely in the 
person of Banks on the first voyage!) the new European ideas of 
progress by scientific inquiry. Specimens of the resources and 
descriptions of the people of Van Diemen's Land were collected as 
objects for remote and alien enquiry.
Although pre-eminent at sea, Britain had to struggle with France
throughout the Napoleonic period before her hegemony was assured.
From 1815 to the 1870's the boom of industrial production in Britain,
and to a lesser extent in other European countries, required more raw
materials and food (such as Australian wool and wheat), and the
expansion of markets. The spread of trade and some expansion of the
formal empire were sufficient to maintain British hegemony, and
either transform traditional production patterns into capitalism, or
eliminate them - as in the case of Indian textiles or the indigenous
Tasmanians. Trade required investment in railways, docks and
production, which Marx believed (correctly in the case of Tasmania)
would start the process of capitalist industrial development so that
' . .. the country that is more developed industrially only shows to
75the less developed, the image of its own future' .
From the 1870's to 1914, imperialism flourished as never 
before. The rising industrial nations of Germany, France and Italy 
scrabbled for colonies and Britain sought to secure her domains more 
firmly. Capital was exported from the core to develop the peripheral 
infrastructures for imperial trade, and to invest in productive
enterprises such as mines and sawmills. Concurrently capitalism 
within the core itself was changing. There was the strong growth of
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monopolies through cartels, trusts and amalgamations, particularly in 
Germany and the United States, and new institutions were organized to 
amalgamate banking with industrial capital into what Hilferding 
termed concentrations of 'finance capital', large enough for the 
construction of heavy industries.
By 1916, Lenin was able to prepare a synthesis of imperialism as 
an outcome of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism depicted 
in Marx's model. Lenin defined imperialism to include five features:
i) The creation of monopolies with a decisive role in the economy.
ii) The creation of finance capital.
iii) The export of capital (rather than just commodities) seeking 
better profits than those available in the core.
iv) The formation of international monopolies and cartels which 
share the world amongst themselves.
v) A territorial division of the world among the biggest capitalist
76powers.
Lenin's model has been severely criticised and does not fit the 
British-Australian relationship in several places. In Britain, the 
growth of monopolies generally occurred much later than in Germany 
and the US, and mostly after the imperial expression. The export of 
capital from Europe was not mostly to backward countries and new 
colonies, but to other advanced countries and places where there were 
less risky opportunities - like the US, Canada and Australia. 
Moreover, the net capital flow in Britain prior to 1914 was generally 
inwards due to the profits from previous investments. Further, the 
links between investment and military alignment and adventure were 
not nearly so straight forward as Lenin supposed. Nevertheless, as
Kemp points out, the first four of Lenin's features have proved of
78enduring importance in shaping the contemporary world. The fifth
has disappeared with de-colonisation and has led to further 
theoretical developments.
4. Neo-imperialism and Underdevelopment
The Leninist theory of imperialism could not explain the 
relative lack of metropolitan resistance to colonial independence
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movements after the Second World War, the failure of most of the new
nations that emerged to sustain their economic and social development
once free of political control, and the rise of US hegemony without
conflict with Britain. Theories of 'neo-imperialism' or
underdevelopment were built that described a new world structure of
79economic imperialism. Its features can be related to Lenin's:
i) The continued concentration of capital has led to the extension 
of monopolies into transnational conglomerate corporations which 
have integrated their production processes and the distribution 
of multiple commodities on a world scale.
ii) The international centralisation of capital has been furthered 
by the creation of international financial institutions, such as 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World 
Bank).
iii) The export of capital has been followed by the export of
production. The developed, former imperial nations, where 
labour struggles have succeeded in raising real wages 
significantly, are being, at least relatively, de-industrialised 
while certain countries and zones in the periphery with lower
wages are attracting new investment.
iv) International monopolistic countries which share the world
market have become much more of a reality than when Lenin 
largely foreshadowed their importance.
v) The political division and alignment of the world has become
more complex than envisaged by Lenin. On one hand, US economic 
domination, backed by military clout and internal subversion, 
reaches further than the British empire ever did. US hegemony 
declined somewhat after 1965 in the face of combinations by 
European and oil producing countries, and in consequence of her 
military retreat from Vietnam. On the other hand, the giant 
transnational corporations are able to play nation states off
against each other, weakening their natural autonomy (including 
that of the US).
Radical theorists differ considerably in their assessment of the 
processes at work. Some emphasise trade (Frank and Wallerstein),
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seeing exchanges as unequal in terms of either use value (Prebisch) 
or labour content (Emmanuel); some emphasise the role of merchant 
capital (Kay); some emphasise production and the new international 
division of labour (FrcSbel). Others have endeavoured to construct 
more complex models. Wright, for example, has described the 
historical transformations of capitalism in terms of the logic of 
Marx's economic model and his own elaboration of modes of determin- 
ation mentioned earlier. Mandel has adopted six variables in
constructing his economic model and introduced further technical and
Q 1social features to explain the development of capitalism.
In spite of such improvements, we need to bear in the mind the 
limitations of the models of the world structure that radicals have 
constructed. Firstly, their ascription of conflict to economy and 
class appears to seriously underestimate ideological, nationalistic 
and strategic factors which the pluralist perspective (taken by the 
modernisers) handles with considerably more ease . Secondly, while 
all such models are limited to describing regularities, world history 
can contain events which seem unpatterned or at least unexpected.
STRUCTURAL CHANGE WITHIN CAPITALISM
We will now elaborate the theoretical advance made by Gibson and 
her co-workers that enables structural change within capitalism to be 
analysed in a manner comparable to the analysis of the articulations 
between pre-capitalist and capitalist modes. Gibson's advance was to 
define a level of abstraction and analysis between that of the mode 
of production, as defined by Marx, and the concrete social 
formation. The identification of structural variants at the 
intermediate level provides a means of projecting Marx's model down 
to a level that is more historically specific. Coherence between 
levels of abstraction was maintained by using the key features of 
Marx's model (inter-class and intra-class relationships) to 
discriminate between variants. Gibson defines each variant, or sub­
mode, as a structure having a particular connection between:
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a) Capital-labour relations. In each sub-mode qualitatively
different mechanisms of coercion and control are used to produce 
and extract value from labour.
b) Capital-capital relations. In each sub-mode, surplus value 
traces a different path through the economy and is accumulated
Q Qas capital at different points.
With these criteria, Gibson has recognised three variants of the 
capitalist mode of production: the competitive, monopoly and global
sub-modes of production. These have the following characteristics:
Competitive sub-mode of production
The operation of competitive capitalism in its classic form is 
well known. Virtually the whole of the labour force is able to 
be grossly exploited by numerous small capitalists because of 
the large size of the reserve army of labour. Capitalists 
compete fiercely with each other in a free market. Prices and 
wages are forced down, and capital is accumulated by successful 
competitors on a localised basis.
Monopoly sub-mode of production
Capitalists operating in the monopoly sub-mode are able to 
profit both from employing labour, much as competitive 
capitalists do, from raising prices in the monopolised market, 
and often from depressing prices paid to dependent suppliers. 
They accumulate capital both from the direct exploitation of 
labour and from unequal exchanges with the competitive sub­
mode. Labour within the monopoly sub-mode is often able to win 
better wages and conditions than in the competitive sub-mode. 
The labour force is generally more structured and organised, and 
the reserve army of labour tends to bear primarily on the lowest 
levels•
Global sub-mode of production
Production in the global sub-mode is organised on an inter­
national basis with capitalists distributing their factories
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wherever resources/ labour costs and governments favour them. 
Capital is highly mobile and able to play one site, state or 
sector off against another. By threatening or moving production 
across the globe the reserve army of labour is internationalised 
and pressure from it can be applied remotely. Capital is 
accumulated as in the other sub-modes and through a maze of 
financial transfers that effect unequal exchanges of use or 
labour values across the globe. (A reservation must be added to 
Gibson's use of 'global' to describe this sub-mode/ as 
production in Russia, China and other communist countries is at 
present largely outside the capitalist world-system).
Gibson has recognised three further structures that have operated in
Australia:
Aboriginal pre-capitalist mode of production
Production in Tasmanian Aboriginal society was based on hunting 
and gathering the means of subsistence and did not generate a 
surplus that could be accumulated. Classes did not exist. 
Labour was divided by sex. Land, the prime factor in 
production, was divided into territories shared by all members 
of a tribe. There was no overall social structure that 
coordinated the tribes.
Prison farm mode of production
Production in the first European settlements was directly 
organised by the state. The means of production - land, tools, 
seeds and animals - were owned by the state, the labour was 
directed by the state, and the products were distributed to 
warders and convicts by the state. Capital was accumulated but 
not realised as cleared land and infrastructure. This mode of 
production was retained as a punishment, and applied to cutting 
timber in Tasmania.
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Small business mode of production
In the small business, or petit-bourgeois, mode small
capitalists not only own but participate directly in their 
businesses. Labour comes from the owners, and typically their 
families, sometimes aided by a few wage workers who may be only 
casually or intermittently employed. Farming,.shopkeeping and a 
host of small milling, manufacturing, transport, contracting and 
other small businesses have been conducted in the small business 
mode. They accumulate capital from saving, trading, and 
employing, but their ability to do so is strictly limited by 
their small scale, their often dependent position both as 
purchasers and sellers, and because lacking reserves they are 
forced to borrow, particularly against seasonal or market 
fluctuations.
A given society at any particular time may contain more than one 
of the structures defined by Gibson, each characterised by its own 
set of relations. Thus the Tasmanian wood industries in 1982 contain 
a dominant monopoly sub-mode, an associated global sub-mode, a partly 
subordinated competitive sub-mode, and a dependent small business 
mode.
With the aid of Gibson's scheme we can attempt to unpack the 
development processes, and to examine them in detail as interactions 
between the sets of relationships that define each structure. Gibson 
has not explored the superstructural ramifications of such changes 
but has pointed to them as matters for further examination. In this 
study we shall be particularly concerned to trace the inter­
connections between the state and changes in the structures of 
production.
THE STATE
We will now consider the third component of the theoretical 
framework needed in this study - radical theories of the capitalist
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state. Recent reviews have classified radical theories into several
85schools, each of which we will consider:
Class Instrument
One school has followed Marx's basic insight and investigated 
the manner by which the capitalist state is used as an instrument by 
the bourgeoisie to advance their class interests. The personal 
links by which power is exercised between capitalist and state 
institutions have been investigated in detail and the work has 
usefully revealed differences and conflicts between different 
fractions of capital. The limitations of this approach are
severe. It does not account for the increasing separation between 
capitalists and politicians that became particularly marked in 
Australia during the twentieth century for example, nor does it 
theorise change processes.
Class and Cultural Structure
Although strong instrumental linkages often exist they are not 
necessary or sufficient conditions to explain what is an objective 
relationship between the bourgeoisie and the capitalist state. The 
'structuralist' school has analysed the function and operation of the 
state in relation to the class structure.
Poulantzas has elaborated this approach, with detailed
descriptions of the class fractions in contemporary society and the
role of the state in mediating inter-class or intra-class 
ft 6relationships. For this he sees the apparent autonomy of the
87state as functional to maintain the cohesion of the state. 
Poulantzas incorporates the notion of cultural and political hegemony 
developed by Gramsci (mentioned earlier) into his work.
Analyses of class and cultural structures are insufficient on 
their own and need to be informed by economic analyses to provide the 
dynamic element of change essential in Marxist models.
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Capital logic
The increasing direct involvement of the state in economic as 
distinct from p o t'it 'icd l activities (analysed by instrumentalists and 
class structuralists) has led to analyses of the state as a 
functional part of the accumulation process. Theorists within the 
'capital logic' school intepret the activities of the state as those 
of the 'ideal collective capitalist'.
Appearing almost as the obverse of analyses of class structure, 
analyses of the state in terms solely of meeting the logical needs 
for capital accumulation need to be informed by analyses of class 
relations.
Dynamic relationships
More recent theoretical work has provided more dynamic models 
which consider interactions between the economy, class relationships 
and the state.
O'Connor has analysed the budgetry crises encountered by the
contemporary state as it pursues the incompatible functions of
assuring the conditions for accumulation and providing the general
welfare that ensures social harmony and legitimates capitalism. With
examples from Australian conditions, Butler has claimed that such a
theory needs to be expanded to consider transfers between different
88fractions of capital. Offe has clarified the structural features
of the state, along similar lines to O'Connor in the following
. 89terms:
- The state is excluded from direct accumulation and allocation of 
private capital.
The state depends on revenues from the private sector that is 
outside its control.
The state is required to ensure that the conditions for accumul­
ation are maintained.
The state has to juggle the needs of private capital accumul­
ation, the maintenance of its own revenues and existence, with 
the need to maintain popular support.
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The resulting complex network of interactions between the structure
and policies of the state, relationships between classes and the
economic structure, has been defined in terms of a detailed system by
90Wright and others.
In spite of their differences, we can regard these various 
schools of theory as providing complementary and cumulative insights 
into what are very complex relationships, and we can conclude, with 
Corrigan, that all state forms under capitalism are constituted 
through continuing conflicts, struggles and contradictions, despite 
their seeming natural and civilised status above society.^
In Tasmania, the state is especially important to the wood 
industries, for it controls and manages two-thirds of the forests 
which the capitalist industries exploit.
FORESTRY
In turning to forestry, we will consider matters that are
particular to producing wood, and the theoretical perspectives that 
have been taken, by those who study such matters, on development.
Histories of forestry - as the organised, purposive, and
rational management of forests - bring out themes common to many
countries. Forests were destroyed by clearing for agriculture,
fire, overgrazing and logging from ancient times; that is, in more 
than one mode of production. In Europe, the rate of destruction 
accelerated markedly with industrial expansion in the seventeenth 
century as ever-more fuelwood was consumed by iron foundries and 
glass works. Deforestation led to shortages of what was a key energy 
resource, and of strategic supplies of ships' masts and timbers. In 
mountain catchments it led to avalanches, erosion, flooding and 
drought which damaged settled areas. Deforestation was typically 
countered through state legislation, reservation of forest land, and 
the regeneration of despoiled areas. More recently, the state has 
undertaken not only to reserve and manage existing forests, but to
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expand the production of industrial wood by establishing plantat­
ions. (Many other themes arise, such as the supply of timber to home 
and farm, or conservation and aesthetic values, but they are not of 
direct concern to the industrial focus of this study).
Crops of trees differ from agricultural ones because of the very 
long time - ranging from 20 to 200 years - that they take to grow, 
and because several commodities, services and intangible benefits are 
produced jointly from any one area. A particular stand of timber in 
Tasmania, for example, might now yield: logs for a plymill, logs for 
a sawmill and wood for a Japanese or Australian pulpmill - all used 
in different structures of production - as well as such non-commodity 
values as recreation, conservation, scenery and water supply.
Forestry serves productive, reproductive and integrative 
functions for industry which take on particular meanings as state 
activities under capitalism. By providing infrastructure,
information and other services, the state legitimates and facilitates 
exploitation of the resource and hence the production of commodities 
and capital. By renewing or expanding the resource, the state 
ensures that the long-term reproduction and expansion of industry and 
capital are possible. By mediating disputes and planning allocation 
of the crop between users to attain complementary benefits, the state 
facilitates the integration of different capitals. Particular 
activities often serve more than one function. For example, building 
a forest road commonly provides access to the resource (productive), 
access to regenerate and to protect cut-over areas (reproductive), 
and its costs may be spread between users (integrative).
The surge of development studies after the Second World War was
reflected in a number of forestry studies in the 1960's, all
conducted under modernisation theory. Johnston, Grayson and
Bradley's text on forest planning introduced concepts of welfare
9 3economics to the British forestry scene. On the international
level, capital investments in plantations to supply industrial raw
materials were advocated as part of the industrialisation package for
94underdeveloped countries. In a guide to preparing forestry
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proposals for the World Bank, Watt did consider adding some social
95issues to the conventional capital budgeting approach. On the
whole, these studies were firmly in the modernisation camp. (Note 
though that the advantages of foresting denuded catchments and other 
environmental matters were also raised that are not so readily 
categorised into the two theoretical camps considered here). 
Disillusionment with the modernisation policies of industrial 
development appears to be reflected in the increased interest in 
village level rural development and the fuelwood projects in under­
developed countries reported recently in the international
literature, but as mentioned earlier, any analysis or critique of the
96sector from the radical camp has been almost totally absent.
It is the thesis of this work that modernisation theory does not 
provide the only way to analyse the wood industries and forestry 
sector; radical theories, three of which we have elaborated, provide 
a rational and effectual alternative. This will now be demonstrated 
in the case of Tasmania.
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Chapter 2
TIMBER PRODUCTION IN THE PRISON FARM
Van Diemen's land is an island of considerable extent, situated 
between the parallels of 40 and 44 degrees south latitude, and 
145 and 149 degrees east longitude. It is divided from New
Holland by a channel, about 100 miles [150 km] in width, called
Bass's Strait, and contains a chain of numerous small islands 
running north and south.
The coasts on every side, present Capes, Headlands, and 
Points; and there is not perhaps in the world any island of the 
same size that can boast so many fine harbours as Van Diemen's 
Land.
The surface of Van Diemen's Land is richly variegated and 
diversified by ranges of moderate hills and broad valleys,
presenting the most agreeable scenes, and replete with whatever 
rich soil and fine climate can produce. The hills, the ridges 
of which form irregular circles, are for the greater part 
wooded; and from their summits are to be seen levels of good
pasture land, thinly interspersed with trees, the grass growing 
most luxuriantly.^
So did the surveyor, George Evans, describe the setting of the 
island in 1822 catching both its isolation and the richness of 
nature. While Evans' eye was drawn to the natural pastures, earlier 
navigators had not failed to notice the fine trees growing almost to
the waters edge, and later prospectors were to find minerals in 
2abundance. Prior to European settlement, there were probably about
34,000 Aborigines in Van Diemen's Land. Their static society had
made negligible impact on its resources although their repeated 
burning was largely responsible for the grassy openness upon which 
Evans so remarked.^ By contrast, the small groups of Europeans that 
landed in 1803-04 increased and expanded rapidly across Van Diemen's 
Land. They destroyed the Aboriginal society, made spectacular 
changes to land and forest, and restlessly developed their society 
from a simple prison farm into a complex and highly productive 
industrialised society of some 400,000 people. In this study, we 
will examine one sector of that development.
In this chapter, we will consider first the rise of competitive 
industrial capitalism in Britain and the forces that led to the
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invasion of Australia and the settlement of Van Diemen's Land as a 
penal colony. Then we will consider the first structure by which 
timber was produced - the prison farm mode - and its articulations 
with the nascent structure of competitive capitalism.
BRITAIN
The time of Tasman marked the end of the long crisis of 
feudalism during which a European world economy had been built, and 
the start of a stage of consolidation in which the major powers
struggled to carve it into commercial empires. By the time of Cook 
Britain had emerged as the dominant economic power, and in spite of 
losing her American colonies (1776) had clearly surpassed the Dutch 
and Spanish and was to defeat Napoleon's challenge (1796-1815) to her 
hegemony.
The capital accumulated in Britain by domestic production, world 
trade and plunder was applied to the increase of further capital by 
adopting the capitalist mode of production in both agriculture and 
manufacturing. In agriculture, the ancient systems of peasant
farming were replaced by new crops, marling, draining and the 
rotational system of arable farming, while rough grazing on common
land was replaced by improved pastures and better breeds of stock. 
These changes were effected in part by enclosing much of the common 
land which displaced the cottagers who used it and formed them into a
rural proletariat. In manufacturing, the changes in the methods and
organisation of production were so rapid that the 1780's have been
7termed the start of the 'Industrial Revolution'. The work of
individual craftsmen, local workshops and small mills, organised in 
domestic, guild and other small-scale relations of production, was 
superseded by factories with more mechanised methods and capitalistic
Qrelations. The pattern of trade changed too, as more raw materials, 
food and timber were imported and more manufactures, such as cloth 
and paper, were exported. While the development of the textile 
industry is well known, change proceeded differently in other
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industries, and it is relevant here to consider the production of 
paper and sawn timber.
Paper making
European paper-making during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries was a skilled craft process organised in small mills. 
Only the maceration of the cotton rags used as raw material into pulp 
by water-powered stamping could be mechanised, and the actual
formation and drying of the paper was a manual process in which each
gsheet was separately made by a team of craftsmen. In Tasman's time, 
England only used an equivalent of about 0.1 kg per person each year, 
but by Cook's time a larger and more literate population used the 
equivalent of 1.1 kg each.^ Until about 1670, Britain had imported 
almost all her paper requirements, but then rapidly built up her own 
industry to have some 200 mills employing some 3 000 workers by 1720, 
and 450 mills producing a surplus for export by 1800.^ Although 
some companies were formed to own or lease a number of mills, the
industry was dominated by small-scale partnerships and family 
businesses.
The hand process of paper-making was superseded by the 
Fourdrinier machine which formed paper into rolls by a continuous 
process. The quantity made by machine increased rapidly from its 
first commercial production in 1806, to surpass the quantity made by 
hand only 18 years later, and to make up 95% of the production by 
1860. The transition from skilled craft production to industrial 
production occurred within a rapidly expanding market so that a large 
number of separate and competitive owners survived with only a small 
reduction in the total number of mills. Although the numbers 
employed were still relatively small (an average of 35 per mill in 
1851 compared to about 15 a century before) the composition of the
workforce was changed as skilled adult male craftsmen were partly
13replaced by cheaper unskilled women and boys.
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Sawn timber
Unlike paper making, manual and mechanised methods of sawing
timber coexisted for centuries. In the manual method of pit-sawing,
logs were cut up by a pair of sawyers - one standing atop the log,
the other in a pit beneath - using a long blade saw. Pit-sawing was
mechanised simply by setting the familiar hand tool in a
reciprocating frame through which the logs were guided, first by hand
and later automatically.14 Sawmills were developed in Europe from
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, made largely of wood and
powered by men, animals, wind or water. They required considerable
power to drive their thick sawblades through logs, but only limited
15and fluctuating power could be obtained from natural sources. 
Productivity was raised only when greater power from steam engines or 
bigger and better designed water wheels and turbines were applied. 
Then the process was multiplied by setting several saw blades in one 
frame or by installing several sawing machines in one mill. It was 
also speeded up, a change which required the frame guides, power 
transmission, feed mechanism, log carriages and rails to be made of 
iron. Thinner saw blades were made from improved steel and circular 
saws, large enough for timber, were made by Brunei in 1805-08 and in 
the United States in 1814-20.^
In Britain, sawmilling was resisted by the guilds and was still
17difficult to introduce in the eighteenth century. Even so,
Britain's rapidly expanding urban and strategic needs could not be
met from domestic timber resources so that timber was imported. The
supplying regions had markedly different production methods. In the
Baltic, timber was produced manually or in small primitive
sawmills. By contrast, sawmills were in general use in North America
throughout the eighteenth century and by its end a steam-driven mill
18in the United States was already sawing 7 cubic metres a day. 
Population, urbanisation and class struggle
The population of England and Wales increased from about 6.3 
million in 1750 to 8.9 million by 1801, and then doubled to 17.9
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million by 1851 as a result of an increase in the birthrate, a
decrease in the death rate, and to a smaller extent the immigration
19of over one-half million Scots and Irish. The new mode of
agricultural production could not absorb the large surplus in the
rural population so that wages for the employed rural labour became
very low, while conditions for the unemployed landless labourers
became desperate. Large numbers migrated to the cities. Whereas
Britain had been predominantly rural in the time of Tasman, by the
1780's the population of London - the largest city in the world - had
already reached about one million, and the industrial cities of the
north were growing fast. Employment in the new factories was
insufficient to absorb the redundant workers from craft and domestic
production, as well as the natural increase in the urban population
and the migration from the countryside. With extensive
unemployment, conditions for those employed were grim, and in spite
of the work of reformers and some legislation, little improvement was
oneffected before the 1840's.
The ruling classes of Britain only achieved structural change by 
exercising their legislative, judicial and military powers against 
the mass of the people. As the tempo of change increased and 
conditions for the majority worsened, so were objections repressed 
with increased severity and ancient civil rights suspended. The 
condition of the agricultural and industrial working classes became 
desperate after Waterloo (1815); unemployment was swelled by a 
quarter of a million discharged soldiers and sailors and by continual 
Irish immigration; the price of wheat was high due to tariffs and 
poor harvests; farmers fed their labourers three loaves a week to 
yield the labour that could not be nourished from their wages; 
poverty was endemic. Agricultural and urban riots were widespread
in 1816-17, as they had been around 1795, and were harshly suppressed 
by the Coercion Acts of 1817 that extinguished the rights of habeas 
corpus, political association and public assembly, prohibited
societies for relief and reform, and crushed societies of
22agricultural workers.
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The composition of the ruling classes was changed by the rise of 
capitalism. In the seventeenth century/ the ruling classes were
made up of the large often aristocratic landowners, the gentry and 
the merchants. The benefits of power such as official, naval and 
military positions were arranged very much by patronage and the 
advantages of trade for entities like the East India Company were 
secured by monopolies and charters. The electoral franchise was 
restricted to property owners, but even so during the eighteenth 
century electoral boundaries became so obsolete and voting practices 
so corrupt that Parliamentary representation was largely controlled 
by a few individuals. These traditional arrangements inhibited the 
expansion of capitalism, which needed ready access to raw materials 
and markets, cheap food for its workers, efficient administration and 
honest government, and greater recognition of its urban interests.
As the nineteenth century progressed the new interests of urban
23industrial capital gradually prevailed on all these issues.
The rise of capitalism in Britain was violent, not only in terms 
of a legal and economic assault against the proletariat it created, 
but also criminally and individually. The mass population, often 
unemployed, existed in poverty in both country and town. 
Contemporary observers dwelt on the symptoms of ignorance, disease, 
drunkeness and violence, and the crimes and offences against the law 
that ’bred’ in the slums of the cities. Offences against property, 
particularly larcenies, were very common; many of the offenders were 
both juvenile and habitual. The British courts provided the
mechanism of social control, and the law - possibly the most savage 
legal code in Europe - was applied extensively.
AUSTRALIA
The problem of disposing of the many convicted became a pressing 
one for Britain after the American colonies declared their independ­
ence ( 1776) and ceased to be a dump to which convicts could be 
transported. Nova Scotia, Quebec and West Africa were tried or
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surveyed as alternatives but considered unsuitable; Australia 
provided a remote solution to a pressing problem.
The founding of a settlement in Australia presented several 
other possible advantages to Britain: a secure base of benefit to
the trade with China; the opportunity to deny the continent to France 
or Holland; and resources of flax and timber on Norfolk Island. 
Although there has been considerable debate about which advantage was 
the most important, it is enough to observe that the combination was 
sufficient in the eyes of the British government of the day.24
The importance of the timber objective requires some elaboration 
here. Britain's security and position in the world economy depended 
on her navy. Timber for ship construction, masts and spars, as well 
as flax for sails and rigging were continuously required as their 
service life was short due to decay, loss in action and storms, and 
in the case of masts to increasing brittleness with ageing. There 
was a desperate shortage of mast timber following the loss of the 
American colonies and the partial closure of the Baltic by Napoleon, 
and particularly so from 1803 when Napoleon assembled his army for
the invasion of Britain. Britain's needs for these strategic
25supplies strongly influenced her internal and foreign policies. 
Britain searched the world for supplies, but if she had held out any
appreciable hope for flax and timber from the Australian colonies,
inefficiencies and diverse practical difficulties were allowed to 
intervene. For example, Foveaux was able to plead shortage of labour 
as an excuse in 1808 for not completing an order for ships timbers 
sent from the Admiralty in 1802! As it seems that the Admiralty only 
wanted the timbers if they could be sent at reduced freight in ships 
returning empty, the timber supply advantage of the Australian
settlement was hardly taken as of major or pressing importance at 
either end.2^
The penal colony was established in New South Wales in 1788. 
It struggled to clear the land, grow food for itself and raise 
stock. Against the most unlikely odds, with inadequate tools and 
the most ill-assorted skills and people, it became self-sufficient,
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built shelter, expanded and increased. The officers and officials 
who comprised the ruling class turned every opportunity to personal 
advantage, accumulated capital by trading, and land by favour and 
dealing. Expeditions and voyages were sent out to explore; Bass and 
Flinders discovered for the British that Van Diemen's land was an 
island. The French too sailed south, both D'Entrecasteux (1793) and 
Baudin (1802) landing in Van Diemen's Land. The latter's arrival in 
Sydney harbour prompted Governor King to make sure that Britain's 
claim to the island was established by settlement.
EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT OF VAN DIEMEN'S LAND
The possibility of the French claiming Van Diemen's Land 
certainly triggered the settlement, but the same mixture of penal 
with other objectives applied as in the founding of New South Wales, 
and the resources of timber were still considered. In a despatch to 
London, Governor King explained:
My reasons for making this settlement are: the necessity there
appears of preventing the French gaining a footing on the East
side of these islands; to divide the convicts; to secure another
place for procuring timber with any other natural production
that may be discovered and found useful; the advantage that may2 7be obtained by raising grain; and to promote a seal fishery.
King placed Lieutenant Bowen in charge and instructed him: firstly,
to clear the land, cultivate the soil and sow the seeds he was given; 
secondly to survey the opportunities for the production of wheat, 
barley, flax and cotton; and thirdly:
You will also inform me whether the general timber of the
country is fit for the purposes of being sent to England for the
construction of the King's ships, particularizing as far as you
are able, the different species, length of trunk and diameter;
also whether it grows mostly crooked or strait, and notice the28facility of getting on board ships.
Three settlements were made in Van Diemen's Land in 1803-4. 
Firstly, a small group (40 soldiers, 63 convicts and 3 free settlers) 
under Lt Bowen landed on the banks of the Derwent River in September
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1803. Secondly, a large party under Col Collins (66 officials and 
marines, 281 convicts, 13 free settlers and 73 women and children), 
which had come from Britain and unsuccessfully attempted a settlement 
at BDrt Phillip, arrived on the Derwent in February 1804. Thirdly, 
Lt-Col Patterson was sent from Port Jackson with a small party (72 
soldiers and officials and 74 convicts) to found an independent 
settlement at Port Dalrymple on the Tamar, and landed there in 
November 1804.
These tiny groups of Europeans broke the isolation of the island 
for ever. Their presence was the outcome of remote changes,
intimately part of the rise of capitalism within Britain and of the 
competition between European nations for dominance of the world 
economy. Divided by class and status, soldier and settler, rich and 
poor, bond and free, they carried the capitalist world-economy to its 
furthest point.
The new settlements organised the production of their food and 
shelter in two structures - the prison farm mode and the small 
business mode. In the former, the state organised the production of 
food, timber and other necessities by providing the means of 
production - land, tools, seeds and animals - and forcibly extracting 
labour from the convicts. In the latter, the state also provided 
land and assigned convicts to labour for the settlers. Initially, 
the state also granted or loaned some of the means of production and 
provided rations to the settlers until they could support themselves.
The struggle for survival was acute in the first six years due 
not only to the difficulty of the task but also to the ineptitude of 
the initial planning and the failure of subsequent supply. The 
materials with which Collins had been outfitted in Britain were 
hopeless for the task; the axes bent; the iron was poor; the seeds 
were dead; even much of his ammunition was the wrong size for his 
rifles. Most of his convicts were labourers and few had agricult­
ural skills; those with trades were mostly inappropriate and several
were infirm. Bowen's party was so useless in fact that Collins sent
29them back to Sydney.
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In spite of all, some land was cleared and crops sown with
viable seed. Food production was organised by the prison-farm mode
on a government farm and supplemented by the small business mode on
the farms of the few free settlers. Until farming could make the
settlements self-sufficient they were dependent on supplies from
elsewhere, which never arrived in sufficient quantities. The
shortage of food became so desperate in 1806 that half the seed grain
had to be eaten, and the convicts were so weakened by reduced rations
3 1that their working day was reduced to three hours.
The independent settlers were granted land, assigned convict 
labour and temporarily provided with rations from the government 
stores - the Commissariat - until they could bring their land into
production. By 1807 some of these farms had surplus grain but not
32enough to relieve the shortage.
The shortage was aggravated in 1807-08 when 554 people,
including 329 women and children, were sent from Norfolk Island to
the Derwent, which effectively doubled the settlement but did little
33to increase its resources. Most of the men were ex-convicts who 
were granted 12-20 hectares of land each on which to secure their 
subsistence. A few succeeded, many bartered their land for rum.^
The failure of the prison farm mode of production to produce
enough food led to changes in the methods and relations of production
and in the administration of the state. Kangaroos were plentiful and
could be hunted successfully by those with dogs who had acquired
skills in the bush. The Commissariat purchased kangaroo meat first
in an attempt to counter scurvy and subsequently to provide a 
35ration. Many of the convicts hunted for their own subsistence and
some produced a surplus which they were not allowed to sell directly
to the Commissariat. West records that:-
The officers allowed servants, sent them to the woods, and sold 
their spoil to the government. Considerable profits were made 
by the more successful: the Commissariat allowed 1s 6d per 
lb. [$0.07 per kg], and the foundations of some fortunes were 
laid by persons whose servants were faithful and expert. A 
marine assisted by two convicts, delivered 1 000 lbs [454 kg] of 
kangaroo meat per month, and continued in this occupation for 
several years. b
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It is not clear how the labour of these convicts was extracted - by 
coercion or reward - but it is clear that a considerable part of the 
value accrued not to them but to individuals of the official ruling 
class who accumulated it as money capital.
The food shortages were overcome within five years and convict 
discipline eventually restored, yet this brief episode shows several 
features of the linkages between the convict system and the origins 
of local capitalism:
Labour was not very productive in the prison-farm mode.
Labour could create surplus values in the small business mode.
The Commissariat enabled surplus values to be realised as money 
which could be accumulated within Van Diemen's Land by those who 
had command over labour.
- The relations between the convicts and their rulers altered and
some of the convict hunters acquired skills in bush living
which, it was said '... laid the foundation of those lawless
habits [bush-ranging] which afterwards brought the colony to the 
37verge of ruin...'
All these features bore on the production of timber within the 
convict system.
TIMBER USE AND PRODUCTION METHODS
Wood was a major raw material for the colony for most of the 
nineteenth century. Shelter for the initial settlements was
provided in simple huts of bush poles with wattle and daub walls and 
thatched or shingle roofs. Although sawn timber and brick
production were early convict activities, housing remained simple so 
that by 1851 half the houses in the colony were still wooden. At 
least until the 1880's wood was the main fuel not only for domestic 
heating and cooking, but for almost the entire range of colonial
*50production. Wooden shipbuilding started in 1813 and flourished by
supplying excellent whaling boats, later small colonial sailing
39vessels, and eventually ships that could be sailed to Britain.
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Wooden barrels were made to export whale oil, and boxes were made to 
package fruit, jams and vegetables.
In the rural economy, wood provided fencing, gates, yards, huts, 
sheds, bridges and even slab roads. A considerable proportion of the 
rural labour must have been engaged in cutting and fashioning it, yet 
this was not the work described in the early records. We too will 
by-pass farm work and only consider timber produced for exchange or 
distant use.
The production process was primitive, as only hand tools were 
used to fell the trees, cut them into logs, and fashion the 
timber. Palings and shingles were split at the stump with wedges, 
mauls and drawn knives. For sawn timber, logs from three or four 
trees were manhandled, or sometimes snigged by a bullock to a sawpit 
where they were sawn by a pair of sawyers - one atop the log, one in 
the pit beneath. Beams and heavy timbers were hewn with broad axes 
at the stump.
Rough tracks were made over which the heavy 'green' timber was
carried by people or hauled on sleds or carts. Roads were few and
land cartage expensive, but the indented coast provided plenty of
points at which the timber could be loaded on to shallow-drafted 
40coastal vessels. Most timber was unloaded and stored in timber
yards in Hobart and Launceston where the flitches were resawn to 
required sizes.
THE PRISON FARM MODE OF TIMBER PRODUCTION
The prison farm mode of production was organised to meet five 
requirements of changing relative importance. Firstly, the state in 
Van Diemen's Land needed the products of the convicts' labour, 
initially to sustain and shelter the colony and later to build public 
works and the infrastructure for widespread production. Secondly, 
the state needed forms of secondary punishment (ie those imposed in 
addition to transportation) to control the convicts within Van
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Diemen's Land. Thirdly, the British ruling classes needed the
deterrent terror of transportation to maintain its control over
metropolitan society. Fourthly, Britain sought to reduce the cost
of keeping the convicts. Fifthly, the interplay of these
requirements was modified by the needs of the developing capitalist
mode of production within Van Diemen's Land.
At the start of the settlement, timber was needed for public
building. Saw pits, known as the King's Pits, were set up at the
source of Guy Fawkes Rivulet about five kilometres from the centre of
Hobart. ^  The timber was dragged on a rough cart by the 'Timber
Carriage Gang' to a timber yard in Hobart where it was stored and
resawn to smaller dimensions.^  Production was limited by the
number of sawyers and Collins reported in 1808 that:
I have sustained a great loss in this useful class of People by 
Desertions, which it was impossible to prevent, by Deaths, and 
by many having become free through having served their Terms of 
Transportation.^
He was forced by the shortage of convict labour to hire some free
wage-labourers to complete an urgently needed public store.
When the King's Pits site became exhausted in 1819, a new form
of organisation - the 'sawing station' - was developed. Sawing
stations were small outposts set up near stands of good timber, close 
to water for transport, and generally in isolated locations with some 
degree of natural imprisonment. Convicts appear to have been 
allocated to sawing stations if they were already skilled sawyers,
when they could not be assigned, or as one of the lesser forms of
punishment.
The first sawing station was set up in Northwest Bay on the
shores of D'Entrecasteaux Channel about 32 kilometres by water south
from Hobart. In 1820 it consisted of an emancipist overseer, seven
men and six to eight pairs of sawyers. The logs were almost
certainly dragged manually to the sawpits and the timber carried on
human backs to the beach. Large sawn pieces were taken to the
Hobart timber yard in the government brig, but were cut into smaller
44sizes if they were to be taken by boat. The work of resawing and
stacking the timber in the yard became the job of those in the Hobart 
Town goal.
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By 1826/ the main government sawing station was at Birch's Bay,
some 16 kilometres further south. It consisted of a Superintendent,
a free overseer, 30 sawyers, tradesmen to maintain the tools,
boatmen, labourers to haul logs and carry timber, and six signal men
45- 62 men altogether. At first, very solidly constructed pits were
built at the central site. No animals were employed and it took 
enormous effort to roll the logs by hand from where they were cut to 
the pits.^
This system soon cut out the timber round the settlement and a 
new system was devised. Rather than concentrate sawing at a central 
site, temporary lightly constructed pits were built. These could be 
made in 2-3 hours, near 3-6 trees that would last a pair of sawyers 
at least 3-4 weeks.
To work a bigger area with sawyers scattered through the bush 
raised the problems of transporting the sawn timber, security and 
supervision. Temporary jetties were required and cutting was kept 
within 1.6 kilometres of them. The task of manually carrying out 
the sawn timber was considerable and bullocks were introduced 
eventually - four were in use in 1828. To prevent timber lying in 
the bush or at the jetty from being stolen, the public was prohibited 
from going to Birch's Bay.^ However, unauthorised visits were made 
and the Superintendent reported boats which '. .. secretly bring the 
men supplies, which is a great temptation to send their timber 
surreptitiously away ...' The dispersion of the sawyers drastic­
ally increased the problems of supervision. Tb see that the men 
worked when out of sight, the Superintendent measured the timber cut 
at each pit. Even so '... something more than coercion [was a
necessity] to keep men in an orderly and industrious behaviour in so
remote a situation, so remote from inspection •••', and it was
4Qrecommended that the sawyers be put on task work.
Under the new system, a compulsory task, of 1.4 cubic metres for 
able hands and 1.1 for the less expert, was set each week after which 
the sawyers were allowed to produce a surplus to be bought by the 
Government. This was thought to give a substantial 'encouragement'
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and provide the potentially useful punishment of being able to ' . . .
turn men of bad habits out of the Sawing Gang ...' . It was thought
that it might also encourage labourers to train as sawyers and
possibly reveal some hidden talents as men were reluctant to admit to
being sawyers in case they were held in sawing stations instead of
50being assigned to settlers. The labourers were allowed to split
shingles on their own account during their free time on Saturday 
afternoons. Production records for 1827-1829 reveal that about one- 
third of the timber cut was on the men's own account (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1
Timber production Birch's Bay 1827-1829 51
Period Cut by men in Cut by men in their own time
Government time Quantity Proportion of total
(m 000) (m 000) (%)
1827 663 287 30
1828 560 317 36
1829 (6 months) 268 12 4
Total 1,491 616 29
Accounts for the settlement in 1828 appear to show a profit of
$225, but as an amount of $790 was credited to a mysterious
difference between measurements at Birch's Bay and Hobart Town, it
5 2seems more probable that the station ran at a loss. The loss
would have been far worse had not the government made a profit of 
$280 from the 'indulgence' of allowing the convicts to work on their 
own account, for it sold their wood at an 18-30% mark-up.
Sawing stations were set up at many different places and 
times. They varied from the small temporary camps that provided 
timber for local works to more substantial establishments. A
further example of the latter was the sawing station started at South 
Port in 1841. The Principal Superintendent of Convicts proposed an 
establishment consisting of 9 pairs of sawyers, 2 splitters, 16 
labourers, 2 tradesmen to maintain the tools, 2 ticket-of-leave men
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to manage the station and a free overseer. The site chosen was near 
good timber, fresh water and a police station. The Governor
approved the station and placed it under the inspection of the local 
police magistrate. It was then found difficult to recruit a
suitable overseer - a common colonial problem. The convicts at South 
Port were required to work set hours during the week but were 
permitted to work on Saturday afternoons on their own account. In 
the first cargo, the quality of the timber cut for the government was 
so bad that the overseer was threatened with dismissal and the 
convicts were prohibited from selling any more timber on their own 
account until they had replaced some bad joists. In the second 
cargo, the sawyers forwarded 61 cubic metres cut on the government 
account during the working week and 75 cubic metres cut on their own 
account - ostensibly on Saturday afternoons! Even allowing that
the sawyers worked longer hours for themselves than allowed and that 
the supervisor was lax, the productivity of labour in the free hours 
appears to have been several - perhaps 3 to 10 - times greater than 
that when coerced.
In essence the prison farm mode of production relied on
punishment and the threat of punishment to extract labour but, like
other systems of coerced labour, in general obtained only slow and 
55inefficient work.
The arrangements at Birch's Bay and South Port were not uncommon 
and many convicts were simultaneously prisoners and proletarians. 
This offered several advantages to the settlers and the state. In 
the early years of the colony, the government saved costs by leaving 
convicts to find their own shelter, either by building huts on town 
allotments or by purchasing it where they could. Many were forced 
into a market for their part-time labour, which was very quickly 
regulated by the state to lower what Collins described as an '. . .
unjust and enormous price for the work performed in their extra time
56. . . ' . Convicts supplied additional labour and skills in times of
shortage. Being recruited and sustained by the government, the
convict labour force did not have to bear the costs of its own 
reproduction. Its labour power could be purchased cheaply, which
58
was not only an advantage in itself but also a means of keeping down 
the wages of free labourers.
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE
Punishment within Van Diemen's Land functioned to extract labour 
from the convicts, maintain official control over colonial society, 
and provide the deterrent that the ruling class in Britain needed.
Maintaining the class structure of colonial society was a major 
part of the state's activity during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. At one extreme were a few wealthy landholders and
merchants, at the other the labouring majority of convicts, 
emancipists and free labourers, with a limited number of farmers, 
shopkeepers, artisans, and successful emancipists in between. 
Unrestricted free immigration did not start until 1816 and comprised 
less than one-third of the arrivals between 1820 and 1849. In 1820 
convicts under sentence comprised over half (54%) of the population,
and this proportion had fallen to only slightly under one-third (29%) 
57by 1851. Convicts, emancipists and those of convict origins thus
comprised a good three-quarters of the population for the entire 
period. The state controlled the conflicts inherent in this social 
structure through the imposition of punishments by the legal system.
Britain revised the policy for her Australian colonies
periodically. A major inquiry was conducted by Commissioner Bigge
who visited both New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land in 1819- 
581820. The primacy of the penal objective was clearly spelt out in
his instructions, yet had to be balanced by the costs, and these he
sought to reduce by decreasing the numbers of convicts employed on
59public works in favour of assignment. To maintain the deterrent
value of transportation, he recommended measures to increase 
punishment and decrease the economic and social opportunities of 
convicts after the expiry of their sentences. He recommended
strict discipline for assignees, harsh punishments for infringements, 
and new penal stations in which these could be applied with severity 
and efficiency.
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The only penal station to which convicts could be sent from Van 
Diemen's Land was at Newcastle in New South Wales. As the numbers of 
convicts increased rapidly after 1817, when Britain commenced sending 
convict ships direct to Van Diemen's Land, a more convenient penal 
station was sought. In Van Diemen's Land, three penal stations were 
operated:” Macquarie Harbour (1821-32), Maria Island (1825-32), and 
Port Arthur (1830-77), which had several outstations on Tasman's 
Peninsular. In each of these the heavy labour required to produce 
timber manually was incorporated into the regimen of punishment.
MACQUARIE HARBOUR
Macquarie Harbour, in the south-west of Van Diemen's Land,
became known to Europeans after the redoubtable seaman James Kelly
sailed there in 1815. He reported the extensive stands of Huon Pine
that grew to the waters edge, the isolated location and the narrow
6 1shallow entrance from the sea. Huon Pine was known to be a superb
ship-building timber, light enough to float and outstandingly durable
against marine decay. It was highly prized for building whale boats
and ships and was also ideal for furniture and joinery. Shipments
62of logs to Hobart commenced in 1816.
Macquarie Harbour was an attractive site for a penal station to
Governor Sorell. It was very remote and the only access through the
narrow channel from the sea could be easily guarded. It also
offered the opportunity of producing Huon Pine timber which Sorell
intended for use in Van Diemen's Land. He had to send a carefully
worded despatch to London to explain his purpose in this respect,
particularly in light of his inability to supply suitable timber to
61two naval supply vessels sent explicitly from Britain.
The first party of 110 soldiers and convicts was sent to 
Macquarie Harbour in 1821 and was increased in subsequent 
shipments. Between 200 and a little over 300 convicts were kept 
there until it closed in 1832.
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The convicts were treated with the most severe legal violence at 
best and barbarity at worst. They were subjected to constant hard 
labour on little rations and kept in terrible conditions. Logging 
and sawing provided most of the hard labour. The quaker, James 
Backhouse, visited Macquarie Harbour in 1832 and described the 
logging operations:
In order to get felled timber to the water, a way had to be 
cleared, and to be formed with logs and branches; over this 
straight trunks of trees were laid in the manner of slips or 
skids, used in the launching of ships. Upon these the timber 
was rolled by the prisoners sometimes to a great distance. 
These roads were termed Pine roads... Except sometimes as a 
punishment, the men were not in irons, for if they had been, 
they could not have performed their work.^
The logs were formed into rafts and floated down the Harbour to the
depot, and:
In this service, life was sometimes lost; and the miserable
workmen, diseased and weakened by hunger, while performing these 
tasks, often passed hours in the water.
Under the administration of Governor Arthur (1824-36), all the 
conditions and punishments by which the convicts were controlled and 
worked were revised, and welded into a comprehensive system of 
management, discipline and punishment. A hierarchy of progressive 
rewards for obedient behaviour and progressive punishments for 
disobedient behaviour was precisely defined and by careful recording 
and supervision was efficiently administered. Even in Macquarie
Harbour a hierarchy of occupations was established, some being taught 
the trades of shipbuilding, carpentry and shoe making, while others 
did the hard labour of logging, were flogged, or were confined 
solitarily.
Two very different views of the operation of Macquarie Harbour 
have been developed: that it was a commercial success with a perfect 
record for rehabilitation and reform, and that it was a barbarous 
example of man's inhumanity to man.
The Commandants saw the settlement as a place where many of the 
convicts were successfully reformed by hard labour, severe 
discipline, and from learning new skills. Certainly Arthur believed
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capacity and difficult access wrote in 1827 that I should never
think of recommending the abandonment of McQuarrie [sic] Harbour 
66... 1 Edwards has examined the extant production and revenue
figures and attempted to assess whether the claim to commercial 
success was valid. Although the data were very limited, Edwards 
considers that if the level of costs were fairly constant, then the 
settlement must have yielded a handsome profit, particularly so if 
the very conservative values given to sawn timber ($8.82 per cubic 
metre) are increased to more realistic values (say $28.20 per cubic 
metre).^
John West, clergyman and vigorous opponent of transportation,
took quite an opposite view in writing his history in 1853:-
The name of Macquarie Harbour is associated exclusively with 
remembrance of inexpressible depravity, degredation and 
woe... Sacred to the genius of torture, nature concurred with 
the objects of its separation from the rest of the world; to 
exhibit some notion of perfect misery. There man lost the
C Oaspect, and the heart of man!
The most telling evidence lies in the statistics. From 1822 to 1832 
with some 250-300 convicts kept at Macquarie Harbour, there were 85 
deaths of which 35 were tabulated as being from natural causes and 50 
occurred violently by drowning, accidents in felling timber, shooting 
or murder by other convicts. The punishment records show:
Table 2.2
69Punishment records for Macquarie Harbour 1826-31
Annual averages (numbers)
Period Prisoners Prisoners Lashes Days in solitary
held sentenced inflicted confinement
1826-28 312 218 6280 5
1829-31 255 56 973 209
The prisoners view is represented by the 112 who absconded even 
though death was known to be almost certain in the bush. Some were
recaptured, 62 perished in the bush, and 9 were eaten by their 
companions.
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Such was 
extremity of, 
system.
the manner in which timber was produced at the 
though still within and for the world capitalist
MARIA ISLAND
Governor Arthur expanded the punishment capacity of the convict
system by establishing a second penal station on Maria island off the
east coast in 1825. This station was more accessible but less
naturally secure than Macquarie Harbour, and the general level of
punishment was between that at the Hobart Town gaol and Macquarie
Harbour. Many farming and manufacturing activities as well as
70sawing and splitting were undertaken at Maria Island. The limited
financial evidence that Edwards was able to locate showed that Maria
71Island was more profitable than Macquarie Harbour.
PORT ARTHUR
In December 1827, Stewarts Bay on Tasman Peninsular was explored
and its sheltered anchorage and good stands of timber reported to
Governor Arthur. A fortnight later, two of the sawpits at Birch's
72Bay were destroyed by fire. With the advance of settlement
southwards, the visits of unauthorised boats, and the dispersed
method of cutting that had been adopted there, this station was
losing its natural security, and an urgent survey was made of
Stewarts Bay, renamed Port Arthur, as an alternative site. It was
decided to commence a third penal station and instructions were
issued to move the Birch's Bay sawing station. These were
73implemented in 1830. As the cost of maintaining three separate
penal stations was of obvious concern, and possibly as the entrance 
to Macquarie Harbour may have become more difficult to negotiate (due 
to shifting sand bars), Arthur decided to concentrate his punishment 
facilities and transferred both the Macquarie Harbour and Maria
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Island stations to Port Arthur in 1832. Port Arthur was by far the 
largest and longest-lasting of the three penal stations, not being 
closed until 1877. It was here that the system of punishment was 
refined and bureaucratised to ensure its perfect application. 
Minutely detailed regulations governed every activity and were 
enforced without remit or partiality. Dispassionate efficiency and 
severity replaced the sometimes haphazard and autocratic application 
of punishment in the other stations and '. .. carried the vengeance of 
the law to the limits of human endurance ...'^
Timber production was an essential occupation at Port Arthur. 
The logs were cut in the bush and carried along the shore to be sawn
at the settlement. The mode of logging was described by a visitor
in 1837:
The system formerly observed at Macquarie Harbour and Maria 
Island is still continued here, both as a matter of conveyance 
and one of the most severe duties the prisoner is put to 
perform, the carrying of large logs from the interior and almost 
impassible parts of the woods to the beach and again landing and 
transporting them through the water to the dry ground and dock 
yard. In this way we saw a gang of thirty men stoop down with
the overseer at the head and shoulder a log many tons in weight
until they carried it to its destination.... Self preservation 
compels every one to do his best to support the immense weight, 
which, notwithstanding, he must be strongly impressed within 
himself would crush him at once to death, whatever his efforts 
might be unless his companions in like manner did their part. 
This is considered the most severe labour on the settlement and 
every offender who is sent to it, be his offence what it may, is 
subject to it for some time as a preliminary ordeal which he 
must of necessity go through. It has a wonderful effect in 
subduing refactory and turbulent spirits and is much dreaded by 
all.75
The sale of the timber produced was an important means of 
offsetting the costs of the penal station. To maintain the
punishment of carrying the logs, no animals were used in snigging, 
but to improve sawing production and concentrate the scattered 
sawyers, a second-hand sawmill was purchased in 1835. It had
originally been constructed for horses but had ironwork added for
water power. The saw was a circular one. It is uncertain whether 
this equipment was ever successfully operated at Port Arthur. Hand 
sawing was certainly continued and the annual return for 1846, for
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example, reports that: '...a considerable number of the convicts are
engaged in procuring timber for the sawyers, of whom about 30 pairs
76are generally employed. 1 It was not until 1864 that a substantial
sawmill with vertical and circular saws was constructed at the main
settlement and bullocks provided for snigging. At that date the
numbers of convicts at Port Arthur were declining and ageing, the
7 7last convict transports having arrived ten years before.
The timber was distributed in part for use at Port Arthur, in
part for colonial public works, and in part for sale to reduce the
78cost of running the prison.
CAPITALISM AND THE PRISON FARM MODE
In this chapter, we have seen how timber was first produced in 
Van Diemen's Land. From the world-historic perspective, this 
regional development was a functional part of the rise of competitive 
capitalism and Britain's struggle for hegemony. It was part of the 
development of a new stage whose salient features were 
industrialisation, urbanisation, the creation of a proletariat and so 
forth.
Although the major determinants of development in Van Diemen's 
Land operated at a world-scale, we have had to recognise the specific 
relations of production that operated in the prison farm mode in 
order to study timber production. Notably, the features of this 
regional structure were not those that characterised the new stage on 
a world-scale.
Timber was cut in the sawing and punishment stations in ways 
which contributed to the primary accumulation of infrastructure and 
money capital in Van Diemen's Land. This even extended to 
permitting the convicts to become part-time proletarians. We saw 
that a three-way articulation resulted between Britain, characterised 
by ascendant capitalism, prison farm production in Van Diemen's Land, 
and the emerging structures of colonial capitalism. Prison farm
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production was not an efficient organisation for local production. 
Hence/ we can observe that development within Van Diemen's Land was 
partially inhibited by its articulation with Britain.
The state functioned most obviously for social repression in
Britain and the coercion of labour in the colony/ in ways that can be
explained in terms of the theory that the state acts as the
instrument of the ruling class. It also functioned to support the
accumulation of capital within Van Diemen's Land by supplying part of
the means of production and labour. The operation of the state's
Commissariat was critical to the realisation of capital in the early
stages of settlement. Such actions are more readily explained in
terms of the theory that the state acts to meet the logical needs of
capital. Overall the convict system never became self-sufficient
and continuous expenditure by Britain was an important source of
79capital inflow. As we have seen, the operations of the state
changed from time to time according to shifts in the links between 
Britain and the structures of colonial production.
Although production in the prison farm mode contributed to the 
primary accumulation of infrastructure and money capital within Van 
Diemen's Land, the rate at which further capital could be accumulated 
was severely limited by the small size of the internal market,
restrictions on external trade, the limited capital imported through 
the Commissariat, and the small number and low productivity of the
convicts. In the next chapter, we shall consider how a structural 
change in production, the removal of constraints, and the export of 
commodities led to the sort of rapid economic growth not possible in 
the early system.
66
Chapter 3
CAPITALIST PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN TIMBER, 1820 - 1856
The constraints to the accumulation of capital within the prison 
settlements of Van Diemen's Land, discussed in the previous chapter 
were relaxed from 1813. A thriving export trade was built up and new 
structures of production under capitalist relations established. 
This structural development occurred concurrently with the expansion 
of the convict system - peak numbers of convicts being received in 
1842-46 and 185 0-52 - but led to the creation of a predominantly 
capitalist society. The transition was marked by social, political, 
legal, administrative and ideological changes which culminated in the 
cessation of transportation in 1853 and the achievement of self- 
government in 1856.
In this chapter, we will consider the formation of classes in 
the dominant agricultural and pastoral sectors, the key place taken 
by commercial capital, the manner in which the production of timber 
was organised under capitalist relations, and the complex 
interactions between the several sectors, structures of production 
and classes.
EXPORT TRADE
The development of international trade from the early
settlements was inhibited by the mercantilist policies of the East
India Company Act and by tariff and shipping regulations of the
British and New South Wales governments.”' Trade from Van Diemen's
Land was further disadvantaged as goods had to be transhipped in
Sydney and regulations to prevent convicts escaping forbade the
2construction of decked vessels longer than six metres. Colonial
markets were not constrained and, although limited by the same 
factors that applied within Van Diemen's Land, provided profitable
3outlets for cereals and meat from 1815 on.
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In 1812, the settlements at Port Dalrymple and Hobart were 
amalgamated into a single administration. Clearly sensible on 
administrative grounds alone, once an overland route had been found 
(1809) amalgamation strengthened the state administration and allowed 
commerce to develop. The few merchants petitioned British
authorities to open the ports to international shipping, and in 1813 
restrictions were lifted. New merchant businesses which imported 
goods directly from England and arranged exports were quickly 
established.^ Trade flourished and the ascension of capitalist
interests over the old mercantilist interests, in both Britain and 
the colonies, was marked by the removal of the restrictions on the 
size of vessels (1819) and their destination (1822).^
Seal skins and whale oil were the first commodities that could 
be produced readily for international trade from resources that were 
abundant around the coast and islands. Seal skins were produced by 
the notoriously wild sealers, and the Aboriginal women they obtained 
by exchange or capture, ‘in a structure that contained elements of 
both slave and domestic relations. These women appear to have been 
the only Aborigines from Van Diemen's Land to have entered the 
production processes of world capitalism and it is only in the 
descendants of the offspring of their unions with the sealers that 
any genetic trace of the entire race remains. Whale oil was 
produced in simple stations set up by merchants round the coast by 
free (not convict) labour under capitalist relations.
Production was expanded quickly but carried to the point of 
destroying the resources. Sealing and bay whaling for the black 
whale were virtually finished by 1840, and although deep sea whaling 
for the sperm whale was then conducted it too declined
7eventually. Although whales and seals were potentially renewable
resources that could have sustained a perpetual yield, their 
exploitation under competitive capitalism resulted in their virtual 
extinction. It may be noted from this example as a forerunner of 
that other potentially renewable natural resource - timber - that the 
resource was a common in which shovt-tevm individual competitive 
interests were served by continual exploitation without remit.
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Further, the amount of fixed capital invested was low and could be 
amortised over very short periods or readily transferred to the 
production of other commodities. Thus the conservation of the 
natural resource was not necessary for the conservation of capital 
and although enlightened officials deplored the destruction and 
perceived the measures necessary for conservation, the state took no 
action.
The establishment of wool as the major export staple, and the 
removal of trade barriers in 1822-26, are legendary topics in
QAustralian histories. The response in Van Diemen's Land was
rapid. In 1820, Lt-Governor Sorell imported Merino lamb rams from 
New South Wales and distributed them to settlers with additional
Qallocations of land. Private imports of Merinos and Saxons soon
followed.^0 The initial (1820) sales of poor quality wool brought 
poor prices on the London market but husbandry, processing and 
packaging were improved, the effects of the better stock became felt, 
freight rates fell and exports increased dramatically - even briefly 
exceeding those from New South Wales.^
LAND OWNERSHIP AND CLASS FORMATION
Within the internal economy of the penal settlements, only small 
farms operating in the small business mode, but assisted with 
convict-labour, were established. The state made land grants of 10- 
50 hectares to farmers, officers, soldiers and marines who left the 
service, and emancipists from Norfolk Island. Small grants were 
also made to ex-convicts to enable them to subsist as peasants. In 
1809, the average holding was only 24 hectares at the Derwent and 74 
hectares at Port Dalrymple. Although the officers and officials of
the ruling class had taken 46% of the land granted, their individual
1 2holdings averaged only a modest 50 hectares at the Derwent.
Export opportunities permitted a new structure of large-scale 
production to be organised under competitive capitalist relations. 
Holders of large estates - the gentry - owned the land, stock, work 
animals, seed and implements, which were worked by a rural prolet-
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ariat of landless labourers and, in the early stages, by assigned 
convicts. The division into large-scale pastoral production and 
small-scale agriculture was not as clear cut as on the mainland and 
both structures competed in producing the major commodities of wheat, 
meat and wool.
Possession of land was a key to expanding production in both
structures and this was provided by the state in grants, sales and
leases. From 1812 much larger grants, of 400-1200 hectares, were
made to those with influence. Grants were also made to the new
settlers who arrived in increasing numbers in the 1820's. From 1825,
regulations were introduced to foster a class of capitalist
landowners - the gentry - and form a rural workforce by excluding
labourers from land. Grants of between 128 and 1037 hectares were
provided to settlers with over $1000 in proportion to their capital,
and small grants to those with little capital were discontinued.
Although the regulations were applied very loosely and many grants
were made to those with more limited capital, they did inhibit the
development of a peasantry.^ Additional grants were made to
settlers who developed their initial grants, or in recognition of
15public services or position.
Table 3.1
1 f sArea of land granted and sold, 1804 - 1859 
(hectares)
Period Granted to Sold
Individuals Van Diemen's Land Co.
1804-19 28,226
1820-29 481,729 28,668
1830-39 181,048 148,267 109,369
1840-49 4,706 101,835
1850-59 2,918 95,789
Not only did the area occupied by grant and lease increase 
exponentially between 1813 and 1831, but the pattern of land 
ownership became strongly differentiated. A few capitalist producers 
were able to amass very large estates due to the cumulative mechanism
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1 7of the granting system and by buying out small farmers. By
contrast, these small business producers with few reserves often had 
to sell out when they could not withstand seasonal fluctuations, the 
erratic or restricted markets for wheat and meat, attacks by 
bushrangers and Aborigines, or the destruction of crops by wandering 
stock.
The labour to expand production was initially supplied by the 
convict system but later by free immigrant labour and those 
dispossessed from farming or petty grazing.
The state assigned convicts to individual settlers who had to
feed, clothe and shelter them, relieving the British government of
expense. Their labour power was the temporary property of the
19settler extracted both by inducement and coercion. To meet the
British requirements for deterrence and his own for control over a 
lawless population, Lt-Governor Arthur established a network of 
stipendiary police magistrates, local justices recruited from the 
gentry, and constables, backed up by the registration of overseers on 
the sheep runs, close control of movement, and detailed regulation. 
The slightest infringements by assigned convicts were punished with 
flogging, periods in public works gangs, chain gangs, or at Port 
Arthur. As inducement, good reports from a master could procure a 
conditional remittance of sentence under a 'ticket-of-leave' which 
allowed a convict to become a proletarian but restricted freedom of 
movement and employment.^
The nature of the early labour force limited production in
several ways. The majority of convicts came from impoverished urban
backgrounds and did not have rural skills. The labour of assigned
convicts although cheap, was unproductive and unreliable, while that
of emancipists embittered by 'the system' was often little better.
Moreover the rural labour force could only reproduce itself by
21continued transportation as few females were transported. These
difficulties were countered by immigration after 1816 when the colony 
was opened to general settlement. Six hundred free settlers arrived 
in family groups in 1822 and by 1827 births exceeded deaths.
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Although the reproduction of the population was assured, more 
deliberate measures were needed to create a capitalist class 
structure. In 1831 the imperial Rippon regulations required land to 
be sold at auction, rather than granted, in order to encourage closer
settlement and raise revenue to fund the transfer of British pauper
22families to the colonial workforce. Although immigration and
natural increase combined with the convict system created an abundant 
proletariat, two competing structures of production - Aboriginal and 
petty squatting - had to be destroyed before capitalist production 
could be fully established.
The Aboriginal structure of production was destroyed as sheep
replaced kangaroos on the grassy plains and the people were murdered,
raped and diseased with the spread of settlement. The Aborigines
were far from passive victims and endeavoured to subsist by
negotiating for or plundering rations from the stockmen's huts.
Governments in Britain, New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land issued
policy statements for their protection, but apparent concern did not
lead to effective action. Pressure from the settlers led Governor
Arthur to empower armed settlers to join the military in driving the
Aborigines from the settled districts, treating them as open
enemies. The accelerated killing during this 'Great Black War' left
few alive and in 1831, when Robinson gathered the remnants of the
23tribes, there were only 190 left.
The unalienated 'Waste lands' provided a common accessible to 
wealthy grazier and emancipist alike, on which the latter could 
thrive by grazing cattle and sheep in the petty commodity production 
of meat and wool. To maintain accumulation in the capitalist mode, 
these ex-convicts had to be separated from land and recruited into 
the proletariat. Doubtless stock were frequently thieved from 
farmers and graziers, and doubtless some ex-convicts associated with 
bush-rangers; both of which provided landowners with issues for 
righteous lobbying. They pressed the Government, complaining that 
'unauthorised' occupation of Crown land offered facilities for stock 
stealing and harbour for absconding convicts, and emphasising:
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... the injurious way the system operates against the proper 
diffusion of agricultural labour in the colony by presenting a 
trifold inducement to free and Ticket of leave men to become 
Occupiers of Land and possessors of stock rather than lead the 
more industrious and useful life of hired servants in regular 
employ.^
The Colonial Treasurer objected that less land could be sold 
when grazing was free and regulations were introduced in 1828 to 
enable 'persons of good character' to tender a minimum of $0.05 per 
hectare for annually renewable leases. Payment was poor and in 1833 
tenders were replaced by auctions, which served to cement the 
position of established landowners against intruders but failed to 
increase revenue or reduce unauthorised occupation. In 1843, when 
sheep numbers had doubled to 1.4 million, tenders for five-year 
periods were introduced. Established graziers took up licences to 
keep smaller men out and revenue trebled. Throughout this period 
only about 81,000 hectares were leased - far less than the area 
occupied. In 1847 - when sheep numbers had increased to 1.8
million - licences -for 202-2025 hectares could be obtained at a fee 
of $0.05 per hectare for ten year periods, and compensation was 
allowed for fences and buildings if a licence area was resumed for 
selection. With security of tenure and protection for capital
improvements, graziers took out licences over some 600,000 hectares 
which virtually ended unauthorised occupation. This legitimated the 
settlers' use of the Waste lands, protected their capital and saved 
them having to purchase new land at higher sale prices. The leasing 
system was thus adapted to meet the needs of colonial capitalists in 
the face of both a competing mode of production and changes in the 
grant and sale system brought about by imperial interests.
The rapid expansion of wool production attracted not only the 
capital brought by enterprising settlers but also large-scale company 
investment. The first and largest, the Van Diemen's Land Company,
was chartered in London in 1825. The company's first settlement was 
made at Circular Head in the previously unsettled north-west of the 
island in 1826. After heroic explorations and lengthy negotiations 
the company obtained grants to 148,267 hectares in 1831 which it 
worked with indentured, convict and later free labour. The
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company spent $0.5 million on development in its first fifteen years,
but many of its ventures were unsuccessful and it turned away from
capitalist production to tenant farming and eventually to land 
27sales.
So far we have considered only the formation of the proletariat
within the island, yet the emigration of both labour and capital
toward more attractive conditions on the mainland has been a
continuing feature of Tasmanian development. Batman's settlement
of Port Philip in 1835, when the economy of Van Diemen's Land was
depressed, led to substantial emigration. The rush to find
Victorian gold imposed a far more serious drain on the labour force -
the adult male population of Van Diemen's land was halved by the end
30of 1852 - which seriously disrupted production. In the critical
shortage, employers competed to cajole workers to their service or
were forced to pay higher wages. To retain population, the state
offered, in 1851, an inducement to land purchasers in the form of the
'quiet enjoyment' for ten years of an area ten times that of any land
purchased. In two years this '... ill-conceived policy ... of
wasteful liberality ...' diverted 405,000 hectares of the best
remaining land to grazing rather than to more labour-intensive
31agriculture, but did little to retain population. More forceful
measures followed. In 1854, the Legislative Council passed the most 
coercive Master and Servant Aet in the Australian colonies to bind 
free labourers to their masters. The Act was energetically
applied by the magistrates who exercised a key role in the daily 
reproduction of social relations. Magistrates could order the 
flogging of assigned convicts or their relegation to a chain gang; 
they could issue the passes required for a man on ticket-of-leave to 
move from one part of the island to another; they could punish free 
labour under the Master and Servant Aet; and they were responsible 
for the operation of other means of social control, such as the 
licensing of timber cutters, described later. The magistracy was of 
two types: Police Magistrates who were stipendiary officials
employed by the government and who provided the local network of 
colonial administration and legal enforcement, and local justices
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recruited from the respectable gentry or officers. Unlike New South 
Wales under Macquarie, the magistracy in Van Diemen's land was not 
opened to emancipists but remained the preserve of wealthy landowners 
in the country, and employers and merchants in Hobart and
Launceston. Not only did legislation and regulation serve the 
interests of capital, but implementation stayed firmly in the hands 
of its beneficiaries.
MERCHANTS AND BANKS
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the ruling class in 
Van Diemen's Land comprised three fractions of which the government 
officials and officers and landowning gentry have already been 
described - the former controlling the society and distributing land 
and labour, the latter possessing much of the land and stock and 
profiting from labour bond and free. The third fraction, the 
merchants and bankers, were of equal if not greater importance due to 
their control of trade, finance and credit. These fractions were 
closely inter-connected and their interests frequently overlapped, 
though not without conflict.
The existence of prison-farm production and the dependence on
imported goods in the early settlements meant that trade internally
with the Commissariat, or externally, was central to capital
accumulation within Van Diemen's Land. For the first merchants, the
profits from trade were probably better than those from production,
33though the risks were greater. Although the officers did not
develop a closed trading ring, as the notorious 'Rum Corps' had in 
Sydney, yet there were substantial connections between government
officials, officers and merchants."^4 From high profits on early 
trading ventures and favoured positions in supplying the
Commissariat, the early merchants were able to extract sufficient
capital, and establish commercial connections with colonial and
British merchants, so that they could take every advantage of the 
expansions of settlement and exports as they occurred. They had
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many functions: wholesale importing, retailing, financing settlers
on mortgage security, and advancing or speculating on produce
exports. They often acted as small bankers and frequently issued
promissory notes and bills due to the shortage of currency. New
settlers always needed supplies to establish their farms and often
needed credit until their crops could be sold. The lack of a cash
market for grain and stock, as well as debt, put the small farmer,
and often his land, in the hands of the merchants. In 1824 Curr
prudently cautioned intending settlers by noting that:
He [the new settler] will, if he thinks proper, obtain credit 
with great facility; but he must generally pay nearly twice the 
value of articles so purchased; and when the pay day arrives, he 
will too often find he has been labouring for the merchant, 
instead of himself; and, from being the proprietor, he descends 
to be the mere tenant of the soil. ^
As trade and commercial activity increased, the merchants'
functions divided. Colonial banks were formed in 1824 and 1828 with
capital from local merchants and landowners, and trade tended to
separate into a few large wholesalers who imported the goods sold by
36many smaller dependent retailers.
The rapid expansion attracted British capital to commerce, 
37insurance and banking. The wool trade was conducted on extended
credit (provided ultimately by London capitalists) through the
colonial merchants who not only linked producers and consumers but
also functioned to link colonial production completely into the world 
3ftcapitalist system.
Profits extracted in trade and finance provided capital for 
further commercial ventures, such as colonial banks and insurance 
companies, and for productive investment. Most merchants were also 
landowners who either farmed or grazed the land with wage labour or 
let it to tenant farmers. Partnerships in manufacturing, whaling,
shipping, milling, brewing and the timber export trade were common 
between the larger capitalists of both the land and commercial 
fractions. ^
76
STATE FORMATION
The form of the state changed during the first half of the 
nineteenth century.
The first change was the amalgamation of the settlements at Port 
Dalrymple and the Derwent into a single administration in 1812 that 
we noted earlier.
While arbitrary justice controlled the convicts it failed to 
settle trade disputes or bring speedy retribution to sheep- 
stealers. Further, the simultaneous expansion of wool production and 
convict numbers required careful and local state administration. 
Following Commissioner Bigge's reports of 1822-3 these needs were met 
by inaugurating a Supreme Court in 1824 and by constituting Van 
Diemen's Land as a colony independent of New South Wales in 
1825.^ A Legislative Council was authorised in 1828 consisting of 
six government officials and eight non-official members - mostly 
wealthy landowners but with some merchants and bankers - selected by 
the Lt-Governor who presided.^ The Council was structured to
integrate the emerging interests of colonial capital with those of 
Empire; when these were contradictory, the council provided a focus 
for conflict.
Conflict came when the British government replaced tho 
assignment of convicts with their allocation to public works gangs 
for periods of 1-4 years followed by probation during which they 
could be employed at a low wage. Angry opposition from the 
landowners first arose because of the loss of the assigned labour 
they needed in a time of shortage. However this quickly reversed in 
the depression of 1841-44 during which unemployment was widespread 
and the wages of free labour dropped severely.^ The colony could 
not afford to support so many convicts on public works and the 
probationers, even on their low wage of $18 a year, could not all be 
employed. The situation was aggravated by the arrival of free
immigrants sponsored in wealthier times. Revenue from land sales 
dried up and, after paying the immigrant's fares, the colony was
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forced into debt. With an overabundant supply of labour, the
interests of both settlers and free labour coincided in their 
opposition to further transportation; the former on account of cost, 
the latter from competition on the labour market. The conflict 
erupted in the Legislative Council in 1845 when the 'Patriotic Six' 
non-official members refused supply.4  ^ The opposition to
transportation was closely associated with demands for representative 
and self-government. Included in this amalgam was the benefit to 
pastoralists of control over the extensive areas of Waste Lands they 
leased. The discovery of gold lent weight to the struggle for these 
ends. In Van Diemen's Land, success was marked first, in 1851, by 
the expansion of the Legislative Council to allow for sixteen elected 
members and eight official ones; secondly, by the end of transport­
ation and the arrival of the last convict ship in 1853; and most 
importantly, in 1856, by the change to self-government by a bicameral 
representative Parliament - a change symbolised in a new name - 
Tasmania.
TIMBER MARKETS
Timber was produced commercially in Van Diemen's Land for 
internal, foreign, and most importantly, colonial markets.
The internal market was limited. Timber for rural building and
fencing rarely became a traded commodity and the convict system
provided for public works. Timber for building in Hobart and
Launceston was provided mainly through timber merchants who generally
undertook most of the production process - at least initially in the
44small business mode.
Small parcels of timber baulks, which did not attract duty, were 
sent to Britain in the 1820's, but the market did not develop and 
foreign timber sales were trivial until a market developed in New 
Zealand in the 1860's.4^
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Colonial markets were provided by the growth of Port Phillip
from 1835, the spurt of settlement in South Australia, 1836-1839, and
above all by the Victorian gold rush which created an intense demand
not only on the goldfields but for the boom of house building in
Melbourne that continued through the 1850's. Van Diemen's Land was
well placed to supply this sudden market as it had ample resources
and timber close to water. Palings and shingles were particularly in
demand and could be produced readily in the new areas being opened up
in the south around the Huon and along the banks of the rivers of the
north and north-west coast. The sudden scurry of men to the
goldfields in 1851 cut production by 40% but labour shortages were
overcome - in part by the mechanisation described in Chapter 4 - and
production and exports increased dramatically. Timber, which had
only comprised 2.6% of the colony's exports in the 1840's, increased
its share to 11.9% in the 1850's. In 185 3, the best year, timber
made up 25.2% of exports with a value of $0.88 million This was not
to be exceeded for seventy years. The boom years of 1853 and 1854
were followed by a sharp drop when timber from other areas, and
particularly the west coast of North America, arrived in quantity on
46the Melbourne market.
Table 3.2
Average annual value for timber exports 1837-185947
Period
1837-39
1840-49
1850-59
Average annual value ($)
18,328
29,344
___ ______________ 292,297
THE MODE OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION
The boom in trade across Bass Strait was promoted by general 
merchants who added timber to their shipments of meat, wheat and 
provisions, by existing timber merchants and by entrepreneurs
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entering the timber trade for the first time. Of the last, James 
Fenton has provided one of the few accounts of the timber trade in
40the mid-century.
Timber was produced for trade under capitalist relations. Their 
particular form was determined very largely by the nature of the 
labour process and the merchants' control over credit, transport and 
access to markets. Ownership was of less importance, as the tools 
required were simple and the raw materials - trees - although legally 
the property of the Crown or settler, were economically free goods - 
present in abundance and viewed generally as obstacles to grass or 
grain.
The sites most accessible for shipping were often otherwise 
isolated so that the pit-sawyers and splitters had to live in the
forest, in bush huts built at each site, and rely on provisions 
shipped in from time to time. They worked mostly in small groups - 4 
to 6 was probably typical - but sometimes in pairs or singly, and 
moved from patch to patch in continual search of the most easily
processed and accessible trees.
The sawyers and splitters worked on a piece-work basis, as most
timber workers in Tasmania do today. Rates were set for each 100
feet [30 m] sawn, bundle of shingles, or 100 palings split and so
forth so that the quantity a worker produced in a given period
determined the wage from which he had to support himself, and his
family in the minority of cases in which he had one. The merchant
set up a group of men on a cutting site, provided supplies on credit,
shipped the timber and delivered further provisions debited against
the amounts due to the men under what is known as the 'truck'
system. Fenton has described the system:
At the commencement of 1840 he (Mr Thomas Drew) went into the 
timber trade on the coast, sailed a small vessel between the
rivers and Launceston, and supplied the splitters with goods in 
return for palings, staves, shingles, posts, rails etc. This 
proved to be a money-making business, for about the year 1844 he 
was the purchaser of 640 acres [259 ha] at the Don Heads, most 
of which was rich agricultural soil. He let a portion to 
tenants in 20-acre [8 ha] lots, put on splitters in the bush, to 
whom he paid low prices; kept a store in order to supply his
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extensive establishment with all they wanted at enormous rates, 
and shipped off the timber to Adelaide in his own vessel, the 
schooner Charlotte. He kept on steadily in this business for 
years, securing all the best freesplitting timber for miles back 
at a mere nominal cost, and selling it at exceptionally high
prices in the Adelaide market, where he seemed to have a
monopoly at that period.
It was a practice of those timber-dealers (Drew, Kingswell 
and others) to bring in all sorts of provisions, clothing and
luxuries. The splitters motto was 'Live while you can'. They
never laid by for a rainy day. I have seen cases of bottled 
ale, wine and spirits taken home to the splitters huts with 
pickles, tinned meats, fruits and other dainties, most costly at 
that time. Then they worked hard, and split a wonderful lot of 
timber.
. . . that wandering class of bushmen .. . were accustomed to 
live in rudely built huts of sapling poles, with sides and roof 
of stringybark, easily constructed in a few hours, where they 
philosophically endured privations that would break the heart of 
any eight-hour man of modern times.^
Transport was organised in the small business mode. The
bullocks and horses commonly used for snigging and transport from the
bush to the water's edge were generally owned by carters or local 
farmers and contracted at a piece-rate or hired by the day. The 
small shallow-drafted ketches that collected the timber, and the 
larger vessels that loaded where water was deep enough and shipped 
across Bass Strait, were owned by individuals who contracted a piece- 
rate or by the merchants themselves.
The merchants who controlled production did not necessarily own 
any of the means of production - trees, tools, animals, or ships - 
other than working capital in the form of credit, or direct 
sustenance for the workers. The timber workers were not independent 
petty-commodity producers but proletarians working for a particular 
form of wages in the production structure of competitive capitalism 
which incorporated dependent small-business for transport.
What were the particular features of production that led to 
these relations? The employer, no less than the warder, had the 
problem of obtaining the most out of labour. In piece-work both 
quality and quantity of labour are controlled by the products 
themselves; the employer is relieved of continuous supervision of the
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workers and need only inspect and tally the products. The isolated
location and scattered disposition of sawyers and splitters would
have made direct supervision of time-work expensive and difficult.
Even with piece-work merchants sometimes sent overseers with parties
5 0of splitters to particularly isolated sites. Marx has argued that
piece-work seems desirable to workers because it allows scope for
individuality and an appearance of liberty, independence, and the
opportunity for self-control in production free of the continuous
supervision of time-work. By additional striving a worker can
produce more and improve his personal lot. This results in wide
differences in wages according to age, skill, strength and energy,
and induces the labour force as a whole to work harder than it
otherwise might. At least part of the benefit from this increased
effort accrues to the employer and is reflected in the rates paid, so
that the older, less able and weaker workers are economically
compelled to seek work elsewhere. '... Piece-work has therefore the
tendency while raising individual wages above the average to lower
5 1this average itself ...' Piece-work, which appeals to individ­
uality and places workers in competition with the average of their 
fellows, acts in an inherently divisive way. Marx concluded that the
' . o. piece-wage is the form of wages most in harmony with the
52capitalist mode of production ...
Even though the piece-work system was divisive and the regime
oppressive, yet sawyers did manage 'through love and unity [to]
support each other' in forming the Hobart Town Sawyers Benefit
Society in 1839. This was based on small voluntary subscriptions
that provided enough to pay the cost of a man's or his wife's
funeral. The society disappeared in the late 1840's; probably being
5 3superseded by Masonic Lodges.
The contracts for snigging, hauling and shipping timber were 
mostly let by piece-rate which removed the need for supervision by
the merchants. The equipment required was comparatively cheap, so
that entry into contracting was possible even with a small amount of 
capital. The attraction of apparent independence was heightened by 
ownership over some of the means of production; by hard work,
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enterprise and thrift, man might a master make. While the most 
energetic, skilled or fortunate throve, competition kept piece-rates 
low. By caring closely for their own beasts and boats, working 
contractors relieved merchants of the difficult problems of guarding 
and maintaining the means of production in isolated situations; by 
supplying part of the capital they relieved them of expense also.
While piece-wages and rates provided incentives to increase the 
quantity produced, they often did so at the expense of quality. 
Timber products are cumbersome to examine, special skills are needed, 
and when shipped directly from the forest, they must be inspected 
there. If inspection is inadequate, any defects are left to be 
detected by customers. In an early example of what was to prove a 
recurrent problem for Tasmanian timber exports, the Colonial Times 
reported the:
... too common practice of unprincipled splitters and sawyers to 
crimp in quantity ... Bundles of lathes that should run 200 are 
found afterwards not to exceed 150 to 170, and shingles which 
should be 100 are frequently found 70 to 90. ^
CONFLICT AND CONTROL
The contradictions, conflicts and controls within and between 
classes took particular expression in the production of timber.
The timber workers were of necessity independent and self- 
reliant forest dwellers who moved frequently between sites and 
districts. Their life was quite at odds with the policies of the 
gentry, whose rise depended on driving people out of the waste lands 
and restricting the mobility of labour. The ruling class promulgated 
a real or imagined harmony of interest between 'the denizens of the 
bush', conveniently lumping together small independent pastoral 
producers and timber cutters with sheep stealers and bush rangers. 
They moved to place the timber workers within the net of magisterial 
and police control, as part of their assault on independent 
producers, by including measures to control the timber workers in the 
grazing lease regulations of 1828, discussed earlier. The Government
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Order that announced that Crown Land was to be leased for grazing was
also drafted to cover the sawyers and splitters:
Persons wishing to remain on Land for the purpose of sawing and 
shingle splitting only, will at any time be able to obtain a 
similar [to grazing permit] written permission from the Police 
Magistrate of the District upon reporting to him their names - 
their last and usual place of abode - the place they will have 
to perform ~ and the period in which it will be accomplished» 
The permission will be granted for such specified period only - 
but be renewable on a new application.^
It was not until six years later that a charge of $0.10 per week was
made for timber licences. The Executive Council very clearly saw
the issue of timber licences as a measure of social control rather
than a forest or revenue matter, and required the Colonial Secretary
to:
notify the Chief Policy Magistrate that as the introduction of 
this measure (licence fees) is intended to be a matter of Police 
rather than Revenue, it is through his department it must be 
carried into effect ...^
The Chief Police Magistrate had the 'firm conviction' that:
.o. these sawyers and splitters are in most instances productive 
of more evil than good - that they constantly harbour and assist 
Runaways for which offence it is almost impossible to bring them 
to Conviction - and that had it not been for persons of this 
description in the Stringy Bark Forest, Britton [a bushranger] 
and his associates could not have kept out so long - upon this 
point no difference of opinion exists.
The administration of timber licences was cumbersome. The splitters
and sawyers applied and paid their fee to the local magistrate who
let them start work. The applications and fees were sent to the
Surveyor-General in Hobart who issued the licences and sent a monthly
return to the Chief Police Magistrate '. . . with a view to enabling
the Police Department to remove all unauthorised trespassers
58. . . ' The long delays before the licences were received from
Hobart hindered local police who could never be certain who had 
licences and who had not.
The local gentry pressed the police to action against the timber 
workers. For example, '... an influential person in the district 
...' brought a case of possible cutting after the expiry of a licence 
before Police Constable Palmer at Bicheno and expected him to act
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under threat of a charge of neglect of duty, yet without knowing who
was licenced Palmer was not sure of his rights and feared a
59retaliatory law suit. Conflicts became more pronounced from the
1840's on. On the one side, flocks multiplied, the tenure of leases
was lengthened, and graziers made capital improvements in the waste
lands; on the other, timber production and the number of workers
increased so that more licences were taken out - often over the same
lands. The gentry were able to exert considerable power locally and
in Hobart. In one example R.C. Gunn, an influential grazier and
estate manager of Launceston, opposed applications for timber
licences on land that he rented for grazing on the grounds that
6 0cutters would damage fences and let sheep stray. In another, John
Archer, a substantial grazier of Deloraine, was able to use the 
police to stop the cartage of wood that he had allowed to be cut - a
decision that a subsequent report to the Chief Police Magistrate
61considered 'unfair'.
The Surveyor-General, although admitting problems had arisen
with timber licences, was not in favour of excluding cutters as he
thought the large landowners would monopolise large tracts of land in
convenient situations ' ... to the detriment of Revenue and the injury
of the Timber Trade ...'. He feared that:
Persons might take up depasturing licences on the Banks of 
navigable rivers with the ulterior object of obtaining exclusive 
timber licences ...'
The Surveyor-General then considered concentrating the sawyers and 
splitters in part of the forest:
... by which means the wandering Backwoodsman-like habits might 
be somewhat corrected, Police Surveillance facilitated, and the 
best timber and the best situations for carriage be no longer 
recklessly cut down evevywheve for every purpose.
There seems little doubt that the majority of the timber cutters 
were ticket-of-leave men and emancipists who had learnt how to work 
timber at Port Arthur and other convict establishments. Whereas
statements by police and other officials, like those of the 
pastoralists, evidenced convict associations and wandering habits as 
justification for measures to subordinate the timber cutters, James 
Fenton, who employed many, evidenced quite different attributes. He
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found "... they were as a rule quiet, hard-working and intelligent 
. . . ' and although '. . . a small keg of rum occasionally found its way 
to their bush encampments . ..', his overall evidence was of honesty
f i  ^and industry. Their self-reliance in the forest and their
mobility was necessary for timber production, and in spite of the 
pastoralists‘ objections, timber licences continued to be let on 
Crown land areas that were also leased for grazing. The Surveyor-” 
General's plan was not adopted. In this instance the state, through 
the official fraction of imperial officials, did not act solely in 
the interests of the pastoralist gentry, but preserved the interests 
and opportunities of the expanding commercial timber trade.
The expansion of timber production, particularly in the Huon
district, led to the appointment of an inspector of timber licences
within the Survey Department in 1848. Although Mr Laffer, Timber
Inspector of the Huon, was authorised to collect revenue and issue
licences, social control was still kept in the hands of the police:
The persons to whom a licence is issued should be bound to 
produce his former licence before he receives another, and these 
are to be kept as vouchers ... The Assistant Police Magistrate 
will exercise the usual jurisdiction, and certify as to the 
character of the men.^
A second inspector was appointed later. The new appointments were 
successful and revenue collections from the Huon were built up to 
$7,756 by 1853» In the remainder of the state, the responsibility 
remained with the police and was not finally lost in all areas for 
almost a century.
DEVELOPMENT AND THE TIMBER TRADE
In this chapter, we have seen how a new structure of producing 
timber under capitalist relations developed in Van Diemen's Land. 
Unlike the coercive relations in the sawing and punishment stations, 
the piece wages and truck relationship between manual cutters and 
colonial merchants did represent one of the defining or salient 
features of the then current state of the world-system.
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The three-way articulation between Britain, prison farm
production and colonial capitalism, described in the previous 
chapter, continued and shifted. Prison farm production relied on a 
continual supply of new workers from Britain. These passed through 
the system and provided most of the recruits for capitalist 
production of timber. This articulation, and the fact that few 
emancipists could marry and incur the costs of the natural
reproduction of their labour, functioned to depress piece wages. 
The addition of free immigrant labour during the depression of the 
1840's exerted a further downward pressure on rates. These new 
workers arrived in families and had to bear the costs of their 
reproduction. The articulation of the prison farm system with the 
emancipist cutters extended through the labour market to depress 
conditions for the new workers. This and cultural factors acted
bitterly to divide the working class between those who bore the costs 
of reproduction and those who did not.
The state continued to function: as an instrument for social
control in Britain, to coerce labour from convicts, and to provide
the needs for colonial accumulation. In addition, the state took
decisive action to promote large-scale capitalist, pastoral and 
agricultural production over small business production, and to 
destroy independent petty commodity or peasant production. Its
intentions in destroying Aboriginal production were ambiguous, but 
the results were effective. The state's actions in relation to the 
minor sector of timber production were directed toward its functions 
of social control, and the promotion of capitalist production in the 
major sector. Such complex actions are not readily explained by any 
single theory of the state. Some actions (such as continuing the 
convict system) can be described in terms of the instrumental 
theory; some (such as providing land to capitalists) can be 
described in terms of capital logic theory; while others (such as 
licensing timber cutters, or dispossesing Aborigines, petty commodity
producers, and small farmers from the land) are more the concerns of
the class structuralist theory of the state.
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Overall, the period was one of prodigious expansion in 
production, economic growth, and capital accumulation; one in which a 
complex capitalist society was developed. The period was certainly 
one of modernisation, but it was not one in which the benefits flowed 
to many. Rather it was a period during which strong state action 
ensured that surplus flowed from a depressed proletariat to enable a 
few to accummulate rapidly and to realise the benefits of export 
trade.
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Chapter 4
THE RISE OF SAWMILLING, 1850 - 1879
The third quarter of the nineteenth century has been called 'the 
golden era of capitalist growth' in which the world economy expanded 
dramatically through industrialisation in the core and trade with the 
peripheries. In Australia, the expansion was magnified by
discovering a wealth of gold, rapidly increasing the population, 
building cities and establishing a much more complex society. 
Although Melbourne and Adelaide provided markets for her timber, 
however, much of the tumultuous growth and change on the mainland 
passed Tasmania by.
In this chapter we will first set the background of British and 
Australian development and the pattern of Tasmanian society. Then 
we will consider the addition of a new structure of mechanised 
production of sawn timber sawmilling - that operated mostly within 
the relations of competitive capitalism. Finally, we will consider 
the conditions under which the structure of manual production, 
described in the previous chapter, continued in the presence of the 
new one.
BRITAIN
In Britain the lingering limitations of mercantilism were swept 
away as the Corn Laws were abolished in 1846 and the Navigation Acts
in 1849. Several 'free trade' treaties between European industrial
1nations followed. Capital already accumulated, as well as
Californian and Australian gold, was invested in further industrial­
isation. Engineering and metal working flourished enabling machines 
to make steam engines and other machines. Britain was the 'workshop 
of the world' and although industrialisation spread to Germany, 
France, the United States, and to a lesser extent several European 
countries, Britain stayed ahead.
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Manufactures from the core of industrialising countries were 
carried in increasing quantitities to wherever their price, innovat- 
ion and quality - aided by imperial clout where necessary - could 
open new markets. Raw materials and cheap food, which kept the cost 
of labour down, returned in exchange. The 'boom' of business
generated profits which were absorbed mainly within the industrial
countries by further industrialisation and the building of railways
2to cheapen transport.
The ascendency of economic liberalism - laissez faire, laissez 
passer - was paralleled by the ascendency of political liberalism; 
Tories gave way to Whigs, though not always; and in 1867 the
franchise was extended to another million males. Copying an
Australian innovation, the ballot was made secret in 1872. Socially, 
the interests of the urban middle classes were in the ascendant, 
although they often blended with those of the aristocracy, the rural 
gentry and merchants. The conspicuous prosperity of Victorian
England became that of the bourgeoisie.
In contrast to bourgeois prosperity, conditions for the working 
class only improved in parts and as the result of bitter struggles 
which were hampered by continually high unemployment. The
3population of Britain increased by 43% to 29.7 millions.
Agricultural production was increased by investing capital in new 
techniques of arable farming, better stock and artificial
fertilising; at the same time productivity was increased by
4mechanisation, so that employment declined. The urban centres,
which already contained 51% of the population, grew further. The 
struggle for better wages and conditions was marked by a series of
5Factory Acts and the establishment of enduring trades unions.
Capitalists countered the rising wages with increased mechanis­
ation, as in the case of wood-working machinery. Although several 
types of wood-working machines had been invented from the late 
eighteenth century, it was not until the third quarter of thegnineteenth that they were well developed and widely applied. Bale, 
writing in London in 1880, ascribed development of this machinery to 
the stuggle for better wages and conditions:
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Till within the last thirty years wood-working machinery in this 
country must be considered to have been in a very crude state, 
but of late great impetus has been given it by the constant 
battles between capital and labour. The great cost and, in 
some cases, the inferior quality of the work turned out by hand, 
have rendered the increasing introduction of labour-saving 
machinery absolutely necessary, to keep pace with the general 
progress of the times.^
The Government, faced with colonial opposition and rising 
shipping costs, ceased transportation in 1852 (except for small
Qnumbers sent to Western Australia until 1867). Rather than legal
force it was the push of poverty, the lure of gold or open spaces,
and the pull of better prospects that induced some 4.6 million
Britons to emigrate between 1853 and 1870, mostly to North America
gbut also to Australia.
AUSTRALIA
Gold, and the economic boom of the 1850's its discovery created, 
attracted immigrants from around the world so that Australia's 
population rose from 0.4 to 1.1 million in that time and then doubled 
to reach 2.2 million by 1880.^
Gold provided a sudden surge to the colonial economies, but 
although gold production slowly declined after 1856, wool exports 
continued to increase.^ Australian economies became more complex
in the post-gold rush period as investment in urbanisation, cons-
12truction and domestic manufacturing proceeded. Until the 1880's,
economic growth was due far more to capital accumulated within the
13colonies than to overseas borrowings.
Urban growth was closely associated with the marked increase in 
secondary industry (manufacturing and construction) that rose from 
16.1 to 25.1% of Gross Domestic Product between 1861-65 and 1875- 
77.^ The consequent demand for more and larger houses in
Melbourne, Adelaide and Sydney provided the main markets for 
Tasmanian timber (Table 4.1). Construction did not proceed smoothly
however but fluctuated considerably from year to year, particularly 
15in Melbourne.
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Table 4. 1
Population and housing details :
Victoria, South Australia & New South Wales 1861-81^
Detail Victoria South New South
__________ ______________________ _____Australia Wales
Increase in metropolitan population (000's)
1861-81 143 57 129
Average dwelling size (rooms per house)
1861 2.69 3.25 3.55
1881 4.26 4.03 n.a.
Increase in number of permanent dwellings 
1861-81
Brick and stone 26,625 25,023 25,778
_____ Weatherboard____________ 55,797______ 2,825________ 32,634
Although landowners and squatters maintained a conservative hold 
of the upper houses in the newly-independent colonial parliaments, 
the urban middle classes held 50-60% of the seats in the lower houses 
of New South Wales and Victoria. ^  The press of liberal and
democratic ideas was reflected to varying degrees in measures to 
extend the franchise, provide secret ballots, pay representatives, 
and equalise electoral districts.
Colonial prosperity, displayed by the housing facades in middle
class suburbs, was not matched by conditions in working class areas,
though these were significantly better than those in Britain at the
time. Trades unions were started or revived in Sydney and Melbourne
in the late 1850's and became co-ordinated in campaigns such as that
for the eight-hour day. Failure of industrial action in the 1860's
however, led to increased interest in political means to improve 
18conditions.
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TASMANIA
The economic stimulation provided by the gold-rush markets was 
not sustained in Tasmania, and the economy stagnated through 'the 
long depression' from the 1860's to the mid-1870's. The population 
increased at less than half the rate of the other colonies and at 
less than the rate of natural increase, for the number leaving 
Tasmania - mostly in search of better wages in the other colonies - 
exceeded the number of immigrants (Table 4.2 & 4.3). Secondary
industry remained small-scale and depressed and there was no 
proportional increase in urbanisation. House construction proceeded 
more slowly, to the disadvantage of the domestic timber market, and 
the situation was aggravated by: the continued decline of whaling and 
sealing; the loss of wheat markets from the mid-1860's on to cheaper 
grain produced by more mechanised methods on extensive farms in South 
Australia; and the protective tariffs introduced by Victoria from 
1865. Only a gentle increase -in the export of vegetables - mostly 
potatoes from the northern coast and jams and fruits 'as fine as any 
that the world can produce' that rose to make up 15% of exports by 
the end of the 1870's - contrasted with the general malaise.
Table 4.2
Relative wages for selected occupations 
Tasmania and Victoria 1861-1879^
Occupation 1861 1870 1879
Carpenters (per day without rations)
Tasmania $0.87 $0.71 $0.79
Victoria $1.07 $1.00 $1.00
Day labourers 
Tasmania 
Victoria
(per day without rations)
$0.72
$0.46
$0.60
$0.5 1 
$0.65
Farm labourers 
Tasmania 
Victoria
(per week with rations) 
$1.75
$0.91
$1.75
$1.06
$1.75
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Table 4.3
Population and housing details : Tasmania 1851-1881
1851-1861 1861-1881
20
Population changes (000's)
Immigration + 73 + 123
Emigration - 83 - 126
Natural increase + 31 + 44
Total + 21 + 41
Increase in metropolitan population (000 's)
n . a. + 2
Increase in the number of permanent dwellings
Brick and stone 1 694 255
Wood and Iron 5 049 2 865
Wool remained the major product and the major export for the 
1860's and. 1870's, and’ ownership of the means of producing it 
remained highly concentrated - a quarter of the island's sheep 
belonged to only 25 'pastoral princes'. In contrast to the other
colonies, the position of the landed gentry in Tasmania was strength­
ened. Pastoralists, bankers and the larger merchants continued to 
be closely interlocked and the removal of the imperial officials left 
them to rule. Franchise requirements effectively excluded the
working class from representation in Parliament and the secret ballot
21was the sole concession to democratic ideas. The rule of the
landed gentry was implemented not only at the state level but also at
the municipal level. After town corporations had been set up for
Hobart (1857) and Launceston (1858), rural municipalities were
22created. Council membership and franchise were legally restricted
and multiple voting allowed so that the Councils became controlled by
23the larger ratepayers. The highly centralised and efficient
police administration, that had been built up under Arthur, was 
broken up and police powers devolved to the municipalities.^ 
Control over local government enabled the gentry to increase the 
rates charged to smaller settlers for roads and bridges while keeping
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25their own constant. Control over local police and appointments to
the magistracy enabled the gentry to keep the rural workforce under 
tight control.
The somnolence that Trollope described on his visit in 1873 was
hardly the tranquility of a harmonious society but rather that of 
26apathy. With the landed gentry so firmly in control of magistracy# 
councils# police and finance# the '... largely emancipist working 
class was probably the most dispirited proletariat in the Australian 
colonies . ..' The working class was still deeply divided. At
the start of self-government over half the adult popultion were
either convicts or ex-convicts who had endured 'the system'; the rest 
were immigrants or Tasmanian born. The latter# who bore the costs 
of reproducing their labour# castigated the former# who had little 
opportunity to do so# with 'that hated stain' of convictism. Much 
to the gentry's advantage# the populist movements of radical 
nationalism never took hold in Tasmania as they did on the 
mainland. The struggle for better working conditions seems to have 
been expressed individually; so many simply left.
The stagnant economic conditions started to ease in the mid-
1870's due to several factors. Markets for Tasmanian produce were
stimulated by developments in the nearer colonies# and wool prices
and pastoral investment increased sharply during the first half of 
28the 1870's. Building boomed in South Australia in the latter half
of the 1870's, gold rushes in New Zealand created new markets# and
29more timber was exported. In Tasmania# gold was mined in
increasing quantities# tin was discovered# and from 1876 minerals
30started to contribute significantly to the economy. The first
railway was only a short one# but in 1873 construction began on the
main line between Launceston and Hobart# and by 1879 there were 267 
31kilometres open.
Thus the 1850's to 1870's included two periods during which 
economic activity and the demand for timber increased markedly - the 
gold-rush and the latter half of the 1870's. Both periods saw the 
advance of the new structure of mechanised sawing of timber.
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THE START OF TASMANIAN SAWMILLING
Mechanised methods of sawing timber - sawmilling - although well 
known in the capitalist world were not tried in Van Diemen's Land 
until 1825 and did not become common until the 1850's. Manual 
production - by pit sawing - co-existed with sawmilling until as late 
as the 1890's, and manual methods continued to be used for hewing 
large beams, piles and sleepers well into the twentieth century.
It seems clear that neither lack of knowledge nor capital
precluded the mechanisation of sawing prior to the 1850's. Colonial
entrepreneurs had built 30 grain mills by 1830 and these were of
similar size, cost and technology to 4 sawmills built between 1825
and 1850. Timber markets were sufficient to justify mechanisation,
for there was considerable local building during the 1830's and
3 31840 's and the export market was developing. Hence the continued
dominance of manual methods must be attributed to labour factors - 
production in the convict system was manual by intent, and capitalist 
production for the merchants was cheap at the depressed wage rates 
that prevailed. The validity of this attribution is strengthened by 
subsequent events, for when labour and market factors changed (Table 
4.4), mechanisation occurred.
The first wave of mechanisation occurred in response to 
Victoria's post gold rush population and the building that followed 
the 1851 gold-rush and which simultaneously increased the market for 
timber and drained Tasmania of labour; within 4 years, 19 new 
sawmills were b u i l t . T h i s  sudden spurt was followed by a 
depressed period of almost 20 years in which trade fell away and 
there was almost no further mechanisation - indeed a number of mills 
were forced to close from time to time.
The second wave of mechanisation occurred during the second half 
of the 1870's. The export markets increased by one-half and the 
internal market improved to supply the timber to mines and
railways. The price of sawn timber rose by one-third and wages by
35 36about 13%. In response, 26 new sawmills were built.
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Table 4.4
0 7Timber exports and prices : quinquennial averages/ 1850-1879
Period Average of annual values of Average of annual prices
timber exports ($000*3) in H o b a r t ______
Sawn
Timber
Split
Timber
Hewn
logs,etc.
Total Sawn
($/m3)
Palings
($/100)
Shingles 
($/1000)
1850-54 n.a. n.a. n.a. 370 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1855-59 110 100 4 214 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1860-64 64 70 4 138 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1965-69 30 66 2 98 n.a. 0.95 1.05
1870-74 42 64 2 108 3.39 0.97 0.97
1875-79 66 70 _ 8 144 4.20 1.09 1.19
The change from pit-sawing to sawmilling altered the production 
process. Tramways with wooden rails had to be built to bring logs 
from the forest to the sawmills. Normally, bullocks and horses were 
used both to snig logs to the tramways and haul them to the mills. 
A few small steam locomotives and some iron rails were in use by the 
end of the 1870's.
The sawmills were very small by modern standards, some being no 
more than conversions of or additions to flour mills. In the
1850!s, mills built in southern Tasmania were mostly powered by water 
wheels, and those in northern Tasmania by 9-15 kilowatt steam 
engines. The mills were equipped with frame saws (with 1-6 blades) 
and some with circular saws as well. By the 1870's, nearly all new 
mills were steam powered. The first detailed statistics were
published in 1885, shortly after the second wave of mechanisation.
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Table 4.5
Sawmill statistics, 188588
Water Steam Total
Number of mills 9 53 62
Average power (kW) per mill 12 18 17
Number of hand 12
Capital invested ($) 3,598
Annual value of timber ($) 4, 102
The sawmills established in the timber boom of the 1850's were
built by a variety of individual entrepreneurs: doctors, flour
millers, a clergyman, a coach builder, merchants and immigrants.
The beginnings of specialisation with distinct production structures
in 'Forest' and 'Town' sawmills soon started to emerge. The
difference lay in the markets and the degrees of processing. The
forest sawmills were located in the forest areas to reduce log
haulage. They generally produced only rough sawn green timber which
was sold either directly or to merchants who seasoned and dressed
part of it. The few (7-9) town mills were built in Hobart and
Launceston and were integrated parts of timber merchants' businesses
39catering to the local building trades.
A few forest mills, such as Cummings & Raymond's (later 
Cummings, Henry & Co) and Moore & Quiggin's, which were established 
in the areas in northern Tasmania being settled at the time, were 
able to expand and diversify. They obtained an advantage from
control over access, for the tramlines they built to bring logs to 
their sawmills also let small settlers in to clear the cut-over 
land. The sawmilling businesses were soon diversified into
providing transport, selling stores and handling the settlers' 
produce. In addition, they organised the production of shingles and 
palings by manual splitters. Production was organised in these
sawmills into the relations of the competitive sub-mode by employing 
labour on time wages. The businesses were profitable and expanded, 
occasionally by taking over other sawmills.4 *^
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Most forest sawmills, such as those in the Huon district of 
southern Tasmania, remained small affairs; some were operated by 
working proprietors in the small business structure, and others in 
the competitive sub-mode entirely with wage labour.^
The town sawmills were built by colonial businessmen already 
using timber; builders, a joiner, a shipwright and merchants. They 
not only cut timber from logs brought by ship or dray, but bought 
timber from the small forest sawmills and imported high quality woods 
for joinery and special uses. They stored, dried and resawed timber 
in their town yards to fill local orders. Several of them installed 
planing and moulding machines to dress the timber. These businesses 
have proved remarkably durable and several, such as Risby's and J & T 
Gunn's, are still in the hands of the descendants of their 
founders.^
MANUAL TIMBER WORKERS
Pit-sawing co-existed with sawmilling and, although the relative 
quantities can not be determined, appears to have remained 
significant. The census in 1870 recorded 250 people occupied as 
'sawyers' who were probably manual rather than mill workers, and a 
gazetteer in 1877 lists seven districts in which manual sawing was 
important.^ Manual workers competed with sawmills not only for the 
type of timber pit-sawn but because mill-sawn boards could replace 
split palings for cladding houses and sawn railway sleepers could 
substitute for hewn. From export statistics (Table 4.4) it appears 
that split timber, of which palings were the principal component, was 
able to hold a fairly steady place in the trade throughout the 1860's 
and 1870's, but that sawn timber declined severely during the long 
depression. As the number of sawmills did not decline to nearly the 
same extent, it appears that the brunt of the decline in exports was 
born by the pit-sawyers.
The improvement in the manual timber workers' lot provided by 
the gold-rush boom was soon reversed by the first wave of
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mechanisation, returning miners, the Master and Servant legislation, 
and falling market prices. The long depression bore particularly 
severely on the timber workers for the two structures of production -
manual and mechanised - each served to depress the other. The
situation was aggravated by the erratic nature of timber markets and 
the increasing difficulty of finding good splitting timber close to 
water.
When cutters had first come to the Huon, '... timber was so
abundant that the splitters and sawyers carried down the produce of 
their own labour to the jetty or shipping place [but] as the
conveniently situated forests were worked out ...', timber had to be 
carried further and further.^ The work was then generally divided
with some men splitting or sawing and some carrying. As market 
prices did not increase (Table 4.4) the burden of increasing 
transport costs fell on the manual producers, as the Surveyor-General 
reported in 1862:
Split stuff is now very generally obtained at a distance varying 
from six to ten 'carries' from the waters edge or some cart road 
leading thereto. (A 'carry' or 'spell' is a distance of about 
300 yards [274 m] ). If the 'stuff' be deposited direct at the 
waters edge, the cost to the splitter is only one-half of his 
daily earnings - that is the carrier receives 500 palings of 
every 1 000 that he backs down. The weights carried by these 
men are immense: about 40 palings at a time (said to weigh
between 4 and 5 lbs each [1.8-2.3 kg]) is a single load.4^
Rough tracks were built where they could be put easily and the timber
transported in horse-drawn carts. Cartage along them cost $0.06 per
kilometre for each 100 palings so that carrying and carting together
absorbed 60-70% of the value of the timber. The District Surveyor
reported that:
Generally, throughout the Huon, it takes a man a day to carry 
200 palings the distance of one mile [1.6 km], and so on in 
proportion. This loss of time, added to cartage and freight, 
leaves but a small balance for the splitter, who is dependent on 
a mere pittance for his support.^
The cutters found it increasingly difficult to pay their licence fees 
of $0.25 per week. In 1866, after representations from the men, 
Parliament reduced the weekly fees to $0.10, but raised them again 
two years later. The workers petitioned Parliamentarians for a
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reduction by calling on their sympathy for the hardship of their 
work:
... your Petitioners are engaged in a very laborious business, 
in the prosecution of which they are exposed to many hardships 
and privations. Cut off from intercourse with their fellow 
colonists, and deprived of much of the comforts of a home, they 
have to pursue their calling in the recesses of the bush exposed 
to many variations of temperature, and almost always to the 
inconveniences caused by a superabundance of moisture and the 
impossibility of the sun's rays penetrating where they have to 
seek an uncertain livelihood.
They pleaded that:
. . . your Petitioners are less able to bear any increased burdens 
now than they were in 1866 when they received much needed
relief, and therefore that the increased fees imposed since the 
beginning of 1869 have proved very oppressive to your
Petitioners, many of whom have in consequence been at times 
starved of food for themselves and families, the licence fees 
often amounting to the week's earnings. ^
The men were often helped by their wives and families and objected to
having to pay licence fees for each. However no remit was obtained
and as soon as conditions and timber prices improved even a little,
48as they did by 1873, the licence fees were doubled. Almost
simultaneously the second wave of mechanisation was introduced, which 
appears to have captured most of the expansion of the timber market.
STATE ADMINISTRATION AND LEGISLATION
Once self-government put legislative power firmly in the
gentry's hands, the conflicts between timber workers and graziers on
the Waste lands leased for grazing were stopped, the issue of timber
licences having been made subject to the grazier's consent. This
gave graziers an effective monopoly over the timber on their runs,
50which they readily applied.
Although the collection of timber licence fees was not overly 
pressed in the pastoral municipalities, it was pursued assiduously 
among small-holders and timber workers concentrated in the Huon. 
The government temporarily retrenched the timber inspectors in the 
Huon during the financial crisis that followed self-government, but
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collections dropped and a post was restored/ much to the advantage of 
revenue:
When the office of Inspector of Timber Licences was abolished 
the fees dwindled down to 173 pounds 15 shillings [$347.50] for 
the year 1858 and to 157 pounds 15 shillings for 1859, whereas 
following the (re-) appointment they rose at once to 575 pounds 
2 shillings and 6 pence [$1150.25]: this alone is convincing
proof of the necessity of having such an officer as Mr Laffer in 
the Huon District ... .
In consequence the Huon, out of 29 districts, contributed 65% of the 
timber licence fees raised in 1869-71.
The administration of the timber licence system remained divided 
between the Police and the Lands and Survey Departments. Applicat­
ions for timber licences still had to be made to local police 
magistrates who, if they approved 'the character' of the workers, 
would forward the applications and fees to Hobart where the Surveyor- 
General would issue the actual licences. There were inumerable
delays.
With the establishment of sawmills and the concentration of 
cutting in particular areas, much of the itinerant nature of the 
workforce gave way to regular employment and local residence. It
became common for sawmillers and timber merchants to lodge licence
52applications for their individual workers. Over most of the
colony, police constables had to check that sawyers and splitters
cutting on the Waste Lands had their licences. This was fraught
with difficulties. Men often worked without licences and when
caught had their wood seized and sold by the police. But it was
hard for constables to determine whether a particular stack of wood
had been cut under licence or not - or even find the boundaries
5 3between public and private land. Disputes were endless.
STRUCTURAL CHANGE
In this chapter we have seen how a new structure of producing 
timber - sawmilling - was started in Tasmania. It differed from the 
manual-merchant structure (discussed in the previous chapter) in that
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far more capital was invested to transport the logs and saw them 
mechanically.
The mills were small and most of the capital to start them came 
from colonial businesses/ modest personal savings, or immigrants 
bringing small capitals or machines. Ownership was in personal or 
family hands, sometimes formed into partnerships or even small 
companies. Owners were or became Tasmanian residents. Management 
was excercised by the owners and the proprietors of the smaller mills 
worked physically in them; that is they were conducted in both the 
small business and competitive structures.
Sawmilling was generally profitable enough for continued 
extension of tramlines and occasional expansion of business. Some 
firms were able to turn their command over access, stores, and 
capital to advantage by diversifying as produce merchants and 
traders.
Sawmillers and timber merchants did the most they could
individually within a polity dominated by the gentry. Several were
elected to Parliament, and many were active on municipal councils,
road trusts, and harbour trusts where they could influence decisions
54about the infrastructure they needed. Sawmilling contrasted
somewhat with the general pattern of the Tasmanian economy in that at 
least some mills were able to accumulate and expand during the long 
depression.
The development of sawmilling appear to have been retarded by 
the endurance of manual production based on the low wages paid to a 
proletariat depressed in part by its articulation with the legacy of 
the convict system. Conditions for manual production steadily
deteriorated to a mere subsistence level in the face of both 
mechanised production and less accessible timber.
The largest capitalists in the major sector - the pastoralists - 
with the larger merchants and bankers acquired political control 
which they exercised against smaller ratepayers, labour and the 
manual timber workers. Trees were abundant, there appears to have 
been no serious conflict between pastoralists and sawmillers in this
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period over access to them, and no state legislation or administrat­
ion had to be developed to advance or control sawmillers' specific 
interests. Thus sawmilling developed in a limited and local way 
during the third quarter of the nineteenth century within a static 
social structure dominated by pastoral production aimed mainly at 
supplying British manufacturers and the expanding mainland
colonies. All this was to change, as we shall consider in the next
chapter, as Britain increased the global spread of capital and arms 
in the age of monopoly and imperialism.
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Chapter 5
TIMBER PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN THE AGE OF MONOPOLY AND IMPERIALISM,
1880-1919
The characteristics of the capitalist world-system began to 
change from the mid-1870's so that by about the turn of the century 
the system was described as having reached the stage of 'monopoly' 
and 'imperialism'.^ In this chapter, we will consider the salient 
changes denoted by these labels, the stupendous technological changes 
that accompanied them, and their effects in Tasmania. Specifically 
we will examine the origin of the state policies of 'hydro­
industrialisation' and concession that affect development to the 
present day. We will see that the production of timber was greatly 
expanded by the existing structures and by the addition of a new 
structure - large sawmills owned by British capital. We will
consider how the state legislated to facilitate this expansion. We 
will then consider the increase of exports of timber to construct the 
infrastructure of the expanding Empire, and the state's very limited 
actions to help it. Finally, we will consider the start of the 
organised labour movement.
THE WORLD-SYSTEM
After the first half of the nineteenth century, Britain's unique
position - holding the lion's share of the world's industrial
production - could not be sustained. As industrialisation proceeded
in the US and Western Europe, and as it spread to Eastern Europe,
Russia and Japan, Britain was confronted with competitors. By the
early 1890's, both the United States and Germany had surpassed
Britain in the production of that crucial industrial commodity - 
2steel. Britain's competitors furthered their own industrialisation 
by active state assistance and protection, and moreover had the 
advantages of industrialising on a larger scale with more advanced
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technology and newer machines - very often purchased, installed and
3financed from Britain. By 1873, the rapid growth of the world's
capacity to produce was already outpacing the expansion of markets 
and this situation - a crisis of over-production - lasted for most of 
the rest of the nineteenth century. Prices and profits were driven 
down as industrialist competed against industrialist and nation 
against nation.4 The struggles to restore profits, capture markets, 
accumulate and expand yet more, resulted in the development of a new 
structure of monopoly production, the export of capital for invest­
ment in the peripheries, and fierce competition between core powers 
to divide the world into their empires. In spite of such salient 
changes, much - perhaps the bulk - of the production remained small- 
scale, local and competitive - as did Tasmanian sawmilling. Thus we 
need to consider how the local and competitive structure was affected 
by the salient new characteristics of capitalism on a world-scale.
Monopoly
The competition between many enterprises, that pressed down on 
prices and profits, was countered with variable success by a variety 
of new arrangements that are commonly collated under the general, 
though technically imprecise, label of 'monopoly'. They ranged from 
mergers at their most effective, through the creation of holding 
companies, trusts, cartels, pools and price-regulating associations,
5to gentlemen's agreements on minimum selling prices. They
developed most strongly behind suitable tariffs and in heavy
industries with few firms, and typically in commanding and growing
sectors such as steel, aluminium, electrical equipment, oil, vehicles
and chemicals. In 1903, a British industrialist reviewed the trend:
In the old days a manufactory could be an individual concern. 
Next ... a partnership .. . Then it grew beyond the capital 
available by two or three joining together as a partnership, and 
limited companies became necessary ... Now we have reached a 
further stage again, when a number of limited companies required 
to be grouped together in what we call a combine ...^
The concentration of capital necessary to build heavy industries 
was accomplished by the development of banks and financial
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institutions, which amalgamated the savings of many individuals with 
existing industrial capital into what has been termed 'finance 
capital'.7
Labour, as well as capital, organised on a larger scale. During 
the 1880's and 1890's, the organisation of British workers into 
unions extended from the skilled trades to the less recognised skills 
and labouring. The national organisation of unions led to political 
oganisation and the formation of a British labour party in 1900. 
Organisation in Australia followed, and sometimes led, on a very
Qsimilar timetable.
Imperialism
The pace and extent of European conquests in the quarter century
from 1880 were unprecedented. At the start, Britain's empire
eastwards held India, Australia and New Zealand, while Algeria had
been subjugated by France. At the end, Britain ruled 90 million
more people, France 40 million more, and Germany 15 million more;
Africa had been partitioned among these three great powers; and
almost the whole of Asia except Japan had been subjected to various
gdegrees of European rule. Although facilitated by new armaments,
military organisation and faster communications, and influenced by 
many strategic and ideological factors, the great spread of 
imperialism did provide responses to the problems of capital. 
Conquest secured markets in which Britain's position had been
unchallenged previously. Conquest protected investments made
abroad. Investment in countries where raw materials were produced 
secured, cheapened, and speeded the supply of raw materials, and
created markets for rails, locomotives, and a host of industrial
products of the imperial power c o n c e r n e d . T o  a much lesser 
extent, some materials for colonial expansion were supplied from
other imperial territories - such as railway sleepers and timbers 
from Tasmania, described later in this chapter.
Britain, although no longer the sole 'workshop of the world', 
remained hegemonic not only by imperial command, but also as 'banker
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of the world'. International trade, insurance, credit and
investment were arranged largely through London.
Technology
Of innumerable technological changes, those to transport, power 
and metals most affected sawmilling. At sea, steam predominated 
over sail from the 1880's, eventually relegating the latter to
i ■]coastal trade and a few bulky cargoes such as timber. Ships became 
larger and faster so that, in the case of timber, large, well- 
organised shipments from the Baltic and the west coast of North 
America could be made to Australian ports at freights as low as those
for small shipments across Bass Strait. Tasmania's natural
12protection - distance - vanished. On land, steel rails and steam
locomotives provided fast, cheap and reliable transport not only over
the expanding networks of industralised countries, but in new regions
13and across continents.
The progress of industralisation in the nineteenth century can
be measured readily by the total power of the world's steam engines
14which almost doubled between 1880 and 1896. In the twentieth
century the situation became more complex. Oil replaced coal for
steamships from the beginning of the new century, but did not come
into its own until the 1920's when it was used extensively for
15internal combustion engines. Electricity provided a far more
flexible and less cumbersome form of power than steam that, when 
organised as a public utility, could be purchased as a simple 
commodity. Public electricity generating stations were built in
Europe from the 1880's and regional grids to distribute their power 
were first established in the 1900's. The ability to transmit
electricity at very high voltages over long distances with little 
loss enabled the transmuted power of mountain waters - hydro­
electricity - to be brought to manufacturing centres.
The ability to use massive quantities of iron and steel rested
17on a series of manufacturing advances and cost reductions. 
Quality too improved and new alloy steels enabled superior machines
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to be made. For example, with steel of higher tensile strength and
greater flexibility it became possible to make blades for bandsaws
which had proved impractical earlier. In these machines, a
continuous band of flat steel, sawtoothed on one edge, was placed
over two large revolving pulleys between which the logs to be sawn
were passed. Large bandsaws were in use in the United States from 
181885-1890. (Such machines combined the advantages of both circular 
and frame saws by providing continuous motion at a constant cutting 
angle).
Abundant cheap electricity - typically supplied by hydro­
electric stations - enabled non-ferrous metals, such as zinc and
aluminium, to be extracted economically by electrolysis, and their
1 9production increased dramatically from the 1890's. Electricity
also reduced the manufacturing costs of other commodities such as
wood-pulp produced by the groundwood process for making newsprint.
Such energy-intensive industries were attracted to mountainous
regions with the water resources to generate hydro-electricity; the
alpine regions of Europe, the west coast of North America and
Tasmania added industrial production to their poor pastoral and
timber economies in a pattern of regional development that has been
20termed 'hydro-industrialisation'.
Public administration
The technological sophistication and huge size of the new
industries, the complexity of finance capital and world trade, and
the management of empires were made possible only by increased social
coordination and state organisation. Public bureaucracies
flourished as the state extended its functions into electricity
generation and distribution, the provision of telephones and
telegraphs, docks, general education, public health and welfare,
colonial administration, and so forth. For all this, efficient,
honest and impersonal systems of public administration, based on
merit and free from patronage, were evolved in most industrial
21countries during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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AUSTRALIA
Australia provided Britain with food, raw materials, markets, 
and safe investment opportunities. Australia's development was
within the ßnpire, yet it had its own internal impetus. Prior to 
1914, British capital in Australia was mainly directed: through loan 
funds to housing and construction, through colonial government 
borrowing to public works and railways, and by private investment to 
pastoral production, private railways and mining. Exports of meat, 
sugar, wheat, fruit, dairy, mining and forest products were 
substantially expanded in the 1900's and enabled the debts to be 
covered. Manufacturing expanded (a little), mostly to supply 
machinery for the export sectors, and to a lesser extent for domestic 
consumption. Although the relative importance of imperial
investment as against internal accumulation is debated among economic 
historians, it is clear that there were substantial differences 
between States and between sectors. In Tasmania for example,
British capital was most important in mining but short-lived in 
sawmilling.
TASMANIA
The narrow basis of production, the limited and local organisat­
ion of capital, and the static social structure (described in the 
previous chapter), were broken by the development of mining from the 
1880's which 'boomed' to provide 60% of Tasmania's exports by 
190 0.24 This was followed in the 1910's and 1920's by the 
establishment of heavy industries based on hydro-electricity. By
1920, the characteristics of corporate capital that were later to 
dominate the wood industries had been clearly developed in these 
sectors:2^
The production of each major commodity in Tasmania was monopol­
ised by a single company.
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Each major company represented an association of British and 
Australian capital.
- The Australian capital component was largely of mainland origin. 
The major companies in Tasmania had interlocking rather than 
competing interests.
- The loose association of British and Australian capital known as 
the 'Collins House' group of mining companies had acquired the 
ability to conduct scientific research to develop new processing 
technologies, and had become established in Tasmania by building 
a zinc refinery - Electrolytic Zinc Company (EZ).
The state 'encouraged' mining and industrialisation by providing
large companies with electricity, 'concessions', and privileges.
Such policies had venerable antecedents but took on particular forms
26which provided precedents for the wood industries:
The state provided industries with electricity at low or 
27subsidised rates.
The state provided rights to exploit the resources of public
lands at little or no rent.
Rights were often exclusive over all or part of the State.
“ The state undertook to exercise its coercive powers on behalf of 
the industrialist over the general population or some other 
fraction of capital. For example, rights of access or 
compulsory acquisition were granted over individual properties. 
The state legitimated the undertakings. For example, company 
by-laws governing their railways were made enforceable by 
magistrates.
In return for all these concessions, the legislation required the
companies to meet certain minimum construction and safety standards, 
and to construct the works with despatch. However, in what was to 
prove a drearily recurrent pattern in the wood industries, when 
obligations were not met, governments did little but amend them.
The transition from the static rural economy of the 1870's to
the industrial and mining economy of the twentieth century led to
Tasmanian business, state and society being increasingly incorporated 
into wider settings. This occurred in part by the take-over or
failure of local firms during hard times, as when the Tasmanian-owned
Bank of Van Diemen's Land failed in the crisis of 1891 - to the
28advantage of its mostly London-based competitors. it also
occurred in commerce for while wool had been king, international 
trade had been conducted directly with Britain. In the new mining 
era, however, most was conducted through the Melbourne head offices 
of Anglo/Australian corporations.
The trend to incorporate Tasmanian affairs into an Australian
setting reached its political climax with the federation of all the
29colonies into the Commonwealth of Australia on 1st January 1901. 
Federation was a necessary step to match the scale of the state to 
the inter-colonial operations of the largest companies. It 
guaranteed national markets unfragmented by inter-colonial tariffs. 
It opened the way for consolidating colonial debts, creating a 
central bank and legislating for uniform banking regulations, all of 
which, by increasing stability and confidence in Australia, were 
thought to enable both public and company borrowings to be obtained 
in London at lower interest rates. It consolidated military forces 
and permitted a coherent foreign policy which was required not only 
to counter the extension of French and German interest in the 
Pacific, but also to assert Australia's own extensions. Federation 
was welcomed by Tasmanian farmers looking for secure access to the 
markets of Sydney and Melbourne for their apples and potatoes, but 
was feared by smaller manufacturers operating behind inter-colonial 
tariffs.
Administrative organisations proliferated not only to conduct 
the affairs of state, employers and employees, but also to conduct a 
myriad of social affairs from hospitals, schools and mechanics 
institutes to sporting clubs, debating and conservation societies.
Unions of tradesmen, established in the 1870's and 1880's, 
formed Trades and Labour Councils in both Hobart and Launceston, and 
received the Inter-Colonial Congress of Trades Unions for its 6th 
Conference in Hobart in 1889. These early unions of skilled 
tradesmen stressed the common interests of labour and capital and
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advocated policies of protection and the encouragement of local 
onmanufacture. Unskilled workers formed a labour union in 1890 which
the pastoralists and capitalists quickly followed with their own
Employers’ Union. Several of the unions and the Trades and labour
Council itself failed to survive the depression of the 1890's. The
resurgence of unionism in Tasmania came from the labour unions. On
the west coast, workers employed by the mining companies formed a
branch of the Victorian-based Amalgamated Mining Association in
1896. Further branches were formed but the union functioned largely
as a friendly society providing welfare benefits to members and their
families. The mining companies were able to deflate the union's
efforts to some extent by supporting medical unions which provided
health benefits. After the visit of a British union leader in 1898,
the union took a more active and militant stance in the 1900's. On
the sheep runs and farms, workers were eventually organised into an
effective labour union by officials of the Australian Workers Union
32sent from the mainland in 1907. Timber workers too were helped to 
form their own union in the following year.
In the 1880's, liberal opinion organised political associations
33and successfully pressed for parliamentary reforms. In 1890,
payment to members of the House of Assembly was achieved; in 1900
manhood suffrage was obtained for the House of Assembly; and in 1903,
adult suffrage for both houses."*4 Shifting factions and coalitions
were replaced by political parties. The liberals, organised under
changing party names, dropped their policies of reform and united
35with conservative interests in opposing the emerging labor party.
A series of labour organizations, formed between 1892 and 1901, led
to the election of labour parliamentarians in 1903 and the formation
of the Worker's Political League, which subsequently became the
36Tasmanian branch of the Australian labor Party (ALP). The older
Victorian and Federal Labor parties provided critical financial and
37political support in establishing the Tasmanian party. By 1909,
with 12 members in the House of Assembly, Labor was able to stimulate
the growth of unionism which, like the party itself, was encouraged
38by mainland organisations and often led by immigrant activists.
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TIMBER PRODUCTION
Over the period considered in this chapter, the timber industry 
increased its production by two or three times. British capital 
built two large sawmills and introduced new technologies, yet small, 
simple mills operated by working proprietors continued to prepond­
erate and manual production continued into the twentieth century. 
Mining, industrialisation, construction and a steady increase in 
fruit growing expanded the internal markets which eventually absorbed 
half the production of sawn timber. Exports expanded to serve the 
spread of Empire, though overall, Victoria, South Australia and New 
Zealand remained the principal export markets.
The official statistics on production and trade for this period 
are subject to a number of serious shortcomings which must be born in 
mind throughout the following discussion:
Production statistics for sawmills were only recorded from 
1902. Sawmillers paid royalty to the state for logs taken from 
public forests on the basis of the volumes they declared, but 
cheating was endemic and is likely to have biased their returns 
to the statistician.
There are no production statistics for any manually produced 
timber.
Export statistics were collected for all timber products but 
their classification changed from time to time.
- Export statistics do not provide any detailed breakdown of 
destination after 1902, and do not record interstate exports 
between 1910 and 1921-22.
Sawmills
The number of sawmills in Tasmania increased slowly through the 
1880's and 1890's, with about 15 new mills being built each decade 
(Table 5.1). The number operating fluctuated from year to year, and 
many closed during the depression of the 1890's. In the worst year 
(1894) only 37 out of the colony's 73 mills were left at work. The 
industry slowly recovered, and had 69 mills operating by the end of
the century. Expansion started again in 1908 and about 50 new mills 
were built in the 1910's.^
Sawmill statistics:
Table 5.1
Decennial averages/ 1880-1919 4^
Period Number of saw­
mills working & 
furnishing returns
Annual volume Average number Average 
of timber of workers per power 
sawn mill (including per mill
(m^ 000) bush workers) (kW)
1880-89 56 13.3 14.4
1890-99 63 11 .7 12.8
1900-09 73 88 14. 1 14.8
1910-19 113 130 12.6 13.9
More detailed statistical information is available from 1910
onwards. A classification of sawmills by numbers employed in 1910
and 1920 (Table 5.2) shows that there were only 5-6 mills that could
be described as large (with more than 50 mill and bush employees),
but an increasing number of very small mills with 4 or less workers.
Table 5.2
Classification of sawmills by numbers employed, 1910, 1920 41
(Bush workers included)
Number of employees 1910 1920
4 & under 15 28
5 - 20 57 74
21 - 50 14 17
51 - 100 2 6
100 & over 3 -
The ownership, management and division of labour within the industry 
is illustrated by a classification of employees (Table 5.3). Few 
clerical staff were employed. The level of business management was 
remarkably unsophisticated, even in 1920 when only 211 proprietors, 
managers, overseers and clerical staff administered 131 sawmills.
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Table 5.3
Employment classification, 1910/ 1920 ^
Employment class _____________ 1910___________1920
Numbers employed
Working proprietors 135 97
Managers & overseers 70 ) 114
Accountants & clerks 61 )
Engine drivers & firemen 145 )
Other workers 1,234 ) 1,536
Carters 106 )
Total 1,751 1,747
During the period considered in this chapter, production became 
more specialised and four distinct types can be recognised: town
mills, general forest sawmills, small case mills, and the new 
structure of large sawmills.
Town sawmills
The town mills, owned by Tasmanian merchant/sawmillers (such as 
those described in the previous chapter), produced hardwood by sawing 
logs and re-sawing timber already rough sawn in the forest mills. 
They also specialised in seasoning, dressing and moulding, and 
handled a variety of high value and some imported woods for special 
uses. They sold mostly to internal markets and their numbers (6 - 
8) remained fairly steady.
General forest sawmills
The mills scattered through the forests were mostly small and 
worked by a handful of men, usually including the owner of the often 
primitive machinery, cutting rough-sawn green timber. Labour
relations were immediate and personal and took diverse forms. For 
example, small mills were sometimes leased to experienced men who 
operated them either as sub-contractors or on their own account; and 
sometimes a crew worked a small mill on a piece-work basis in which
they were paid collectively on the quantity produced and left to 
divide the amount between themselves. The larger forest mills 
operated with normal wage relations.
Case mills
The increase in the total number of mills in the 1910's is 
largely due to the small case mills that were built to provide for 
the rapidly increasing apple exports. By 1913 there were already 40 
of them.4  ^ They were almost all small individually or family owned 
businesses operated either by the orchardists themselves or closely 
associated with them. The logs were often obtained from orchardists' 
own properties or from land being cleared for further orchards. 
There was some overlap between the general forest and case mills as 
the former often produced case shooks as a side line, and the latter 
could cut scantling and farm timbers for local use.
Large mills
The two large mills built by imperial capital are described 
later in this chapter.
TIMBER EXPORTS
Both the value and composition of timber exports changed over 
the period (Table 5.4). Overall, exports increased considerably in 
both quantity and value, though they fluctuated year by year and 
dropped to less than a quarter of previous values during the worst 
years of the 1890's. From the 1880's, increasing quantities of 
Blackwood were sold on the mainland for making furniture and for 
fitting out railway carriages - which raised the average value 
somewhat.
The demand for palings gradually fell away from its peak in the 
1860's. Other manually produced timbers, staves, piles, beams, some 
sleepers etc, are included with the few logs exported under the
heading 'Other' in Table 5.4. Virtually none of the sawn timber was 
produced by pit-sawing after the 1880's, hence the proportion of 
manually produced timber fell from about 40% in the 1880's to about 
5% by the end of the period. Mechanisation had taken almost a 
century to vanquish manual production.
Table 5.4
44Average annual value of timber exports/ 1880-1909
($ 000)
Period Sawn timber Palings Other Total
1880-89 60.2 23.9 16.8 100.9
1890-99 43.4 7. 1 12.4 62.9
1900-09 151.9 11.8 8.5 172.2
The distribution of exports changed markedly (Table 5.5). 
During the 1 8 8 0 'S /  the principal mainland markets continued much as 
they had done in the. 1 8 7 0 ' s ,  while the New Zealand trade halved. 
During the 1 890's, the mainland trade almost halved while the New 
Zealand trade fell by one-third. New markets with Britain and South 
Africa had by then appeared and were eagerly sought after to offset 
the general decline. Improvements in the Australian economy/ and the 
removal of inter-colonial tariffs with federation, enabled the 
mainland trade to recover in the 1 9 0 0's but only to a level trivially 
higher than it had been in the 1 8 6 0 ' s ,  1 8 7 0 ' s  and 1 8 8 0 ' s .
Table 5.5
Markets for timber exports, 1880, 1909
Period Average 
annual 
value 
($ 000)
Proportion
Australia
of value (%)
Overseas
NSW Vic SA Other Total NZ UK South Other 
Africa
Total
1880-89 100.9 7 45 27 8 80 19 1 20
1890-00 62.9 16 19 30 6 71 18 5 4 2 29
1900-02 81.9 13 24 21 1 59 24 9 7 1 41
1903-09 211.0 n.a. 49 n.a. 51
The growth of exports in the 1900's was due almost entirely to
overseas trade and particularly to that with South Africa.
Unfortunately Tasmanian export statistics do not provide details of
country of destination after 1902/ and the relative importance of the
major markets of New Zealand, South Africa and Britain must be judged
by other means. The import statistics for New Zealand show that
imports from Tasmania remained at a very steady level between 1900 
46and 1913. South Africa is judged to have been a larger market than 
Britain on the grounds that the mass of contemporary documents deal 
with the export of large quantities of railway sleepers and mining 
timbers to South Africa, but refer mainly to the difficulties of 
maintaining high quality for the fastidious British market. ^
A comparison of the production and export statistics for sawn 
timber for 1902-1909 indicates that 52% of production was
4 0exported. However a further reservation about statistical
reliability must be made here due to the possible incompatibility of 
the statistics from the two different collections.
SAWMILLING AND THE STATE, 1880-1895
In the 1880's and early 1890's, Tasmanian sawmilling continued
to expand, much as it had in the 1870's, on local capital. The new
mills were similar to the larger mills built in the 1870's.
Typically, logs were pulled by horses along 2-3 kilometres of wooden
tramway. The mills were powered by 10-20 kW steam engines and
equipped with large vertical frame saws to break down the logs, and
circular saws for re-sawing and cross-cutting. About 25-30 men were
employed of whom at least half worked in the bush. They put out
49about 60 cubic metres a week.
Not only were increasing numbers of such sawmills being built, 
steadily extending their tramlines further into the forests, but 
settlers and speculators were looking for new land. The rounds of 
the resulting competition for the forested waste lands were marked by 
legislation.
In the 1870's capital in a sawmill or tramway that drew logs 
from the Waste Lands was always at risk for public land could be 
selected for agricultural settlement but not for timber purposes. 
The risk to sawmillers was aggravated because the access their 
tramways provided and the partial cutting of the forest made the land 
more attractive to selectors. As sawmilling expanded the best
forest land acquired value for its timber, yet it was often the same 
soils carrying the best stands that also attracted the selector. 
Selectors often 'improved' their blocks by ringbarking the forest 
leaving the trees to die. Valuable timber resources were thereby 
diminished and by 1878:
. . . opinions of some of the most experienced sawmillers were 
unanimous that the supply was declining rapidly. But this 
arises not so much from the quantity of the timber cut as from 
the absence of timber reserves where the sawyer might precede 
the settler.
In the 1880's, new settlers occupied only a small proportion of
the 14,000 selections made; speculation and 'dummying' to extend
5 1existing holdings were prevalent. Some blocks were selected in
the middle of grazing leases or timber cutting areas merely to sell
them at a profit in a form of blackmail. In response others were
selected by graziers and sawmillers, or their nominees, to protect
their investments. Repeated legislation in the 1880's and 1890's
5 2attempted to promote genuine settlement, but with little success.
In the forest, the interests of manual timber cutters could
conflict with those of sawmillers and selectors. Splitters took 
only the best parts of free-splitting trees, wasted many valuable
logs, and sometimes:
'... left the ground ... so covered with logs and heads of trees 
that many years must elapse before intending settlers will be
found to select it for the purpose of clearing for 
cultivation'.^
In other cases the interests were complementary and generally, the
small-holding settlement that took place in the Huon district was
closely related to the timber industry. Many genuine selectors '...
earn[t] the chief part of their living by working timber and
preparing it for the market .. . ' or working in nearby sawmills while
54gradually clearing their blocks.
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In 1875, sawmillers in the Huon district proposed that 
settlement should be kept two years behind cutting to allow the 
timber to be removed. In 1878, a Select Committee worried about
the possible destruction of valuable species and made a sketchy 
report recommending that ' . .. the falling of Huon Pine be prohibited,
Csave under regulations to be made by the Governor-in-Council1.
Legislation in 1881 provided that reserves for the
preservation and growth of timber .. . ' could be proclaimed by the
Governor in Council. The reserves seem to have been intended as
areas in which selection would be delayed only until the timber had
been removed, to which end the Act provided that they could be
altered or revoked on 60 days' notice. More enduring reserves, in
which cutting could be prohibited by proclamation, seem to have been
envisaged only for water supply or recreation purposes. Otherwise
cutting was allowed under the same system of licensing cutters as
applied elsewhere on Waste Lands of the Crown. Few reserves were
created in the next few years as the press of survey and other work
for the mining boom on the west coast absorbed most of the state's
administration. By 1884, only 9,959 hectares had been reserved and
the Deputy Surveyor-General urged:
...that State Forest Reserves be established all over the
island, but at the present time principally in the new settled
Districts where the wholesale destruction of very valuable58timber is going on.
By 1886, the area of forest reserves still only totalled 20,841
59hectares and only 425 hectares were added in the next three years.
In 1885, legislation enabled the staff of the Crown Lands office
to be increased by the appointment of a 'Conservator of Forests':
... who shall have the management and control of all Waste Lands 
of the Crown which may be reserved to Her Majesty for the 
preservation or growth of timber, or for places of public 
recreation, and also of such other Waste Lands of the Crown as 
may be by the Governor in Council assigned to his care, and who 
shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed.
The post of Conservator was filled between 1886 and 1892 and then
allowed to lapse. Protection of the forest reserves, supervision of
regulations and cutters was still left to one Timber Inspector and
some 40 local policemen appointed as Crown Land Bailiffs.
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The much-amended Waste Lands Act of 1863 was replaced with The
Crown Lands Act, 1890 which enabled the re-named public lands to be
leased for tramways, wharves, jetties or mill sites for a period of
6114 years with an option of renewal for a further 14 years. 
Otherwise licences to cut timber were still issued to individuals for 
up to a year at a time and sawmillers had no security of supply even 
from the forest reserves.
It was not until 1895 that sawmillers could take out leases on 
forest reserves, but their tenure was limited to 5 years and their 
area to 202 hectares. Sawmillers had to pay for surveys of their
leases and an annual rental of $0.05 per hectare. By 1897, the
Department of Lands and Survey had received applications for 13 
leases over a total of 1,787 hectares.
Thus by the mid 1890's, increasing numbers of small and 
moderately-sized sawmilling businesses obtained only very limited 
rights to state-controlled resources. Although the waste of valuable 
timber was well known, the slight increase in state administrative 
staff did little more than write a few reports.
THE EMPIRE, SAWMILLING AND THE STATE, 1895-1914
The spread of British capital and empire affected the timber 
industry in Tasmania by increasing exports and direct investment.
Mines were opened and railways built across southern Africa from 
the 1880's. Most of the railway sleepers and mine timbers had to be 
imported, largely from the Jarrah forests of Western Australia, but 
also from Tasmania after 1898.^ Hewn sleepers were preferred to 
sawn and the market provided work at least initially for '. . . a large 
number of men squaring by hand ...' and some sawmills. The trade
was conducted by Tasmanian timber merchants, such as R.A. Robertson 
and H.E. Day, who visited and developed contacts with South African 
businesses and railways.
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Greater trade and larger vessels, of both the merchant marine 
and the Royal Navy, needed new deep-water docks. The very long 
heavy piles that could be hewn from Blue Gum grown in southern 
Tasmania were ideal, and a flourishing but specialised export trade 
was developed not only for the harbours of Melbourne and Auckland, 
but for such emblematic structures as the Admiralty Docks in Dover 
(England) and Simonstown (South Africa).
The first proposal to invest British capital in sawmilling came 
in 1897 as a subsidiary part of a proposal to build a cement works on 
Maria Island. A local agent requested that over half the island be 
proclaimed a forest reserve :
... with a view to a timber licence being granted whenever 
applied for [so that] this additional industry [sawmilling] 
would be an extra inducement to Capitalists in England to start 
the [cement] works without further delay1. ^
Not only did the Minister and Secretary for Lands agree, but
legislation was passed in 1898 to provide much greater security and
scale of operation by extending the maximum area that could be leased
in a timber reserve from 202 hectares to 2023 hectares and the period
from 5 to 21 years. Regulations were introduced for the orderly
working of such large leases by dividing them into 10 equal blocks to
be worked sequentially, and providing that as soon as a block was cut
out it could be released for selection and the lease rental reduced
proportionately. Sawmillers were required to build a mill of size
69proportionate to the lease area:
Nominal power (kW) Lease area (ha)
22
15
2,023
1,214
11
4
405
202
The regulations were shortly amended to require a lessee to erect 
' .. . good and effective machinery ...' within three months of 
receiving a lease and calling for larger mills to warrant the larger
123
leases, viz:^
Nominal power (kW) 
lb 
30 
15 
7
Lease area (ha) 
2,023 
1,214 
607
40
The 1898 Act also changed the manner in which revenue was 
collected. Although manual cutters were still licensed, sawmillers 
were charged royalties based on the quantity of timber they declared 
they had sawn from logs cut on Crown land. Rates were set initially 
at $0.03 per cubic metre for Eucalypts and $0.15 per cubic metre for
Huon Pine and Blackwood, but when the sawmillers complained the rates
71were halved.
In 1899, the lands and Surveys Department transferred one of 
their officers from the Stock Branch, appointed him Chief Forest 
Officer, and titled his administration the 'Forests Branch'. For 
the next twenty years the strength of the Branch varied from one to 
about four depending on how many Timber Inspectors were appointed. 
Their principal functions were the collection of revenues and later 
the certification of timber exports.
As soon as the Boer War ( 1899-1902) was over, African mining and 
railway construction proceeded apace, funded both by British capital 
and the fabulous wealth of the diamond and gold mines. The promise 
of the expanding South African timber market led to two companies 
being formed to exploit the forests of southern Tasmania: the Huon
Timber Company and the Tasmanian Timber Corporation. Both built 
large mills - their development only proceeding with substantial 
legislative support.
7 7Huon Timber Company
The Huon Timber Company was promoted by R.A. Robertson. 
Robertson secured leases to 8,903 hectares of forest in the Arve and 
Kermandie River catchments behind Geeveston, and the active
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involvement of John Geeves & Sons, owners of the local 'Speedwell' 
sawmill and 546 hectares of forest land. John Geeves secured the 
lease to a further 1,659 hectares, and with Osborne Geeves had a 
number of tramway rights including that to the old Liverpool and 
Honeywood Tramway. Robertson proposed to construct a large sawmill, 
a hydro-electric scheme and a local railway system.
In 1901, a private Bill was successfully promoted which 
consolidated the leases into one and provided an option of renewal 
for a further 21 years. This gave security of tenure for 42 years 
all told, which was comparable to the 40 to 60 year periods given to 
the larger mining companies. Although the lease was divided into 
202 hectare blocks, several could be worked at once and only one 
sawmill had to be constructed. Rights for tramways, jetties and 
water were provided. Robertson persuaded a group of Glasgow
capitalists, including two of the leading timber merchants, to invest 
and form the Huon Timber Company in 1902.
With plentiful finance the company built what was claimed to be 
the largest sawmill in Australasia. It was certainly the largest 
and most technologically advanced in Tasmania, being equipped with 
the latest Canadian machines. Instead of frame saws, the mill had 
two large band saws for breaking down the logs into flitches. Much 
of the manual handling was eliminated by new sorts of machines. Many 
of them were driven by electricity generated on the site. A 
substantial railway with metal rails was built into the forest. The 
original 10 kilometres of heavy construction were eventually extended 
by a further 54 kilometres, mostly of lighter construction. Instead 
of bullocks and horses, steam powered winches, known as 'steam 
hauliers', were used to pull logs from the forest to the rail lines, 
and four steam engines pulled trains of logs to the mill. By 1911, 
$210,000 had been invested.
73Tasmanian Timber Corporation
In 1900, the British Transvaal and General Finance Company Ltd, 
whose head office was in London, set up a subsidiary - the Tasmanian
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Timber Corporation Ltd - registered in England. It appears to have
been largely a family company. The company was interested in both
grazing and sawmilling, and took up land in three places: on South
Bruni Island/ at Port Esperance, and around Southport. Grazing
leases were secured for 14 years over 3/238 hectares of Crown Land
and initial payments made to purchase 557 hectares, mostly of second
class land, from the Crown. Five sawmilling leases were taken out
in June 1900 over a total of 8,182 hectares. One lease of 2,023
hectares was on South Bruni, another of the same size was at
Southport, and the others were in a consolidated block at
Esperance. In the same month the regulations were revised,
apparently at the suggestion of the Timber Inspector, to make the
maximum lease area comparable with the power of the largest existing
74local mills:
Nominal power (kW) Lease area (ha)
19 2,023
15 1,416
10 405
6 80
The company built the 'specially powerful' Hopetoun sawmill at 
Dover (Port Esperance) in 1901-02 at an initial cost of about
$112,000. Although the mill was larger than any previously built in 
Tasmania (it was built before the Huon Timber Company's mill), it did 
not represent any significant technological change.
In 1902, the Tasmanian Timber Corporation promoted a private
Bill drafted much along the lines of the Huon Timber Company's
Act. They sought greater security of tenure and the right to erect 
1 large mill for all 5 leases rather than a separate one on each. 
Opposition came from smaller local sawmillers who objected to big 
mills '... taking over all the country . . .' when their own requests 
for special reserves had always been refused. The resulting Act 
awarded the Tasmanian Timber Corporation a special lease which 
allowed them to work their Esperance leases to the Hopetoun mill and 
permitted them to delay building mills on the other two areas. 
Moreover it provided that the lease could last with renewal for 42
years
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Although the eventual cost of the mill, associated equipment,
works and land was rumoured to have been $240,000, a balance sheet
struck in 1908 shows that 40% of the assets (excluding properties)
75were spent on getting logs to the mill.
Failure
Despite magnificent forests, large leases and extended tenure
specially provided by the state, and although they appeared to be
squeezing out small local mills at first, neither the Huon Timber
Company nor the Tasmanian Timber Corporation was a commercial
success. In 1906, the Tasmanian Timber Corporation was sold to
other British interests and renamed the Tasmanian Hardwood 
76Corporation. By 1908, neither company had paid a dividend and both
appointed an energetic local company, Henry Jones and Co., to manage
their affairs. Henry Jones was primarily concerned in making jams
but had diversified into boat building and sawmilling by taking
shares in the Huon Timber Company. However Henry Jones failed to
make the mills profitable and they were purchased, at a fraction of
their cost, by Millar's Karri and Jarrah Company Limited. Millar's
was then a predominantly British company which flourished by
producing and exporting Western Australian timbers to South Africa,
and had expanded into New South Wales, the Phillipines, Greece,
77France and England. They were able to buy the Huon Timber Company
and the Tasmanian Hardwood Corporation for about one-third of their 
cost. Millar's too were unable to make the Huon Timber Company
profitable and eventually closed the Geeveston mill in 1924.
Whilst the imperial spread had appeared to provide opportunities 
for imperial capital to profit in Tasmanian production, the reality 
was disappointing. Western Australia, with better timbers and
shorter routes, remained the major Australian supplier. In
Tasmania, the largest mill, with its elaborately engineered railway, 
was probably too capital intensive to compete with a host of small 
mills built with wooden tramways and operated with more intensive use 
of cheap labour. But as we have seen, the addition of a large-scale
imperial structure to what had been solely a small-scale local
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industry effected changes to state legislation to meet the demands 
for greater protection of larger investments.
EXPORTS AND THE STATE
Opportunities in distant markets were sought not only by large 
British-owned companies with their own trade connections, but also by 
many smaller Tasmanian mills and merchants. Efforts beyond the
means of most individual mills were needed, however, to get Tasmanian 
timbers accepted in new markets and to ensure their quality. The 
state responded, though in a half-hearted way, by promoting Tasmanian 
timber in overseas markets and by providing an inspection service.
Promotion
Although samples of Tasmanian timbers had been sent to London
from the earliest colonial days, and the qualities of the better
timbers (Huon Pine, Blackwood and Blue Gum) had secured some
favourable reports, they were little known. Attempts were made to
78promote them in London but with little success.
The entrepreneur H.E. Day made energetic attempts in 1903 to
promote sales of Tasmanian sleepers to the South African railways.
He received only brief and formal replies to his enthusiastic letters
to the Lands Department, and when he at last managed to arrange for
the South African authorities to test some sleepers, the Tasmanian
Government sent only three, and then charged the South Africans for 
79them I In 1905, the only promotional step to be followed
consistently was taken when the Lands Department published a booklet 
of technical and commercial information which was distributed to 
overseas enquirers.88
Inspection
More than promotion was needed to increase exports for new 
opportunities could be easily lost if the quality delivered was poor,
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Q 1as it sometimes was. The problem lay in ensuring that products
like railway sleepers and piles# for which long-lasting qualities 
were required# were cut from durable timbers like Blue Gum and 
Ironbark. Durable species generally grew intermingled with less
durable ones# the woods appeared much alike and were 
indistinguishable to foreign purchasers# yet their performance varied 
greatly. The timbers were produced by many individuals or sawmills 
working and shipping from isolated locations and it was all too easy 
for inferior species to be 'palmed off' on buyers to the long-term 
detriment of the trade in general.
For major purchases, the British Admiralty sent out their own
timber inspector to Tasmania# but this was hardly possible for other
buyers and in 1905 the Lands Department provided a voluntary timber
82inspection service. For a fee# the Department's inspector would
examine and brand timber that met government specifications# and
issue a certificate. Buyers very quickly took advantage of the
scheme and called for certificates with purchases. Inspection did
reject unsatisfactory material# but there were difficulties as
83inspection could only be arranged at sawmills or dockside. It was
too difficult for the inspector to visit manual cutters scattered
widely in the forests and hewn sleepers# which the market preferred#
84were initially excluded from the scheme. Railway sleepers were
branded as they were being loaded on ship which did not allow the 
inspector sufficient time to examine them and resulted in thousands 
of quick rotting Swamp Gum sleepers being certified as durable Blue 
Gum in a shipment sent to the Egyptian railways.
In the affair of the Ganges, the failure of inspectors to reject
unsuitable timbers in 1909 led to a well publicised parliamentary
85attack on the government of the day. In 1908# an English firm
acting through import agents placed a large order with Henry Jones# 
managing agents of the Huon Timber Company# for 822 very long Blue 
Gum piles. They asked the government to have the piles inspected# 
and the import agents sent their own representative to Tasmania. 
Four contractors duly cut the timber around Port Esperance and on 
Tasman's Peninsula. Inspector Dearden issued certificates covering
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768 hewn piles and 158 sawn beams on the Ganges, and another 75 piles 
on another vessel, certifying them all as Blue Gum. However as the 
contractors admitted, and the local Crown Lands Bailiff confirmed, 
most of them were Stringybark. The Ganges sailed with what the 
Department believed to be 109 pieces of Blue Gum, 341 pieces of 
Stringybark and 110 pieces of quick rotting Swamp Gum. The Huon 
Timber Company and the import agents’ representative sought 'cover- 
up' letters and certificates from the Minister of Lands and the 
Secretary of Lands. The matter went to Cabinet which, being afraid 
of the possibility of being sued for damages on account of the false 
certificates, finally decided to send a weak 'cover-up' letter to the 
English purchasers. Judging from the inspection fees collected
(Table 5.7), the scheme was still used after the 1909 scandals but 
less frequently.
STATE REVENUES FROM TIMBER
Revenues from timber were obtained by the state for: licences 
issued to the sawyers and splitters (introduced in 1834), rents for 
timber leases and permits (introduced in 1895), royalties on the 
quantities of logs cut by sawmills (introduced in 1898), and fees for 
timber inspections (introduced in 1905). Ensuring that all were 
paid required adequate, efficient and honest administration, which 
was not completely established until the 1940's, so that the amounts 
collected (Table 5.6) were consistently less than they should have 
been.
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Table 5.6
State revenue from timber, 1903-1939 88
Annual averages ($)
Period Timber Leases and permits
licence rents royalties
fees
1903 -08/09 2,894 1,818 1,630
1909/10-18/19______2,472________ 3.206________2,872
* 1905/06 to 1908/09 only
Timber Other 
inspection
fees_________
1,018* 
622 94
Timber workers
The problem of ensuring that licence fees had been paid by
cutters and splitters was an enduring one. The timber regulations
were still supervised in most areas by policemen acting as Crown
Lands Bailiffs, and the administrative confusions of the 1840's still
continued in the 1900's. The 1890 Act provided that timber cut on
Crown Land without a licence could be seized and sold but, though
87this was frequently done, unlicensed cutting continued. The
problem was worst on the west coast where 'the piners' cutting Huon
Pine worked in the most isolated places. On an inspection of the
King River in 1904, for example, the Chief Forest Officer found that:
At no time were there an adequate amount of licences taken out 
for the number of men employed and there can be no doubt that 
the Department has lost a large amount of revenue in licence 
fees .. .88
In this case, the Crown Lands Bailiff was suspected of collusion with 
a local sawmiller, blamed for negligence and sacked. A new timber 
bailiff reported that '... the pining industry has got into a fearful 
muddle and is the hotbed of larceny and chicanery . . . ' . Even an
honest bailiff could not readily get on top of the piners on his own 
and the logs he seized were sometimes seized right back again!90
Sawmillers
Rents for leases were collected easily as the rights could be
cancelled by notice in the Gazette. This was done, and the revenue
91obtained closely matched that due.
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Royalties on the quantities of timber cut on leases and permits 
were the major focus of conflict between sawmillers and the state 
administration in respect of both the rates at which they were set 
and the extent to which they were collected. Rates varied with 
species (Table 5.7), and were changed periodically (Table 5.8)..
Table 5.7
9 2Examples of royalty rates for different species
1898 1918
($ 3,per m ) ($ per m3)
Eucalypt 0.02 0.03
Pine 0. 17 0.50
Blackwood 0.17 0.50
Beech 0. 17 0. 13
Table 5.8
Royalty rates on eucalypt logs , 1898-1918 93
Date from Rate
($ per m3)
25 November 1898 0. 033
21 June 1900 0.017
1 January 1905 0.033
October 1905 0.017
1918 0.033
case for higher rates was made consistently by
administration. For example, the Secretary for Lands pressed for
higher royalties in 1901-02 during his evidence to the Select 
Committees on the private bills for the Huon Timber Company and the 
Tasmanian Timber Corporation. In 1903, noting that the state had 
only collected $925 in royalties for timber with a market value of 
$100,000, he recommended restoring the rate to $0.03 per cubic metre 
which would still have been lower than in any other State. The
government increased the rate in January 1905 but by October
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pressure by sawmi Ilers on 'the powers that be' had succeeded in 
having the rate reduced back to $0.02 per cubic metre where it
Q  Aremained until 1918.
When royalties for timber were introduced in 1898, there was no 
adequate administration to ensure they were paid; the system relied 
on sawmillers declaring the quantity they had cut and forwarding 
their payments. It was- not until 1907 that millers were even 
required to keep registers of the logs taken from Crown Land. When 
an investigation was made, it:
... very clearly demonstrated the inaccuracy of the attested 
returns that had been supplied, while an examination of the Log 
Register Book showed that the measurements entered therein were 
fictitious
In spite of these reports, the state took no action to strengthen the 
administration and the collection of royalties remained a problem 
throughout.
FOREST RESOURCES AND THE STATE
The Acts of 1881, 1885, and 1898 provided some security for
sawmills drawing on timber reserves, largely by delaying selection
until timber had been removed, and the private Acts in 1901 and 1902
did give longer security to two large companies, but did not secure
resources for the majority of sawmills that drew their supplies from
public land outside the timber reserves or from private land.
Continued land clearing and cutting depleted the easily accessible
resources. By 1903 the stands readily accessible to water transport
had been cut out, and sawmillers were having to log as far as 8
kilometres back from the coast. This made sawmilling more
expensive for the medium and large mills which had to invest capital
in building immovable tramlines that could equal the cost of the mill
itself. Apparently to make the limited resources available to more
lessees the maximum area of lease was reduced to 405 hectares in 1903
97but relaxed slightly to 607 hectares in 1911. By contrast, the
many smaller mills tended to be moved frequently to wherever small
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Q  Oeasily accessible patches of timber could be found.
While the need for resources by individual small capitalists 
could be met by mobility, and those of individual medium and large 
capitalists could be met by reserves and leases, the long-term needs 
of capital in general required policies to counter the depletion of 
the forest resources; that is, for the reproductive function of 
forestry.
Forestry was advocated in Tasmania at the turn of the century, 
not by individual capitalists concerned with production, but by 
officials and intellectuals in government reports and the Proceedings 
of the Royal Society of Tasmania. "  A strategy of planting exotic 
species, such as English Oak and Radiata Pine, was put forward partly 
to replace imports of softwoods (which were costing 41% of the value 
of timber imports in the 1900's) and partly as the rough unseasoned 
timber produced in Tasmania presented many building difficult­
ies.^*^ The leisurely response by the state consisted only in 
setting aside a corner of the Botanic Gardens as an arboretum, 
starting two small tree nurseries in 1908, and planting small trials 
in 1916.101 More usefully, in 1909, 47,349 hectares of young
regrowth stands were placed in reserves, but only where the land was 
poor and in isolated situations where it was unlikely to be required 
for selection.
Forestry was advocated not only by Tasmanians for Tasmania, but 
by Australians for the Commonwealth, and Britons for the Empire. 
Imperial concern for the deteriorating condition of Australia's
forests was expressed by the Governor-General and in a State-by-State 
inspection and report in 1915 by D.E. Hutchins, a former Conservator 
of Forests in Capetown. He was appalled at the destruction of
Tasmania's forests by clearing and fire, by 'reckless' grants to
sawmillers, and the complete absence of any policy to secure the
103reproduction of the forests. Interstate conferences on forestry
brought together politicians and officials from the States and 
Commonwealth. Tasmania became increasingly involved, first sending 
the Government Botanist in 1911 and 1912, then the Premier and
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Surveyor-General in 1916. In spite of all this, the Tasmanian state 
took no significant action during the period considered here, either 
to control the rate of resource depletion or to conserve its 
productive capacity.
THE FEDERATED TIMBER WORKERS UNION
The scattered and small-scale nature of production, combined
with the prevalence of piece work, inhibited the assembly and
combination of workers to pursue their common interests and made the
management of a union, when established very difficult. A society
that probably included some timber workers existed in 1890 but did 
104not last. Sporting contests - 'wood-chops' - brought axemen
together from the turn of the century, but their association remained 
a sporting body.
The transition from manual to mechanised production concentrated 
and settled workers, and as districts with several mills developed, 
such as the Huon, sufficient numbers were thrown together to permit 
organisation. In addition, the town mills diversified into joinery, 
furniture, and other wood manufactures, so that the workers and
craftsmen making these goods strengthened the ranks of the timber
. 106 workers.
The creation of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court in 1904, and
the passing of the Harvester award in 1907, that established the
concept of a basic minimum wage, was followed in Tasmania in 1910 by
legislation for State Wages Boards that could determine wages and
conditions by agreement between representatives of employers and
workers. With mainland help, new unions were established that could
push workers' interests before State Boards and if necessary press
for claims to be made in the federal arena. A union of timber
workers was established from 1908 with help from the Australian
107Workers Union - established in Tasmania the year before. By 1911,
the Tasmanian branch of the Federated Sawmill, Timber Yard and 
General Woodworkers' Employees Association of Australasia, known as
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the Federated Timber Workers Union, had listed workers throughout the
108State, though only 633 appear to have been financial members. 
This gave the union an effective membership equivalent to about one- 
third of the total employment in sawmilling.
The union, which appears to have fallen away during the war,
achieved little through the State Wages Board. By 1918, the men:
. . . were thoroughly disgusted with the conditions under which
they were working, they also bitterly complained re the 
administration of the [Tasmanian] Industrial Department 
[responsible for supervising State Wages Board awards] also
1 H Qhaving no protection under the Workers Compensation Act.
The union was completely reorganised as the No. 6 Tasmanian Branch of 
the Australian Timber Workers Union (ATWU-T). A new committee was 
formed, and an energetic Organising Secretary, W. Scanlon, enrolled 
1209 members within the year.^^ Thus by the end of the period 
considered here, the union in Tasmania had become reasonably well 
organised and, although it had made little advance either by direct 
negotiation with employers or through the State Wages Board, was soon 
to join branches in other States in action before the Commonwealth 
Arbitration Court.
CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT
We have considered at some length the changes that took place at 
levels of the world capitalist system, Tasmanian society, and the 
timber industry there, between the mid-1870's and the First World 
War. We can now review these changes and consider the articulations 
between these different levels and the structures involved.
The monopoly structure of production, that characterised the new 
stage of the world-economy, clearly superseded other structures in 
Tasmanian mining, but did not enter pastoral, agricultural or timber 
production which remained organised in small business and competitive 
structures. The spread of empire and the export of metropolitan 
capital, which also characterised the new stage, did result in 
substantial change however. Investment in South Africa doubled
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markets for Tasmanian timbers and stimulated all structures of timber 
production. In Tasmanian mining, British capital took a particular 
form of association with Australian capital which was to govern much 
of the later development in the wood industries, and it was the rapid 
expansion of mining that stimulated economic growth and broke the 
stagnant inter-class relationships. The investment of British
capital in a much larger scale of Tasmanian sawmilling did produce 
substantial changes to state legislation and administration. The 
factors of scale and capital source were confounded however, so that 
we can not say which was most important. We can see that state 
policies of concession, developed in the mining sector (dominated by 
the monopoly structure), were applied to the larger mills in the 
competitive structure of sawmilling. That is to say they were not
unique to the sub-modes of production. Thus we have seen that
substantial superstructural change was initiated not only by change 
between sub-modes, but by the addition of a different structure of 
production within the competitive sub-mode.
The state did little more than collect revenue and assist 
production by providing some security of tenure for the larger 
capitals against selection. Although it was well recognised that 
the forest resource was being wasted and destroyed, the state took no 
effective action to reproduce it. That is, the state did not act to
reproduce the resource that would enable capital in general to be 
reproduced in the long-term. It only acted to secure production from 
the resource by small business and competitive fraction of capital, 
and the short-term individual interests of these did not need 
policies of forest conservation. The actions of the state in
providing concessions to the new large mills and in establishing a 
timber inspection service can be described in terms of the theory 
that the state acts to meet the logical needs of capital. This 
model does not explain, however, why the state fatted to act in the 
long-term general interests of capital (by reproducing the resource) 
or why the inspection service was so lax.
The period considered here ended with the First World War and 
the intent of Russia to pursue a path of socialist development. The
137
world-system within which the Tasmanian timber industry developed was 
fashioned quite differently in the subsequent period.
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Chapter 6
TRANSITION AND INDUSTRIALISATION, 1920-1945
The tumultuous period of the two World Wars and the great 
economic depression between them contained the transition from one 
stage of the capitalist world-system to another; from monopoly and 
imperialism (considered in the previous chapter) to late capitalism 
and neo-imperialism (considered in the next). It was a period
during which hegemony shifted, and the imperial characteristic 
weakened. After the First World War, it was the United States
without an empire, rather than Britain with one, that became the 
economic leader; and it was the US that emerged from the Second World 
War as the undoubted hegemonic power of capitalism.
Between the wars, Britain attempted to recover her economy 
within the shelter of her Empire, and favoured Australia as a 
destination for investment. Australia added a policy of industrial­
isation to her traditional development strategy of expanding rural 
and mineral exports, and encouraged both British and Australian 
capitalists to manufacture and replace imports, or process raw 
materials before export. And manufacturing did expand though, given 
the vicissitudes of the period, most unevenly. In the Tasmanian
wood industries in particular a kiln-drying process was added to
season sawn timber artificially, and on a much larger scale the heavy 
industry of making pulp and paper was established.
In this chapter, we will outline the effects of depression and 
war on Australian development and on the existing structures of
Tasmanian sawmilling. Then we will consider the addition of first, 
kiln-drying, and second, pulp and paper making. In this we will be 
concerned to see the relationships between the different structures 
of production, and between them and the state.
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AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENT
New technologies were used for new production as electricity, 
oil, cars and aeroplanes took over from wood, steam, horses and 
bullocks. Electricity powered new factories and new appliances in 
the spreading suburbs. Hydro-electric schemes were expanded world­
wide, and in Tasmania provided cheap power to attract new 
industries.^ Motor vehicles so reduced the cost of transport on 
land relative to water that Bass Straight was turned into a barrier 
for Tasmanian timber. Bulldozers were able to build roads into
previously inaccessible forests and road trucks superseded tramways 
for bringing in the logs. Petrol, diesel and electric motors
replaced steam engines, which made it easy for very small sawmills to 
be built.
Australia's development strategy aimed to increase agricultural 
exports, expand domestic manufacturing, and attract British manufact­
urers to set up branch plants in Australia. It relied largely on 
British capital, and absorbed up to 43% (1925-28) of Britain's entire
foreign lending to public authorities, which made Australia Britain’s 
ogreatest debtor. The Commonwealth and State governments spent the 
money, to very variable effect, on irrigation, electrification, 
roads, and telephones. To implement the strategy, the Commonwealth
3set up five new bodies:
The Bureau of Commerce and Industry.
This Bureau was established in 1918 to advise British investors 
and coordinate British and Australian capital in manufacturing.
The Institute of Science and Industry.
The Commonwealth's industrial research body was expanded in 1919 
and was later developed into the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). Its purpose was to 
undertake research for rural industries, and to adapt 
manufacturing technologies, such as those for drying timber or 
making wood-pulp, to Australian raw materials.
140
The Tariff Board.
The Tariff Board was created in 1921 to protect the new
industries. It was limited in what it could provide as
Australia needed exports to pay British debts and the opposing 
rural interests were powerful ones.
The Loans Council and the Development and Migration Commission.
Tasmania considered that it fared poorly from State-Commonwealth 
financial relations and pressed 'The case for Tasmania' strongly 
on the Commonwealth arguing for new arrangements.^ The
Development and Migration Commission and the loans Council were 
created in 1926-27 to investigate and coordinate the economies 
of the States and Commonwealth
The Australian development strategy began with confidence. At 
the start of the 1920's, building boomed in the capital cities. 
Australian capitalists, led by the Anglo/Australian Collins House 
group of mining companies, built or expanded factories and supported 
' . . . the definite determination by Australia to assist in making the 
Empire self-contained in essential commodities required in peace and
5war ...' in Tasmania, a full-sized zinc refinery, confectionery
and textile mills were built.
The Institute of Science and Industry went about its tasks 
vigorously and set up a small Forest Products Laboratory to service 
the wood industries. The research objectives were set in conferences 
of Commonwealth and State governments and guided by industrialists,
CLparticularly those associated with Collins House. One task was to 
develop methods of artificially drying Australian timbers so that 
they would be good enough to replace imports of high quality dressed 
timber. By the early 1930's, the design of drying kilns had been 
improved and a 'reconditioning' process invented to overcome problems 
of internal collapse that occurred with eucalypt wood. Another task 
was to develop methods of making pulp from Australian woods that 
could replace imports by existing paper manufacturers and more 
importantly enable new manufacturers to start. This research was
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remarkably successful; by 1924 printing and writing paper could be
7made on an experimental scale, and by 1927, newsprint. in both
cases, the Commonwealth research followed studies by the Statespduring the First World War which had come to naught. The
Commonwealth's researchers worked very closely with sawmillers and 
industrialists in extending the research results into commercial
Qpractice.
Manufacturing was not expanded easily, given the small size of 
the internal market, the limited protection that the Tariff Board 
could supply, and the economic crisis of 1922 which stopped the post­
war housing boom. All expansion ceased in the world-wide economic 
crisis of the Great Depression (1929-32).
The severity of the Great Depression in Australia, exacerbated 
by the burden of British debt, is well known: manufacturing
contracted, exports halved, half a million were unemployed,
destitution became a mass phenomenon.^ Although we need not
elaborate, we can note that the emergency measures devised by the 
Commonwealth and State governments included schemes such as planting 
trees in Tasmania that employed men in return for sustenance 
wages.
In the second half of the 1930's, the world and Australian 
economies gradually started to recover, and new ventures, such as 
making paper in Tasmania, commenced. Although the gradual recovery 
enabled Tasmania's exports to almost double by 1938-39, from the 
trough of the depression, the State's economy was far from robust. 
Doubled government spending (largely on hydro-electric, railway, and 
to a lesser extent plantation schemes) increased employment, yet 9% 
of unionists and 16% of timber workers were still unemployed in 1938- 
39.11
The Second World War abruptly changed economic conditions by
calling many to arms, demanding great quantities of material, and
cutting Australia off from world trade. The Commonwealth directly
1 2controlled the war-time economy. Many aspects of production and
consumption were regulated; materials, transport and workers were
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allocated to the most important industries, inessential products were 
eliminated, and rationing and conscription introduced. Secondly, the 
economy was closely planned: wages, profits, and the prices of 
essential commodities were controlled, income tax was unified in all 
States, and capital investment and borrowing were constrained to 
essential projects. The regulatory system was applied through
existing commercial institutions so that the structure of capitalism
1 3was preserved while defence needs were met. Thirdly, the 
propaganda of war exhorted workers to greater effort and savers to 
further thrift. Manufacturers who had struggled to establish 
factories in the 1930's suddenly found they were required to expand, 
diversify and produce as never before. Overall, the war established 
Australian manufacturing on a firm footing.
TIMBER MARKETS AND MILLS
After the First World War, the imperial markets that had taken 
up to half of Tasmania's timber exports collapsed.^ On the
mainland the post-war boom of suburbanisation did increase 
consumption, but Tasmanian timbers faced fierce competition from 
mainland sawmills as well as North American and Baltic imports. 
Markets within Tasmania did improve somewhat, stimulated by hydro­
industrialisation, but not from building since the population 
increased at only half the national average. The production of sawn 
timber in the first half of the 1920's was barely (6%) above that in 
the previous decade. By contrast, the production of apples, and 
hence the demand for wooden cases, more than doubled.
The post-war demand for building timber subsided quickly» By 
1922, the industry was 'severely depressed'. In 1925 the Tariff 
Board, unswayed by evidence from the Forestry Department, allowed 
cheap timber to be imported virtually without restriction. By 1925
many sawmills had closed; many were working only part-time, and those
15that were left could scarcely have been profitable. By 1929, 44%
of the sawmill workers had lost their jobs. In 1930, a prohibitive
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tariff was introduced on imports of Baltic timber and large sizes of
1Oregon, but conditions only worsened. The industry recovered only
gradually from the mid-1930's.
The Second World War completely changed the picture and Austral­
ian timber was in keen demand as imports fell. Although there were 
numerous war-time production difficulties, competition was virtually 
eliminated. Timber and plywood prices were set, and adjusted
periodically to allow for wage and cost increases, by the
Commonwealth's Prices Commissioner, which allowed most sawmillers to
17make steady or improving profits.
Table 6.1
18Sawmills statistics; Decennial averages, 1920-1949
Period Number of Annual Average number of Average
sawmills volume workers per mill power
working sawn incl. bush excl. bush per mill
(m3 000) workers workers (kW)
1920 -23/24 143 138.0 12.3 12.3
1924/25-28/29 164 122.4 7.9 5.2 16.9
1929-30-33/34 194 106.9 4.0 18.6
1934/35-38/39 215 186.6 6.4 22.4
1939/40-43/44 212 230.7 7.7 35.2
1944/45-48/49 274 238.9 7.0 52.3
Table 6.2
Number of sawmills by employment class 19in selected years
Number of 1920 1929/30 1938/39 1948/49
employees (Bush workers incl.) ----(Bush workers excluded)-
4 & under 28 81 77 174
5 - 2 0 74 100 116 143
21 - 50 17 7 16 13
51 - 100 6 - - 5
Total 125 188 209 335
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The overall pattern of Tasmanian sawmilling (Tables 6.1, 6.2)
was composed of divergent developments in the several structures of 
production, which we will consider separately.
In the competitive sub-mode, four structures operated:
i) Kiln drying plants
Two large-scale kiln drying plants were built at the end of the 
1930's (detailed later), and kilns were added to a few of the largest 
sawmills.
ii) Town sawmills
The main timber merchant/sawmilling businesses catering to local 
markets survived the depression, prospered during the Second World 
War, and expanded rapidly afterwards.
iii) Large sawmills
The largest sawmills, such as those built by the Huon Timber 
Company and the Tasmanian Timber Corporation (Chapter 5) were owned 
by British capital and cut mainly for the export market. The highly 
capitalised Huon Timber Company became the focus of capital-labour 
conflicts (described later) and closed during the depression.
iv) General forest sawmills
The general forest sawmills that cut rough sawn green timber 
were in a very dependent position in the industry and bore the brunt 
of the depression. The mills were mostly small, had very limited 
administration or working capital, and sold their timber monthly as 
it came off the saw. Some went to Tasmanian timber merchants or 
later to the kiln drying plants, but much of it went to timber 
merchants in Melbourne or Adelaide. Only two or three Tasmanian
millers were large enough to support their own yards and sales staff 
on the mainland.
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The mainland merchants dominated the Tasmanian forest mills for
four reasons. Firstly, the largest merchants (Gunnersen, Le
Messurier and Alstergren) built up an interstate network of
interlocking interests that gave them a particularly strong position
in the market. Secondly, they were also importers who could juggle
foreign and Australian timbers in the market. Thirdly, the
merchants both graded the timber and sold according to grade.
Tasmanian sawmillers complained that they were often defrauded and
that the general reputation of Tasmanian timber was impaired when
20merchants palmed second grade timber off as first. Lastly, the
merchants could afford to lay out working capital for seasoning the 
best timber. This was particularly important for eucalypt timber 
which warped and cracked if dried quickly. The remedy - of gradual 
air drying in covered stacks - took 12-24 months, depending on 
thickness, and required capital in stocks, yards and sheds, as well 
as market forecasts of quantities and dimensions. Although
advocated by the Lands Department since 1905, only a few of the
21larger Tasmanian sawmills could afford it. Once seasoned, the
merchants could profit by dressing the timber into high value
flooring, boards and mouldings.
Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, the general forest sawmills 
remained stagnant or depressed. Some mills closed, but many others, 
as we shall see, resorted to petty chiselling on wages and cheating 
on royalties to reduce their costs. To decrease the effective wage 
rates, some sawmillers introduced 'the cooperative system of working' 
whereby a crew working a small mill was paid piece rates for the
quantity produced and left to split the amount between themselves, 
while others leased small mills to one or more of the workers.
The small business mode of production applied to a large number
of small mills, including those leased by the workers. Two
structures can be recognised, though many mills operated in both:
i) Small forest sawmills
These mills competed in the market with the sawmills conducted
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under wage relations. They required little capital and perhaps as 
many as 100 were built immediately after the Second World War - we 
will consider this expansion in the next chapter.
ii) Small case mills
The small mills that cut case shooks were often owned and
operated by the orchardists themselves to meet their seasonal
demands. There were about 40 case mills in 1913 and about 30-40
22more were built in the 1920's and 1930's as apple production rose.
THE AUSTRALIAN TIMBER WORKERS UNION
The Tasmanian Branch of the Australian Timber Workers Union 
(ATWU-T), which had been reorganised at the end of the First World 
War, pressed the union's Federal Council to action in the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Court. Useful gains in wages were made but 
quickly lost to inflation during 1919-20, so that wages '... did not
cover the amount necessary to secure the ordinary comforts of life 
23...'. Fresh claims were pressed.
Awards could only be obtained with legal costs which the small 
union raised from special levies of $0.10-0.20 a week. Like the
annual dues of $2.00 a year, levies were hard to collect from the 
scattered workers, and it was a continual battle to lure all the 
workers to join the union.
Although awards were obtained, the union had to battle before 
the workers were paid. It was particularly hard to combat
widespread petty chiselling in the smaller mills where workers feared 
for their jobs and hesitated to give public evidence. Nevertheless 
the union did bring breaches of awards before the courts which, even 
though they imposed paltry fines,’ served to legitimate the union and 
enable the Secretary to claim, perhaps with some exaggeration, that 
'... the union had compelled employers re hundreds of breaches of 
awards re holiday pay and retrospective pay ...'.^4
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In remote places, the sawmills provided shelter for their
workers. Often this consisted merely of huts which the workers hired
during the week, returning to their homes at weekends. Larger mills
rented simple houses to married workers and sold the staples of life
from company stores. Such stores were commonly the prerogative of
mill managers who operated them on the 'truck' system in which
purchases on credit at inflated prices were deducted from wages, and
affairs arranged so that the net balance paid in cash was as small as 
25possible. Access to many mills was difficult, especially in
winter, and to some only practicable by company transport; once 
engaged many workers and their families could not leave their masters 
readily.^
Unions attempted to improve conditions through legislative
reforms introduced by the Labor Party. The truck system was formally
broken by Parliament in 1920, though it lingered on for a decade or 
27so. The union induced Health Department inspectors to require
28remote company hamlets to meet public health standards. Trying to
obtain safe working conditions in the mills was a harder job as
29Tasmania's safety legislation lagged far behind other States'. 
The union persisted, complained, and managed to get some minor 
matters corrected, such as the never ending problem of inadequate 
first aid boxes. In all, the union achieved progressive
improvements though, with never more than one or two officials and a 
few disinterested state inspectors, the rate was very slow.
Employers countered union gains by collective advocacy in the
Arbitration Court and Wages Boards, with innumerable pettifogging
circumventions of awards, by discriminatory hiring and firing, and by
direct action. In the 1920's, the union called local strikes in
several cases where members or stewards were sacked, as it
considered, unfairly, and succeeded in some cases in obtaining 
3 0reinstatement. However it was hiring non-union labour to work a
48 hour week - when the 1920 Timber Workers Award provided for 44 
hours - that provoked the largest, longest, most violent dispute in 
the Branch's history. This dispute in 1921-22 can be seen as the 
first round of what was to become a successful campaign by Australian 
sawmillers and timber merchants to restore the 48 hour week.
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The dispute arose where the greatest number of workers were
assembled, in Huon Timber Company's mill at Geeveston which appears
to have been completely unionised. The company, which had hardly
ever been very profitable, reacted to the change from 48 to 44 hours
per week and rising wages by increasing mechanisation and direct
confrontation. At first, the company tried to increase the
intensity of labour by requiring the bush workers to camp out in the
forest during the week to save the time spent travelling daily to
32their homes in Geeveston; this the men refused. Next the company 
tried to break the new conditions by having some railway re-alignment 
work carried out by sub-contractors, who firstly tried to get 
unionists to work under non-award conditions (48 hours per week at 
$1.25 a day vs. 44 hours per week at $1.50 a day), and when this 
failed, employed non-unionists. The company had chosen a propitious 
time for confrontation as the depressed state of the timber trade had 
led to extensive unemployment, the closure of several sawmills, and a 
huge stock (21,000 cubic metres) of unsold timber in the mill yard. 
The company closed the mill in August 1921 for re-modelling and kept
it closed, locking the timber workers out. Some other employers
33joined in the lock out.
On the federal level, the sawmillers applied to the Arbitration 
Court to have working hours set back to 48 again. To fight the court 
case and aid perhaps as many as 500 workers locked out, the union was 
forced to appeal to the public and the labour movement at large for 
financial assistance.^4
In Geeveston, the dispute became more violent as the months 
passed. The union organiser was threatened with a revolver, the few 
non-union 'scabs' working on the railway were assaulted, and their 
boarding house and the stores which supplied it were boycotted. 
After six months, the Premier called a conference of mill owners, 
unions and parliamentarians, to no avail. After nine months, part of 
the boarding house was blown up. After ten months and a further 
unsuccessful attempt at settlement, the contractor was attacked, and 
an attempt made to derail the train taking the scabs, now armed with 
revolvers, to the job. After twelve months, even though the scabs
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were protected on the job by armed police guards, they were still 
assaulted if they left their boarding house. Never more than a 
token force of 2-6 non-union workers would risk working there.^ 
The overall effect of concentrated local opposition was to prevent 
the company carrying out its re-alignment work.
For the union, the Geeveston dispute provided only a pyrrhic and 
short-lasting victory; the mill closed soon after, and in 1923 the 
Arbitration Court reduced margins for skill and put the weekly hours 
for bush mills back to 48. In 1929, the Lukin award put hours for 
the remaining timber workers back to 48, decreased wages for skilled 
and juvenile workers, and legitimated crew pieceworking by the 'co­
operative system'. Whereas the branches in New South Wales and 
Victoria carried out a long and bitter campaign against the award, 
only to be beaten by strong well-organised action by the employers, 
mass meetings of the Tasmanian branch in Hobart and Launceston were 
almost unanimous in deciding to work the 48 hour week and agreeing to 
abide by the Lukin award. As the unions feared, the Lukin award
undermined their status. Its acceptance in Tasmania without a fight 
and its forced acceptance elsewhere can only have dispirited the 
workers. As the depression worsened and job seekers waited at the
mill gates, millers found it easy to frown on unionists. The
37weakened and impoverished Tasmanian branch simply faded away.
The federal organisation of the ATWU survived the depression and
was able to start the Tasmanian branch up again in 1936. Even
though meetings were well attended it was a long slog to get hard-up
workers to sign and pay. Although production and employment were
increasing, prices and profits were so low that many small mills only
just managed to stay open; wages, working and living conditions 
39stayed grim.
The union relied on state rather than direct action to improve 
conditions. It asked the government to build better roads. Several 
prosecutions were launched for breaches of the award but local Police 
Courts, which imposed only trivial fines, were of little use against 
mills without the capacity to pay award wages.^ An additional
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lever was provided by the Labor Party, returned to power in 1934, 
which amended the Fovestvy Act to enable forest permits to be 
cancelled if award wages were not paid.4  ^ The legislation had
little more than threat value as the Forestry Department, unwilling 
to investigate sawmillers, insisted on sworn evidence which employees 
in small mills and remote communities could scarcely give; moreover 
its application might have closed mills and lost jobs for the very 
workers it was designed to help.
The decades-long situation of more workers than work changed
abruptly with war; many were called to arms, the new pulp and paper
mills took a thousand more, the sawmills were in full production and
there was a shortage, particularly of skilled labour. The union
continued to press claims in the Arbitration Court and shared in
slight gains made generally from the mid-1940's.4  ^ It was in having
the awards implemented that more substantial gains were made, for
profitable mills could afford to pay and employers could no longer
cheat and chisel with impunity. Even 'ideal living quarters' were
43provided when a new mill was built at Adventure Bay.
The Man Power regulations prevented a worker from enlisting or 
leaving his job without state permission, and prevented an employer 
from dismissing a worker, except for serious misconduct. The
regulations were not applied as draconian instruments to oppress the 
working class, on either national or local levels. For example in 
1942 a dispute broke out in two mills at Launceston when employers 
introduced non-union labour and reported the resultant strike to the 
Man Power Directorate. However, the Directorate did not enforce a 
return, and when the union threatened to apply to have a forest 
permit of one of the mills cancelled (under the terms of the Fovestvy 
Act, 1938), the sawmillers gave in and allowed the union to sign up 
the non-unionists.4  ^ In all, the Union became solidly established 
during the war.
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THE TASMANIAN TIMBER ORGANISATION
In the 1920*3/ Tasmanian sawmillers were faced not only with an
organised and militant union but with increasing subordination to
mainland merchants, the needs to control the quality of exports, to
keep royalty rates down, and the possibility of having to pay for
forestry work (something that was being advocated more frequently).
Common action by local groups of millers had occurred from the
1870's, but it was not until the 1920's that three district
sawmillers' associations were formed - presumably in response to the
1920 Award and the 1921-22 strike.^ During the Huon strike the
district associations were coordinated through a Central Executive,
47which spent $16,000 on industrial representation.
The Tariff Board, in refusing protection, had criticised the
industry's efficiency. This stimulated the State government and the 
Commonwealth's Development and Migration Commission to call a 
conference in 1927. The many small and hard-up working sawmillers 
were induced to attend, - with free rail passes for the journey to
Hobart. The meeting resolved to form the Tasmanian Timber
Organisation (TTO), argued about how it was to be financed, whether
timber importers should be excluded, and agreed that timber should be
4 0inspected and graded before export.
The TTO was incorporated in 1928 with the objectives of
providing insurance, promotion, mainland distribution yards, finance
for seasoning facilities, shipping, and generally '... to safeguard
and protect the interests of the timber industry of the State in all 
49matters.' There was no mention of labour relations, but there was
no doubt what the TTO intended. A few months later it interpreted
'all matters' to include '... Arbitration Court proceedings, Wages
50Board hearings, [and] industrial matters generally ...' These
were hardly expressions that would have endeared the TTO to a labor 
government, but by then the National Party had come to power.
The Labor government had agreed to find $6,000 to promote 
Tasmanian timber, and had legislated for a toll ($0.03 per cubic
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metre) to be collected by the Forestry Department on all timber
51cut. Expenditure was supposed to be made against a programme of
work agreed with the government. While generally pleased by the 
formation of the TTO, the Commonwealths inspectors deplored the 
extra work imposed on the struggling Forestry Department.
The TTO started quite energetically by appointing 6 inspectors
to grade timber prior to export/ but their cost exceeded the toll and
53the scheme was dropped. As the depression deepened/ sawmillers
lobbied for reduced royalties to offset the toll/ while the Forestry 
Department struggled to maintain them and hence its revenue. The
TTO retained its industrial officer and did not lodge its programme 
of work with the government, but it was internal divisions that made 
it largely ineffective.
The government, thoroughly exasperated by the TTO's squabbles,
laid down that funds supplied publicly could not be spent on
industrial representation, cancelled the toll, and told the TTO to
54get itself in order. The TTO did amend its constitution and the
government provided a grant of $2,000 pounds a year, but no
55levy. To continue their fight against the workers, the sawmillers
formed the Sawmill Owners Association outside the TTO which set up a 
separate fund called the 'The Tasmanian Timber Employers' Industrial 
Committee' . ^
The TTO had to tailor its activities to its grant. It lobbied
the government for lower royalties and against the Forestry
Department making 'large expenditures' on planting pinesy otherwise
57its activities were trivial. Neither cooperative seasoning works
nor mainland distributing yards were set up, and Tasmanian timber, 
mainly air-dried and ungraded, competed poorly in the Melbourne 
market.
The Tasmanian Timber Association
War-time conditions increased the need for common action by 
Tasmanian sawmillers. The TTO suddenly had to negotiate the
distribution and price of timber with Commonwealth officials. As
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usual, the TTO negotiated with the State government on royalty rates,
though this process was eased by the existence of Price Control which
allowed higher sale prices to cover higher royalties. By 1943, it
was clear that the TTO needed $6,000 a year and a full-time executive
to cope with the business, and that higher grants from the government
could not be expected - indeed, given the opposition of the ATWU-T
within the Labor Party, it was doubtful whether even the existing
59grant would continue.
The first proposal re-activated the idea of a toll, but the
government insisted that any toll it collected could not be used 
6 0against workers. Instead of bowing to the government, the
sawmillers decided to re-form their organisation without government 
assistance; not only did they need to be represented more frequently 
in the Arbitration Court, but as they were making steady profits, 
they could afford to.
The Tasmanian Timber Association (TTA) replaced the TTO in 
1945. A full-time manager was appointed and the voluntary member­
ship grew quickly to 116 firms, covering about 90% of the 
industry. Membership fees were proportional to the volume cut. 
From its start, the TTA not only continued the activities of the TTO,
but also appeared in the Arbitration Court opposing union claims for
6 1increased wages, shorter hours, or easier working conditions.
SEASONING, PLYMILLING AND MAINLAND MERCHANTS
So far, we have established the fluctuating fortunes of the main 
structures of timber production and the organisations of capital and 
labour. We will now consider the addition of the new structure of 
kiln-drying - and incidentally a plymill - owned by mainland merchant 
capital.
The Commonwealth's successful research into artificial seasoning 
of eucalypt timber was designed to improve its quality and enable 
imports to be replaced. Kiln-dried timber was much more uniform and
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reliable in use than air-dried timber. Generally kiln-drying was 
used on timber air-dried for only a few months, which meant that much 
less working capital was required. In production, less over­
dimension cutting was needed to compensate for uncertain shrinkage, 
and kilns were readily combined with dressing and moulding 
processes. Thus kiln-drying facilities became the key to the most 
lucrative markets for boards, floorings and mouldings.
The advent of practical methods of kiln-drying their own timbers
appeared to offer sawmillers a chance to break the stranglehold of
the timber merchants and compete with imports. The largest
sawmillers in Victoria and Tasmania built kilns. For example, Henry
Jones added a drying plant to their Warentinna mill in the north-east
6 2of Tasmania in 1934. But the smaller mills needed to amalgamate
or cooperate to afford them.
A group of sawmillers in the north-west of the State did join 
together in 1924 and proposed to float a company with a capital of $2 
million to undertake sawmilling, seasoning, marketing, and furniture 
making on a large scale. They secured a concession over the fine 
forests of Blackwood and other high-quality woods, growing on rugged 
and inaccessible Crown Land between the Arthur and Pieman rivers, but 
they could not raise enough capital during the depression and the 
proposal lapsed.^
Co-operative kilns and mainland timber yards were envisaged in
the TTO's objectives in 1927, and were suggested again in 1929 by the
Development and Migration Commission. By 1931, four of the Forestry
Department's staff had been to training courses in seasoning held at
the Commonwealth's research laboratories in Melbourne, and were
assisting Tasmanian sawmillers to set up kilns; mostly to dry apple 
64cases.
The timber merchants were threatened by possible losses to their 
seasoning and dressing business, their sales, and their import 
business. Threats to the larger timber importers were increased by 
the prohibitive tariff placed on imports of Baltic timber in 1930 
which was designed to protect kiln-dried Australian timber on the
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r cmarket. To preserve their sales, the timber merchants had to
enter Australian production and set up their own kilns. For
example, the Kauri Timber Company built kilns in South Melbourne to 
process air-dried timbers bought from Tasmanian and Victorian 
mills. Three of the largest merchants, who were also substantial
importers, combined to set up production in Tasmania.
67Mainland merchants
The three mainland merchants - Gunnersens, Le Messuriers and 
Alstergrens - that set up in Tasmania, were private companies. They 
were largely owned by the families and descendants of their founders, 
who had built up a network of interlocking businesses in the main 
eastern States. None of them was large and they pooled their
capital, probably as much by necessity as choice, to establish two 
kiln-drying plants - one at Stanley in 1936, the other at Launceston 
in 1937 - and a plymill at Somerset in 1942.
6ftCircular Head Timber and Kiln Seasoning Co
In 1936 these three merchants formed their first joint venture 
in Tasmania __ the Circular Head Timber and Kiln Seasoning Co - and 
built drying kilns on the waterfront at Stanley in the north-west. 
Timber which had been cut at a number of small independent forest 
mills was sent by rail to Stanley for drying and dressing, after 
which it was sold by the partners on the Adelaide and Melbourne 
markets.
The company amalgamated with local sawmillers, Dunkley Bros, who 
had sawmills at Smithton and Stanley, to form Circular Head 
Amalgamated Timbers Pty Ltd. This amalgamation enabled sawmilling, 
based on a log input of some 30,000 cubic metres a year - a large 
scale for Tasmania then - to be integrated with the kiln drying and 
dressing facilities.
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69Kilndried Hardwoods0
In 1937/ Kilndried Hardwoods Pty Ltd was formed between 
Alstergrens and Holymans/ a Tasmanian shipping company, with lesser 
shareholdings taken by K.D. Atkins, a Tasmanian sawmiller, and both 
Gunnersens and Le Messuriers.
An air-drying yard, sheds, 8 kilns, and 2 reconditioning 
chambers were built at Launceston. Machinery was installed to dress 
and mould the dried timbers, and later a sawmill was added.
The company operated in several ways. It sawed, dried, dressed 
and sold its own timber; it bought green or air-dried timber from 
small sawmills and processed it further; it also kiln-dried timber on 
contract for other millers.
70Tasmanian Plywood Mills
At the start of the Second World War, Alstergrens bought several 
Tasmanian sawmills, including one at Loongana in north-western 
Tasmania, to offset their loss of imported timbers. To offset the 
loss of plywood imports, the merchants formed a third joint venture - 
Tasmanian Plywood Mills Pty Ltd - to build a plymill at Somerset in 
northern Tasmania.
The Forestry Department issued a permit for a forest area in the 
Leven catchment near Loongana that contained the highest quality logs 
required for making plywood. As the area was steep and 
inaccessible, the company had to build substantial roads as well as 
wooden tramlines. Both bullock teams and steam-powered winches with 
lowering gear were used for logging. The logging was integrated to 
produce logs for both the sawmill and the plymill.
In spite of war-time difficulties, the plymill was started in 
1942. Techniques for processing Tasmanian timbers had to be devel­
oped, and new skills acquired by the workers. At first the factory 
produced only rotary-cut veneer - from Myrtle and some Tasmanian Oak 
- which was pressed into ply by a Sydney manufacturer. As this 
proved successful, a press and other machines were added in 1943
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enabling standard sheets of furniture grade plywood to be 
produced. At first, the quality of the sheets is said to have been 
poor, yet so intense was war-time demand that everything the factory 
could produce was sold.
The new structure
The addition of kiln drying to Tasmania was clearly a develop­
ment in the sense of further industrialisation. It was achieved by 
only a few of the larger sawmills and notably by the mainland 
merchants (but not by the bulk of the small mills which remained as 
suppliers to the merchants). The merchants realised the advantages 
of integrating sawmilling with kiln seasoning and plymilling, and did 
start to take over and construct sawmills. Hence the existing mills 
were threatened by competitors in the hands of the very merchants who 
dominated the trade. The resulting conflicts between the old and 
new structures significantly affected relationships with the 
state. We will return .to these after we have considered the 
addition of the second new structure - pulp and paper making.
PULP AND PAPER MAKING
In contrast to sawmilling, pulp and paper making in Tasmania was
a large-scale heavy industry which used great quantities of energy in
complex mechanical and chemical processes, and employed specialised
workers, tradesmen, scientists, technicians, accountants and
managers. The two Tasmanian mills were huge in comparison to the
sawmills; their engines had more than three times the power of those
in the two hundred sawmills, and they added 1,000 people to the
71workforce. They made different products, avoided competition with
each other, and were operated by some of Australia's largest 
companies in the monopoly sub-mode of production.
The Australian market used several major types of paper and
paperboard (cardboard), and a host of minor ones. The local
companies made about 42,000 tonnes a year in the 1920's, which
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supplied only about 20% of total paper consumption but 75% of the
72market for wrapping paper and paperboard. The paper was made
partly from straw, rags and waste paper, and partly from wood pulp, 
mostly imported from Scandanavia. One mill made strawboard, while 
the others made mostly wrapping paper and paperboard, with smaller 
quantities of other grades. Australia did not make any pulp from 
its own wood. Imports of newsprint, printing and writing papers 
were large enough to present an opportunity for domestic manufact­
uring (Table 6.1), but sufficient raw materials could only be 
obtained from the forests, which meant that the technology of pulping 
Australian woods had to be mastered.
Table 6.3
7 3Imports of paper, paperboard and pulp, 1920's 
Annual averages, 1922/23 - 1928/29 (tonnes)
Major Type Quantity
Newsprint 112,746
Writings, Printings 24,831
Wrappings 13,150
Paperboard 10,938
Tissues 1,806
Blotting and Cartridge ___ 934
Total (Major types only) 164,415
Wood pulp 13,310
The first stage of making paper from wood - logging - involves 
much the same processes as producing logs for sawmills, although 
pulpwood can be cut from crooked or irregular trees or the heads left 
after sawlogs have been removed, as long as the wood is sound. At 
first pulpwood was cut - by hand in the forest or by sawing in the 
mills - into billets small enough to fit grinding or chipping 
machines. Later huge machines were built that could devour whole 
logs at one pass. The next stage of production - pulping - involves 
breaking the wood down into a pulp either mechanically (by grinding
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it), chemically (by cooking it with chemicals under pressure), or in 
various combinations. The mechanical processes consume very large 
amounts of energy and are used to produce the cheaper grades of pulp 
used in newsprint. Chemical pulp mills require expensive recovery 
plants to recycle some of their chemicals, and need to be large to be 
economically efficient. The chemical processes are used for most of 
the stronger wrapping papers and for fine printing and writing 
papers. The pulp is commonly bleached, and several pulps with
differing properties are usually blended for a particular type of 
paper. The final stage in which paper is made requires the largest, 
most expensive and complex machines in the wood industries - one 
Tasmanian machine makes a sheet of newsprint 6.6 metres wide at a 
speed of 760 metres per minute. A number of services - water, steam, 
electricity, waste disposal, workshops, laboratories, administration, 
and so forth are required to support the processes.
Before mills could be built in Australia, substantial barriers 
had to be overcome: the Commonwealth's laboratory research into
making pulp from Australian woods had to be developed on a commercial 
scale; wood, water and power resources had to be secured; large 
amounts of capital had to be mobilised; the price of Australian 
paper had to compete with imports; and Australian newspapers and 
printers had to be persuaded to buy it.
The economic actors
Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, three major groups of capital 
weighed the new but uncertain opportunities and jockeyed for 
position, sometimes acting together and sometimes in competition. 
The depression delayed development but the structure that emerged 
left each group with a near monopoly over separate sectors of the 
market. The groups were:
“ the Collins House group of mining companies,
the existing manufacturer, APM, and 
- some of the newspaper companies.
Collins House represented the largest concentration of capital 
in Australia, was closely linked to Australian banks and British
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firms/ and could mobilise substantial funds. After the First World 
War, Collins House financiers sought to invest capital in manufact­
uring, and evaluated the paper i n d u s t r y . A l t h o u g h  not experienced 
in the paper industry, Collins House companies were highly successful 
in developing sophisticated technologies for mining, were intimately 
connected with the Commonwealth's research, and overall had the 
finance and ability to start a new heavy industry.
In 1920, the two largest Australian paper manufacturers
amalgamated and, in 1926, took over two smaller companies to form
Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd (APM) which thus became the sole
75domestic manufacturer. Production relied on traditional skills
and APM did not then have the scientific expertise to develop pulping 
processes. The possible entry of new manufacturers threatened APM, 
both in its existing markets and from possible tariffs on imported 
pulp.
The newspapers too felt threatened. The world newsprint market
was strongly .competitive and prices low, but a domestic manufacturer
carrying as much weight as Collins House might secure tariffs on
newsprint that would force their costs up. Like APM, the newspapers
had to consider manufacturing themselves not only as an opportunity
but also as a defensive strategy. In the 1920's, the ownership of
newspapers began to concentrate, but even so the two major
proprietors - the Herald and Weekly Times Ltd and the Fairfax Group -
76had to form a joint venture to make pulp and paper.
The state, controlling resources of wood, water and electricity, 
was the fourth major economic actor. Proposals to build pulp and
paper mills fitted well into the Tasmanian policy of hydro­
industrialisation and the state responded by granting concessions and 
privileges, much as it had done previously for mining and metal 
processing and for the large British sawmills built twenty years 
before.
Acting between the major groups of capital and the state were 
the 'promoters'. These were individuals or companies given standing 
in legislation granting forest concessions. In some cases they were
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merely formal representatives of particular companies, but in others 
they were individual entrepreneurs who initiated proposals, solicited 
capital for companies they floated, and negotiated concessions with 
the state.
THE BURNIE MILL - APPM
Collins House wanted the major market for newsprint rather than
the fine paper market for printings and writings which, although
initially more promising technically, was smaller and partially
occupied by APM. From the early 1920's the possibility of
manufacturing at Burnie, in north-west Tasamania, was pressed by
77Gerald Müssen, an industrial consultant to Collins House.
Collins House, through its investment company, Amalgamated Zinc
(AZ), agreed to buy the site for a pulpmill at Burnie and 50,700
hectares of forest, known as the Surrey Hills Block, from the Van
78Diemen's Land Company. AZ proposed building a mill to make 30,450
tonnes of paper a year and employ 400 men which would reduce
unemployment and considerably expand the size and prosperity of
Burnie. The company negotiated with the Tasmanian government for
inducements and concessions. The proposal carried the excitement of
large-scale development and the convincing aura of being associated
with Collins House and being presented by a former premier, Sir N.E.
Lewis.79 The resulting Wood-Pulp and Paper Industry Encouragement
Acty 1924, passed easily through a Select Committee and
ft 0Parliament. it provided the company with a forest concession,
rights to water and effluent disposal, and special rates of land tax.
In spite of the authoritative aura, there were major uncert­
ainties. The ability to make newsprint from eucalypts had only been 
demonstrated in the laboratory. AZ, aided by the Commonwealth's
research scientist, L.R. Benjamin, hastened to conduct a commercial
scale trial in a Dutch mill in 1925. Results were promising, but
8 1further research was needed. Secondly, it was uncertain whether
Australian newspapers would buy the paper. Müssen tried to induce
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them to put capital into the mill, but their proprietors formed an 
investigating committee which advised them in effect to oppose 
domestic manufacturing. Thirdly, it was uncertain whether the
paper could compete with imports. AZ applied to the Tariff Board 
for protection at the rate of $11.81 per tonne, but in view of strong 
opposition from the newspapers only obtained $7.87 per tonne. Late 
in 1925, AZ decided to abandon the Burnie project in favour of one at 
Kermandie in which ways of producing good quality paper more cheaply 
would be developed.
Kermandie
Further laboratory research showed AZ that the quality problem 
could be solved, but that extensive feasibility studies were needed 
on a semi-commercial scale to see if newsprint could be made 
profitably at the level of tariff available; for these a semi­
commercial pilot mill would have to be built. To undertake such 
expensive research Collins House sought the guarantee of a forest
concession, with sufficient time for research»
AZ obtained a new forest concession under the The Kermandie 
Wood-Pulp and Paper Industries Act, 1926. In 1927, AZ formed an
investigation company, Tasmanian Paper Pty Ltd, with minority 
interests taken by Collins House companies, British investors and
APM.84
A pilot mill was built at Kermandie, outside Geeveston (on the 
site of the Huon Timber Company's recently defunct sawmill), and 
equipped to make up to 4 tonnes a day of sulphite and groundwood pulp 
and turn it into newsprint on a 0.6 metre wide paper machine.
Benjamin and other scientists, recruited from the Commonwealth, soon 
improved the pulping processes and adapted them to cook the old 
growth Swamp Gum in the concession. AZ considered that a mill of 
about 35,600 tonnes a year was commercially feasible and was 
preparing to float an operating company when the Wall Street crash
caused them to lose confidence, shut the pilot mill, distribute the
85staff to APM and other companies, and postpone investment.
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During the depression
When Collins House abandoned the Burnie project. Müssen took it 
over, formed companies, and raised enough capital - largely from the 
newspaper company, John Fairfax - to buy the Surrey Hills forest and 
the Burnie mill site. However the depression stopped Mussen's
proposal too; indeed his company, Papermakers Ltd, could not raise 
enough capital to justify the government proclaiming its forest 
concession.88
As none could proceed alone, Collins House, APM, various
newspaper companies and Mussen's group, formed a series of shifting
alliances throughout the early-1930's to investigate three different
87joint enterprises, but none eventuated. In 1932, the newspapers
started to develop the Derwent Valley project, as described later, 
which pre-empted the possibilities for either Collins House or 
Mussen's Burnie mill to enter the newsprint market. Müssen doggedly 
continued to promote the Burnie project until finally, in 1936 when 
the last possibility of a joint venture with APM had been discarded, 
Collins House decided to build a mill to make fine papers.
The Burnie mill
Associated Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd (APPM) was formed in 1936 to 
build a pulp and paper mill at Burnie with a capacity to make 15,200 
tonnes of fine printing, writing and typewriting papers. The 
possibility of building a second mill at Kermandie later was also 
considered. The company was started with an ordinary capital of
$1,900,000 of which the majority came from Collins House companies,
88although about 2% was reserved for Tasmanian residents. The
Associated Pulp and Paper Mills Act 1936 was passed to provide APPM 
with the forest concession and rights to take water and discharge 
effluent.88
The Burnie concession
The provisions for the concession in the 1936 Act were first 
formulated in 1924 Act, and they still apply in the 1980's. Thus the
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level and problems of forestry in the 1920's need to be recalled as
the background to later operations. In 1924, the Forestry Department
was struggling to establish forestry against obstruction in the Lands
Department and opposition from the sawmillers. Some of Tasmania's
forests had not even been explored, let alone mapped or assessed, and
the Department was still trying to locate those best suited for
permanent production. The Department had no idea of the timber
resources and had not even roughly surveyed the forest conceded by
the 1924 Act. Against this background a concession to a large-scale
pulp and paper mill backed by a substantial and reputable company
appeared to relieve the embattled Department of its responsibilities
over a substantial area. The Conservator considered that:
... a pulp-wood company must practice sound forestry principles 
if it is to have a prolonged tenure of existence... whereas 
sawmilling which looks only to the rapid cutting of the mature 
timber and then moving elsewhere has no such economic 
restrictions.^
The main provisions of the concession were as follows:
Unlike all earlier concessions and permits, the Burnie 
concession was granted without any period being specified - 
indeed, it exists in apparent perpetuity.
- The company was granted exclusive right to all the pulpwood, but 
trees big enough for sawlogs were excluded.
The company was allowed to cut sawlogs but was not given 
exclusive rights.
The government could dedicate about one-quarter of the 
concession as permanent reserves. For these the Conservator 
could make formal plans, to which the company could object.
Unlike other timber for which royalty rates were set under 
regulations which could be varied from time to time, the minimum 
royalty for pulpwood was set at $0.03 per cubic metre without 
any provision for review. This rate was first set in 1924, even 
though at the time the Conservator did not know if it was a 
reasonable one or not, and thought it probably too low. The 
rate to be paid was made dependent on the company's
profitability and was increased by 5% for every 1% extra profit 
made by the company over 8% up to a maximum of $0.07 per cubic 
metre which would apply at 38% profit.
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- Unlike -timber permit and lease areas, rental was not charged for 
the Burnie concession.
Starting up and war
The company recruited an experienced manager and skilled workers
from Britain to build and start the machines and train local 
91workers. The mill was built with a capacity of 22,800 tonnes a
92year and started making paper in 1938. Although published reports
are markedly discreet, it seems that the quality of the papers
93initially produced could not match that of imports. There were
difficulties in production and considerable difficulties in breaking 
into the long-established and conservative paper market. APPM had 
to drop its prices twice in 1939 and hasten to the Tariff Board for
protection. The Board appeared sympathetic but, being bound by
Imperial Preference, waited until a long-delayed British case was 
presented, and in view of strong opposition from importers, who
complained of 'irregular quality', only recommended a tariff of $3.45 
a tonne which had little protective value.^
The Second World War changed the market and provided effective
protection. Imports dropped sharply and their prices almost
doubled. The mill's order book was suddenly filled and customers,
glad to get deliveries at all, had to bear with uncertain quality.
The paper machines, which had previously tried to match a wide range
of minor variations in imported papers, were able to have long
production runs making a few standard types. In 1941, imports from
non-sterling countries, the major source of pre-war competition, were
prohibited, and in 1942 the industry was declared an essential one,
allowing the company to retrieve workers from the armed services for
employment in the forests. APPM quickly became profitable. A loss
in 1938-39 was converted to a profit in 1939-40 and from 1940-41
throughout the remainder of the war, APPM made profits of over
$200,000 a year and paid dividends of 6% - the maximum agreed with
95the Prices Commissioner. In 1943, the obvious success of APPM
enabled it to recover the Surrey Hills forest and land at Burnie, by 
issuing 85,000 shares in APPM to the newspaper group in the Derwent
166
96Valley. The accounts for 1946/47 show that profits had been
accumulated (in various reserves) that amounted to over half of the 
paid up capital of the company, after less than nine years of 
manufacturing. Research was continued throughout the war and both
the quality of paper and efficiency of the processes greatly 
improved.
THE DERWENT VALLEY MILL AT BOYER - ANM
The persistence of Collins House and John Fairfax in trying to 
make newsprint compelled the other large newspaper group, The Herald 
and Weekly Times Ltd of Melbourne, to consider the possibilities. 
L.R. Benjamin, who was deeply involved in all the early developments, 
has recorded that the Herald's first object was to pre-empt the 
possibility of Collins House establishing a newsprint mill that would 
require high tariffs, and that it was only after the Herald had 
secured a forest concession as a pawn for financial bargaining that
QQthey began serious investigations.
In 1932, the government granted a concession to the Herald and
Weekly Times Ltd in the valley of the Florentine River, which flows
into the Upper Derwent. The concession contained magnificent stands
of Swamp Gum with trees of giant dimensions - the tallest hardwoods
in the world. The wealth of timber was reported to be 5. 1 million
cubic metres, equivalent to about 30 years' supply to all the
99sawmills of Tasmania at the time. It was particularly attractive
for making pulp because of the high proportion of Swamp Gum in the 
forest - considerably more than in the Burnie concession. The
valley was inaccessible but possible road and railway routes were 
surveyed. The valleys of the Styx and Russell Falls (now Tyenna) 
Rivers, which were already accessible, were included. The Bill 
passed through a Joint Committee and Parliament fairly readily.10 *^ 
The only opposition came from several sawmillers logging the 
accessible areas, mostly to small case mills. To ensure their
futures, the company was obliged to supply them with sawlogs, and the
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Conservator was allowed to select 2,428 hectares out of the 
concession for further reserves. The Conservator advised that this 
would be sufficient, but apparently never considered that sawmilling 
might expand.
Whatever its original motives, the Herald investigated manufact­
uring most energetically. It recruited Benjamin and other technical 
experts, and in 1934 organised a commercial scale test of Tasmanian 
woods in a Canadian mill. This showed that it was commercially
feasible to make newsprint from a mixture of pulp made from eucalypts
101and Canadian softwood pulp.
The Fairfax company had joined the investigations soon after
they had started, and for 2-3 years had an interest in both the
Burnie and Derwent Valley proposals. The possibility of building a
kraft pulp mill was investigated with APM, which could have used some
of the pulp on its mainland paper machines, but was eventually
discarded. In 1935, the Fairfax company broke with Müssen and
concentrated its interest on the Derwent Valley proposal. Delays, a
new partner and the results of further surveys stimulated
107renegotiation of the Act in 1935.
Markets, capital and agreements
Although the company had secured the resource and knew how to 
make the paper, it still had to secure a market and raise the 
capital. To secure a market, the company had to supplant some
imports, but this only became possible when there was a shift in the 
whole pattern of trade (Table 6.4).
The first shift resulted from the British policy of concentrat­
ing production within the Empire. Imports from Scandinavia were
virtually eliminated by the mid-1920's by imposing a tariff of $5.91 
tonne imposed to the advantage of British and Canadian manufact­
urers. The second shift occurred in the mid-1930's when Canadian 
manufacturers captured all the growth in the rapidly expanding 
Australian market leaving Britain with constant sales but a declining 
share. The third shift occurred in 1937 when Canadian manufacturers
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increased their share of the market further and Britain lost sales 
both relatively and absolutely.
Table 6.4
Newsprint imports by origin/ 1920's and 1930’s^^^
Period ____Country of O r i g i n ________
U.K. Canada Scandin All
-avia & 
other
(Proportions by weight %)
1920/21-1924/25 49.4 20.9 29.7 100.0
1925/26-1928/29 63.8 30.4 5.8 100.0
1929/30-1932/33 59.5 37.7 2.8 100.0
1933/34-1935/36 39.8 59.6 0.6 100.0
1936/37-1938/39 20.3 79.3 0.4 100.0
The test of Tasmanian woods in a Canadian mill of the Crown
Zellerbach corporation in 1934 is understandable in terms of the
second shift in trade. Whereas Crown Zellerbach, as one of the
world's largest exporters, might have been expected to oppose
Australian manufacturing, in fact they suggested the tests to the
104Herald group - Australia's largest consumer. Thus technical
assistance went hand in hand with increased Canadian sales.
The decision to build the mill was finally made in 1937-38 when 
the pattern of international trade shifted for the third time,
sufficient domestic capital was mobilised, and government assistance 
was provided. Four related agreements facilitated the decision:
1. Australian Newsprint Mills Pty Ltd
In 1937, an attempt was made to get all the metropolitan
newspapers to subscribe some capital and agree to take part of 
the paper on a cost+6% basis. Some, notably News Ltd and
Consolidated Press, declined to join, apparently fearing 
domination by their larger competitors proposing the scheme.
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Economically the proposal still seemed risky as the ' . . .
estimated costs of production were substantially higher than 
those prevailing elsewhere .. . ' and a public subsidy was
sought.^04 Other companies did join and early in 1938,
Australian Newsprint Mills Pty Ltd (ANM) was formed by eight
companies of which the Herald and Weekly Times and John Fairfax 
were the largest.
2. Canadian buying agreement
In 1937, the papers combined to negotiate a seven-year contract
to buy 80% of Australia's import requirements, then about
134,000 tonnes a year from Canadian mills - with a provision
1 nthat allowed the ANM mill 20% of the market. Presumably the
paper contract was tied to that for the 25% of imported softwood 
sulphite pulp needed to mix with the Tasmanian eucalypt pulp. 
Thus Canadian agreement to a secure place in the market for 
local production went hand in hand with increased Canadian 
sales o
3. Australian bounty
In 1938, the Australian government agreed to provide a bounty
for the first four years of the new mill's operation, depending
107on import costs and the company's profit. In the event, the
Act was not proclaimed nor bounty paid as wartime import prices 
rose sharply before the mill even started.
4. The 1937 Act
Even with more newspapers as shareholders, ANM was short of 
capital and approached the Tasmanian government for assist­
ance. An amending Act was passed in 1937 providing for the
state to take $500,000 of cumulative preference shares amounting
108to almost a quarter of the company's capital.
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The Florentine concession
The provisions for the Florentine concession under the 1932 Act 
(and slight amendments in 1935) were as follows:
- The concession was granted for 88 years.
The concession contained approximately 124,000 hectares.
- The company' was allowed to enter sawmilling or use the sawlogs 
in its pulp mill. As such an enormous resource could have 
enabled ANM to overwhelm the sawmilling industry, it was not 
allowed to sell more than 20% of the timber cut, and was obliged 
to supply sawmillers with 30,000 cubic metres a year.
- Cutting, regeneration, and protection of the forest were to be 
undertaken by the company according to a plan approved by the 
Conservator.
- The royalty rate for pulpwood was set at a concessional rate of
$0.07 per cubic metre subject to an increase of $0.01 per cubic
metre for each 1% increase in profit above 10%, and subject to
109revision after 20 years.
Starting up the Boyer mill and war
Construction of the mill at Boyer was delayed by wartime 
shortages so that the mill did not make paper until 1941.*^® 
Canadian workers were brought to start the paper machines and train 
local workers, and Canadian experts were employed in construction and
special areas such as logging. At first, the paper had a bad colour,
111but this was improved over several years by further research.
In 1940, imports were cut and newsprint rationed so that ANM's
paper was welcomed despite its poor colour. In 1942-43 imports were
stopped, leaving ANM as the sole supplier. ANM made paper as fast
as it possibly could although this only amounted to about one-
quarter of pre-war consumption. Even in the late 1940's, paper was
short and world prices high. Although ANM's costs were also high,
their paper was sold to their shareholding customers on the cost plus
112formula, which made it cheaper than Canadian imports.
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WORKERS' UNIONS, CONDITIONS AND WELFARE IN THE MONOPOLY SUB-MODE
Workers in the pulp and paper mills fared markedly better than
those in the sawmills and forests» Most obviously, the pulp and
paper mills required some highly skilled workers who obtained! large
margins over the basic wage; they operated continuously and provided
stable, secure, long-term employment, and were profitable enough to
113afford above-average wages and conditions.
The workers were readily organised by comparatively strong 
unions who settled most disputes by negotiation with company 
managements. In both mills, the pulp and paper workers were
represented by the Printing Industry Employees' Union of Australia 
(PIEUA), later to become the Printing and Kindred Industries Union 
(PKIU), and the Australian Workers' Union (AWU). The workers and 
tradesmen not directly making pulp and paper were represented by 
unions for their own callings and trades and these joined with the 
paper unions in overall federal industrial agreements. Timber 
workers employed by the companies remained under State awards.
Both APPM and ANM pursued 'advanced' industrial relations 
policies that sought to defuse militant unionism and create a stable 
and contented workforce by providing comprehensive welfare benefits 
through structures in which the workers participated. Early forms of 
these policies had been tried by mining companies on Tasmania's west 
coast from the turn of the century, but they were not fully developed 
until the Russian revolution alarmed the ruling classes and the flood 
of servicemen returned from the First World War armed with expect­
ations of better things. In 1919, Müssen as advisor and spokesman 
for Collins House saw that: ' ... the secret of increased production
as far as employees are concerned lies in our bringing about a change 
in their point of view ... ' ^  He urged that ' mere money-grubbing' 
should give way to a 'Gospel of Happiness' whose components consisted 
of decent health care, education, housing and wages in excess of 
subsistence. The policy was developed at Port Pirie, and applied in 
Tasmania at EZ and APPM. ANM followed a similar policy with schemes
for:
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- medical and hospital benefits,
loans in periods of sickness and distress, 
company housing that workers could buy, 
community facilities on company housing estates, 
sporting facilities and clubs, 
superannuation funds, and
116continued employment for injured, or disabled workers.
Although administered by the companies, these schemes allowed for 
joint control by workers' and company representatives. They were 
applied with a caring, if initially paternalistic, attitude by the 
management which, within the small compass of Tasmania, served to 
maintain good political and community relationships. The companies 
also fostered the support of the workers by encouraging technical 
training and advancement, and through company magazines which carried 
company views and information amidst personnel and sporting stories.
Neither better wages nor advanced and humanely administered 
welfare schemes were achieved without effort by the unions; where 
unions were weakest, wages and conditions were worst; where there 
were no unions, the welfare schemes did not apply; conditions for 
workers in the forest were very different from those in the mills. 
Müssen's 'Gospel of Happiness' was preached in a manner more demure 
than evangelical.
Union organisation of the workers cutting pulpwood for APPM was 
difficult as they were widely dispersed, paid piece-wages, and worked 
in small groups for small-scale logging sub-contractors. Typically, 
the sub-contractors worked in the forest themselves, provided 
tractors or horses for snigging, and often owned or further sub­
contracted the road trucks. They held their sub-contracts from a 
firm, Forest Supplies Pty Ltd, set up as principal contractors to the 
mill. The company was thus insulated from the workers by two tiers
of contractors. The ATWU-T appointed a temporary organiser and
117slowly signed up the cutters. In 1940, the union and small sub­
contractors approached APPM for higher rates but the company refused 
to recognise either the union or the combined deputation, and Forest 
Supplies sought to circumvent the union by negotiating with the sub-
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contractors only. However the Trades and Labour Council in Burnie
supported the ATWU-T and after a brief hold-up, Forest Supplies,
118acting for APPM agreed to pay higher cutting rates. By 1941 the
union had succeeded in having a Tasmanian Wages Board set up to cover
pulpwood cutting and the federal award margin for cutting firewood
119was taken to apply to pulpwood. In spite of this, sub­
contractors frequently paid less than the award by manipulating the
120piece-wages system and by petty chiseling.
The workers cutting for ANM were concentrated on fewer sites and 
were readily organised. The major logging operation was conducted 
directly by the company which meant that most workers were paid time- 
wages. However the fallers were generally paid on piece-wages. At
first, the company paid less than the award rates and refused to
121recognise the union. However the union persisted and represented
timber workers in various disputes over breaches of the award.
Generally disputes were settled by local negotiation, occasionally
12 2supported by other unions at the mill. Maydena was built as a
company village for the timber workers and supplied with shops, a 
hall, water, electricity, and sewerage facilities. With a
concentrated workforce on highly mechanised and productive 
operations, better conditions for timber workers were obtained there 
than elsewhere in Tasmania.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF FORESTRY BY THE STATE
We have seen how the two new structures were added and can now 
consider the relationships between the wood industries and the state, 
and particularly how the state constructed forestry. In the
previous chapter, we saw that forestry's reproductive function of 
renewing the resource was pressed from the centre of Empire through 
Imperial and Australian conferences. During the 1910's, Tasmania 
had done little more than send delegates to Australian conferences, 
but in 1920 it was her turn to act as host to the other States, and 
something had at least to be seen to be done.
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The debut of forestry
The 1920 conference approved calculations by Commonwealth
officials that Australia should permanently reserve and manage 9.9
million hectares of indigenous forest to ensure a permanent supply of
timber; Tasmania's share was considered to be 0.6 million.^23
Tasmania responded by passing the Forestry Act, 1920, '... to
establish a Forestry Department and to provide for the better
124management and protection of forests ...'
The Act dutifully specified that 0.6 million hectares of 
forested Crown Land were to be 'dedicated' as permanent 'State 
Forests' within 7 years. Once selected and proclaimed, such forests 
could only be revoked by agreement of both houses of parliament. 
Dedication proceeded slowly due to the conflicts over the use of 
Crown Land between the pastoral, agricultural, mining and forestry 
fractions of capital, expounded and expanded by the relevant 
Departments» By 1927, only 132,711 hectares had been proclaimed,
but in 1928, probably spurred by the visit of the Empire Forestry
Conference to Australia and by the incipient pulp industry, a further
374,186 hectares were proclaimed. The target of 0.6 million
125hectares was not reached until 1939.
In 1922, commercial plantations were started but, as funds were
1very limited, only 352 hectares were planted by 1930. The
Commonwealth advocated more and undertook to provide $6,000 a year
for a small programme, but as the depression deepened the undertaking 
127was cancelled. Some funds were provided for unemployment relief
and used to employ men mostly on plantation establishment and later 
to set up two training camps for Tasmanian youths. The timber
resources created by these funds were trivial, as only 45 hectares
were planted between 1935 and 1939.128
The system by which sawmillers were provided with security of
tenure by leases was modified in 1922 to a system of Exclusive Forest
Permits (EFP) which gave exclusive rights to a surveyed area of
129forest for a period of up to 15 years.
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The Act created a Foresty Department (in place of the Forestry
Branch within the Lands Department) headed by a Conservator of
Forests and responsible to a Minister for Forestry. There was no
immediate increase in staff and the new Conservator had to report
humbly to the Commissioner of Police that:
... at the present time [1920] I have no field staff and am 
dependent upon the assistance of your officers acting in their 
capacity as Crown Lands Bailiffs . ..^^
Under the Forestry Act, one-half of the timber revenues were paid
into a 'Forestry Fund' and devoted to the new Department. As this
fund gradually built up, a few staff were appointed.
The struggle over forestry
Forestry's integrative practices to secure the orderly working 
of the forests by many users meant controlling individual sawmillers' 
logging, and its reproductive function of protecting and regenerating 
the forests had the potential to add to their costs. Thus, the new 
policies were by no means in the immediate interests of individual 
small-scale sawmillers. In 1921, the Conservator, noting the
perpetual conflicts in other States, made '... every effort to 
further a sympathetic attitude towards the timber industry . . . ' He
hoped that cooperation would enable ’. .. forestry to forge ahead
[but] fully realised that there are serious difficulties and that
131conflict of interests will at times be quite unavoidable ... '
His expectation was quickly realised.
The strong demand for timber immediately after the First World
War enabled the state to increase the royalty rates, but still only
132to levels that were low in comparison with other States.
Table 6.5
133Royalty rates on eucalypt logs, 1918-1936
3 3Rate from_____ Rate ($ per m )___________ Date from_____ Rate ($ per m )
1918 0.03 1 Mar 1929 0.21
1 Jan 1921 0.21 1 Sept 1929 0. 18
1 July 1923 0.18 1 Aug 1931 0.11
1 June 1928 0. 14 1 Jan 1932 0.18
1 Dec 1928 0.18 1 Sept 1936 0.19
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The severe depression in sawmilling in 1922 led to reductions in
rates (Table 6.5) which, when combined with reduced production, cut
revenues (Table 6.6) and kept the Forestry Department poor (Table
6.7). From 1926, the Department asked for a greater proportion of 
134the revenues. Revenues continued to fall, and by 1930 the
government was forced to raise the proportion allocated to the
I O CForestry Fund to two-thirds merely to keep the Department open. 
Being starved of funds, the new Department could make only very slow 
progress in surveying and assessing the resource, and could do 
virtually nothing to ensure its reproduction.
Table 6.6
State revenue from timber, 1920-1939 ^3^
Annual averages ($)
Period Timber licences Leases and permits Other
Fees Royalty Rent Royalty
1919/20-23/24 583 4,553 2,768 9,129 179
1924/25-28/29 175 3,722 2,415 11,675 67
1929/30-33/34 144 2,453 2,317 8,386 -
1934/35-38/39 209 4,581 2,790 20,786 -
Average
Table 6.7
annual expenditure by the Forestry Department,
TotalPeriod Forestry
Fund
1920-1939 137 ($)
State State and
Loan Commonwealth
Fund Unemployment
Relief
Other
1919/20-23/24 11,072 11,072
1924/25-28/29 22,192 586 22,778
1929/30-33/34 15,714 6,078 794 22,586
1934/35-38/39 35,854 31,560 21,942 8,000 97,356
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Tasmanian efforts to establish forestry in the 1920's were 
clearly not sufficient. The Commonwealth forcibly enunciated what 
was needed:
The fundamental and far reaching alteration to Tasmania's forest 
policy recommended ... is the acceptance of the principle of 
continuous production which foresters term sustained yield in 
place of the present system of exhaustive exploitation. ... it 
is now necessary to provide ... a properly constituted depart“ 
ment staffed with technical officers of repute.1"^®
The needs for resource surveys, planning, a sawmillers organisation,
and an increase in the productivity in sawmills were also
discussed. These recommendations were introduced by H.E. Gepp,
Chairman of the Development and Migration Commission and immediate
past Managing Director of the Electrolytic Zinc Company - part of the
Collins House group which was then planning to make pulp and paper in
Tasmania. Thus the report carried not only views from the Australian
state, but the implicit imprimatur of central capital.
The State government responded by increasing the staff of the 
Forestry Department slightly and appointing a new Conservator in 
1930, who considered that:
... it was becoming evident that unless something could be done 
to control the cut and definite efforts made to obtain something 
like a sustained yield, the sawmilling industry could hardly be 
expected to survive another twenty years. 1^
He prepared A Forest Policy for Tasmania, which elaborated the 
Commonwealth's recommendations, and involved regeneration works in 
the forest and control by the Forestry Department of the quantity cut 
from the forests - both to the short-term expense of the millers. 
The State government accepted this in principle, though implement­
ation was slow and partial due to the financial stringencies of the 
depression and the opposition of the sawmillers.140 Looking back in 
1937, the Conservator considered that:
... the regime of laissez-faire had become so firmly established 
that any mention of control or restriction was regarded as 
heresy of the most dangerous order .. . and one might almost say 
that it was only as such opposition was overcome that the policy 
could be formally recognised by the Government.141
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In the mid-1930's, unemployment relief funds increased and the 
state provided loans for plantations (Table 6.7). The sawmillers 
opposed this by claiming, with little obvious logic, that unemploy­
ment relief funds might lead to their having to pay increased 
royalties to meet heavy expenditures. In 1935 a large deputation 
called on the Minister wanting more information and the right to 
criticise the Department. They were clearly influential for the
Minister undertook to submit any further regulations to the TTO
142before they were gazetted.
The system of collecting royalties had relied, since 1898, on
sawmillers declaring the quantity of logs on which payments were due
to the state. When staff were increased in the 1920's, checking
increased, many frauds were found, and the new Conservator instituted
a series of prosecutions against sawmillers.14  ^ However the courts
provided little support for the Forestry Department.144 An increase
in funds in the mid-1930's enabled the Department to strengthen its
administration slightly. In the North-Western Division, a vigilant
inspector was appointed who introduced a system of intensive checking
and doubled the royalty collections. All discrepencies in
sawmillers' returns were followed up for '... there never had been a
145month when all log sheets have been correct. ' The Conservator
was quick to point to the considerable loss in revenue as '. . . an
example of the cost of some of the uneconomic 'economies' forced on
146the Department by lack of funds...' Clearly many sawmillers had
reason to oppose the build up of the Forestry Department, in addition 
to the rate at which the royalty was set and the cost of forestry in 
general.
Changing relationships
The addition of the kiln drying structure in 1936-37 and the 
move of mainland merchants into sawmilling was correlated with 
significant changes in the relationships between the state 
administration and the existing structures of production. Whereas 
sawmillers had vigorously opposed measures to control the rate of 
cutting, so that permits had been allocated in response to virtually
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every application, in 1936 the TTO asked the Forestry Department to 
refuse permits to any new sawmills. They drew attention to the 
scarcity of resources, a matter of no apparent concern to them 
previously.^47 The Conservator was able to add quantity conditions 
as each permit was granted or renewed, and where multiple permits 
were held, the quantities were combined into an overall allocation 
for each mill. In 1937, he was able to gazette regulations to 
control the total volume being cut to the then current level.
Tasmanian sawmillers feared that the war-time regulations might
1 4ftstrengthen the domination of the mainland merchants. In 1941,
'... the granting of a large Crown Forest area to a mainland company
[Alstergrens] for plywood manufacture was questioned by many millers 
. 149.... The TTO sought to have the issue of any further forest
permits restricted to bona fide Tasmanians.^0 The conflict
degenerated from an argued case to a welter of increasingly public 
accusations, rumours, smears, and gossip about corruption in the 
forest administration that led to a major political scandal and the 
eventual re-structuring of the Forestry Department.
Corruption
The scandal centred on accusations that the Minister for 
Forestry, T. D'Alton, had accepted bribes from the mainland timber 
merchants, E.A. Alstergren and W.G. Nosworthy, in return for which he 
had granted exceptionally favourable conditions on the permits for 
the plymill and the Loongana sawmill. Further accusations that 
local sawmillers too had obtained favours by bribing Forestry 
Department officials added to the furore.
Problems of irregular administration by Forestry Department 
officials appear to have been raised first by the ATWU-T in 
1940. The Minister sought an independent investigation by the
head of Victoria's forest service, who made suggestions for
I C Oadministrative reforms which were implemented.
The permit for the plymill was issued in 1941 but it was not 
until 1943, when the output of sawn timber associated with the
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plymill was rising, that the major scandal started to unfold. When
investigations by the Auditor-General into Forestry Department
officers were mysteriously obstructed by the Minister, the
153Legislative Council appointed a Select Committee to inquire.
D*Alton promptly resigned and was sent to New Zealand. The Select
Committeee inquiry dragged on inconclusively and was followed by a
1 S4police inquiry and eventually, in 1945, by a Royal Commission. 
Even though Alstergrens sent their company records to the mainland 
and D'Alton stayed in New Zealand, the Royal Commission did find that 
the former had bribed the latter. It also found that four Forestry 
Department officials had received minor bribes. Subsequent court 
cases were unable to prove the charges; D'Alton returned, was re­
elected, and served as government leader in the Legislative Council 
for another 20 years, though he was never again appointed to the 
Ministry.155
The Forestry Commission
The government looked to the Commonwealth for advice and 
received a report which recommended strengthening and professional­
ising the forest service, and giving it greater freedom from 
Ministerial direction. It recommended that regeneration and
protection policies be implemented, and a greatly increased 
plantation scheme be started after the war.
The government, keen to restore public confidence after the
D'Alton scandal, proposed to change the status of the forestry
administration from a department to a stronger, more autonomous 
157body. The sawmillers again opposed planting pines, but agreed:
...that a Forestry Commission be set up in Tasmania, vested with 
full authority to administer the forest estate, and free from 
political control other than responsibility to Parliament as a 
whole ...1
The Forestry Act was duly amended in 1946 to provide for control
by a Chief Commissioner, who was to be a trained forester, assisted
by two Assistant Commisioners, one technical and one with '...
159practical business experience and executive ability ... 1 The new
Forestry Commission and the TTA were quick to reassure each other
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that their relations were harmonious, that old antagonisms had ended
1 fi nand that close cooperation was the order of the post-war era.
DEVELOPMENT
We have now established the significant changes that occurred in 
the Tasmanian wood industries during the turbulent period from 1920 
to 1945. Even though progress was reversed by the cruel depressions 
of the 1920's and 1930's, yet the overall changes were certainly 
developments in the popular sense of industrialisation and a 
transition to a more modern society: a heavy industry was started;
improved techniques of treating timber were applied; and new organ­
isations of labour, capital and above all the state were established.
The major determinants of change - two World Wars, the Great 
Depression, Britain's declining hegemony, and Australian policies for 
industrialisation - originated outside Tasmania. The importance of 
international factors was seen again with newsprint, for Tasmanian 
manufacturing appeared to be possible only as a minor 'spin-off' from 
shifts in world trade.
The monopoly sub-mode of production - a salient feature of the 
world-system since the beginning of the century - was a late arrival 
in the Tasmanian wood industries, but one of great consequence. It 
was certainly more progressive than the competitive and small 
business structures of sawmilling, in so far as most of its workers 
did considerably better than in sawmilling, and it required the 
resource to be renewed whereas the small-scale competitive sawmills 
did not.
In contrast to the substantial development of making pulp and 
paper, Tasmanian sawmilling remained predominantly small-scale, 
local, stagnant and depressed for most of the 1920's and 1930's. The 
limited structural change that did occur - the move of merchant 
capital into Tasmanian kiln-drying, plymilling and sawmilling - was 
largely determined by intra-class competition. Although further
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industrialisation was a structural addition at the Tasmanian level, 
at the Australian one it was merely an industrial relocation that 
preserved the general subordination of Tasmanian forest mills to the 
mainland merchants.
Although the fortunes of labour waxed and waned and waxed again 
more strongly, the essential nature of inter-class relations in 
sawmilling changed little. The limited introduction of 'cooperative 
group working' did not constitute a change in the relations of 
production, but merely a change in the form of payment. Relations 
were altered for some workers in small mills during the depression 
when the means of production were leased to them; however this seems 
likely to have been an arrangement introduced within the competitive 
sub-mode to decrease effective wage rates, rather than an independent 
structure of production.
The needs of the different structures of production were 
expressed by changes in state legislation and administration. The 
long-term need of industrial capital in general required state 
policies to maintain or increase the forest resource. This need was 
pressed ever-more strongly after the First World War from the centre 
of Empire; its implementation was planned by the Commonwealth; and 
its execution passed to the States. The Australian state also
conducted industrial research to promote its development strategy of 
capitalist industrialisation. The theory that the state acts to 
provide for capital's logical needs explains such actions at the 
imperial and Australian levels of the state quite adequately. It 
does not fully explain the actions of the Tasmanian state.
The Tasmanian state obediently followed the plans prepared at 
higher levels and legislated for the long-term reproduction of the 
resource - quite as would be expected by the capital logic theory. 
However, the state's actions in implementing this policy were set in 
more complex ways that require intra-class competition to be 
accounted for. Firstly, the small competitive capitalists opposed 
the introduction of forestry practices that would have contained 
their freedom and increased their costs. As a result the state's
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administration was starved of funds, unable to map or plan the forest 
let alone protect and regenerate it, and was far too weak to handle 
large projects such as providing access to the Florentine Valley. 
Secondly, the large-scale heavy industry, operating in the monopoly 
sub-mode, sought not only concessions, inducements and even finance 
for its production - which the state readily supplied - but also the 
reproduction of the forests. The beleaguered Forestry Department 
was forced to leave the provision of infrastructure, the regeneration 
of the forests, and even planning, to the companies. This weakness 
was not seen to be in the long-term interests of capital in general, 
and particularly not of the large-scale immobile capital represented 
in the pulp and paper industry. The need for the state to take on 
the reproductive function and provide a stronger, and above-all 
honest administration were repeatedly pressed through the 
Commonwealth. By 1946, such needs prevailed over those of a 
parochial and depressed small-scale sawmilling industry.
At the end of the period considered here, it is clear that both 
new structures - kiln-drying, and pulp and paper making - had been 
successfully established. Kiln-drying was articulated with 
sawmilling, but pulp and paper making operated independently. Both 
structures were able to take every advantage of the boom that was to 
follow in the 1950's and 1960's but, as we will see in the following 
two chapters, their expansion brought them into increasing contact 
with the existing structures of sawmilling and led to new 
relationships with the state.
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Chapter 7
EXPANSION OF THE WOOD INDUSTRIES , 1945 - 1969
The Second World War marked the start of a quarter of a century 
of global changes/ a new stage of capitalism/ and an economic boom 
within its core of rich industrialised countries. In this chapter, 
we will first establish the salient features of the new stage and the 
course of the economic boom in Australia. Then, we will consider 
the expansion of both sawmilling and pulp and paper making in 
Tasmania, the changing relationships between the different structures 
and capitals, and the actions of the state.
'Late Capitalism' and a 'New Imperialism'
The quarter of a century to 1970 was one of spectacular change: 
a billion more people were added to the world's population; 
prodigious scientific discoveries were brandished at Hiroshima and 
flaunted from the moon; industrialisation spread. The United States 
emerged from the Second World War as the undoubted hegemonic power of 
capitalism, and the old empires collapsed as a host of colonies 
declared themselves to be nations. Meanwhile, socialism spread to 
Eastern Europe and China, covering one-third of the world's 
people. The United Nations Organisation proclaimed its 'Decade of 
Development' and modernization theory flourished as attempts were 
made to understand, ameliorate and counter underdevelopment 
reforesting, for one example, increased. Yet the paradoxes between 
human potential and condition became bleaker: wretched and rich drew 
further apart, the bountiful biosphere was increasingly impaired, and 
finite resources depleted prodigally.
The capitalist world-system is held to have entered a new stage 
described by such terms as 'Late' or 'Advanced Monopoly Capitalism', 
and 'New Imperialism'.^
In the core , capital was directed both to expanding factories 
and increasing their productivity with more powerful and automated
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machines. Production and planning became far more complex but were 
rationalised with ubiquitous computers. Consumption too rose
rapidly as clever marketeers cajoled increased wages into a host of 
products that enabled market relationships to penetrate ever further 
into the household economies of the 'Consumer Society'. Even as 
this process was continuing, capital was being directed out of the 
core to industrialise states where labour was cheaper, workers more 
disciplined, local elites accommodating and governments less 
discriminating.
Free of overt political control by the old imperial powers,
enfranchised in the United Nations, the former colonies and other
Third World countries found they were still held firmly in a 'New
Imperialism' of complex economic controls (unequal exchange, the
monetary system, technological rents and so forth), backed at times
2by more forceful measures. Their experience varied; a few were 
favoured destinations for western investment and industrialised 
rapidly, but the lot of many deteriorated. This new imperialism was 
dominated by the United States which, by 1971, had 52% of the
3capitalist world's foreign investment.
Changes in the core became increasingly linked to changes in the 
periphery by the advent of the global sub-mode of production 
(introduced in Chapter 1) with its typical organisational form - the 
giant transnational conglomerate corporation. This form represented 
a further stage in the progressive concentration of capital, beyond 
the monopoly of a single industry. Its advantage to capital sprang 
from its ability to transfer capital internally between both sectors 
and nations. As we have seen before, the advent of a salient
structure, taken to characterise a new stage of the world-system, did 
not immediately overwhelm the Tasmanian wood industries. In this 
chapter, we will see that foreign capital only penetrated sawmilling 
and pulp and paper-making to a very limited extent. But in the next 
chapter, we will see that during the 1970's over half Tasmania's wood 
came to be used in the global sub-mode of production.
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AUSTRALIA
Australian development through the 1950's and 1960's contained 
features of both developed and developing states: it had high
production, wage and consumption levels, and yet it was the destin­
ation of investment from the core, particularly from the US.
After the Second World War, Australia sought to absorb returning
fighting men and reconstruct the economy by declaring a policy of
full employment to be achieved by both public and private
investment.^ The economy did expand quite rapidly (by 4-5% per
annum in the 1950's and 1960's) but with low inflation for twenty
years (1953-73).^ Wool prices reached record heights, primary
production rose, and newly-found mineral deposits were exploited.
The greatest change was in manufacturing which virtually doubled its
share of the economy. Not only did heavy and complex industries
overtake the traditional lighter industries, but for the first time
manufacturing as a whole surpassed rural and mining production
7combined; Australia became an industrial nation.
The expanding economy needed all the labour it could get. Some 
2.5 million refugees and immigrants, half from new non-British 
sources, arrived in the 1950's and 1960's, and more women joined the 
industrial and commercial workforce, yet unemployment was contin­
uously lower than any period since about the beginning of the
Qcentury. Immigration combined with a high post-war birthrate meant 
that Australia's population, which rose from 7.6 million in 1947 to 
12.8 million by 1971, increased 2-5 times faster than in other 
industrialised western countries. The demand for housing and hence 
timber was intense, especially in Sydney and Melbourne. In 24 years 
(1947-71), 1.8 million homes were built, which doubled the number.
The unions made significant gains to both the real value of 
wages and conditions - the 40 hour week was declared a standard in 
1947, 3-4 weeks annual leave was obtained, and long-service leave was 
introduced for unionists.10 But labour's power was also limited by 
decisions of the Arbitration Court, limited union membership, and as
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the workforce became increasingly fragmented. On the one hand,
skilled tradesmen in short supply, and workers in some heavy and 
profitable industries such as pulp and paper, were able to negotiate 
better wages and conditions than those awarded by the courts. On the 
other hand, the mass of unskilled and semi-skilled immigrants from 
non-English speaking countries found only low-paid and insecure work 
on assembly lines, in packing sheds, in mines, or in the forests 
cutting pulpwood. Sex, race and age further divided the working 
class.11
Personal consumption almost doubled between 1938-39 and 1968-
1269. Much of it in the spreading suburbs was directed to housing,
to cars to traverse them, and to televisions and electrical goods -
promoted with gusto and financed in part by hire-purchase and other
13forms of consumer credit. The average consumption of paper per
person doubled, pushed up by packaging and advertising for mass 
supermarket shopping, the replacement of more durable materials by 
disposable paper, and increased education, bureaucracy and personal 
reading.^
The new factories were built or bought largely by foreign 
capital. International comparisons, published in 1978, showed that 
foreign control of Australian industry, which varied from 29% to 62% 
according to sector, was only exceeded among developed countries by
Canada (36-90%) and was generally similar to developing countries
15like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
The orientation of Australian capitalism was turned decisively 
from Britain towards the United States by the military alliance of 
the Second World War, by international agreements, and above all by 
the influx of U.S. capital and corporations.^ Britain continued to 
invest but Australia was no longer its almost exclusive preserve. 
Studies made in the 1970's showed that Britain controlled 20% of the 
largest manufacturers, the USA 16%, other foreign countries 6%,
leaving 58% of the large companies and presumably a much higher
17proportion of the smaller companies in Australian hands. The USA
surpassed Britain in controlling a larger proportion of the expanding
18raining (29% vs.12%) and finance (17% vs.12%) sectors.
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Australian companies held a strong position in most sectors of
the paper market thus making it difficult for foreign capital to
enter. In the printing and writing paper segment, two foreign
entrants were associated with or taken over by APPM, as described
later. In the heavy paper and paperboard segment, APM's monopoly of
production was not upset by foreign capital. Tissue paper was not
made in Australian mills and the rapidly expanding market for
disposable products was captured by Australian offshoots of two
19transnational corporations - one as a joint venture with APM. By
1975-76, foreign investment in the paper, paper products and printing
20sector was estimated (from the largest 20 companies) at 11%. The
diffused, small-scale, sawmilling industry was generally unattractive 
to new foreign capital and remained predominantly Australian, though 
two major companies operating in Tasmania were taken over by foreign 
corporations.  ^^
Australian capital was mobilised for industrialisation in ways 
which concentrated control into institutional hands. Insurance
companies and superannuation funds, controlling the accumulated 
premiums of countless Australians, altered their rules to become 
major industrial investors from the 1950's on. Banks too shifted 
capital, the savings of many depositors, from pastoral to manufact­
uring industry. Capital was also raised on the share market from 
many, mostly affluent, individuals so that the number of shareholders 
in major public companies increased many times, though control 
remained highly concentrated - APM for example had 36,000 individual 
shareholders by 1975, but only 20 of them controlled 29% of the 
capital. A detailed study of large Australian companies in
1974/75 found that 35% of their capital came from financial 
institutions and other companies. Only about one-third of them were 
still controlled by individual capitalists, while the rest were
controlled either by other (mostly overseas) companies or their own 
23managements.
The Commonwealth retained some of its war-time powers and was 
clearly in charge of whatever manipulations could be made to the 
Australian economy within the world framework. New activities such
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as the Commonwealth Bank, domestic and overseas airlines, and a 
coastal shipping line were undertaken, and a professional and 
competent career public service built up. Industrialisation and
expansion needed more capital for electricity, water, roads and 
ports, houses, schools and hospitals. Initially, public investment 
concentrated on the infrastructure required for industry, and the 
States had to struggle to provide suburban and social services from 
funds remitted by the Commonwealth and such taxes as they could raise 
themselves.^
TASMANIA
The boom was reflected in Tasmania to a lesser extent than in 
the other States. Even though the population grew at a slower rate 
(as few overseas migrants settled there and the net outmigration to 
the mainland continued), some 50,000 new dwellings were built which 
created a strong demand for timber after the war. The goal of
'development' was still pursued with the policy of hydro­
industrialisation which, with the availability of natural resources, 
led to substantial expansion in mining, metals-processing, and the 
wood industries. Electricity was sold at less than half the price of 
other States, which attracted capital into such energy-intensive
concerns as the refining of zinc, manganese and most notably 
26 27aluminium. Mining too increased. Although the dramatic
expansion of manufacturing was concentrated around Sydney and 
Melbourne, a steady expansion did occur in Tasmania so that 
manufacturing employment increased from 19,000 at the war's end to 
over 31,000 by the end of the 1960's. Similarly, production of most 
pastoral and agricultural crops increased steadily. The production 
of apples fluctuated and in the 1960's manual packing in wooden cases 
gave way to automatic packing in cardboard boxes so that the demand 
for case timber fell and that for cardboard rose.
The wood industries, the third major sector of Tasmania's post­
war economic growth, increased production through both the building
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of more mills and technological improvements. Sawmilling expanded
very rapidly in the immediate post-war years when the demand for
building materials was greatest. Pulp and paper production increased
by intermittent large steps as new machines and mills were built.
Together they accounted for 18% of both employment in and the value
28of the output from all Tasmania's mills and factories.
In the forests, not only did the quantity of wood cut triple, 
which necessitated more roads and regeneration works, but the
operations of the two industries came into increasing contact which
29led to greater state planning and control. Competition and
conflict extended well beyond the forest's edge and led to various 
takeovers, amalgamations and changes in the structure of ownership 
and control. We will consider the industries in turn.
SAWMILLING
The post-war boom in building created the need for great 
quantities of sawn timber. Imports increased, but only to about one- 
fifth of consumption. Australian production increased by 62% in the 
post-war decade but then stayed at a fairly steady level. In 
Tasmania, production increased very fast in the post-war decade and 
continued to increase through the 1960's.
Table 7.1
3 0Sawn timber production and exports, 1945-1969
Period Average annual volumes Ratio of volumes
Produced 
(m3 000)
exported 
(m3 000)
exported/
produced
(%)
dressed/
total
(%)
1944/45-1948/49 238.9 72.2 30.2 15.9
1949/50-1958/59 309. 1 189.5 45.1 7.7
1959/60-1968/69 400.1 170.3 42.6 24.5
191
Immediately after the war, controls and a shortage of ships
restricted Tasmanian exports, but in 1948, the Commonwealth abandoned
price control and supplied ships to get the timber to the industrial 
31centres. Exports to the mainland rose rapidly, though overseas
trade remained trivial.
The forests were cut heavily .to supply the boom in production, 
and in many areas at a faster rate than could be sustained in the 
long-term. The competitive fractions of capital sought to profit as 
fast as they could, and the Forestry Commission was either unwilling 
or politically powerless to restrict production by regulating the 
quantity cut to a sustainable level. We will see (Chapter 8) that 
severe reductions, induced by this failure, became inevitable in the 
1970 's.32
The increase in production was obtained by building more mills, 
employing more workers, harnessing more power and increasing 
productivity (Table 7.2). The expansion was effected differently in 
the various structures of production (Table 7.3). As virtually no 
sawmills were built during the war, data for 1938/39 provide an 
estimate of the position at the war's end.
Table 7.2
Sawmill statistics : Decennial averages, 1940's-1960 's 33
Period
1940's 1950 's 1960's
Number of mills 243 346 301
Number of workers 1,767 2,372 2,805
per mill 7.3 6.9 9.0
Power per worker(kW) 4.6 9.0 11.4
per mill (kW) 33.4 61.5 103.5
3Volume cut per worker (m ) 125 130 143
per mill (m3) 912 893 1,329
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Table 7.3
Classification of sawmills by :numbers employed, selected years 34
Number of 
employees
1938-39 1948-49 1950-51 1967-68
4 and under 77 174 205 116
5 - 1 0 103 91 96 92
1 1 - 2 0 32 25 34 38
21 - 50 12 14 18 19
51 - 100 2 4 2 6
Over 100 1 3
Total 5 and over 132 161 150 158
Total all 209 335 355 274
Small business mode
The 150 sawmills built after the war were almost all very small 
ones that operated in the small business mode. They had little more 
than a petrol or diesel motor, a single saw, and a simple carriage 
for small logs, and were operated by the owner and 1-3 workers. They 
were set up in the forest and moved frequently from spot to spot 
cutting rough-sawn green timber for the building boom and to supply 
case shooks. Their numbers declined when the boom was over and as 
the apple industry changed from wooden to cardboard boxes.
General forest sawmills
The number of medium sized mills (employing 5-20 workers) stayed 
fairly constant. These mills mostly cut rough-sawn green timber and 
were operated in both the small business and competitive struct­
ures. Hart analysed the comparative costs in 1959-70 of producing 
green sawn timber in a sample of 20 sawmills spread across the range 
of mill sizes, (excluding the very small case mills) but could not 
find a relationship of any significance between size and cost, 
although there weve considerable differences between costs in 
individual mills. Hart found that the sales area was closely
related to size; the smallest mills selling their production within
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Tasmania, and the largest mills selling two-thirds of their timber 
interstate.^
Large sawmills
The number of large mills (employing 21 or more workers) 
increased appreciably. Both the Tasmanian and mainland merchants 
operated large mills. Although they did not enjoy any particular 
advantage in green sawing, they were able to instal kilns and 
dressing equipment and to introduce new techniques like accurate
band-sawing or pre-drying, which few of the middle sized mills were 
37able to afford. During the 1940's, many more kilns were built and 
planing and moulding machines installed. By 1950, sixteen mills were 
able to produce kiln dried timber and flooring. By the 1960's, one- 
quarter of the exports were of high quality dried and dressed timber 
(Table 7.1).
Some of the largest mills continued to obtain part of their
requirements of rough-sawn timber for seasoning and dressing from
medium and small mills. There was a general tendency to vertical
integration in order to secure supply from the smaller mills, most of
which were kept in operation. Hart examined the reasons for closing
38 mills (other than case mills) and found that 16 (42%) of the
closures were due to take-overs and group rationalisation and the
remainder mostly to difficulties in obtaining sawlogs. These
structural changes led to a drop in the number of working proprietors
and a rise in the number of managers and clerical staff, indicating
39some improvement in the level of administration.
CONCENTRATION OF SAWMILLING : FOUR CASES
We will now examine in more detail the increase in production in 
large mills, the expansion of kiln-drying, and the vertical 
integration of production by considering four longitudinal cases - 
one for each of the four main fractions of capital involved:
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Tasmanian merchant/sawmillers, 
mainland merchant/sawmillers,
- foreign transnational corporations, and the 
mainland pulp and paper company, APPM.
1. Tasmanian merchant/sawmillers - Risby Brothers^
Risby Bros is a long-established firm of sawmillers and timber 
merchants in Hobart, which even in 1982 is still owned and managed by 
the Risby family. At the end of the Second World War they had a mill 
with kilns, dressing and moulding machines, and a timber yard in 
Hobart. They also had forest sawmills at Brown Mountain and 
Ellendale which were supplied with 3,000 cubic metres of logs a year 
by ANM (described in Chapter 6), and held other permit areas.
Steady profits in the 1940's and keen markets in the 1950's
enabled Risby's to expand. In Hobart they added two more drying
kilns in 1952 and introduced fork-lift trucks - an innovation at the
time. The forest sawmills were replaced with a new mill at Westerway
capable of cutting 4,500-6,000 cubic metres a year. Part of the
Hobart mill had to be rebuilt in 1954, which delayed further
expansion, but in 1958 the Westerway mill burnt down which forced
Risby's to construct a large new one at Austins Ferry on the northern
outskirts of Hobart. Instead of the circular saws normally used for
41breaking down logs, a large modern band saw was installed. The
more sophisticated technology of band-sawing was mastered (after 
initial difficulties - as they did not read the maintenance manuals!) 
and a more accurate sizing log carriage added in 1963. In 1962, 
Risby's purchased a sawmill at Sorell, and transferred its log 
allocation to the Austins Ferry mill which, by 1963, was built up to 
approximately 15,000 cubic metres a year.
Risby Bros, as an example of an old-established Tasmanian firm 
of merchant/sawmillers, managed to double their production by: 
securing an allocation of logs from the ANM concession; 
obtaining their own forest permits; 
taking over a smaller firm;
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specialising in high quality timber, which was relatively easy 
to market out of Tasmania (they could sell their general timber 
in Tasmania through their own organisation);
- being able to adopt more sophisticated technology;
- being able to finance their own expansion from accumulated 
capital (and presumably loans) and retain ownership; and 
having sufficient managerial and technical expertise within the 
Risby family to continue the firm.
The example of Risby's is not unique for other firms, such as 
Kemp and Denning, or Crisp and Gunn, expanded in a similar manner, 
managing to retain Tasmanian ownership and control while gradually 
increasing and improving production. A similar firm, Chesterman's, 
closed when there were no new family members who wished to carry on 
the business.
2. Mainland merchants/sawmillers - Kilndried Hardwoods and Tasmanian 
Plywoods.
After the Second World War, the net of mainland timber merchants 
(Gunnersen, Nosworthy, Le Messurier and Alstergren), which already 
had three sawmills, two kiln-drying plants, and a plymill in Tasmania 
(described in Chapter 6), expanded their activities.
In 1947, they converted Kilndried Hardwoods into a public 
company and had no difficulty in raising an additional $70,000,
(partly from the Tasmanian sawmiller K.D. Atkins and the finance
house, Australian United Corporation). They then purchased further 
sawmills at Campbell Town and Oatlands.4  ^ In 1953, the company was 
restructured as Kilndried Timber Industries Ltd and the capital
increased to $560,000, which enabled it to build a new sawmill at
Hamilton and buy Southern Hardwoods Pty Ltd with a large timber area 
and sawmill at Geeveston.4"^ The company continued to expand in the 
1960's by taking over further Tasmanian sawmillers - Fenton Timber 
Products, Dee River Sawmillers, Pyengana Sawmills and I.C. Fehlberg 
Timbers. Some of these takeovers appear to have been achieved by 
issues of shares to the original owners, though Holyman's and the 
network of Gunnersen, Alstergren and Le Messurier (in Alstergren Pty 
Ltd) remained the major shareholders.44
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The plywood factory was rebuilt following a fire in 1955, and
its capacity increased from 4,400 to 6,600 cubic metres. A slicing
machine was added enabling decorative panels to be made from
Tasmanian woods. Improved peeling and clipping equipment was
installed in 1961 and special jet driers obtained suitable for the
45refractory Tasmanian species. Between 1951 and 1954, three
Tasmanian sawmilling companies were taken over - Loongana Sawmill Pty 
Ltd (owned by Alstergren), Bruny Timbers Pty Ltd and A.E. Hilder Pty 
Ltd. These takeovers provided a large sawmill at Sulphur Creek, near 
Somerset, four forest mills in the north-west, and a mill cutting
pine near 46Hobart. These companies sold out, reputedly because they
could not make the transition from logging moderate country with
tramways, animals, steam winches and lowering gear to logging steep
country, which required substantial new investment in bulldozers and 
roads as well as new operational skills.^7 In 1950, Tasmanian 
Plywood Mills introduced bulldozers in order to log previously 
inaccessible stands, and gradually replaced winches and animals for 
snigging.
During the 1950's production was reorganised. In the north, 
sawmilling was concentrated in the Sulphur Creek mill to give it a 
cut of 21,000 cubic metres a year and in 1955, another sawmill was 
moved to the plymill, which improved the selection of logs there. In 
the south a frame mill, which specialised in cutting large sections 
of Blue Gum, was purchased from A.J.& J.W. Dicker, and a new sawmill 
built alongside.
The three merchant firms combined and concentrated their capital 
in a complex network of holding, investment and operating companies 
that preserved dynastic interests, allowed additional capital to be 
raised, and permitted coherent management of large businesses. The 
two major holding companies were: Timber Holdings Ltd, formed in
1950, which held the network's Tasmanian and mainland interests in 
hardwood sawmilling, plywood and timber selling; and Softwood 
Holdings Ltd, formed in 1952, which owned pine plantations and 
sawmills on the mainland. Both companies gradually took over various 
sawmills, timber merchants, hardware and agency businesses on the 
mainland.
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The network built up by the mainland merchants (Gunnersen, Le 
Messurier and Alstergren, with lesser interests from Holyman, Atkins 
and others) was able to expand production in Tasmania by:
concentrating their individual and family-based investments a 
network of companies;
taking over smaller mills when the latter were unable to adopt 
new technology;
integrating backwards from the market through kiln drying into 
log sawmilling; and
integrating the production of plywood with sawmilling.
3. Foreign transnational corporation - the Kauri Timber Company
The Australian-owned Kauri Timber Company (KTC) was formed in 
the 1880's to take over kauri forests and sawmills in New 
Zealand. The company had made some investments in Australia, but
it was not until its New Zealand resource actually cut out in 1942 
that KTC started a programme of take-overs of Australian companies to 
replace and expand its operations. Between 1944 and 1961, KTC took
over at least 41 separate companies of sawmillers, plywood 
manufacturers, timber, joinery, hardware and steel merchants spread
around Australia, disposed of its New Zealand interests, and started
50to improve its mills and yards.
The company financed its e>q?ansion by issuing $800,000 of 4%
preference shares in 1949 to the AMP Society, Australia's largest
insurance company, and selling its New Zealand assets in 1961 for
$3.8 million. The expansion was too rapid, however, many of the
companies taken over were unprofitable, and their dispersion made
management difficult. The recession in 1962 brought KTC near to
bankruptcy and led to a scheme of rearrangement whereby a new
company, Kauri Holdings Ltd, took over Kauri Timber Co Ltd and
reduced the value of the shares by 44% in the process. Kauri
Holdings had to realise some of its assets and sold the Western
51Australian business to a British company. More of the mainland
assets were sold during the 1960's - including pine plantations and 
sawmills to the timber merchants' company, Softwood Holdings.
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In Tasmania, KTC took over three timber firms between 1945 and
1949. The first taken over was J.S. Lee and Sons, who had operated
in the Smithton area in the north-west since the 1880's. They
specialised in the Blackwood export trade. When taken over they had
a main mill at Leesville outside Smithton where they cut, dried and
dressed timber, five forest mills, a timber selling yard in
Melbourne, and a store in Smithton. Next, KTC took over Circular
Head Amalgamated Timbers (described in Chapter 6) from the network of
mainland timber merchants. The network probably sold the business to
52fund the construction of Tasmanian Board Mills, described later. 
KTC also took over F.H. Haines, who had a sawmill at Deloraine and a 
mill with seasoning yards and kilns at Devonport. The result of 
these takeovers was to provide KTC with a log input of over 67,500
cubic metres spread over 5 main mills; 3 in the Smithton-Stanley area
3 3(63,000 m ) and 2 in Deloraine-Devonport (4,500 m from Crown Land
plus private purchases). Both the Leesville and Stanley mills were
53burnt just after KTC took them over. KTC put both back into
production, but was able to delay rebuilding the kilns at Stanley 
until 1957 as it had spare capacity in Melbourne. Kilns were added 
to the Smithton mill in 1960.
The dispersion of KTC's capital and the financial problems in 
the 1960's prevented the company from concentrating and modernising 
its Tasmanian production. In 1969, KTC obtained additional capital 
and expertise from a large United States paper and forest products 
company, the Boise Cascade Corporation, which was then expanding and 
trying to enter Australia as a possible stage for expansion into 
South-East Asia. Boise Cascade provided $2.5 million, in return for 
which it received slightly over one-third of the shares in Kauri
Holdings and an option to purchase sufficient to give it a slight 
54majority. Kauri repaid its overdraft and, in 1970, bought two
more mills to build up its log allocation in the Smithton area to
93,000 cubic metres - sufficient to plan the construction of
Tasmania's largest sawmill, the Chatlee mill, in which the production
55of seven mills would be concentrated.
199
KTC was able to expand in by:
- building up log resources, largely by taking over companies
which had themselves had built up resources in earlier
takeovers; and
- operating its own distribution network on the mainland.
The company's financial difficulties, and probably poor management, 
prevented it from being able to concentrate and improve its 
production facilities. Although some of the firms taken over had a 
long history of successful introduction and adaptation of new 
machines and techniques, KTC did not seem able to master current 
technological developments. Foreign capital was introduced as
coming to the rescue of an ailing firm, and with its help the 
construction of the State's largest mill was planned.
4. Mainland Pulp and Paper Company - APPM
The paper company, APPM (described in Chapter 6), owned largely 
by the Collins House grouping of Australian and British capital, 
commenced sawmilling in 1954 and eventually became the largest miller 
in Tasmania. It entered sawmilling for two complementary reasons. 
Firstly, the forests that supplied the Burnie pulpmill contained very 
large logs - up to 2 metres or so in diameter - that had to be
reduced to billets small enough for the chippers. The initial method 
of barking and splitting the logs and loading the billets on to
trucks by hand demanded intensive back-breaking labour which was 
eliminated if logs were processed in a mill. Secondly, the company's 
own forests contained valuable sawlogs which could be processed 
profitably into sawn timber. In 1954, the company built a sawmill on 
the Burnie site, with a hydraulic debarker and twin band saws which 
could not only reduce pulp logs to billets but could also cut the 
best logs or parts of logs into flitches for resawing. The resawing 
section was equipped with a gang saw for cutting boards. A drying 
yard, kilns, and reconditioning chambers were added, as well as 
planing machines to dress the sawn timber. The sawmill was able to
use the central services of water, steam, power and administration 
available on the site.
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The company expanded by taking over a series of sawmills
operating in its concession areas. In I960, APPM took over eight
small forest sawmills, two larger mills at Natone and Somerset, and
two drying yards from the Cumming family. This business encountered
a series of difficulties: tractor logging was started but strained
Cummings' resources; the small mills were not efficient; and few
56workers chose to work in isolated forest mills. APPM was able to 
take over the Wynyard Sawmilling Company from the Blackwell family 
for similar reasons. APPM closed the small forest mills and
concentrated production at the Burnie, Natone, Somerset and Wynyard 
mills. Facilities were expanded in a series of steps in the 1960's 
and the Natone and Somerset mills were replaced with a new mill at 
Burnie in 1970.57
The company concentrated on producing high quality timber and
were innovative in packaging it. They built up their production to a
size that warranted setting up their own marketing organisation on
the mainland and were able to by-pass the established mainland
58merchants' network. The successful expansion of APPM into
sawmilling was due to:
- having access to plenty of sawlogs on its own property, the
acquisition of quotas on Crown Lands by buying other firms, and 
securing some allocations in its own right;
- the complementary benefits of joint production of pulpwood
billets and sawn timber in the same mill;
having plenty of capital and expertise to master the change in 
logging systems; and
being large and strong enough to arrange its own sales on the 
mainland.
SAWMILLERS VERSUS THE STATE : THREE INSTANCES
The intense demand for timber in the post-war years and the 
extension of non-Tasmanian ownership led to several conflicts between 
the Tasmanian state and the sawmillers. We will examine three
instances.
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1. Timber for housing versus exports
In the immediate post-war period, the demand for timber 
outstripped the rise in production. By 1950 exports had almost 
doubled, production was unable to increase as fast, imports did not 
meet the gap, and a shortage of timber developed. Tasmanian 
shortages were greatest for kiln-dried and dressed products - 
weatherboards and flooring - produced by the larger mills which 
typically were owned by non-Tasmanian companies. Timber also was in 
very short supply in Sydney and Melbourne, where prices were higher.
To the Tasmanian public, the shortages were associated
rightly or wrongly - more with non-Tasmanian ownership of the larger
mills than with the relative levels at which prices were 
59controlled. A sub-committee set up by the Cabinet blamed the
shortage of weatherboards and high prices on timber's being exported
in larger sizes rather than being processed for domestic use. The
60sawmillers replied that Tasmanian prices were 'unattractive'. The 
State government was unable constitutionally to restrict the trade 
between the States by direct regulation and sought indirect controls.
The indirect controls employed (attaching conditions to forest
permits) were weak measures since alternative log supplies were
available from private properties (they comprised 40-44% of logs cut
1945-50), and since legal obstacles prevented the Commission from
imposing a condition on permits that priority be given to Tasmanian
orders. It could do little more than threaten that:
...While the Commission cannot prevent interstate sales of 
timber, it has declared its policy to the industry, that no 
sawmill can expect either extensive protection of future 
supplies of raw material or continued non-competitive sales of 
Crown timber unless it contributes its proper share of timber to 
meet the local and general needs of Tasmania in the sizes and 
grades necessary.^
During 1950-51, the Commission claimed it had only issued 
permits for new forest areas to sawmills selling their output to the 
local market, and had not issued them to mainland based sawmills. 
The immediate force of this was negligible as the larger mills were 
well established and only needed to transfer or extend their existing
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permits. The Commission considered that a proposal made in the
Legislative Council that it should refuse to transfer or renew 
permits for mainland firms was 'fraught with difficulties', namely
fi ?those of defining and detecting the source of ultimate control.
A Board of Inquiry was appointed which expected further 
shortages and recommended that indirect forest controls should be 
maintained, price control should be kept, and the state should 
compulsorily acquire timber and assign it where needed. By the
time the Board's report was released the Korean war boom had
collapsed, and instead of shortages, Tasmanian mills had difficulty 
in selling their timber.^
2. Imports versus employment
The contradiction between the Tasmanian state and non-Tasmanian
companies flared again during the 1961-62 economic downturn when
Tasmanian timber exports dropped sharply, some mills closed, and
employment fell» The mainland merchants were suspected of selling
Asian timbers at the expense of maintaining employment in their
Tasmanian mills. The question of ownership and control was again
raised in the Assembly. The Forestry Commission pointed out that
almost without exception sawmills had registered their offices in
Tasmania and that the extent of mainland control would be very
difficult to trace, particularly where mainland interests had partial
shares in partnerships and individual businesses not registered as
companies. More importantly, it asserted that its charter was
limited to management and declared:
The Commission has not been concerned with who buys a company's 
shares, but with the management of the logging and milling 
operations and the responsibility therefore.6^
3. Timber for the apple crop
Apple-growers, particularly in the major area in southern 
Tasmania, had long-standing difficulties during bumper seasons in 
obtaining enough cases to pack their crop.
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Shortages had arisen after the war - from a combination of four 
factors. Firstly, imports had resumed at only about one-third of 
their pre-war quantity, mainly because prices had risen to double 
that of a local hardwood case. Secondly, the replacement of premium 
grade imported pine shooks with hardwood cases made with ends from 
seasoned and dressed timber had required additional kiln-seasoning 
and dressing equipment, which was quite outside the scope of small 
case mills. Thirdly, the medium and large mills, which had
previously cut shooks in slack periods, used their scarce labour to 
cut house timbers, and their kiln facilities for flooring and 
weatherboards. Moreover, the very strong mainland markets were 
offering better prices and accepting timber for building which
normally could only have been cut for cases. lastly, the quantity of 
apples harvested was fluctuating more markedly than usual from year 
to year.
The apple growers were a numerous and important constituency
whose problems commanded the attention of the ALP government. In
1948, the government proposed that the Forestry Commission set up a
government mill and depot. The facilitating Bill was strongly
supported by the fruitgrowers and equally strongly attacked by
sawmillers and the Liberal party, which saw the Bill as '... the
67first step in nationalising the milling industry ...' The Bill was
ft Qemasculated in the Legislative Council and withdrawn.
Imports from North America were cancelled in 1950 and 1951 (due
to Britain's currency problems), apple crops were good, and the
government presented its proposal again, only to have the Legislative
59Council reject it again. In spite of price increases, cases were
in short supply once more. The State Fruit Board tried to get the
Bill re-introduced but the TTA maintained its opposition and nothing 
70was done. As with building timber, the 1952-3 downturn in the
economy and the removal of Tasmanian price control appeared to 
eliminate the shortages.
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PULP AND PAPER MAKING
The pulp and paper industry expanded rapidly in Tasmania after 
the Second World War. By the end of the 1960's, production had 
increased by five times; over 2,623 more people were employed in the 
mills, overtaking the long-established sawmilling industry.
Table 7.4
7 1Production of pulp and paper and employment, selected years
Year Quantity (tonne 000) Employment in
Printing Newsprint Pulp Pulp and Paper
& Writing Mills
APPM ANM APM
1948/49 24.2 * 30.8 0 1,136**
1958/59 64.2 * 84.4 0 n.a.
1968/69 117.8 123.5 51.1 3,759
* Estimates' ** 1945/46
Production was increased by the entry into the industry of two 
further companies, APM and Tasmanian Board Mills, and by the build-up 
of the existing mills at Boyer and Burnie. Expansion brought the 
pulp and paper industry into closer contact with sawmilling. 
Integration of the two industries was obtained in some cases by 
greater state planning, and in others by the absorption of the 
sawmillers into the paper companies. We will consider mills in turn.
THE KILLAFADDY MILL - TBM
The successful start of a small box board mill by a new mainland 
company in 1943, and the endurance of three smaller independently- 
owned mills producing special boards, appeared to demonstrate that 
APM's long-held monopoly of paperboard production was not 
inviolable. On these grounds, a group of Tasmanian and mainland 
capitalists proposed to build a small mill at Killafaddy (part of
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Launceston) in northern Tasmania to produce special products, largely 
for the local market. The proposers were Holyman's (the Tasmanian
shipping company with interests in sawmilling), K.D. Atkins (a
Launceston timber merchant and sawmiller), and the network of
mainland timber merchants represented in Kilndried Hardwoods,
described previously. In 1946, they formed Tasmanian Paper and
Timber Mills Ltd to concentrate their capital and obtained a
concession over Crown forests in the Asbestos Range area. The
provisions for the concession were intermediate between those for the
concessions granted to ANM and APPM (described in Chapter 6), and
those governing concessions granted in the 1950's and 1960's, 
72described later. The legislation was regarded as a progressive
measure at the time, but as the concession lapsed, its provisions
73need not be elaborated.
In 1949, the company changed its name to Tasmanian Board Mills 
Ltd (TBM), issued $1 million of shares to the public (which brought 
the issued capital up to $1.48 million), and started to build the 
mill. This consisted of a small sulphite pulp plant, one board
machine, and a pasting plant to make solid fibre board for containers 
and building board. There were many delays in importing the
machinery and it was not until late in 1953 that production 
started.
The mill was not successful. Substantial losses were made for
18 months before production was stopped and the board machine sold to
APM. Several factors contributed to the failure. The long delays in
construction lost TBM the chance of entering the market in the
immediate post-war years when competition was slight. The mill was
then too small to compete with imports and APM on the local market.
The other small mills closed during the 1950's and 1960's or, in one
case, expanded to a more economic size. Further, the market was not
readily entered due to prior agreements between potential customers
75and the major supplier, APM.
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TBM after the paper mill
TBM continued to operate as a sawmilling company after the pulp
and paper mill venture failed. The company owned at least 12
sawmills, the central mill site at Killafaddy, 12,000 hectares of
forest purchased for pulping, and held permits over Crown forest for
milling timber both in the north and in the Huon region. For a
decade the company tried to pay off its accumulated debts and then,
in 1965, wrote down the value of its shares by 50%. Although this
eliminated debts, the company could not finance the modernisation and
concentration of its timber production. In 1968, APPM unsuccessfully
tried to buy TBM, but in 1970 a British company bought 80% of the
ordinary shares, enabling it to introduce new capital for a programme
76of concentration and diversification carried out in the 1970's.
PORT HUON MILL - APM
The advent of the Forestry Commission in 1947 marked the 
beginning of planned management of the forests, as envisaged in the 
Forestry Act of 1920. The Commission declared its minimum object­
ives to be the conservation of the forests suppling industry, fire 
protection and the conduct of forest operations in ' . .. an orderly 
planned manner ...' based on permanent rural establishments. Beyond 
these it took more expansionist and developmentalist views seeking to 
dedicate more land as State Forests and to reforest abandoned farm 
land. It interpreted the State's hydro-industrialisation policy to 
be:
...the development of industries dependent on timber to the 
maximum possible extent, and the productive utilization as far
as
use
is possible .77 of land in the State not suitable for other
The forests in the south of Tasmania contained the major
resource of high quality pulpwood outside the ANM and APPM 
concessions, and their stands of regrowth were important as a 
resource of sawlogs for the future. The Forestry Commission started 
to assess them and by 1953 had accumulated sufficient information to
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report the potential of the area, plan how it should be worked, and 
encourage a new pulp mill.
The first interest in the resource came in 1953-54 from two
groups intent on manufacturing rayon. Both were based on British
capital, one in association with Italian manufacturers and one
78connected with the network of Australian timber merchants. 
Neither proposal was definite.
Legislation was passed in 1954 to authorise the Forestry 
Commission to 'sell* the resource by allowing it to grant options for 
investigation (for 12 months, with a discretionary extension of 3
months) and the right to grant or refuse the concession to any 
79applicant.
The two rayon groups and the existing newsprint manufacturer,
ANM, applied for the concession. Rayon was investigated first but
with increasing competition from other synthetic fibres, rayon
8 0manufacturers lost interest in Tasmania. The Commission then
granted the option to investigate the resource to ANM. After 12
months, their investigations were not complete and a 3 month
extension was granted. ANM's investigations were thorough. They
tested 900 tonnes of wood by the groundwood process but found it not
to be as good as that from their Florentine concession. Further
testing by a semi-chemical process was needed and the Act was quickly
revised to allow the Commission to grant a 12 month extension, which 
8 1it duly did. In the end, ANM relinquished their option. They
claimed technical difficulties and economic reasons, though the 
overriding cause appears to have been the reluctance of some 
newspapers to contract to buy local paper when they expected the 
price of imports to drop.82
The 1959 Acts - Pulp exports
The Forestry Commission in 1958 next let the option to L. R.
Benjamin (the pioneer of eucalypt pulping research, then retired from
ANM's mill) as a Tasmanian promoter for Australia's largest paper
company, A PM, which operated a pulpmill and several paper mills on 
83the mainland.
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APM investigated the concession thoroughly and tested 1,500
84tonnes of wood in their Victorian pulpmill. Whereas the ANM and
APPM mills made the wood into paper in Tasmnania, APM planned to make
only pulp which would be exported to be made into packaging papers on
the company's mainland paper machines, mainly in Sydney. With no
other proposals in sight, the Commission and the government accepted
it. Two new Bills, to make minor changes and additions to the 1954
Act, passed through parliament relatively smoothly, probably due to
their having been discussed with local sawmillers and municipalities
85during their preparation.
The legislation provided rights to 105,800 hectares of forest 
and specified the minimum and maximum quantities of pulpwood to be 
cut. The company was allowed to cut some logs for sawmilling, but 
should it do so could be obliged to provide case timber for the apple 
crop. The Commission was empowered to integrate pulpwood and
sawmill logging. It could direct loggers to produce and deliver 
sawlogs and pulpwood, and could settle disputes on costs.
The legislation specified that two types of plan were to be 
prepared:
A Working Plan
The first Working Plan, duly approved by the Governor, was 
issued in conjunction with the Act. It displayed the yields
of sawmill logs and pulpwood that could be sustained for the 
period of the Act (80 years), and the defined standards and 
responsibilities for logging. Revisions at intervals of ten 
years were specified.
A Plan of Operations
The Plan of Operations was for five years and was to be updated 
annually. It included the logging plan (defining the areas to be 
worked and the yields of sawlogs and pulpwood), and the 
programme of road maintenance and construction.
Although the plans regulated both APM and the sawmillers, they were 
prepared between the Forestry Commission and APM (through a committee 
of two officers from each organisation) , leaving the sawmillers to be 
consulted by the Commission only ' . .. as necessary for the
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purpose. ' They were consulted, but they did not enter the planning 
process formally. Thus the smaller competitive fractions of capital 
became followers in an action planned between monopoly capital and 
the state administration.
The Port Huon pulpmill
The Port Huon pulpmill was built at Geeveston in 1962 on the 
site of the Huon Timber Company's old band mill, later used by the 
Kermandie research mill. APM adopted and adapted a new continuous 
process for making pulp, and developed a novel way of pressing the 
pulp into pellets that could be stored in bulk and loaded on to ships 
by conveyor. The mill, which cost about $6 million, was small, 
compact and only employed about 80 people on the site.
When the Port Huon mill started in 196 2, the Commission had
already started roading into inaccessible parts of the Arve
catchment, and several sawmills held permits for sawlogs within the
concession. Logging was carried out directly by the smaller mills
and by logging contractors to the larger ones. Integration between
logging sawlogs and pulpwood was achieved by negotiation. Sawmillers
and contractors were persuaded to cut pulpwood in their existing
operations, and APM required its contractors to cut sawlogs as well
as pulpwood wherever possible. The Commission never exercised the
87directive powers provided in the Act. APM did not start a sawmill
nor take over those operating in the concession.
The small businesses - case mills, logging contractors and truck 
owners - formed the Huon Timber Association in the mid 1960's. The 
Association's main function was to negotiate rates with APM, but it 
also negotiated rates for green sawn timber, and was concerned with
obtaining safe working conditions in the bush.88 The large
sawmillers were members of the TTA rather than the Huon Timber
Association.
In the Port Huon mill, the workers were represented by the Pulp 
and Paper Workers Federation of Australia (PPWFA) which obtained 
conditions and welfare schemes broadly similar to those in the other
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89two mills. The bush workers employed by the many contractors and 
small sawmillers were represented by the ATWU-T, though not all 
belonged to the union.
THE BOYER MILL - ANM
Australian production of newsprint was increased four-fold 
during the 1950's and 1960's by ANM's expansions of the Boyer mill in 
the Derwent Valley. The first step in expansion occurred in 1953 
when the second paper machine started; and the second step in 1969 
when the third machine started. These major steps were supported by 
a number of additions to the pulping and forest production 
processes. As with the establishment of the mill/ each step was 
connected with changes in imports, capital, the policies of ANM's 
customer-shareholders, technical developments, and perhaps pressure 
from the Tasmanian government.
Table 7.5
90Newsprint imports by origin, 1950-1969
Period Country of Origin
U.K. Canada New Scandinavia All
Zealand Sc Other
Proportions by weight (%)
1949/50-1953/54 48 19 - 33 100
1954/55-1958/59 38 33 13 16 100
1959/60-1963/64 8 46 29 17 100
1964/65-1968/69 - 44 40 16 100
The first step
The addition of the second paper machine in 1953 coincided with 
shifts in both the pulp and paper markets towards New Zealand. 
During the dollar shortages of the 1950's, it was Britain and 
Scandinavia rather than Canada (the pre-war supplier) that provided 
Australia with newsprint. From 1956, New Zealand and Canada took an
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increasing share of the market, while Britain was eliminated. 
During the war, the local pulp had been mixed with 22-25% of sulphite 
pulp imported from Canada under a 10 year contract. When this 
expired in 1952, 18% of kraft pulp, made in New Zealand, was used
instead.^
In the 1950's increasing world prices enabled ANM to make
substantial profits, which were used to finance the improvements and
increase dividends. The company was restructured as a public one
though the two founders - the Herald and Fairfax newspaper companies
- still remained in effective control, while the two other major
nevspaper groups - News Ltd and Consolidated Press - remained 
92aloof. Production was still sold to Australian newspapers on 10-
yecr contracts based on the New York price of Canadian newsprint.
During the late 1940's and 1950's the forests in the concession 
were assessed and found to contain only about 50% of oldgrowth Swamp 
Gun, the only species from which acceptable groundwood pulp could be 
made. ANM directed its research to developing a new (chemi-
mechanical cold soda) process that could pulp the other species 
cheaply, and a plant was built in 1957 which enabled 20% of this type 
of pulp to be used. Several other improvements were made, including
one to impregnate eucalypt regrowth with chemicals enabling them to 
93be ground.
The second step
The third paper machine, installed in 1969, almost doubled the 
prcduction capacity of ANM's Boyer mill again. This step was taken 
only after the market had been reorganised, and integrated with New 
Zeeland production? it required changes in ANM's structure, the 
mobilisation of additional capital, and legislative amendments.
The manufacture of newsprint in New Zealand was started in 
1956 by the New Zealand state and private capitalists who founded 
the Tasman Pulp and Paper Co. In 1959, the Bowater Corporation, 
which was owned largely by British and American capital and which 
held a leading position in the British and Canadian newsprint trade,
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invested in Tasman, took over the management of the mill, and sold
94its products around the world. In 1964, the New Zealand
government put in more money, production was doubled, and Bowaters
apparently orchestrated a division of the Australian market between
Tasman and ANM. The resultant oligopoly was sealed by an exchange
95of directors and $2 million worth of shares.
In 1966, ANM renegotiated the sales contracts to its share­
holder/customers, undertook to restrain price increases to a maximum 
of $1.97 per tonne annually, and persuaded the two major groups that 
had refrained from investing in ANM, News Ltd and Consolidated Press, 
to buy $4.6 million of shares. Thus every major consumer had a
stake in domestic manufacturing, and through it was linked to New
96Zealand and to international producers in an ordered balance.
The Tasmanian government pressed ANM to expand. By 1964, a
Minister was threatening that the government might ' ... reconsider
97its attitude to the concession ...' The following year, the
company announced that it would instal the third paper machine and
the government promptly legislated not to reduce the concession but 
98to increase it. The base royalty rate for pulpwood was increased
from $0.20 to $0.30 per cubic metre, the period of the agreement was
extended, and the company's hold on the concession was strength-
99ened. The relationship between ANM and the sawmillers was
legislated in two ways. Firstly, the supply of 30,100 cubic metres 
of high quality sawlogs to two of the major Hobart timber 
merchant/sawmilling firms (Risby Bros and Kemp & Denning) was 
assured. Secondly, the possibility of ANM competing with them was 
further reduced, as ANM's right to cut saw timber was reduced from 
20% to 5% of the total volume cut. Thus the legislation integrated 
the two industries only to a very limited extent, but it did remove 
competition over the resource by consigning the bulk of sawlogs to 
the pulpmill. Estimates of the proportion of input to the pulpmill 
that was of a quality suitable for sawmilling have never been made 
public, but can be expected to be of the order of 35 to 40%.
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THE BURNIE AND WESLEY VALE MILLS - APPM
Associated Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd (APPM) not only increased 
its production of fine paper by almost five times during the 1950's 
and 1960's, but also diversified its production into sawmilling and 
the manufacture of hardboard and particleboard. This expansion was 
funded from accumulated capital and a threefold increase in share 
capital. By the end of the 1960's APPM had become one of Tasmania's 
three or four largest companies.101
In making fine papers, APPM achieved part of its expansion by 
adding paper machines at the Burnie mill and building a new mill at 
Wesley Vale; part through joint ventures with British capital, which 
it subsequently displaced; and part by taking over a new entrant. 
The first joint venture built a coating mill at Ballarat (Victoria) 
in 1950 - though within four years APPM was able to buy out its
British partner. The second joint venture was with the Thomas Owen 
company at Burnie (described later) - though it too was to become 
wholly owned by APPM. The one independent entrant to the sector was 
the British paper company, Wiggins Teape, which built a mill at 
Shoalhaven (NSW) in 1956. Some of its papers were specialised and 
did not compete with APPM's, but entry into the market for others was 
impeded by purchasing agreements between the larger paper merchants 
and APPM. The company apparently was unable to make satisfactory 
profits. A transnational conglomerate, The British American Tobacco
Company, took over Wiggins Teape and soon sold the mill to APPM in
102exchange for shares. Thus APPM, which had been predominantly
controlled by the Anglo-“Australian Collins House group, became partly 
(25%) the property of a foreign transnational corporation.
Paper production at Burnie
Immediately the war ended, APPM expanded production in the 
Burnie mill. A third paper machine was added in 1949 and a fourth 
soon after. These machines were financed from capital accumulated 
earlier and new shares taken up by existing shareholders103
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APPM entered the small Australian market for food wrapping
papers by forming a new company with a long-established British 
manufacturer and exporter, Thomas Owen. In 1948, the Tasmanian
government duly legislated to give the new venture rights to take 
water and dispose of effluent. The new papermill was built at
3urnie with two small paper machines and a parchment making
machine. It drew on APPM's existing mill for pulp, water, steam, 
administration, etc. It was no sooner started in 1952 than Thomas 
Owen sold out to APPM. APPM later added two larger paper machines.
The production of pulp was increased in 1949 by a cooking
process, developed by the company, that raised output from the 
existing plant by 40%. It was increased further by two continuous 
digesters, installed in 1956 and 1964.
?aper production at Wesley Vale
Further expansion at Burnie was limited by the cramped site, the 
Limited quantity of wood on the company's property and concession, 
and the high cost of hauling wood from forests to the east; any 
najor expansion was dependent on the company's obtaining a further 
concession and a new site.
In 1961, they anounced a proposal to build a large new pulp and 
j»aper mill at Wesley Vale, near Devonport (some 60 kilometres east of 
lurnie) at an estimated cost of $25 million. The state readily 
cranted a second forest concession, under conditions similar to those 
for APM's at Port Huon, provided that APPM built the new mill by
I AC970. During the 1960's imports competed strongly and periodic
cownturns in sales were followed by reductions in production,
cismissals of workers, and urgent appeals for temporary assistance
106ind lasting tariff protection. Even though profits were good (at
the average rate of 13.9%) they were subject to alarming fluctuat-
:ons. In 1962 they fell to 5.9%. The company pursued its
expansion plans cautiously and announced in 1965 that it would build
ihe Wesley Vale project in stages, first the paper mill, which would
108receive its pulp from Burnie, and only later the pulp plant.
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Construction eventually started but paper was not produced at Wesley 
Vale until 1970.
Diversification and integration
The complementary advantages of the different types of
production became sharply apparent to APPM in 1946 when it started to
use its own forests. The company '... believe[d] it to be essential
[to] utilise every bit of timber that can be profitably turned to
account ...', and diversified into sawmilling and the making of
109hardboard and later, particleboard. Thus the company sought to
integrate production within the firm. APPM's entry into sawmilling
has been described earlier. It did not, or was not able to, take 
over all the sawmills operating in both concessions, so that some 
integration outside the firm was still required.
The company's forests contained wood not suitable for pulp, 
which could be used for hardboard. A hardboard plant was built on 
the Burnie site where several services were already available. It 
commenced production in 1951. The market expanded and the company 
built a second mill at Ipswich in Queensland in 1958. The Colonial 
Sugar Refining Company, which also manufactured hardboard, combined 
interests with APPM, first to form an export sales company and 
second, in 1967, to form Hardboards Australia Ltd, which operated the 
hardboard mills of both companies.110
APPM expanded into the growing market for particle board by 
building a factory at Wesley Vale in 1963. At first this mill used 
thinnings from the Commission's pine plantations, but later used wood 
from APPM's own plantations. By contrast, the declining market for 
hardboard was to lead Hardboards Australia to concentrate their 
Australian production in other mills and close the Burnie plant in 
1978.
Integration on the Burnie concession
The 1926 Act which granted the Burnie concession (described in 
Chapter 7) did not resolve the problems of integrating and controll-
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ing competition for logs; indeed several ambiguities confused 
them. The main issue was whether APPM had rights to the sawlogs and 
plylogs or whether the Department could grant them to others by 
issuing Exclusive Forest Permits. The issue became prominent in 
1941 when Alstergrens were granted forest permits inside the APPM 
concession to supply Tasmanian Plywood Mills and their own sawmill 
(described in Chapter 6). Given the exigencies of war the permits 
stood, but the Solicitor-General thought the rights of the Crown and 
all other parties should be reconsidered and clearly defined. A Bill 
to amend APPM's 1936 Act was drafted in 1944 but was never put 
forward; given the scandals then current it was probably held over 
until the Royal Commission was completed. ^
Thereafter, the Forestry Commission sought resolution by 
discussion and agreement. It issued permits covering 26,000 hectares 
of the concession - approximately the area it could dedicate as State 
Forest under the 1926 Act. About 47% of the permit areas were held 
by mills connected to the network of mainland timber merchants 
(including Tasmanian Plywood Mills and Kilndried Hardwoods), 35% by 
mills which APPM took over in the 1960's, and 18% by other 
sawmills. Although APPM maintained that their rights de juve might 
embrace sawlogs, the Commission was successful in obtaining de facto
recognition of the rights of permit holders and in persuading APPM to
112deliver logs to sawmills holding permits. Integration was thus
achieved partly within the firm and partly by persuasion from the 
state's administration.
The 1926 Act envisaged that about one-quarter of the concession
would be dedicated as State Forest, carefully planned and
regenerated. It did not specify which party should pay for the work,
nor did it provide for planning or regeneration over the remaining
three-quarters. Again, agreement was reached de facto, by practice
and local agreement. APPM took on the roading, most of the fire
protection and regeneration, while the Commission took on
113regeneration in the State Forest.
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EXPANDING THE FORESTRY COMMISSION
The expansion of sawmilling and pulp and paper making was
accompanied not only by legislation, but also by an expansion of the
114Forestry Commission's staff and expenditure. Walker reconstructed
the Commission's accounts from 1936/7 and in detail from 1953/54 to 
1 1 51977/78. He distinguished between a 'Native Forest Operations
Account' which covered annual revenues and expenditures (including 
notional interest on public funds spent on roads etc.), and a 'Fund 
Statement' showing capital invested for long-term benefit such as 
plantations and roads (Table 7.7, Appendix 1). We need to consider 
Walker's analysis in functional rather than accounting categories.
In the Native Forest Operations Account, the revenue (royalty 
and rents) came from production. Expenditure was partly productive 
(the maintenance of roads, marketing, and some protection), partly 
reproductive (regeneration, most protection, mapping, surveys, and 
silvicultural research), and partly integrative (some planning). 
Expenditure on planning and research - activities with a high 
integrative and long-range content - increased almost four times as 
fast as the average. The Fund Statements show that most of the funds 
received from the State and Commonwealth were spent on building roads 
- for a mixture of functions - and establishing plantations to ensure 
long-term reproduction and expansion. Overall, the Commission's
expansion was greatest for the function of long-term reproduction and 
expansion.
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Table 7.6
Abstract of the state*s forestry accounts/ 1953/54 to 1967/68
5 year periods ($ OOP's) 
1953/54 1958/59 1962/64
to to to
Increase
1953/4-57/8
to
1957/58 1962/63 1967/68 1963/4-67/8 
(Real terms
1966/7 %)
Native Forest Operations Account
Revenue 3,606 4,966 7,0 36 55
Expenditure on current
operations 2,673 4, 169 5,167 55
Interest on loan funds 579 1,229 2,326
Total Costs 3,252 5,398 7,492 84
Profit (loss) 354 (432) (456)
Fund Statement
Funds received 3,978 6,075 12,623 254
Application of funds
Development of native forest 1,889 2,599 3,455 146
Development of plantations 1,391 2,45 3 6,483 373
The state's increased emphasis on the reproductive and integrat“
ive functions occurred concurrently with continued concentration of
and increased investment by mainland merchants and foreign capitals
in sawmilling, and above all by the great expansion of the pulp and
paper industry. It is notable that the Commission's expansion was
achieved without incurring the traditional opposition from Tasmanian
1 1 fisawmillers in the small business and competitive structures. 
This is attributed primarily to the fact that the immediate costs of 
expanding the reproductive functions were funded from government 
loans. That is, the reproduction of the forest resource occurred 
with the rise of larger capitals - particularly that in the monopoly 
structure - and was charged substantially to the taxpayer rather than 
the industrial user.
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EXPANSION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES
The period we have considered, 1945-1969, was certainly one of 
development in the popular sense of industrialisation, physical 
change, and economic boom. It was also one of structural change 
that occurred in a complex pattern not to be explained by single or 
simple determinants.
The overall trend was for capital to be controlled by fewer 
hands. In sawmilling, the surge of the small business structure was 
followed by a decline in the number of working proprietors. 
Moreover, the large mills in both the monopoly and competitive 
structures actively took over smaller mills. Similarly, the attempt 
by relatively small capital to enter the pulp and paper sector was 
short-lived.
Concentration operated in the different structures to different 
effect. With respect to the entry of foreign capital, we saw take­
overs by foreign transnational corporations of Australian and 
Tasmanian owned sawmills, the entry and retreat of British capital in 
paper making, and the successful entry of transnational capital as 
partial owner of APPM. We have also seen, in the case of ANM, that 
the expansion of Australian capital can be affected by foreign 
capital, through intricate articulations. Many of the larger
mainland and Tasmanian firms, operating in the competitive and 
monopoly structures, throve in the economic boom. However the
smaller firms in the competitive structure - those who could not 
adopt more expensive logging techniques, and case mills that lost 
their market - failed to survive. Concentration resulted in an 
increasing proportion of the industry being controlled by non- 
Tasmanian hands.
The state's forestry administration was expanded and 
strengthened, but it failed to contain the boom in sawmilling to a 
level that the public forest resource could sustain in the long 
run. For small competitive capital, it supported the short-term 
productive function of forestry at the expense of the reproductive
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one. However, the Tasmanian state acted in general harmony with the 
long-term interests of the greater but mostly non-Tasmanian 
capital. In repeated instances we saw that the state had little or 
no influence on the decisions made on larger spatial scales. The 
difficulties in asserting Tasmanian interests over others were 
doubtless formidable, but it is notable that the state's 
administration sought to restrict its responsibilities to the 
technical and exclude the inherent conflict. In doing so it made 
the state's function to serve capital rather than Tasmania.
We saw that forestry's reproductive function was established by 
the state in direct and necessary correlation with the rise of larger 
capitals. We also saw that the state expanded its integrative 
function, and this was to become of critical importance as wood 
production doubled in the 1970's with the advent of the woodchips 
export industry.
221
Chapter 8
THE EXPORT OF WOODCHIPS AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE, 1970-1980
The long boom in the capitalist world's economies, described in 
the previous chapter, ended sharply with the economic crises of the 
early-1970's. Inflation, fuelled by the United States' spending on 
the Vietnam war, soared further when the OPEC cartel of oil-exporting 
nations secured a four-fold increase in the price of oil, late in 
1973. Economic growth fell and unemployment rose throughout the
core of rich industrialised countries, and the resulting condition, 
'stagflation', persisted through the remainder of the 1970's. This 
period has been considered not only as an economic crisis, but also 
as marking a turning point for capitalism as a whole. Firstly, the 
hegemony of the United States was no longer a thing beyond dispute, 
as she retreated from Vietnam and as her relative economic growth 
declined. Not only did Japan and the European Economic Community 
improve their relative positions somewhat, but several formerly 
peripheral countries were industrialising rapidly. Secondly, while 
manufacturing increased in such countries as the Phillipines, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong, it declined 
in many traditional centres of industry in the core - particularly in 
Britain. Thirdly, the economic crises, de-industrialisation,
unemployment, and the difficulties of maintaining the social welfare 
services built up during the long boom, led to political reshuffling 
and fundamental questioning within developed industrial countries.^
The global redistribution of production was partly or mainly the 
result of the rise of the global sub-mode of production, which 
appears likely to characterise the emergence of a new stage in the 
historic development of capitalism. In this sub-mode capital moves 
freely between sectors and nations. The resultant power to 
industrialise or de-industrialise, to develop or undevelop particular 
regions provides capital with two strong levers that are less 
available to other sub-modes: firstly, pressures from reserves of
labour in the low-wage peripheral nations can be brought to bear on
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labour in the high-wage countries of the core and, secondly, capital 
can play nation off against nation to obtain cheaper resources, 
greater 'assistance', or coercive labour legislation.
In this chapter, we will consider how the wood industries in 
Tasmania developed within the new world structure. Firstly, we will 
note how the global changes were reflected in the Australian 
economy. Then we will consider the three major sectors of the 
Tasmanian industry in turn: the export woodchip mills which were 
established during the 1970's and operated in the global structure of 
production, the pulp and paper mills which continued, and the 
sawmilling sector which declined. Finally, we will consider the
continued concentration of capital and the emergence of APPM as the 
dominant corporation. In all, we will examine the complex
relationships that developed between the different fractions of 
capital, and the actions of the state.
AUSTRALIA
In Australia, economic growth and industrial development 
proceeded much along the lines established in the 1960's - though 
with increasing inflation - until the economic crisis which commenced
in 1974 and 1975. In those years, inflation rose from 2.4% to
15.1%, the economic growth rate fell from 5.1% to 1.5%, and
unemployment rose from a general level under 2% to 4.7% of the
workforce. Although inflation was subsequently reduced to under 10%
and the rate of economic growth recovered to nearly 3%, static
employment could not absorb the natural increase in the workforce so
that unemployment grew to be consistently over 6% by the end of the 
2decade. The economy underwent a number of structural changes whose 
salient features were:
Exports vs. manufacturing
The economy moved towards one that exports basic raw materials, 
such as minerals, coal and wood, for manufacturing elsewhere, 
rather than one that industrialises further.
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Export markets
Japan and the newly industrialising states in South-East Asia
became increasingly important markets for Australian exports.
During the 1970's, Japan took 30% of Australia's exports and by
the end of the 1970's, the newly industrialising states along
with China (and minor quantities to other Asian nations)
3accounted for a further 20%. All the woodchip exports went to 
Japan, with the exception of small quantities to South Korea. 
Foreign capital
Foreign capital continued to be invested in Australian industry 
but was concentrated more in mining, coal, oil and chemicals,
4than in manufacturing. From the mid-1970's, the foreign
controlled companies already in Australia were able to 
strengthen their hold by raising over half the funds they 
required for expansion from accumulated capital and local 
borrowing.5
Concentration and sectoral change
The economic recession pressed unevenly on Australian industry - 
harder on small capital than large; harder on the manufacturing 
and construction sectors than others. The differentials can be 
seen in several ways. Bankruptcy proceedings increased in
number but involved mostly small assets and liabilities, 
indicating that they involved small concerns. Concentration
was also achieved by mergers and takeovers - some of 
comparatively large institutions - and by the closure of the 
least profitable operations. In manufacturing, the number of 
factories fell by 1,200 from a peak of 37,000 in 1973-74.^ 
Whereas the total number of people employed remained almost 
constant from 1974 to 1979, the number in manufacturing and 
construction fell by 14% and the number of houses and flats
Obuilt annually fell by over 20% in the same period.
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TASMANIA
The structural and recessionary changes in the Australian 
economy had most uneven regional consequences. Some areas or towns 
centred on particular export projects, boomed while others, such as 
the inner city areas of Sydney and Melbourne, or regional towns like 
Launceston, lost employment as manufacturing declined in sectors like 
textiles. Overall, Tasmania fared badly - average incomes were 12% 
less than for Australia as a whole; there were more poor people; 
unemployment was one-third higher; and the net outmigration, 
particularly of young people, continued.
The Tasmanian government (with Commonwealth financial backing) 
looked hard at opportunities for creating employment and how 
development and conservation needs might be balanced. After numerous 
studies a State Strategy Plan was drafted in 1976.^ It considered 
that forestry and timber processing offered the greatest potential of 
all resource based industries for rapid expansion and that its 
encouragement with state assistance should be investigated.
The Commonwealth government commissioned an inquiry (the 
Callaghan Report) into the 'Tasmanian Problem', which reported in 
1977 that:
Tasmania is heading towards another Newfoundland or Ireland 
situation [ie being a permanently depressed region] but one in 
which the rate of economic decline has been moderated by what 
might be called the political muscle of the state gained through 
Federation.^0
The lower average incomes in Tasmania were attributed mainly 
to: the lower proportion of very high income earners (directors,
executives, professionals, etc.); the proportionately lower profits 
received from shares and investment; and poor returns from 
farming.^ The Tasmanian state was found to be severely constrained 
in its ability to raise revenue, but was supported by higher grants 
and loans from the Commonwealth than any other State.
The Callaghan inquiry concluded that '... Tasmania's major 
problem is Bass Strait ...' (due to the high cost and the irregular 
nature of shipping to the mainland). Its minor problems were those
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of industrial dispersion, proliferation of local governments, and
poor internal transport. The report noted that much of the
industrial production was concentrated into:
. . . enclaves of capital intensive units of production [eg. the 
pulp and paper mills] which do not have as big an economic 
effect on the state as is sometimes suggested as they export 
their products ...^
The report called for a new development strategy that would diversify 
the industrial base by encouraging the expansion of small and medium 
business (rather than attracting heavy industry with the policies of 
hydro-industrialisation and concession). The report made a few
topical 'blasts' at conservationists, who might hamper industrial­
isation, and a number of specific recommendations about smaller 
matters. Generally it thrust '... the primary responsibility for 
the economic situation...on the people of [the] State ...' It
recognised that a small State was could not 'assist' industry as 
lavishly as larger ones, and concluded that the relative economic 
decline and net outmigration would continue.
The changes to the Australian economy were reflected in changes 
in the Tasmanian wood industries. Exports of woodchips to Japan 
increased spectacularly during the 1970's to require more than double 
the quantity of wood to be cut by the end of the decade. By contrast 
the domestic production of pulp and paper expanded only a little 
after 1974. The production of sawn timber dropped by 15% and was 
concentrated by the closing of 35% of the sawmills, while the 
concentration of capital into fewer hands was even more marked.
WOODCHIP EXPORTS
From the mid-1960's, Japan's rapidly expanding pulp and paper 
industry sought raw materials for making printing and writing paper 
in addition to the softwoods it obtained from North America. 
Australia had uncommitted resources of eucalypts for which the 
pulping technology had been proved already. A number of Japanese 
trading and paper companies sought and obtained numerous proposals,
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trading and paper companies sought and obtained numerous proposals, 
mostly from well established Australian companies, to build and 
operate mills that would chip wood for loading on to Japanese ships.
During the 1970’s, five woodchip mills were built; the first in
New South Wales in 1970, the next three in Tasmania in 1971 and 1972,
and the last in Western Australia in 1976. The mills were large -
one in Tasmania being the world's largest - but comparatively
simple. At the mills, logs brought from the forest were debarked,
reduced in size where necessary, and chipped into pieces (about 5-6
cm long, 2-3 cm broad and 1 cm thick). The mills were adjacent to
water deep enough for vessels of 30-50,000 tonnes, had areas to
stockpile enough chips to fill 2-3 ships, and were equipped with pipe
lines and conveyors to stock the chips and load ships rapidly. The
1 3largest mill cost about $12 million. Woodchips were also produced
by sawmills from their otherwise wasted off cuts and sent to both 
export sites and domestic pulpmills.
The relations between capital and labour in the woodchip mills,
and in the forests supplying them, were virtually identical with
those in the domestic pulpmills. Capital was organised in a
particular form that differed from the US or European based
transnational corporations of kinds depicted in descriptions of the
ideal type. The central places in the woodchip trade were occupied
by giant Japanese international trading companies that owned or
arranged the shipping and negotiated agreements linking particular
mills to particular suppliers. Prices were set and revised in
bilateral negotiations which revolved around inflation in Australian
costs, changes in the Japanese industry, and movements in the prices
of softwood woodchips exported from North America.1^ The Japanese
companies' negotiations, and their joint investments in shipping,
were coordinated by an 'Overseas Pulp Material Committee', which
functioned as a kind of cartel under the guidance of the Japanese
15Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The agreements
effectively dedicated Australian capital to the interests of the 
Japanese companies. Conversely, the Japanese expanded their pulp
mills on the surety of raw material supplies from Australia, though 
their dependence was less as their ships could go elsewhere.
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Production increased rapidly. By the end of the 1970's, wood-
chip exports accounted for about 60% of the wood cut in Tasmanian
forests. Although logging required comparable labour, the small
amount of processing in woodchip mills required only 193 people for
each million tonnes of wood compared to over 7,000 when the same
16quantity was made into paper.
The large-scale and rapid development of the woodchip industry 
produced both complementary benefits and contradictions between the 
different fractions of capital involved, and raised environmental 
issues that were the focus of action by numerous groups and 
individuals of the 'conservation movement'.
To the Australian pulp and paper companies, the uncommitted 
forests represented opportunities for eventual expansion, which they 
tried to secure either by opposing exports or by obtaining 
concessions and entering the trade. The Commonwealth government 
tried to protect the future of domestic manufacturing by only 
granting export permits until 1985-1991, and requiring studies of the 
feasibility of upgrading the woodchip mills to pulp or paper 
mills. ^  The Commonwealth also set a minimum price at which
woodchips could be sold, which served to ensure that the trade would 
be sufficiently profitable to reproduce the cut-over forests.
We are not concerned in this work with the environmental issues
and values involved but with the effects of the conservation movement
18on the course of development. Firstly, the conservation movement
succeeded in making the extent of forest cutting both a household 
word, 'woodchipping', and a subject of governmental inquiries. 
Secondly, public forestry authorities co-opted as much of the 
criticism as possible by encouraging the public to make submissions 
to the various inquiries, while leaving decision-making powers 
unaltered. Thirdly, logging practices were modified to ameliorate 
their environmental impact and appearance without any great increase 
in costs. Fourthly, several public relations and lobby groups were 
set up by the wood industries (closely supported by government forest 
services and forestry leaders) to counter the movement. Lastly, the
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interests of some inquiries spilled over from environmental into 
economic and resource effects.
THE TRIABUNNA MILL - TPFH
The first Tasmanian woodchip mill was built in 1971 at
Triabunna, on the east coast, by a group of mostly Tasmanian 
sawmillers. It was operated profitably by the group until 1979 when 
it was sold to APPM.
In 1966-67, the possibilities of woodchip exports were invest-
19igated by the Tasmanian Timber Association (TTA). Prospects
appeared hopeful, so the thirteen sawmillers in eastern and southern
Tasmania combined to form Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Pty Ltd
(TPFH) to further the investigations. The member companies included
long-established Tasmanian merchant/sawmillers, the network of
mainland merchants, and Tasmanian Board Mills, which had failed in
2 0its first attempt to enter the pulp and paper industry. TPFH
approached the Tasmanian government for a forest concession, hired US 
consultants to conduct a feasibility study, but then had to secure 
definite markets, resources, capital and governmental approval.
Market
The market was secured in 1968 by entering into a long-term 
contract with the Japanese trading company, Mitsui, which arranged to 
supply 610,000 tonnes of woodchips a year to a large Japanese 
company, Jujo Paper Manufacturing Company.
Commonwealth approval
The initial contract price of approximately $13.50 per green 
tonne (subject to increase with inflation) is said to have been a 
world record price. The Commonwealth issued a licence in 1968 
permitting 711,242 tonnes a year to be exported for 18 years, subject 
to State legislation described below and hence to a study of the 
feasibility of building a pulp mill.2^
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The Eastern and Central Concession
The State government legislated to provide a concession over
2 2uncommitted Crown forests of eastern and central Tasmania. Its
main features were:
- Initial rights for 18 years. The company could be required to 
carry out feasibility studies for the building of a pulpmill, 
after which the Act envisaged that either a pulp mill would be 
built and the rights to the wood extended to 80 years, or 
woodchip exports could be continued on a basis to be negotiated.
- TPFH was required to spend at least $1 million building the 
woodchip mill and to cut certain minimum volumes - which it did. 
The provisions for joint planning and integrated logging 
followed those for APPM's Wesley Vale Act and APM's Port Huon 
Act (described in Chapter 7).2^
- The Commission was responsible for regenerating and protecting 
the forests.
- The Act provided that any of the concession could be dedicated 
as State Forest on the recommendation of the Forestry 
Commission.
This last feature resolved conflicts within the state 
bureaucracy and between different fractions of capital, in favour of 
the wood industries. Objections from the Mines Department were
overcome by declaring new State Forests as subject to the Mining Act 
and hence to shared control with mines officials - mining being 
allowed. Objections from the Lands Department could not be
overcome. Grazing leases abounded and many had to be terminated in 
order to regenerate the forest.24 Resolution of this issue in 
favour of the Forestry Commission illustrates in fact the rapidly 
growing importance of the wood industries relative to the
traditionally dominant grazing industry.
The Act was not passed without objection from Australian 
manufacturers. Australian Newsprint Mills (ANM) - whose concession 
abutted TPFH's - complained that it wanted part of TPFH's area for 
its own expansion. The government gave the complaint short shrift, 
partly because ANM's case was weak and partly because it was keen to
230
encourage a large new venture, especially one which appeared to be
25particularly Tasmanian. This impression was reinforced by the
selection of members of long-established Tasmanian sawmilling firms
26as the first directors and subsequent chairmen of TPFH. The
capital required was greater than local sawmillers could assemble, 
however, and the impression of Tasmanian ownership could only be 
realised in part.
Capital
The problems of mobilising sufficient capital from the relat­
ively small Tasmanian family sawmilling companies were aggravated by 
rapid inflation during construction, engineering problems, and the 
need for funds to build logging roads and to operate the mill. In 
1968, the TPFH group estimated the capital cost would be $3.4
million, of which they expected to raise half internally and to
27borrow half on the Australian market. By the time the mill was
opened in 1971, $5.4 million had been spent, and in 1973 a
reconstruction of the ship loading wharf was necessary. By 1975 the
28total assets employed amounted to $10 million.
To raise the additional capital, TPFH was reconstituted as a 
public company in 1969. Part of the capital was found by the
sawmilling companies, particularly by the two largest, Kilndried 
Timber Industries which lifted its shareholding to 25%, and IXL
Timbers, a subsidiary of Henry Jones. The former (as discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7) was mostly owned by the network of mainland timber 
merchants (40%) and a Tasmanian shipping company, while the latter,
although originally Tasmanian, had become an investment for mainland
29institutional capital. The insurance company, AMP, provided $1.5
million. Two of the original Tasmanian sawmilling companies later
withdrew - the shares held by ones were widely dispersed, while the
shares held by another were mostly bought by Henry Jones.
Identifiably Tasmanian interests appear to have held about 35-40% of
the equity capital. Capital was also raised from loans of some $4
million, so that the identifiably Tasmanian component in the overall
30capital structure was about 21-24%. Hence the appearance of TPFH
as a Tasmanian venture was considerably less than the reality.
231
The government also provided $1.8 million in port facilities, 
access roading, water and power supplies at the site, and built 20 
houses at Triabunna. Nearly all these costs had to be repaid by 
TPFH over 3-7 year periods, and can be regarded more as temporary 
loans than state investments.
Operation
After initial delays and a loss in 1971, production increased
rapidly and the company proved very profitable, earning an average of
$0.9 million a year (equivalent to 17.8% on share capital) over the
1972-78 period. However these profits were nearly all distributed
(dividends averaged 16.5%) rather than accumulated within the firm to
31upgrade the mill to make pulp.
The integration of pulpwood with sawmill logging was achieved by
negotiation, without the Forestry Commission having to exercise its
directive powers. As with the Port Huon concession, the planning was
conducted by a committee of company and Commission officers, which in
theory excluded sawmillers. In practice the committee invited the
TTA to represent sawmillers' interests, but as TPFH provided sawlogs
to 26 different sawmills it was virtually impossible for a single
representative to enter the planning process in the detail that
32individual millers needed. Although sawmillers were originators
and shareholders in TPFH they do not appear to have received any 
additional complementary benefits from integrated operations. Indeed 
even the biggest individual shareholder reported continual 
difficulties in obtaining regular deliveries of sawlogs from TPFH as
the weekly operational imperatives of the far larger plant took 
33precedence.
The Forestry Commission protected and regenerated the forest. 
On the basis of costs up to 1973/74 and the then current royalty for 
pulpwood of $0.79 per tonne, a Commission report forecast likely 
costs and returns and found '... that revenues...are insufficient to 
meet all the costs of the project ...'34 Although revenues covered 
direct costs of protection and regeneration, they did not cover the 
costs of managing the project, nor did they provide any net return to
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the state. Both royalty rates and costs increased during the 
remainder of the 1970's, but it is unlikely that the general position 
of company profits and state losses would have altered appreciably.
TPFH also cut wood on freehold properties/ particularly in the 
midlands and central districts, though the major user of private wood 
was not TPFH but a company which depended on it entirely - Northern 
Woodchips.
THE SMALLER LONG REACH MILL - NORTHERN WOODCHIPS
The second and third of the Tasmanian woodchip mills were built 
side by side at Long Reach on the Tamar estuary near Georgetown - the 
smaller by Northern Woodchips Pty Ltd, the larger (described later) 
by APPM.
The proposal for the Northern Woodchips mill, like that for the
TPFH mill, originated as an attempt by sawmilling companies operating
in Tasmania to enter into the first stage of the pulp and paper
industry. Following initial investigations by the TTA, sawmillers in
the north and north-west combined to form Tasmanian Woodchips Pty
Ltd. The group included the Kauri Timber Company and Alstergren
35interests, but was smaller and weaker than the TPFH group.
Tasmanian Woodchips
Tasmanian Woodchips asked the government to allow them to log
APPM's unused Wesley Vale concession for 10 years, or at least until
APPM built their second pulpmill and needed it. However APPM were
36busy developing their own proposal and could hardly be dislodged. 
Uncommitted Crown forests in the North-West district were considered 
but rejected as the eucalypt resource there was too small.
Over one-third of Tasmania's forests of commercial quality were 
on privately owned land and these represented an alternative to the 
committed Crown resources. Tasmanian Woodchips obtained the rights 
to cut timber on many properties and counted on the chips that could
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be produced from waste in their members' sawmills - in all they
believed they had sufficient resources. They negotiated a contract
to supply 305,000-710,000 tonnes year to Japan at a price of
approximately $11 per tonne, ie. significantly lower than the price
of $13.50 obtained by TPFH. The Commonwealth refused an export
37licence on the grounds that the price was too low.
Savoy Corporation
Another proposal to utilise the private forests was developed by
Plantation Management Pty Ltd, one of the many subsidiary and
associated companies of the Savoy Corporation Ltd which managed
38hotels and speculated in real estate development. The group's
property ventures were highly geared, with debts and loans exceeding 
the group's equity, and little capital was left for investment.
Northern Woodchips
In 1970 the two groups combined to form Northern Woodchips Pty
39Ltd, in which they took equal shares. The Commonwealth's
insistence on the minimum price was effective, the Japanese
renegotiated at a higher price, and the Commonwealth granted a permit
40allowing 9. 1 million tonnes to be exported over a 15 year period. 
Northern Woodchips became a public company and construction 
commenced.
No sooner had construction started than the Savoy Corporation
collapsed, leaving Northern Woodchips without the means either to pay
41for work half done nor to complete it; construction ceased. The 
sawmillers, realising their proposal was being dragged down with the 
collapse of Savoy, set up another group, Tasmanian Pulpwood Suppliers 
Cooperative Ltd, to acquire timber rights from landowners and 
possibly develop a fresh proposal.42 They effectively withdrew from 
Northern Woodchips but failed to establish a definite proposal.
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H.C. Sleigh
Northern Woodchips was saved from bankruptcy in 1971 and 
refinanced by an oil company, H.C. Sleigh Ltd, and the Commonwealth 
government. H.C. Sleigh, which took a 32% equity, was a joint US- 
Australian company in which the US Caltex Petroleum Corporation held 
the largest interest (36%) and a variety of Australian investors held 
the balance.^ The Commonwealth's Australian Industry Development 
Corporation took a 20% equity, and the engineering consultants and 
contractors received shares in part payment for their work. H.C. 
Sleigh took responsibility for constructing and managing the mill. 
The sales contract was renegotiated with the trading firm, Jamamoto 
Sangyo, for the Taiyo Paper and Pulp Co. The price was reported to 
be slightly over the minimum set by the Commonwealth and export 
approval was obtained, though a condition was added requiring the 
company to reforest 2,000 hectares a year after 5 years
operation. ^  It was also required to study the feasibility of
building a pulpmill and, if possible, have one operating by 1986.
Further capital was required to meet the inflating costs of
construction (which was completed in 1972), to repair a major
breakdown in 1973, and to provide log yards, loading equipment,
satellite chipping facilities and operating capital. The mill cost
over $7 million by 1972 and further items brought the total cost to
$8.5 million by 1979. H.C. Sleigh provided this, and by 1974 held a
majority interest (50.7%). By 1977, H.C. Sleigh had exercised an
option over the government's shares, had bought out the remaining
shareholders, and incorporated Northern Woodchips as a division
45within the corporation. Neither sawmillers nor Tasmanians, other 
than as incidental shareholders in H.C. Sleigh, retained any 
interest.
Operation
The chipmill was constructed very lightly so that breakdowns
were common at first. It only started to be profitable in 1974/75,
but for the next three years earnt an average net profit of $1.2
46million a year, representing 40% on the share capital.
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Without a concession over Crown forests, Northern Woodchips had 
to range far and wide buying wood from private properties throughout 
northern and central Tasmania, often in competition with TPFH and 
APPM. APPM blocked Northern Woodchips from buying most of the waste 
from sawmills by claiming rights under their Acts to waste from any 
logs cut within their concessions.^^
Northern Woodchips improved their mill, overcame the competition 
for resources, and increased their output to the maximum of their 
licence, 710,000 tonnes a year, by 1979. In 1980, they obtained 
approval to increase their exports by 103,000 tonnes a year to Japan
4Pand 90,000 tonnes a year to South Korea.
THE LARGER LONG REACH MILL - APPM
Associated Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd (APPM) were short of neither 
capital nor wood in establishing the larger of the two woodchip 
export mills at Long Reach. APPM had obtained the Wesley Vale
concession in 1961 and built a paper mill there in 1970, but had 
deferred building a large pulp mill. The woodchip trade presented an 
opportunity for immediate profit and ensured that they could hold the 
concession against others or until such time as they might need it 
for domestic pulp production.
The capital was readily available. During the 1960's, APPM had 
made good profits and saved $10 million within the firm. A further 
$5 million was raised in 1968 from existing shareholders of whom the 
largest were the mining companies of the Collins House group, and $6 
million was obtained by a debenture issue.
APPM had to obtain the government's approval to export wood from 
a concession that had been granted for domestic production. In this 
it was opposed by Tasmanian Woodchips, who competed for the resource, 
and the whole matter was questioned in the House of Assembly. APPM 
stressed that they only intended to export temporarily and that they 
would build a pulp mill at Wesley Vale within 10 years (ie. by
236
1978). Even though legal views conflicted, the government
50authorised APPM's right to export. Tasmanian Woodchips' requests
were simply refused.
APPM, with the advantage of experience, built a very solidly
5 1engineered plant designed to last. It started ahead of schedule
in 1972, and operated most efficiently. The mill cost $8 million and 
had a capacity to produce 1 million tonnes a year. An additional $1 
million was spent on rail facilities.
Sales contracts were negotiated with two Japanese trading 
companies, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, to supply two paper companies, 
Mitsubishi Paper Mills and Sanyo-Kokusaku Pulp Co. The first
contract, for 610,000 tonnes a year, to be based on 508,000 tonnes
from the concession and the balance from private property and sawmill 
waste, was approved by the Commonwealth for 11 years, 1972-1983. A 
second contract for 300,000 tonnes with the possibility of additional 
quantities, was approved for 5 years, 1973-1978. This was based on a
short-term permit sale by the Forestry Commission of up to 255,000
52tonnes a year from the uncommitted forests in the north- west.
Logging the concession
Logging pulpwood on a large scale from the Wesley Vale
concession required the resolution of the conflicts and the
realisation of complementary benefits with sawmilling in more
intricate detail than in the other concessions - partly because
sawmills were more numerous, and partly because the shortage of 
sawlogs had become so starkly apparent in the 1970's.
The forests of the concession had been cut for well over a 
century and were supplying hardwood logs to 56, mostly small, 
sawmills by the time APPM started cutting in 1972. Logging was 
carried out by numerous small contractors and subcontractors in 67
different areas held under licences or Exclusive Forest Permits. The 
forests were cut selectively, taking only the best trees for sawlogs, 
but, as many of the stands were being cut for the second or third 
time, the average yield and quality of logs were gradually
237
C Odeclining. The area rights granted to APPM by the 1961 Act thus
overlay well established area rights of numerous sawmills. In this 
region, the sawmills had expanded their production during the boom of 
the 1950's and 1960's to about twice the level that the forest could 
sustain in the long-term. Whereas the Forestry Commission had
failed to control cutting on public forests in that period, the 
gravity of the resource depletion became inescapable in the 
1970's. In 1977, a 30% reduction in log quotas was ordered,
followed by a further 30% in 1980 and the expectation of further cuts 
in 1983 and 1986. Reductions in quotas in other parts of the state 
have also been made.
Both the Forestry Commission and APPM advocated integrated
logging by stressing the complementary benefits of higher
54productivity and better roads. However, the realities of
continuing conflicts over prices and the difficulties of scheduling 
deliveries and other problems - summed up as 'loss of control of the 
bush' - outweighed any advantages for the many sawmillers who 
preferred to continue to log their own permit areas. Such operations 
only produced a little pulpwood from the heads of trees felled for 
sawlogs.
Irrespective of sawmillers' preferences, the quantity of wood
required by the chipmill was so large - 3-4 times that used by all
the sawmills - that widespread clear falling, large operations and
substantial roading were necessary. Moreover as clear felling
ensured that every possible sawlog was felled, it almost certainly
increased the overall supply of sawlogs, and averted even more
drastic reductions than occurred. Price differentials between
sawlogs and pulpwood, and close supervision, ensured that the
55products were segregated successfully. The transition to fully
integrated logging was hastened as the Commission declined to renew 
Exclusive Forest Permits to sawmillers as they expired, and only sold 
sawlogs on 2 year sales contracts, which guaranteed quantities but 
not areas. By 1977, only 10% of the pulpwood cut on the concession 
came from partially integrated operations, whereas 60% came from 
fully integrated operations and 30% from clearing lands for 
plantations and salvage operations.
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The operations were planned in detail. A formal Working Plan, 
although not mandatory under the 1961 Act, was prepared on a 
provisional basis in the early 1970's and, as in the TPFH and Port 
Huon concessions, a Five Year Plan of Operations was prepared 
detailing responsibilities and scheduling operations.^  Operations 
were planned and monitored in close detail by a whole series of 
documents and meetings - Forest Block Plans, Coupe Logging Plans, 
Cutting Approval Advices, Environmental Impact Statements, Three 
Monthly Review Meetings and Operational Field Meetings. Further 
plans were prepared within APPM to schedule their deliveries.
The Forestry Commission and APPM worked closely together. At
the top, the Planning Committee of two senior officers from each of
the two organisations considered how the 5 year Plan of Operations
should be prepared. Logging schedules were discussed in meetings
between APPM representatives and Commission divisional staff and
details prepared and revised by specialist planning officers in the
two organisations. APPM staff carried out much of the daily
supervision of logging operations. By contrast the sawmillers took
little part. Initially they were excluded from the Planning
Committee - although one representative from the TTA was subsequently
invited to join, they did not have a planner to join the specialist
discussions, and did not contribute reports to the reviews of the
Plan of Operations. In the forest, individual sawmillers were not
readily available for or attracted to collective meetings, and they
relied on their contractors to get their logs and the Commission
87staff to look after their interests.
Generally it was the advent of the woodchip mill, the 
fluctuations in its wood demands, the progress of APPM's road 
construction programme, the depletion of the sawlog resource, and the 
transition from sawmill logging on exclusively held permit areas to 
integrated operations and contract sales, that set the pace of 
change. Sawmillers had few options but to follow.
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EXPLOITING PRIVATE FORESTS
Ever since white settlement, the rate at which Crown forests had
been granted, sold and selected had far exceeded the rate at which
they had been cleared for agriculture or grazing. By the 1970's,
one million hectares (or 36%) of Tasmania's forests were privately
owned, of which about 90% were within the supply zones of the
woodchip export mills. Private forests had always supplied a
considerable proportion of the timber cut, and all three of the
woodchip mills drew on them - Northern Woodchips almost entirely - as
did the three existing pulpmills (though their usage was minor by
comparison). In all, the private forests provided 42% of the
pulpwood used in Tasmania during the 1970's, with the balance coining
5 0from Crown forests (51%), and waste from sawmills (7%).
The private forests were a gradually depleting resource, partly 
because some land was cleared after cutting, but often because
repeated fires and browsing destroyed natural regeneration and left 
only scrub or rough grazing. This degradation had been deplored for 
a century, but whereas sawlog cutting had been small-scale, 
selective, diffused and ignored, many of the huge areas clear-cut for 
woodchips thrust scenes of apparent devastation before the public. 
Clearly many were not being regenerated to provide timber crops for 
Tasmanians' industrial future.
The sudden market for previously useless timber was very 
attractive to many landowners. It was therefore a buyer's market and 
one in which the ruling rates had been set at a very low level by the 
state as part of its policy of industrial encouragement. Some of
the rates paid were little more than half those that the state 
59obtained. Forest owners combined to improve their market
strength, and even developed an (unsuccessful) export proposal, but
although one organisation contained 359 members it was not able to
60force the price up. Landowners considered that a rate of about $2
per tonne would be required to make it worthwhile to regenerate the
forests - compared to the average rate of about $0.50 they were 
6 1receiving. By 1975, it became clear that only one-quarter of the
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cut-over areas would yield a second crop, and that if the trends 
continued, the long-term yield of pulpwood from private forests would 
halve, and the overall production of pulpwood in Tasmania would drop 
by 20%.62
The rapid increase in cutting for woodchip exports also raised 
protests from the environmental movement, which fuelled a public 
controversy - centred on the issues of economics, resources and 
conservation practices - that raged through newspaper columns, 
pamphlets, questions in Parliament and several enquiries. Some
resolution was sought, by both the state and the pulp and paper 
companies, through legislation, bureaucratic reorganisation, economic 
incentives and sanctions. Notably, reforms relied on education, 
persuasion and subsidies, rather than the market mechanism of 
increasing the price paid for pulpwood until investment occurred.
Everett Report
An initial inquiry into the use and regeneration of the state's 
forests was made by a Select Committee of the Legislative Council, in 
1970-72, before all the consequences of woodchip exports were 
realised. The Committee was concerned at the uneconomic level of
pulpwood royalties, and what might happen to private forests. These 
fears were reinforced, in 1975, by the publication of an extended 
critique of woodchipping and the Committee's report. ^  When the
trends to declining yield became apparent in 1976 a full-time Board 
of Inquiry, led by Mr. (later Justice) Everett, was appointed to look 
at the private forests.^ The main recommendations of Everett’s
report were to:
- provide financial incentives to private forest owners from 
public funds;
- raise royalty rates for wood from public lands high enough to 
cover the costs of growing wood and provide a profit to the 
state or investor;
regulate logging and other forest operations to ensure 
regeneration and minimise environmental damage;
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- regulate the quantity of pulpwood cut from private forests by 
requiring woodchip and pulp companies to hold a licence from the 
state which would define a maximum annual quota; and
- create a Private Forestry Division within the Forestry
Commission to deliver the incentives, provide technical
extension services, and police the regulations.
The government appeared to accept most of the recommendations in
principle but only (to 1982) took those measures which would not add
to the costs of the major companies. Thus the Private Forestry
Division was set up promptly and staffed with an Assistant
Commissioner and several extension foresters. Incentive schemes
were devised and loans and subsidies paid to forest growers though,
given the financial stringencies of the late 1970's, on a modest
scale (only amounting to $37,000 out of the Private Forestry
Division's budget of $346,000 in 1979/80).^7 Proposals for forest
practices regulations which would be binding on owners, the
Commission, and the industrial companies, and which might increase
logging costs, were put forward later but have not yet (1982) been
decided. The recommendation to review royalty rates and road charges
was initially accepted, and a Board of Inquiry was appointed. The
very existence of an inquiry was so strongly opposed by at least one
68of the major pulp companies that the government cancelled it. The
recommendation requiring the companies to hold a licence to cut
private forests would have restricted both landowners and companies
69and was not implemented.
Industry schemes
Schemes to encourage landowners to grow future crops were also 
developed by two of the woodchip exporters.
APPM, which had been cutting private forests for its Burnie mill 
for 30 years, launched its 'Associated Tree Farmers' scheme in 
1975. Under this scheme, APPM prepared a management plan for a
private forest about to be logged, offered technical advice, and 
undertook to regenerate it satisfactorily after logging on the 
landowner's agreement to offer the second crop for sale to the
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company. It also provided a slightly higher royalty to owners
70intending to regenerate their forests.
TPFH provided no assistance or incentive to landowners until 
APPM took them over in 1979 and applied their scheme.
Northern Woodchips introduced a scheme in 1979 in which they 
increased the royalty by $1 per tonne to landowners regnerating their 
forests under an agreed plan. They were also prepared to pay half
the costs of regenerating previously cut-over land in return for a
71first refusal option on the next crop. Northern Woodchips' scheme 
relied on landowners to do the work and hence gave them an 
opportunity to increase their incomes.
PULP AND PAPER MAKING
In contrast to the boom of woodchip exports to the Japanese 
mills, pulp and paper making within Tasmania made far less progress - 
though there were important differences between the three
manufacturers. Australian Newsprint Mills (ANM) expanded to replace 
imports with cheaper local paper, while APPM and Australian Paper 
Manufacturers (APM) restrained their expansion in the paper industry 
but diversified their investments. We will consider each.
Pulp exports from Pert Huon - APM
APM expanded and diversified its manufacturing facilities on the
7 2mainland throughout the 1970's, but not at Port Huon. APM did
investigate exporting pulp to Japan from Port Huon but could not find
73a market for the comparatively small quantities involved. 
Generally, the Port Huon mill continued to feed pulp to the company's 
mainland paper mills fairly steadily, though at a rate about 18% less 
than in the peak year of 1973/74.^ APM needed more regrowth to 
raise the quality of its paper in a tighter market to that of 
imported and competing domestic papers. The Working Plan was
formally revised in 1974 to reflect new information, a number of
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changes in the forest, and balance sawmillers' needs to have
oldgrowth stands cut against APM's needs for more high quality wood
75from regrowth stands.
Newsprint production at Boyer - ANM
The Australian consumption of newsprint increased steadily in 
the early 1970's and then held fairly constant in spite of the 
recession. Production at ANM's Boyer mill was increased fairly
readily by bringing the paper machine installed in 1969 up to full 
capacity, and modifying the older No. 2 machine.76 ANM remained the 
sole domestic producer and held a little over 40% of the market.
The installation of computer control systems on the paper 
machines in 1972/73, and improvements in pulp preparation, enabled 
the thickness of the paper to be reduced by 6% and the sales price 
per tonne to be increased proportionately. However this was far from 
sufficient to overcome the inflation of costs. The long-term 
contracts (described in Chapter 7) proved an embarrassment for, 
although most of the shareholder-customers were prepared to 
renegotiate prices, News Ltd, which took one-quarter of the 
production, was not; the contracts held and profits slumped.77
ANM continued to road, log and manage the Florentine concession 
and finally, in 1979, prepared a formal Working Plan (based on a 
sophisticated computer model) 38 years after the company had started 
logging! As ANM converted nearly all the wood to pulp and was
responsible for regeneration, joint planning was unnecessary and a
78submission to the Commission a formality.
At the end of the 1970's, ANM commenced a further expansion 
which, like earlier steps, involved re-ordering the domestic market, 
re-arranging international supply, re-organising the company's 
capital and negotiating with governments. The expansion aimed at 
replacing imports of both pulp and newsprint. The step started in 
1976 when ANM ceased to supply News Ltd and could negotiate new sales 
contracts with its shareholder customers at rates which immediately 
restored profitability. In 1978, the company built an additional
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plant at Boyer to pulp softwood by the thermo-mechanical process. 
Up to 78,000 cubic metres a year of pine pulpwood was obtained by 
thinning the Forestry Commission's plantations in the north-east.
The resultant long-fibred pulp partially replaced the expensive kraft
79pulp being imported from New Zealand.
By the 1970's, the two major shareholders, the Herald and Weekly
Times and John Fairfax companies, had become wealthy enough to
finance an expansion on their own. In 1978 the interlocking
shareholding with the New Zealand producer, Tasman, was reversed, and
in 1979 the minor newspaper-shareholders were bought out and the
80total capital split equally between the major two. ANM looked for
additional forest resources and built a complete new pulp and paper
mill, at Albury in New South Wales, which doubled its productive
81capacity and gave it the potential for a virtual monopoly.
Fine paper at Burnie and Wesley Vale - APPM
APPM started the 1970's by opening its Wesley Vale paper mill
and amalgamating with Wiggins Teape, taking over the latter's
Shoalhaven mill in New South Wales (described in Chapter 7). The
expansion of production was far from even and the company experienced
a profit slump in 1972/73, due to escalating costs, followed by a
drastic 35% drop in paper sales between 1973/74 and 1975/76 and a
8 2further slump in profits.
The company countered these situations by asking the Common­
wealth government for more protection, reducing the workforce, and 
diversifying its investments.
A series of requests were made through the 1970's asking for
temporary duties, embargoes on imports, and higher tariffs. Many of
these were refused and overall, the Commonwealth bodies involved do
8 3not appear to have been particularly sympathetic to APPM. The
Commonwealth did offer to direct government orders for paper to APPM
and loaned the company $650,000 to enable it to hold higher stocks
84and maintain employment through the 1975 slump. However estimates
of APPM's production and employment in Tasmania indicate that while
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output of the main products increased, employment decreased (Table
8 .1).
Table 8.1
p CAPPM: production and employment, 1970/71, 1978/79
1970/71 1978/79
Statistic APPM
Total
Estimated 
amount in 
Tasmania
APPM
Total
Estimated 
amount in 
Tasmania
Total employment 
Paper sales (tonne 000's)
5,856
167
4,450 * 
127 *
4,933
208
3,500 * 
168 *
3Sawn timber sales (m 000's) 31 31 54 34 *
Woodchip sales (tonne 000's) Nil Nil 900* 850 *
Estimated
Like ANM, APPM started to make pulp from pine wood in order to
replace expensive imports of long-fibre pulp from New Zealand. This
was done by modifying and extending facilities in the Burnie mill in
861979 at an overall cost of about $30 million. The wood came from
thinnings made in both the Forestry Commission's and APPM's own pine
plantations. The company diversified into pine sawmilling by buying
a pine sawmill at Wynyard in 1977, and made a number of other small 
87investments.
SAWMILLING
The more or less steady increase in the production of sawn 
timber continued from the Second World War until 1972/73, when more 
timber was sawn in Tasmania than ever before. The economic recession 
and consequent decline in construction, combined with the depletion 
of resources, forced the production of hardwood timber to be reduced 
each year until by 1979/80 only 71% of the volume of the peak year 
was being cut. The decline in hardwood sawmilling was partly offset 
by an increase in the cutting of softwoods from pine plantations 
(Table 8.2).
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Table 8.2
O QAverage annual production of sawn timber, 1970-1980
Period Production
Hardwood
3(m 000's per 
Softwood
year)
Total
1969/70 - 1973/74 399.6 13.0 412.6
1974/75 - 1978/79 331.5 30.7 362.2
1979/80 287.6 67.6 355.2
Not only did production decrease during the second half of the
1970's, but costs increased/ marketing became more difficult, and
further reductions in the supplies of sawlogs from Crown land were
forecast. These factors applied more severely to smaller, older and
less efficient mills. Additionally only about 20 of the larger mills
were big enough to warrant installing chippers to process their waste
89for sale to the woodchip or pulp companies. The resultant trend
to concentrate production in the larger mills can be seen in Table 
8.3. Although the number of mills classified as 'small' increased 
as production fell, they cut less than 5% of the total production and 
employed few workers.
Table 8.3
9 0Operating sawmills classified by log input 
Class of mill and log input 1972 1976 1980
3(m OOP's per year)
Very large Over 60 - 1 3
Large 15 -60 17 15 9
Medium 3 - 1 5 89 75 25
Small Under 3 116 110 145
Total 222 201 182
The drop in production and the concentration into larger more
efficient mills reduced the number of workers employed significantly 
(Table 8.4).
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Table 8.4
Sawmilling employment/ 1975/76/ 1978/79^^
(excluding mills employing less than 4 
1975/76
workers)
1978/79
Number of sawmills 129 94
Number of workers 2,582 1,973
Average per mill 20 21
Annual volume produced (m3 000's) 360.0 308.3
Average per mill (m3 000's) 28.0 32.8
Average per worker (m3) 13.9 15.6
The concentration of production was achieved by building very 
large mills, closing others, and concentrating ownership into fewer 
hands - only some of which were Tasmanian. We will consider three 
major cases, each involving a different fraction of capital: the 
Kauri Timber Company, Tasmanian Softwoods, and in the next section, 
APPM.
Kauri Timber Company - transnational corporate capital
The Kauri Timber Company's (KTC) accumulation of sawlog
resources in north-west Tasmania and its recruitment of foreign
capital was described in Chapter 7. In 1972, the company built the
largest sawmill in Tasmania - the Chatlee mill near Smithton - to
replace its seven old mills, which had an allocation of 68,000 cubic
metres of sawlogs amounting to about 10% of the total hardwood logs
92from Crown forests. To build this mill, KTC had welcomed US
capital and expertise from the Boise Cascade Corporation, but had
retained control. However the technical advice was unsuited to
Tasmanian timber and parts of the Chatlee mill had to be 
93reconstructed. More importantly, Boise Cascade found itself in
financial trouble in 1973 and not only sold its interest to the 
Danish transnational corporation, East Asiatic, but exercised an 
option to take up additional shares in the process. KTC ended up as
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East Asiatic dismantled the over-extended network of subsid­
iaries built up by KTC throughout Australia and sold its sawmills at 
Devonport and Deloraine to the Tasmanian merchants, J. & T. Gunn. 
Thus by the mid-1970's, the two largest sawmilling companies in 
Tasmania - KTC and Tasmanian Board Mills (Chapter 7) - were both
foreign owned.
95Tasmanian Softwoods - Tasmanian merchant capital
In contrast to the depletion of sawlogs from the natural 
hardwood forests, the quantity of softwood sawlogs available from the 
Forestry Commission's pine plantations increased during the 
1970's. In 1973, the Commission invited tenders for 60,000 cubic 
metres a year from the Branxholme-Scottsdale area, sufficient for a 
mill almost as large as KTC's Chatlee mill.
To build such a mill required Tasmanian sawmillers to combine 
their capital. The successful tenderer, Tasmanian Softwoods Pty 
Ltd, was a consortium of Risby Bros Pty Ltd (40%), Clements Marshall 
Pty Ltd (40%), and Timbersales Ltd (20%). Both Risby Bros and 
Clements Marshall were Tasmanian concerns. The former (described in 
Chapters 4 & 7) were timber merchants and sawmillers in Hobart who 
were prominent in starting TPFH. The latter were produce and timber 
merchants who owned a hardwood sawmill at Devonport. Timbersales 
Ltd was a Melbourne timber agent, owned jointly by two old Australian 
merchant companies involved in timber.^
The consortium built a sawmill, complete with drying kilns and a 
planing mill, at Tonganah on the outskirts of Scottsdale, in 1976. 
The cost of the mill escalated during construction from $2.5 to $3.5 
million; it burnt down shortly after opening and had to be recon­
structed; it had many difficulties in starting up, and faced a 
depressed market when it did so - all of which put Tasmanian 
Softwoods into a precarious financial position.
The company's financial difficulties were reflected back on to 
the state. In making its original tender, Tasmanian Softwoods had 
offered to pay a royalty of $13.50 per cubic metre, which was high by
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Tasmanian standards and was indexed to inflation. When the mill 
started the rate had inflated to about $17.60, which the company 
could not pay. It appealed to the government, which reduced its
rate to an amount considerably less than two local sawmills (G. & K. 
French and Branxholme Sawmills) were paying for poorer logs. They 
complained that they were at a competitive disadvantage, but although 
the Commission initiated an inquiry, a concessionary rate to the
Q7larger mill was maintained until 1980.
APPM's TAKE-OVERS
During the 1970's, APPM became by far the largest wood using 
corporation in Tasmania - entering the woodchip export trade, 
increasing production of pulp and paper, and above all taking over 
TPFH's woodchip mill, several sawmills and a plymill.
By the late 1970's, TPFH had become an attractive target for
takeover offers as it was profitable and had an extensive concession
with resources to support a pulp mill. Although TPFH announced in
1977 that it would undertake a feasibility study for building a mill
it was clear that the company could never raise the $250 million
98required. Both the other two exporters, Northern Woodchips and
APPM, competed to take it over.
To the oil company, H.C. Sleigh, (the parent company of Northern 
Woodchips), a take-over of TPFH offered secure resources for woodchip 
exports and the chance to diversify into manufacturing. A takeover 
of TPFH by Sleigh posed a threat to APPM, for the former had the
capital to build a mill which might have competed with APPM for other 
resources, the Japanese market, or perhaps even the Australian one. 
To APPM, a take-over of TPFH offered an opportunity to build up
resources for a far larger expansion than possible from the Wesley 
Vale concession alone.
The battle to take over TPFH was fought vigorously, with a
series of offers and counter offers to the shareholders. A key
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qqshareholding was the 25% owned by Kilndried Timber Industries. To
obtain this, APPM first bought out the entire Tasmanian interests of 
the network of mainland timber merchants, including the plymill, 
several sawmills, and their majority holding in Kilndried. By
increasing their offers for TPFH shares to a value of $31 million, 
APPM were able to top Sleigh’s last public bid of $25 million.
Consequential moves
APPM's take-over of TPFH and Kilndried was followed by further 
takeovers by other companies. The Tasmanian merchant/sawmillers
directed some of their windfall gains from the TPFH sale to buying up 
smaller sawmills for their log quotas. Risby Bros, for example,
were able to almost triple their production.^0^
Having lost the takeover battle for TPFH, H.C. Sleigh had to
find other ways of strengthening its resource base and Tasmanian
'presence' in order to support the sort of case it would need to
justify a continuation of its woodchip export permit after 1987.
Sleigh bought the ailing Tasmanian Board Mills from its British
owners which gave Sleigh forest land, rights to sawlogs from state
forests, and the potential to secure some complementary benefits from
102its woodchip operations.
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, 1980
The result of the changes we have considered was to leave the 
pulp and paper companies, operating principally in the monopoly sub­
mode, with the largest proportion of production and the dominant 
position.
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Table 8.5
10 8Quantity of pulpwood produced/ 1979/80
Company Quantity (tonne 000's) Proport­
ion
(%)
For
pulp
Tasmanian
production
For woodchip 
exports
Total
APPM Group (incl. TPFH) 736 1,797 2,533 61
Northern Woodchips (Sleigh) - 1,005 1/005 24
ANM 469 - 469 11
A PM 151 - 151 4
Total 1,356 2/802 4, 158 100
The industrial structure in 1980 is clear from the published 
statistics for pulpwood (Table 8.5) and the estimates for sawmilling 
(Table 8.6)/ though the latter must be regarded with reservation as 
they are based on incomplete data and several subjective estimates.
Table 8.6
Allocation of Crown sawlogs and production of sawn timber: 
Estimated proportion of State total/ circa 1980
Company Allocation of sawlogs Production of
from Crown forests (%)____ sawn timber (%)
APPM group 18 26
Risby Bros. 14 8
Kauri Timber Company (East Asiatic) 13 13
J. & T. Gunn 11 n.a.
Tasmanian Board Mills (Sleigh) 10 6
Tasmanian Softwoods 8 8
Forest Developments (Neville Smith) 4 n.a.
B & G Clennett 3 2
W & A McKay 3 2
G. & K. French 3 n.a.
Various other 13 n.a.
Total 100 % 100 %
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The relationships between the pulp and paper companies and sawmilling 
are recapitulated briefly in Table 8.7.
Table 8.7
Resources and relationships in the pulpwood concessions 105
Company and Area of Crown Relationship of pulp and paper
concession forest as % of companies with sawmilling
State total
APPM,Burnie 9
Wesley Vale 21
TPFH 25
Integrated within the firm - all but 
one sawmill owned by APPM 
Integrated partly through state planning 
and partly within the firm as APPM 
organises most of the logging and owns 
several of the sawmills.
As for Wesley Vale.
ANM Florentine 8 Resolved mostly within the firm as ANM
conducts all the logging and pulps most 
of the sawlogs.
APM Port Huon 9 Integrated through state planning only.
We can now summarize the relative weights and linkages of the 
different structures of production/ though with the reservation that 
actual firms can not all be expected to comply neatly with the ideal 
types - particularly those firms which enter more than one structure 
and are owned by more than one fraction of capital.
Global and monopoly sub-modes of production
Four firms, exporting woodchips and making pulp and paper, 
operate in these two sub-modes. Two (Sleigh and APPM) are partially 
owned by transnational corporations and partially bound to others by 
their woodchip trading agreements; two (APM and ANM) are owned by 
Australian capital; any Tasmanian shareholding is incidental. The
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conflicts between the two sub-modes have emerged as competition for 
resources in the case of Sleigh, but have been resolved by 
integration within the firm in the case of APPM. Linkages between 
the two sub-modes may strengthen, as APM is trying to organise part
of its production globally - in this case in combination with a New
Zealand firm.
The global and monopoly sub-modes are linked to the competitive 
sub-mode, within which timber is sawn, through both state planning 
and ownership. Together, APPM, Sleigh, and the Kauri Timber Company 
(owned by transnational capital) own some 40-45% of the sawmills.
Competitive sub-mode of production
About 50-55% of sawn timber is produced by firms operating only 
in the competitive structure. The most important are the five,
mostly old established family companies of Tasmanian merchant- 
/sawmillers, who account for some 40% of production. Although
dominated by the woodchip and pulp companies in many forest areas, 
the Tasmanian merchant/sawmillers are able to maintain a strong 
position, matching that of APPM, in a market that is still
competitively organised. However, even acting in combination they 
have been unable to break into pulp or paper making.
Small business mode of production
The small business structure probably accounts for only about 5%
of sawn timber production. The huge increase in logging for
woodchip exports was mostly undertaken by contractors, and numerous
owner/operators of trucks. These businesses are dependent on the
global and monopoly structures they serve, but with limited capital -
and frequently with debts to finance companies (characteristically
penetrated by US transnational capital) - they are often unable to
107withstand trade fluctuations or inflating costs.
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THE STATE
The industrial changes of the 1970's were undertaken only with 
much greater activity by the state in its productive, reproductive 
and integrative functions.
Table 8.8
Abstract of the state's forestry accounts, 1968/69 to 1977/78 ^
5 year period ($ 000's) Increase
1968/69 1973/74 (real terms
to 1972/73 to 1977/78 1966/67 %)
Native Forest Operations Account
Revenue 9,305 19,947 27
Expenditure on current operation 7,706 22,962 77
Interest on loan funds 4,216 8,588 21
Total costs 11,922 31,550 57
Profit (loss) (2,618) (11,603) 63
Fund Statement
Funds received 21,627 61,525 69
Application of funds
Development of native forest 4,000 8,914 32
• " plantations 11,115 29,840 59
The costs of the expanded operations - largely to serve the
reproductive and integrative functions - increased much more than 
revenues from the productive function (Table 8.8; Appendix 1). In 
spite of some rumblings about the costs of roads, the expansion was 
made without opposition from the industry, due no doubt to the fact 
that the Commission obtained grants and loans, ultimately from 
taxpayers, to cover its increasing losses. That is, the costs of 
the long-term reproduction of capital were not imposed on the 
productive process. Tasmania, like other States, could not readily 
fund the big increase in plantation costs but secured $7 million on 
loan from the Commonwealth to do so. The Forestry Commission
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forecast that their revenues and costs would remain fairly constant 
during the 1980's, and the public would have to continue to subsidise 
the reproduction of the resource by some $7-8 million a year.
DEVELOPMENT
We have described the changes that occurred to each of the 
Tasmanian wood industries during the 1970’s and can now summarise the 
overall development.
The structure of the woodchip export trade contained most, but 
not all, the features that defined the emergent global sub-mode of 
production. It did show that manufacturing (of pulp and paper) was 
located in a lower-wage country (Japan) rather than in a higher-wage 
one (Australia), and capital was organised by giant transnational 
corporations. However this did not result in de-industrialisation, 
except in the sense of Tasmanian manufacturing opportunities 
foregone, nor in depressed wages. The global sub-mode flourished in 
Tasmania, as in many Third World countries, with encouragement and 
subsidy from the state. State encouragement was not unique - the 
precedent had been set firmly with the monopoly sub-mode.
The monopoly sub-mode was able to expand in the presence of the 
global sub-mode and conflicts between the two were integrated largely 
within a single firm. By contrast, the combination of expanded 
pulpwood production, declining sawlog resources, and a depressed 
economy led to a rapid concentration of sawmilling ownership and 
production. Parts of this competitive sub-mode - the firms owned by 
transnational and Tasmanian merchant/sawmillers - remained sturdily 
established, but much of the rest was either integrated within or 
subordinated to the monopoly and global structures.
The state acted repeatedly to encourage the expansion of 
production in the global and monopoly sub-modes and to integrate the 
conflicting and complementary demands of different structures. 
Notably it tended to further the interests of larger capital over
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smaller, and hence of non-Tasmanians over Tasmanians. The earlier 
failure of the state to control the yield from the forests and 
regenerate the cut-over stands became starkly apparent when sawn 
timber production had to be curtailed because the productive capacity 
of the resource had been too greatly depleted. This result is quite 
contrary to the expectation that the state acts as the 'ideal 
collective capitalist' (as the capital logic theory of the state 
depicts), and requires more complex explanations that recognise 
competition and conflicts within and between different fractions of 
capital.
The state's actions were a continuation of the modernization 
policies of hydro-industrialisation and concession that had been 
applied since the beginning of the century. According to
modernization theory the capitalist industrialisation that occurred 
should have led to rising employment and prosperity, yet in this 
period these did not occur, either generally or in the wood sector. 
In spite of investment in heavy industry, Tasmanian development 
became the 'Tasmanian problem' of regional decline and
outmigration. In spite of a doubling in the production of wood from 
the forests and expanding paper production, employment in the wood 
industries declined. Sawn timber production also declined, and
employment declined there at an even greater rate. Although wages 
and conditions remained reasonably stable for those employed, rising 
unemployment increased poverty not prosperity. Moreover, the 
expanded utilisation of the forest resource led not to increased 
public returns, but to the increased public expense of its 
reproduction.
Modernization policies, and the theories supporting them, were
found to be failing.
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Chapter 9
DEVELOPMENT IN THE CASE OF THE TASMANIAN WOOD INDUSTRIES
The general thesis of this work is that radical theories provide 
a consistent and efficient framework within which to analyse the 
development of the Tasmanian wood industries. A radical approach was 
taken because the modernization theories prevalent in analyses of 
this sector have been widely discounted in other domains, and because 
development policies based on them have been considered to fail on a 
world scale.
The history of the Tasmanian wood industries was narrated in the 
last seven chapters using three radical theories described in the 
first chapter. The task of this final chapter is to evaluate and 
substantiate the thesis. This will be done in three steps. Firstly, 
the case study will be searched to see how the three theories enabled 
us to detect the patterns and processes of development at work. 
Particular attention will be given to the manner in which forestry 
was constructed. Secondly, we will consider whether what was 
detected enables us to prophesy future development. Lastly, it will 
be shown that the analysis of development, past and future, made in 
this work is quite different from that derived from modernization 
theory, and hence that the policies derived from them will differ 
significantly.
THE WORLD-HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE
The resurgence in radical theories of development after the 
Second World War occurred largely to explain the problems of 
underdevelopment. Although there is much debate about the mechanisms 
and current trends at work, the main stages of the development of 
capitalism as a world system are now widely agreed. The work of 
theorists such as Frank and Wallerstein take the perspective that 
underdevelopment should be analysed primarily in terms of the
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development of the capitalist world-system as whole. We must ask
whether the development of the Tasmanian wood industries was 
determined primarily by factors operating at a world scale, and 
whether those theories used to explain underdevelopment have been 
relevant to the Tasmanian case?
Some major determinants of Tasmanian development clearly did 
operate on a world scale, and changes in international hegemony did 
affect the wood sector. The invasion of Britons, their destruction 
of the tribal society, and the production of timber in the prison- 
farm mode, was the first and most striking example - due to both
Britain's struggle for world power and the inter-class conflicts of 
the transition to capitalism. At the start of the twentieth century, 
Britain's grab for a share of Africa and the maintenance of her
supremacy at sea boosted Tasmanian timber production. During the 
1920's and 1930's, Britain's defence of her previously hegemonic
position led to Australian industrialisation and the advent of both 
kiln-drying and paper-making in Tasmania. The rise of US hegemony 
after the Second World War was mirrored by US investment in Tasmanian 
sawmilling, and the rise of the Japanese economy took dramatic effect 
in Tasmania's forests through the woodchip trade.
Of the international economic factors we saw that the rise of 
British woollen manufacturing provided Tasmania with a major export 
commodity whose production stimulated the economy and set the pattern 
of class relations within which timber production had to fit. After 
the 'Golden Age', some of the capital exported from Britain was 
directed to mining Tasmanian ores and even briefly to sawmilling. 
The booms and busts of world capitalism were felt in the Tasmanian 
timber industry; as in the Great Depression of the 1930's, the boom 
after the Second World War, or the recession of the 1970's. Yet some 
global events passed Tasmania by; most noticeably the long boom of 
sustained economic growth on the mainland and in the US during the 
1860's and 1870's, which failed to reach the stagnant Tasmanian 
economy and its depressed timber industry.
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Whilst Tasmanian development was stimulated, by some world- 
system and regional changes, it was also stimulated on two occasions 
by separations from the world economy. The brief separation from
external food supply in the first six years of British settlement led 
to a change in the mode of producing the necessities of life. 
Although the separation during the First War did not lead to any 
development, that during the Second enabled Tasmania's paper mills to 
become established successfully, when otherwise they might not have 
done so.
Other major determinants of Tasmanian development operated at 
the Australian and Tasmanian levels on which the bulk of this study 
has been conducted. For example the gold rush of the 1850's on the 
mainland, and the mining boom on Tasmania's west coast in the 1880's, 
significantly altered class relations and stimulated two steps in the 
transition from manual to mechanised production of sawn timber. Most 
importantly, Tasmanian sawn timber and paper was produced primarily 
for the mainland and local markets (apart from supplying the boom 
market during Britain's rush for empire) so that it was the changes 
in these markets that largely set the pace of development. Most of 
the linkages with the international economy were therefore 
indirect. However the recent development of the woodchip industry, 
part of the global structure of production, has demonstrated that the 
level at which development is determined can change quickly.
We have seen repeatedly that the emergence of new features, 
taken to characterise a new stage of the capitalist world-system, 
only affected the Tasmanian industry indirectly or at a much later 
date. For example, the production of sawn timber in Tasmania was not 
mechanised completely until the 1880's - a century after the start of 
the British industrial revolution and two centuries after sawmills 
were common in North America. As a second example, we find the 
combination of capitals into monopolies at the end of the nineteenth 
century only entering Tasmania in the mining sector. Although
mining stimulated the timber market and did set a precedent for state 
encouragement and concession, it was not until a half a century later 
that the monopoly structure (in the making of pulp and paper) entered 
the wood sector.
260
Whether the patterns of development operate primarily on a 
world-system, national or regional scale is not considered to be a 
real problem, as it is apparent from this case, as elsewhere, that 
at t scales must be considered. The virtue of the world-historic 
perspective is the emphasis it gives to this holistic view.^
The bulk of radical development theory has been directed, as we
have noted, to the problems of undevdevetopment, which was not the
experience, in our case, of the dev etopment of Australia as an
industrial nation. Although part of Australian economic growth may
be considered as ovevdev etopment attained at the expense of
undevdev etopment elsewhere, this was not the case in the Tasmanian
wood industries which secured their materials, sold their products
and accumulated their capital within Australia. In considering
underdevelopment, one contemporary debate has analysed the
persistence of pre-capitalist modes of production in many societies
2where they have coexisted with capitalism over long periods. This 
debate seeks to explain the processes of development and 
underdevelopment by the interactions, or 'articulations', between the 
two modes. Hence the focus of analysis has been shifted from those 
stages characterising the world-system as a whole to processes of 
structural change to capitalism within particular societies. The
elaboration of this debate by Gibson in the case of the structural 
change taking place within capitalism provided the second member of 
the theoretical frame supporting the above case study.
STRUCTURAL CHANGE WITHIN CAPITALISM
Gibson's elaboration of Marxist theory defined three variants of 
the capitalist mode of production - the competitive, monopoly and 
global sub-modes - according to the relationships between and within 
major social classes. These, together with the Aboriginal, prison- 
farm and small business modes, provided the ideal types to which we 
related the structures of production in Tasmania.
261
In this study twelve structures of production have been 
identified, to cover the different products, stages of manufacturing 
and types of capital employed, which were then located within Marx's 
ideal types or rather Gibson's elaboration of them (Table 10.1).
Table 9.1
Correspondence of ideal types of production 
with empirical structures
Ideal type of production Empirical structure identified in
the Tasmanian wood industries
Prison-farm mode Sawing and Punishment stations
Petit-Bourgeois mode Small businesses:
1. Small general forest sawmills
2. Small case mills
3. Logging and cartage contractors
Competitive sub-mode 1. Manual production of sawn,
split or hewn timber for
merchants.
2. Large sawmills
3. Medium-size general forest
sawmills
4. Town sawmills
5. Kiln-drying plants and plymill
Monopoly sub-mode 1. Pulp and paper
2. Pulp only
Global sub-mode Woodchip exports
Some of the differences between empirical examples of particular
structures arose in obvious physical ways - as between different 
types of small business - and need be of no further concern. Other
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differences arose because we considered development within one 
region. Hence we had to distinguish which stages of manufacturing 
were located within Tasmania, where the commodities were sold, and 
which locational fractions of capital were involved. For example, we 
examined the establishment of kiln-drying plants within Tasmania by 
the network of mainland timber merchants. From a Tasmanian 
perspective, this was a significant development to the industrial 
structure, though from an Australian one it would appear merely as a 
technical improvement and relocation. In considering the paper 
industry, there was an obvious and big difference in terms of 
Tasmanian industrialisation between mills that made paper, and those 
that made pulp or even exported the raw material as woodchips. Hence 
in our regional study we needed to distinguish structures in more 
detail than might be necessary at a national or international scale.
The importance of the location of markets depended on how much 
of the surplus value of production was realised within the region. 
For example, the depressed condition of the small and medium sized 
forest sawmills in Tasmania, prior to the Second World War, was 
largely determined by their subordination to the mainland timber 
merchants.
The importance of the locational base of capital rested on the 
influence it had on reinvestment decisions and, as we will consider 
later, on the relationship between particular capitals and states. 
The old-established merchant/sawmillers living in Tasmania did 
reinvest their accumulated profits within the island. This was also 
done by non-Tasmanian capitals such as APPM, or ANM until the 1970's, 
but the location of reinvestment has always been uncertain and we saw 
that ANM, after 30 years of reinvesting in Tasmania, built its next 
paper mill elsewhere.
The linkages between the different scales, sectors and struct­
ures of production have been examined throughout the study. We can 
now review them and consider: how far the development of some
structures was inhibited or enhanced by their articulation with 
others, how far changes were simple transitions to a new structure,
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and how far new developments occurred 'Independently of existing 
structures.
First considering linkages between different spatial levels, we 
saw that the adoption of the prison-farm structure to cut timber in 
Tasmania was determined by the needs of the British ruling class 
during the rise of competitive capitalism there. The coercive labour 
process was inefficient in Van Diemen's Land but functioned to 
advance capitalism in Britain. Thus development in Van Diemen's Land 
was inhibited because of its articulation with the developing mode in 
the core. Much later, we detected the intricate linkages (through 
research facilities, market division and capital investment) in the 
international redivisions of production that conditioned the 
development of newsprint production in Tasmania.
Next, considering the linkages between the production of 
different commodities from the land, we found that both inhibiting 
and complementary relationships had occurred. Relations in the 
dominant sector of production - pastoral and agricultural production 
on large estates - set the class relationships within which the 
relatively minor sector of timber had to fit as best it could. 
Further, grazing and land settlement generally took precedence over 
timber in the allocation of land by the state right up to the 
woodchipping expansion of the 1970's. The relationships could also 
be complementary as in some early settlements where sawmillers' 
tramways provided settlers with access, and settlers' produce 
provided sawmiller/merchants with freight and trade.
There were numerous linkages between the different structures of 
producing timber; four instances will be reviewed. As the first 
instance, we saw how the convict system was articulated with the 
structure of splitting and sawing timber for trade. Initially the 
sawing and punishment stations produced timber for the infrastructure 
that served the rise of competitive capitalism, and the part-time 
labour of convicts was sometimes employed in ways which permitted 
some initial capital to be accumulated. As the timber trade 
expanded, the articulation became more complex. The labour force
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working for the merchants under capitalist relations depended largely 
on the continued production of emancipists and ticket-of-leave men 
from the convict system, which itself depended on continual British 
recruitment. Hence the costs of reproducing the labour force were 
borne by other structures. Free immigrant labour arrived, the 
reserve army of unemployed labour grew, and the working class became 
bitterly divided between free and freed; that is between immigrant 
labour in family groups that bore the costs of its own reproduction, 
and the predominantly single itinerant convict labour force whose 
reproduction costs were born elsewhere.
As the second instance of a linkage between different structures 
of timber production, we found that the development of mechanised 
production was retarded by the persistence of manual production due 
to the low level of wages, itself originally partly the product of 
its articulation with the convict system. The articulation between 
the two structures went through three phases: from 1825-1850 the
development of sawmilling was inhibited by manual production; in the 
1860's and 1870's the two structures co-existed, with each serving to 
depress the other but providing only starvation wages for the manual 
workers; and from the 1880's manual production was virtually 
eliminated except for some specialised products such as hewn piles.
The third instance is taken from the linkage between the general
forest sawmills cutting rough-sawn green timber and the timber
merchants, mostly on the mainland, who stocked, seasoned, dressed and
sold it. The relationship went through four phases: independent
exchange, dependent exchange across Bass Strait, dependent exchange
within Tasmania, and incorporation within the firm. In the 1850's
and 1860's, the relationship between sawmillers and timber merchants
in Tasmania and the many small merchants and customers on the
mainland seems to have been based on quite unremarkable market 
3exchanges. About the 1880's, larger firms of timber merchants 
developed on the mainland to import foreign timbers. Disruptions 
during the First World War led some of them to extend their business 
to Australian timbers. By the 1920's and 1930's, the small and 
medium forest sawmills in Tasmania had fallen to a very dependent
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position due to the merchants' control over quality grading, capital 
advances for stock, as well as their place in seasoning and dressing 
high quality commodities from the rough material they bought. When 
kiln-drying became feasible in the 1930's, the merchants perpetuated 
this articulation by setting up drying plants in Tasmania for which 
they continued to buy in rough-sawn timber. This third phase lasted 
only briefly as the merchants subsequently proceeded to buy up the 
small mills and integrate production within their firms.
The fourth instance of linkages between different structures of 
production is taken from the complex interactions between sawmilling, 
pulp and paper making, and woodchip exports. These articulations 
took different forms. In one case, the development of sawmilling was 
mostly supressed in favour of newsprint production. In another of 
these, sawmilling was progressively incorporated within a firm that 
made paper in the monopoly structure. In three other cases,
sawmilling was articulated with pulp making or woodchip exports 
through the medium of state planning. We saw that as resources
became more of a constraint, the continuation of sawmilling became 
more dependent on the development of larger structures.
We also need to consider the situations w i t h o u t linkages. The 
first two pulp and paper mills were developed virtually independently 
of other structures and appeared as simple additions to the Tasmanian 
industrial structure though their initial development substantially 
affected the subsequent development of sawmilling.
The empirical structures identified in the case study have been 
remarkably persistent and all but two - the prison-farm mode and 
manual production for merchant trade - still exist. The structural 
changes that we have considered have been those of conflicting and 
adjusting relationships that, in several cases just reviewed, have 
roughly fitted the model of articulation. In contrast, the case 
study does not contain instances of rapid transition in which one 
structure of production simply displaced a contradictory one.
Finally, we need to review the ability of single agents to enter 
multiple structures. We found that individuals might be both convict
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workers and proletarians in different parts of the working day.^ 
Similarly a company might produce woodchips in the global sub-mode, 
paper in the monopoly sub-mode, and sawn timber in the competitive 
sub-mode. The point to be recalled is that structures are defined by 
their relationships, not by their agents, even though it is 
convenient to label agents by the structures in which they mainly 
operate. Changes between different structures can be reflected
within single agents as they decide how to allocate resources - the 
convict, his labour power; APPM, its investments.
THE STATE
In setting up the theoretical framework within which to place 
this study, we briefly mentioned four schools into which contemporary 
radical theories of the nature of the state within capitalist 
societies have been classified. These were the instrumental, class 
structure, capital logic, and dynamic schools, each different in its 
model's mechanisms and complexity. In reviewing the relationships 
between the state and the many socio-economic structures under which 
wood was produced in Tasmania we will call on each of the theories 
for the insights it provides to different situations. Many specific 
situations are often complicated as the relationships they entail can 
span several levels - municipal, Tasmanian, Australian, or 
imperial. There were several hierarchically or laterally ordered 
administrations linked to several structures of production. We will 
proceed chronologically.
The study started with direct state action - the invasion and 
settling of Van Diemen's Land. This fulfilled several functions for 
the British; it aided Britain's struggle for hegemony, by pre­
empting French settlement; it aided class rule in Britain, by 
providing a destination for transportation, and hence aided capital 
accumulation during the rise of competitive capitalism; it might have 
supplied strategic materials of flax and timber; and it might have 
provided a base for eastern trade. Some of these functions fall
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within the focus of world-systems theories, some under pluralist 
theories of power struggles between nations, while the convict system 
fits the model in which the state is seen as an instrument used by 
the bourgeoisie to advance their class interests.
The instrumental theory of the state not only describes and 
explains the origins of the convict system, but suits the bloody 
circumstances under which timber was produced in the punishment 
stations. However, Van Diemen's Land was not just a prison farm and 
the growing settlement placed its own demands upon the state. The 
state adapted the prison farm system to facilitate the creation of 
local capital - by operating a Commissariat and by using convicts as 
part-time proletarians - while still meeting British needs. From the 
first, the state met the needs of capital by granting land and 
assigning convict labour to the settlers, activities that grew 
dramatically from the 1820's on when commodity production could be 
expanded to supply export markets. Whilst this fits a model of the 
state functioning to serve the logical needs for capital accumul­
ation, we also noted that the connections between the bourgeoisie and 
the state were often personal ones - as when the first sawmiller 
arrived with a letter of introduction to Governor Arthur - more the 
focus of instrumental theory. State actions were also critical to 
the formation and reproduction of relations within and between 
classes through mechanisms such as: the direct coercion of convicts,
the licensing of timber cutters, the dispossession of independent 
simple commodity producers from the Waste Lands, and the granting of 
preferential and cumulative favours to the larger capitalists. Such 
matters fall within the domain of theories of class structure.
The change in the state's external relations, on obtaining self- 
government, enabled the landed gentry and the merchants to rise to 
power in the Tasmanian parliament and create a municipal level of 
government over which they held sway. Instrumental theory provides 
quite an adequate model for the manner in which the gentry then used 
the two levels of state against both the proletariat and smaller 
capitalists. Legislation was passed to control labour and give
pastoralists the right to clear timber cutters from the sheep runs.
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Moreover the state was administered preferentially by placing the 
burden of increased municipal rates on the smaller landowners# and 
ensuring that timber licence fees were collected assiduously in the 
one region in which smallholders and timber workers were prepond­
erant. Of course the state also continued to supply land by sale 
and lease to assist capital to expand# and endeavoured to improve the 
infrastructure of roads and bridges with the limited funds that could 
be taxed from the depressed economy.
We saw that the increasing investment in sawmilling in the 
1870's and 1880's was followed by legislation to reserve stands of 
good timber from agricultural selection until the mills had cut them# 
though the capitals were small and the state failed to implement the 
legislation to any appreciable extent. This situation could be seen 
to fit an instrumental or capital logic model# with due allowance for 
the predominant place of agricultural or pastoral production. By 
contrast# the state acted decisively at the turn of the century to 
assist larger capitalists from Britain to produce timber in 
Tasmania. The two new mills they built had substantial immovable 
investments in forest railways which the state protected by conceding 
far longer and more extensive rights in the forest than were 
available to smaller locally owned mills. No obvious connection is 
apparent between the state and the companies# so that the situation 
fits the capital logic rather than the instrumental model.
Building the Empire, in a quite literal sense# expanded the 
markets available to exporters of Tasmanian timber but required the 
state to take on the functions of promotion and inspection that could 
not be handled by individual capitalists. While the theory is that 
the state acts to fulfill the logical needs of capital# it does not 
explain why such needs were so poorly administered.
Relationships between the Australian level of state and the 
structures producing timber in Tasmania became important after the 
First World War as Australia industrialised. The Australian state 
took on an industrial research function and successfully adapted 
processes to season timber artificially and make pulp from eucalypt
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woods. These innovations opened new opportunities for manufacturing 
in Tasmania which were seized by larger mainland-based capitalists. 
The Tasmanian state met the needs of the pulp and paper companies by 
conceding them large areas of forest, granting various access and 
service rights, and even on occasion loaning some of the capital. 
This situation fits readily into that model of the Australian and 
Tasmanian states that sees them acting to meet the needs of capital.
Both the Commonwealth and Tasmanian states set up institutions 
to mediate between capital and labour over wages and conditions of 
work. Class conflicts were sometimes conducted through these 
institutions and sometimes not. For example the Huon timber strike 
of 1921-22 originated in a struggle that could not be contained 
within the Commonwealth Arbitration Court. The Tasmanian state was 
not an instrument of one class or the other; it attempted concili­
ation, it aided capital with police guards for scabs, but it aided 
labour by doing the latter half-heartedly. (The nature of the state 
in mediating class conflicts is the central focus of the class 
structuralist model).
Other aspects of the inter-war period were more complex, the two 
levels of state interacting in their relationships with the 
structures of production. There were many instrumental connections 
between leading industrialists and Commonwealth bodies, such as the 
CSIRO and the Development and Migration Commission, that powerfully 
influenced Tasmania's development. The Tasmanian Timber Association, 
for example, was initiated by a Tasmanian government on the advice of 
Commonwealth officials.
The complexity of these relationships increased as production 
increased and as the various structures and capitals conflicted and 
complemented each other over the exploitation of the limited forest 
resources. The Tasmanian state took on the function of integrating 
production, bringing together sawmilling, pulp making, woodchip 
exports, and landowners. Neither the class structuralist, instrum­
ental nor capital the logic models appear to be sufficient by 
themselves to analyse such complex situations. What they do
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provide, however, is a composite model of the state acting within a 
complex and dynamic network of class economic structures, which is a 
conception much nearer to the empirical reality of the 1960's and 
1970's than any contending picture.
The actions of the state in conducting forestry need to be 
reviewed in more detail.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF FORESTRY
Forestry, as the planned management of forests for the 
production of commodities, has three industrial functions: it may be
productive by providing wood or logging roads, reproductive by 
regenerating the forest to provide future crops, or integrative by 
allocating crops between commodities. Our interest here is to review 
how forestry was constructed in Tasmania, primarily as a state 
activity, in relation to changes in the structures of production, and 
particularly how the distinctive feature of being able to renew the 
resource, and hence reproduce or even expand production over a long 
period, became established.
For the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century the main 
thrust of the state's land policy was to promote settlement. Wood 
was superabundant. Although the state allowed cutting on the Waste 
Lands of the Crown, the measures to licence cutters were designed 
more to control workers and raise a little revenue than deliberately 
to aid production.
In the last quarter of the century, the state did take 
deliberate action to assist production by making reserves and 
granting leases and concessions. These protected resources against 
agricultural selection for periods of 5 to 42 years, which were long 
enough to cover the depreciation of the immovable part of sawmillers' 
capital, but not long enough to ensure reproduction of the forest.
For the first twenty years of the twentieth century, the case 
for reproduction - that is for forest protection, regeneration and
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plantations - was put forward by imperial and Commonwealth sources 
and did result in the Forestry Act, 1920. Although this case was 
recognised in legislation, it was only partially implemented over the 
next quarter of a century. The main progress was in dedicating land 
as State Forest, though this occurred mainly where there was no other 
competing capital. The case for reproduction continued to be pressed 
by the Commonwealth which was closely connected with the large Anglo- 
Australian capital then trying to establish pulp and paper making. 
It was opposed by the sawmillers, with their competitive and small 
business structures, because of the costs it might have imposed 
(directly or by preventing royalty cheating), and it was delayed by 
the depression and the Second World War.
The implementation of reproduction function in the forests was 
closely, and it is argued necessarily, connected to the advent of the 
pulp and paper mills. The capital invested in pulp and paper mills, 
unlike that in sawmills, was effectively immovable because of the 
high cost of shifting the machinery, the extensive infrastructure, 
the progressive improvements that repeatedly extended the 
depreciation time required on a site, and as alternative forest 
concessions were few and far between. Unlike sawmills, pulp and 
paper mills could not 'cut out and get out'. Hence to ensure the 
continual reproduction of their capital they needed:
rights long enough to allow the forest to be renewed, and 
- regeneration operations to be undertaken that would do so.
The state acted readily to provide them with rights to forest 
concessions for 80 or more years, and acted in two ways to meet the 
need for regeneration operations. In all the concession agreements 
made between 1924 (Burnie) and 1946 (West Tamar), when the sawmillers 
opposed the costs of reproduction and the state's administration was 
extremely weak, the reproduction function was handed to the 
concession holders. This was not an ideal solution for capital, as 
forestry is an expensive and bothersome business that ties up capital 
for an inordinately long time. After the war, the Tasmanian state, 
with advice from the Commonwealth, reconstructed its administration 
to meet the needs of heavy industry. Notably it purged the system of
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petty corruption, professionalised the service, expanded information 
and planning activities, and assumed the reproduction function itself 
in all concession agreements made after 1946. Similarly, the
stronger state took on the integrative function of allocating the 
crop between commodities and capitals. The adoption of the
reproduction and integrative functions by the state was achieved 
increasingly at the taxpayer's expense, which overcame opposition 
from the sawmillers and enabled capital to socialise significant 
costs.
The state continued to exercise its productive, reproductive and 
integrative functions during the 1970's on an enlarged scale as 
cutting doubled to supply the woodchip export trade. Although the 
woodchip mills were relatively cheap and (their export permits) 
ostensibly had a short tenure (5-15 years), the state still renewed 
the resources to encourage subsequent industrialisation. Also, the 
state extended its reproduction function from public lands to private 
ones in the late-1970's by setting up advisory services and providing 
reproduction subsidies.
This account of the construction of forestry in Tasmania has 
related changes in the state's activities mostly to the needs of 
individual capitalists in the different structures of production. 
Notably, the state appeared to take little or ineffective action to 
meet the general needs of capital for the renewal of the forest 
resource prior to the Second World War. Since then, the adoption of 
the reproduction function by the state has the potential to serve 
both the identified individual large capitalists in the pulp and 
paper sector as well as the unidentified general needs for sawlogs; 
indeed the state expects to supply increasing quantities of both 
products from its plantations and regenerated forests in the 
future.^ Hence, in one period the state appears not to have behaved 
as might be expected from the capital logic model, while in the 
second period this model appears more useful.
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FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
We have now completed our review of the historical development 
of the wood industries and forestry in Tasmania and can consider what 
the patterns we have detected might mean for the future. Before 
doing this, however, we must canvass the general issue of looking 
forward from history, and of doing so at present.
Looking forward
We considered (in Chapter 1) that 'development' implied an
optimistic endeavour to create a 'better' future based on an analysis 
of the past. Although it is a truism that human actions are informed 
by experience, the extent and value of the information to hand is
ginvariably limited, and social forecasts have often proved wrong. 
The catalogue of difficulties is large and so are the dangers of
prediction. Because contemporary social systems of the sort
discussed here are both big and intricate, there is the danger of
ignoring macro-factors while refining detail. Because development is 
an optimistic endeavour, there is the danger of confusing goals with 
analysis; a danger which is aggravated by any teleological 
assumptions. Even if what development may occur can be predicted, 
the question of when it may happen is a separate one which may be 
impossible to forecast. Moreover, it is precisely where forecasts 
are most difficult to make and have the greatest uncertainty, that 
they are often most needed.
Development forecasts both depend on future actions and are 
required to guide them, yet future human actions and their outcomes 
are always problematic, hence few forecasts can be more than 
probabilistic expectations. Summarising the problems involved in
looking forward, Hobsbawm concludes;
The structures of human societies, their processes and mechanisms 
of reproduction, change and transformation are such as to 
restrict the number of things that can happen, determine some of 
the things that will happen, and assign a greater or lesser 
probability to much of the rest.^
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Looking forward now
This analysis has been concerned with structural change within 
industrial capitalism. The theory we applied to seek such patterns 
was developed during the same period, hence our forecasts may well 
only apply if it endures. How likely is this?
Modernization theorists certainly believe the future will be the 
present extension of the past writ large. Marxists on the other hand 
hold that the working out of present patterns will make it impossible 
for capitalism to survive, and Neo-Malthusians (also described in 
Chapter 1) believe that the growth of population and industrialisat­
ion may have reached, or over-reached, their limits whether
capitalist or no. Marxists seek to hasten the crisis of
capitalism's demise (in order to create a socialist society in its
place), whereas Neo-Malthusians seek to avert ecological, 
nutritional, and resource crises by timely action. By contrast, 
other theorists have held that the present stage is being superseded 
already by a 'Post-industrial' one characterised by the rise of 
'knowledge industries' and the replacement of class-divisive property
Qrelations by technocratic leadership in a corporatist polity. While 
the advent of the global sub-mode of production dominated by giant 
transnational corporations may present such a corporatist and 
technocratic image in the core, the global operations of
transnational corporations seem more adequately explained along 
Marxist lines.
The position taken here is that current changes to the world- 
system do not constitute a radical disjuncture, yet do amount to 
substantial structural changes within capitalism; they are being 
reflected in Australia in terms described as crises of capitalism, 
but not in terms of an imminent revolution in the relations of 
production or forms of the state.
Looking forward in Australia
We considered the transformation of the Australian economy 
during the 1970's in relation to changes in the world-system. The
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effects were far from transient so that/ as Catley and McFarlane 
recently observed Australia entered the 1980's locked into a
social and economic crisis. It is the most serious and prolonged
' 9crisis for a generation.
Several analyses and forecasts of likely developments in the 
1980's have been published, but none predict a sudden improvement to 
the current situation. For example, Catley and McFarlane have
examined a range of possible scenarios, most of which envisage 
increasing penetration by foreign capital, rising mineral and energy 
exports, some de-industrialisation and rising unemployment, 
counteracted by various mixes of authoritarian control or welfare 
relief. From a different theoretical vantage point, Theophanous
has developed possible scenarios much like Catley and McFarlane's? 
one envisaged authoritarian control, and another continued 
stagnation. Both Theophanous, and Catley and McFarlane, have
developed what they regarded as more optimistic scenarios based on 
transformations to a more socialistic society, but neither has 
established the feasibility of these within the world-system, nor do
they appear to regard them as very probable. Without debating the
relative merits of these and other forecasts, it will be sufficient 
to note that they emphasise four points:
The problems in Australia are part of the problems of continuing 
structural change within capitalism as a whole.
- Australia will become more firmly held in the world-system as a 
result of the continuing penetration of foreign capital and 
rising mineral and energy exports.
Conflicts between and within classes as well as between the
States and the Commonwealth are expected to heighten as a result 
of some or all of: continuing unemployment, falling real and
social wages, de-industrialisation, and uneven regional 
development.
These conflicts will focus particularly on the state. This is 
expected because of the crucial place of the state in providing 
both infrastructure for private capital and services for the 
communal welfare. The competition for funds within reduced state
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budgets will highlight the contradictions between the reality and 
democratic expectations of what the capitalist state can do.
THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WOOD INDUSTRIES AND FORESTRY
Given the difficulties and uncertainties of looking forward and 
the features that analysts feel will dominate Australian development, 
we now want to see what the patterns we have detected might mean in 
the future development of Tasmanian wood industries.
World-historic perspective
Three critical points were raised by our world-historic 
perspective. Firstly, international and to a lesser degree
Australian economic and political affairs were often the over-riding 
determinants of development. Secondly, there was often a long delay 
between the emergence of the salient features taken to characterise a 
new stage of capitalism and their entry into Tasmanian timber
production. Thirdly, we should not necessarily expect development to 
proceed in a linear cumulative manner, and it is possible for 
undeoelopment to succeed development.
We saw that the Tasmanian wood industries have become
increasingly incorporated into larger scale structures due to the
continued concentration of capital, the centralisation of ownership 
into non-Tasmanian hands, and their entry into the 'resources boom' 
(exporting over half the wood cut in an unmanufactured state). 
Whereas the wood industries have often lagged behind salient
developments in the past, their incorporation into Australian and 
international structures makes it likely that international changes
will be reflected more rapidly in Tasmania.
Structures of production
In reviewing the structure of the industry, we saw that the 
several structures of production involved have been remarkably
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persistent, but that the continued concentration of capital has left 
the bulk of the industry in the control of only a handful of 
companies of which one has the lion's share. This not only means 
that any forecasts about structures are contingent upon the 
performance of individual companies - a matter not dealt with at all 
in this work - but more importantly reveals a perilous dependency in 
the Tasmanian situation. We will consider each structure in turn.
The global sub-mode is firmly established, exporting woodchips 
to Japan. The conditions for export permits and forest concessions 
laid down by the Commonwealth and Tasmanian governments envisage that 
woodchip mills might be upgraded to produce pulp. A large pulpmill 
to be built jointly by Japanese and APPM capitals has even been 
proposed. This would produce pulp to make paper both at Wesley Vale 
for the Australian market and in Japan. Hence it would operate in 
both the monopoly and global sub-modes. While particular outcomes 
will be governed by the specific circumstances of individual 
companies and influenced by state policies, upgrading appears 
unlikely - mainly because Japanese capital has already been invested 
in pulping capacity to process the Tasmanian wood in Japan. Overall, 
any developments that do occur appear likely to tie Tasmania even 
more firmly to the global structure of production with the inherent 
risks of becoming more dependent on market fluctuations and
investment decisions beyond the reach of even the Australian state.
The monopoly sub-mode within which pulp and paper is produced is 
firmly established in the Australian economy and, given the
persistence of production structures, must be expected to endure in 
Tasmania. Nevertheless, two trends that may qualify future 
development must be noted. Firstly, APPM and probably APM will 
continue to operate in both the monopoly and global sub-modes. 
Secondly, Tasmania no longer provides the sole site for Australian 
newsprint production. These trends incorporate Tasmanian production
into wider spheres so that the reduction, continuation or expansion 
of the Tasmanian mills will become contingent on the allocation of 
production and capital between branches.
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The competitive sub-mode within which sawn timber is produced is 
composed of distinct structures which must be considered 
separately. Firstly, the three large companies whose main business 
is in the global and monopoly sub-modes, and which represent varying 
amounts of foreign capital, control some 40% of timber production. 
They appear certain to continue, subject only to the unlikely 
withdrawal of foreign capital. Secondly, the Tasmanian and mainland 
merchant/sawmillers who control a similar amount of production appear 
firmly entrenched. This structure has proved most persistent, though 
the continuation of any of the smaller family firms is always 
contingent on dynastic circumstances. Lastly, some of the small 
sawmills operating in competitive and small business structures will 
almost certainly persist, though the proportion of wood cut by them 
is likely to fall. Over all, some further concentration of 
production may be expected which, with increased investment in more 
modern machines and a shift to cutting more plantation softwood, is
likely to reduce employment in sawmilling. However, this may be
partially offset by increased processing by some of the smaller 
companies seeking specialised markets.
State
In our review of the ways in which the state has acted, we saw
that although some situations could be explained by quite simple
models, the situation since the 1950's has shown that the state has 
entered the relations of production, reproduction and integration of 
capital through forestry in a complex and dynamic manner. Moreover, 
the costs of state forestry have increased rapidly, partly at the 
taxpayer's expense. Analytic expectations, mentioned earlier, that 
the state's actions, and particularly costs, will become the focus of 
increasing conflict in Australia, is almost certain to extend to the 
wood industries and forestry sector. We will consider each function 
in turn.
In relation to the production function, the state administration 
is likely to attempt to recover the full cost of providing services, 
such as roads, from the industry. Capital is likely to mount
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counter-attacks on a range of grounds from the accounting conventions 
applied, the operational competence of the administration/ to the 
extent of the state involvement in production.
In relation to the integration of complementary and conflicting 
uses of the forest/ the state will have to retain its integrative 
function because a substantial number of competitive sawmills are 
expected to survive and to overlap the operations of the big woodchip 
and pulp and paper companies. Although often practised with apparent 
reasonableness and good humour/ the integrative function will always 
be a potentially contentious one. In this, there is no reason to 
expect that the state will not continue to favour large capital over 
small irrespective of its origin, and hence support even further 
extensions of non-Tasmanian ownership.
In relation to the reproductive function, we saw that under the 
early concessions the forest was regenerated by the pulp and paper 
companies at their own expense. On the later concessions it was 
regenerated by the state, partly at the taxpayers' expense, and on 
private property it was regenerated again partly at the taxpayers' 
expense. Given that the state budget is likely to continue to be
strained, the extent of these subsidies for forestry will almost 
certainly be questioned - particularly as the early concessions 
function without them. Again, the state administration will attempt 
to recover its costs from industry. Capital will resist this by 
raising the real or imagined possibility of current production or 
future development being transferred to another State or country - a 
possibility made more real by the incorporation of production on 
larger scales.
Tasmanian development
The future that emerges by assembling the forecasts just made is 
a gloomy one for Tasmanian workers and taxpayers as far as the wood 
industries and forestry sector is concerned. The mills producing in 
Tasmania will function mostly as components of structures that will 
span states, nations or sectors, and the choice between some limited
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further industrialisation or some degree of de-industrialisation will 
be determined by factors and in places beyond Tasmania's reach. It 
appears likely that overall employment will decline as the limited 
employment that might be generated by upgrading a woodchip mill to a 
modern pulpmill would be insufficient to offset the reduction in 
sawmilling and a possible downward drift in existing pulp and paper 
mills.
Conflicts over the costs of public forestry will almost 
certainly heighten, yet may be unable to be resolved. That is, 
taxpayers may have to continue to support forestry to avert transfers 
of production out of the State. There is no sign that Tasmanian 
average incomes or state revenues will be increased by profits from 
the wood industries? if anything the transfer of ownership to non- 
Tasmanian hands is likely to continue.
PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT : MODERNIZATION AND RADICAL THEORIES
The idea of progress or development, discussed at the start of 
this work, carries the promise that human endeavour guided by human 
reason can improve the material conditions of existence. It rests on 
the belief that rational guides can be obtained by joining syntheses 
of the past to prophecies for the future. The point of
constructing such syntheses is not merely to narrate the past and 
project a future but to enable purposive development strategies to be 
prepared. Hence the ultimate test of historical analyses, such as 
this work, must be not only whether they permit prophesies and 
development strategies to be prepared, but whether resultant action 
is effective.
Development has been vigorously pursued in the Tasmanian wood 
industries according to strategies consistent with modernization 
theories and their efficacy must and can be evaluated accordingly. 
Such a test is clearly not possible for radical theories. The most 
that can be attempted in this final section is to review the 
narrative briefly to observe some of the strengths and weaknesses of
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the modernization approach, and then to show that the radical 
approach taken here offers a rational alternative.
Modernization
Development has been pursued in Tasmania ever since the 1820's 
by a strategy based on state 'encouragement' of capitalist 
investment, with various forms of hand-outs and subsidies. The major 
forms of the strategy were: first the supply of land and some of the 
means of production and convict labour to settlers arriving with 
capital, and second, the supply of cheap energy and resources to 
heavy industry under policies of hydro-industrialisation and 
concession. According to modernization theory, the associated 
capital investments should have led to an increase in and diffusion 
of economic benefits, and the modernization of society at large.
Clearly, in several situations the modernization theory implicit 
above was vindicated by the results. For example, the expansion of 
mining in the 1880's did increase general prosperity and break up a 
stagnant social structure. Again, the pulp and paper industry 
established in the 1940's did increase employment, under far better 
working conditions than had existed previously in the wood 
industries. Most progressively, large scale investment did lead to 
the forest resource being reproduced. Overall, Tasmania did develop 
into a complex, modern, industrial society.
Equally clearly, in other situations the results were quite 
contrary to modernization expectations. For example, investment in 
sawmilling in the 1850's and 1870's led not to rising prosperity, but 
to a long period during which mechanical and manual production 
interacted, each serving to depress the other. Increased investment 
and expanded wood production in the 1970's was also accompanied by 
falling rather than increasing employment. Overall, in spite of 
applying modernization policies vigorously, Tasmanian development has 
fallen behind that on the mainland. Net outmigration has occurred 
almost continuously for over a century and Tasmanian development has 
ended as the 'Tasmanian Problem' of relative economic decline and 
incipient regional depression.
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It is in analysing the 'Tasmanian Problem' and revising the 
development strategy that the widespread criticisms of modernization 
theory can be most obviously applied. We noted in the previous 
chapter that both the Commonwealth and Tasmanian governments examined 
the economic situation during the 1970's and suggested reforms. Thus 
the Commonwealth (Callaghan) inquiry observed the lower average 
incomes in Tasmania, the lower proportion of highly paid executives 
and professionals, the lower profits received, the capital intensive 
mills that failed to diffuse the benefits expected, the increasing 
vulnerability of the Tasmanian economy to fluctuations in the affairs 
of a handful of large mills, and the severe limitations on state 
revenues which have inhibited greater 'assistance' to further 
industrialisation. Yet the origins and causes of these phenomena 
were hardly examined, and Tasmania's major problem was declared to be 
Bass Strait! Hardly surprisingly, the inquiry did little more than 
collate a few ad hoe proposals and recommend encouraging smaller 
scale and more diverse manufacturing. Little cheap power or
resources are left to 'attract' any new large industry. Indeed, the 
inquiry recognised that its proposals would be insufficient, that 
economic decline, unemployment and outmigration would continue.^
Radical theory
Forecasts of the future provided by the modernization approach, 
as exemplified by the Commonwealth's inquiry, are not in many 
respects dissimilar to those made here according to radical theory. 
Where then does the difference lie?
The vital difference between the two theoretical camps lies in 
the location of the dynamics for change - the causes and processes of 
development. Hence rational guides to further endeavours are 
constructed on different principles.
The modernizers, locating the dynamic for progress in capital 
investment and the outward diffusion of benefits, are unable 
adequately to theorise about uneven development, or rather the 
relative undevelopment of the Tasmanian region after more than a 
century of modernization policies.
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The radical analysis conducted here, locating the dynamic for 
change in the conflicts between and within classes over the
accumulation of capital, is able to theorise about the Tasmanian
situation in the wood industries sector in a more penetrating 
manner. Firstly, it was shown that Tasmanian development was
determined in part by the historic development of capitalism on a 
world - and to a lesser extent Australian - scale. Secondly, it was
shown how the continued concentration of capital led to the
incorporation of much of the Tasmanian wood industries on an ever 
wider scale. Lastly, it was shown that the Tasmanian state acted in 
many ways, some of them most complex, to further the interests of
capital accumulation. Radical analysis enables the actions of the 
state in the conduct of the several forestry functions to be closely 
correlated to changes in the structures of production.
Thus radical analysis is able to theorise both progressive 
changes, such as the benefits flowing from some industrial expansion 
or the renewal of forest resources, and the structural changes that 
have increased non-Tasmanian ownership and decreased Tasmanian
benefits. The thrust of radical analysis is the identification of 
changes in the ownership of the means of production, where control of 
development under capitalism is taken primarily to lie.
This thesis rests on an analysis of the past. It identifies the 
moments of development as the formidable processes of capitalism. No 
policies are propounded. That is a separate task; but endeavours
for progress can only succeed if the nature of the system is
rationally analysed and understood.
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NOTES
Additional abbreviations used in notes
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics
ANZAAS Australia and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of 
Science
CPP Australia, Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers (year/paper)
HRA Historical Records of Australia (series/volume/page)
Van Diemen's Land or Tasmania:
CSO Colonial Secretary's Office (series/volume/file)
FC Forestry Commission (series/file)
FD Forestry Department - files are included in FC series
JHA Journals of the House of Assembly (year/paper)
jpp Journals and Papers of Parliament (year/paper)
j pp p Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament (year/paper) 
pplc Papers and Proceedings of the Legislative Council 
(year/paper)
LSD Lands and Surveys Department (series/volume/file)
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Malcolm L. Alexander, 'Structure and process in the modern world 
system: the world system of Immanuel Wallerstein and its 
predecessors'.
I. Wallerstein, 'The rise and future demise of the world 
capitalist system', o p . c l t p.27-33. The third and fourth of 
Wallerstein's main eras are:
1740-1917 Era of industrial capitalism.
1917- Consolidation of " "
These eras are divided into periods:
1740-1815 Rise of industrial production. British struggle 
for hegemony.
1815-1873 Britain hegemonic - the 'Workshop of the world'.
1873-1917 Britain declining cf. U.S.
1917-1945 Rise of U.S. German challenges.
1945-1965 U.S. hegemonic.
1970's- U.S. declining - restructuring in progress.
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imperialism', In Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, Studies In the 
theories of Imperialism, p.42.
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pp.100-109.
Letter from the Committee of Seventeen that directed the Dutch 
East India Company to their Governor-General (Anthony Van 
Diemen) and councillors in Batavia, 11 Apr. 1642, cited by A. 
Sharp, Tne voyages of Abel Tasman, p.20.
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74. The first colonists probably arrived over 20,000 years ago
during the last period of glaciation that had lowered the sea 
level to the extent that Van Diemen's land was part of the 
mainland. Rising seas separated the island some 12,000-13,500 
years ago and reached their present level about 7,000 years 
ago. Although the aborigines built simple canoes from bundles
of bark and travelled to islands 6-8 kilometres off shore, they 
were quite unable to cross the 130 km of stormy waters in Bass 
Strait. J. Allen & R. Jones, Sunda and Sahul, pp.215,359.
75. K. Marx, Capital, op.cit., vol.1, Preface to 1st German edn., 
p. 19.
76. V.I. Lenin, 'Imperialism', op.cit., p.232. Lenin drew on
several earlier studies by Bauer, Hobson, Hilferding and others.
77. M. Barrett Brown, 'A critique...', op.cit., pp.54-55; V.G. 
Kiernan, Marxism and imperialism, pp.37-60.
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Sutcliffe, op.cit., pp.28-29.
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given by James O'Connor, 'The meaning of economic imperialism', 
In k .t . Fann and D.C. Hodges, Readings in U.S. imperialism, 
pp.43-44.
80. E.o. Wright, Class, crisis and the state, op.cit., ch.3.
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82. R. Pettman, State and class, op.cit., p.65.
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85. Bob Jessop, 'Recent theories of the capitalist state'; David A. 
Gold, C.Y.H. Lo and Erik Olin Wright, 'Recent developments in 
Marxist theories of the capitalist state'.
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90. E.O. Wright, Class, crisis and the state, op.cit.; Gosta
Esping-Andersen, Roger Friedland and E.O. Wright, 'Modes of 
class struggle and the capitalist state'.
91. P. Corrigan et at., 'The state as a relation of production'.
92. W.B. Greely, Forest policy, gives an account of policy in a wide 
range of countries. P. Sartorius & H. Henle, Forestry and 
economic development, describe policy in Central Europe.
93. d .r . Johnston et al., Forest planning.
94. J.C. Westoby, 'Forest industries in the attack on economic
underdevelopment'.
95. G.R. Watt, The planning and evaluation of forestry projects.
96. The most remarkable apparent switch of interest to the village 
level is that of the World Bank, which has envisaged channelling 
60% of its loans into rural rather than industrial projects - 
World Bank, Forestry (1978).
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
1. G.w. Evans, A geographical, historical and topographical
account of Van Diemen’s Land, pp.1,47,27.
2. Cook's own observations made at Adventure Bay on Maria Island in 
January 1777 are most directly to the point
'The wood is very long and close grained, and extremely 
tough, very proper for spars, oars and many other uses, and 
w[o]uld on occasion make good masts perhaps none better if 
a method could be found to lighten it.'
J.C. Beaglehole, The journals of Captain James Cook, p.58.
3. JHA 1866/27 Statistical summary of Tasmania for the years 1816 
to 1865 inclusive, The estimate of 7,000 was made by G.A. 
Robinson who had the widest contact with the Aborigines, 
collected the remnants of their population, 1829-35, and became 
the official Protector of Aborigines. Using archeological 
evidence, Rhys Jones has estimated that the population would 
have been between 3,000 and 4,000 - cited by Lyndall Ryan, The 
Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.14.
4. W.D. Jackson, 'Vegetation', In J.L., Davies, Atlas of Tasmania, 
p. 30.
I. Wallerstein, 'The rise and future demise of the world 
capitalist system'.
5 .
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6. 800,000 hectares were enclosed 1761-1800, and a further 800,000 
in 1801-1850 - cited by Brian Fitzpatrick, British imperialism 
in Australia 1783-1833, p.45.
7. e .j . Hobsbawm, The age of revolution 1789-1848, p.46.
8. M. Dobb, Studies in the development of capitalism, ch.4.
9. D.C. Coleman, The British paper industry 1495 -1860, ch.2.
10. Ibid. Estimate 0.1 kg per head for about 1600 - p.15; and of
I. 1 kg for 1800 - p.105.
11. Ibid, pp.88, 147.
12. Ibid, p .206.
13. Ibid, p.292. From 1841 to 1851, the proportion of males over 20 
years employed fell from 62% to 33%, being replaced by females 
(increased from 28% to 48%) and males under 20 (increased from 
10% to 19%)
14. F. Klemm, A history of western technology, p.58; E.N. Simons, 
'The evolution of the saw'.
15. W.R. Fisher's text on Forest Utilization, (2nd edn., 1908) was
based on a translation of Gayer's text of 1863. A detailed 
description of water-powered sawmills is given for which the 
improvement in sawblades from 5.5-7 mm thickness to 1.75-2 mm is 
noted.
16. John Evelyn, Sylva (3rd edn., 1674), p.196, shows a picture of a 
water-driven 'Norway engine or Saw-mill' using three saws in a 
frame to resaw a squared piece. E.N. Simons, op.cit., 
reproduces a picture of a sixteenth century man-driven saw with 
multiple blades and refers to mills with several blades working 
on the Danube in the same century. G.R. Wilkins, 'History of 
circular saws'.
17. J.R. Forbes, Man the maker, p.148, notes that a wind-powered 
sawmill was destroyed in 1630. K. Marx, Capital, op.cit, vol.1, 
p .404.
18. Peter Koch, 'History of wood machining', notes a water-powered 
sawmill operating in New Hampshire with a gate saw in 1634.
J. W. Oliver, History of American technology, p.14, mentions a 
sawmill built by the Dutch on Manhattan Island in 1635 and the 
general use of sawmills throughout New England by 1700. Oliver, 
p.4, also notes that in the earliest mills the logs were moved 
through the saws by hand with the aid of spikes but that this 
method was replaced by log carriages moved with cog wheels. 
A.R.M. Lower, Great Britain's woodyard, p.42, notes that there 
were 90 sawmills operating in Nova Scotia by 1785.
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19. B.R. Mitchell, Abstract of British historical statistics, -
median estimates.
20. Robert Owen provided a notable lead by pamphlet and practice; he
acquired his New Lanark mill which he operated on more humane 
lines in 1800, published Essays on the formation of character in 
1813, and attempted to establish a co-operative cotton mill at 
New Harmony in Indiana in 1825. Dates of salient legislation 
which were mainly restricted to textile mills and mines were;- 
1833 Exclusion of children under 9 from textile mills and the 
appointment of inspectors; 1842 Exclusion of boys under 10 and 
women from mines; 1844 Fencing of machinery; 1847 Ten Hours Act 
(8 in lieu of 12 hour days previously worked). It was only
after 1860 that the Factory Acts were extended to industry
generally.
21. B. Fitzpatrick, op. cit. , pp.47-50.
22. Ibid, pp.174-81.
23. The rise of industrial interests is marked by the Reform Act of
1832 which spread the electorates more evenly to allow urban
representation and destroy the system of Parlimentary patronage, 
yet which by restricting the franchise (to 655,000 property 
owners out of a population of 14 million) effectively prevented 
Parliament from being a forum in which the power of the ruling 
classes could be challenged. The rise of industrial capitalists 
into the ruling class is epitomised in the debates on the Corn 
Laws. Landed interests maintained tariffs to preserve a high 
and stable price for their domestic wheat, whereas manufacturers 
wanted the price of bread, and hence wages, kept low. It was 
not until 1847 that the interests of industrial capital
prevailed and the duty on imported corn was reduced to 1s a 
bushel. Although reform of administration was urged by Edmund 
Burke in 1780, the modern public service, recruited on merit 
rather than patronage, can only be considered to have started
from 1853 - M. Wright, Treasury control of the permanent civil
service 1854-1874, p.xiii.
24. The major arguments have been collated and discussed by G.
Martin, The founding of Australia.
25. R.G. Albion, Forests and sea power.
26. HRA 1/6/205, Cooke to Bligh, 11 Jan 1808; HRA 1/6/653, Foveaux
to Castlereagh, 6 Sept. 1808.
27. HRA 1/4/248, King to Nepean, 9 May 1803.
28. HRA 1/4/152, King to Bowen, 28 March 1803.
29 j .b . Walker, Early Tasmania, pp.41-56.
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30. The stock of flour that Collins brought with them was husbanded 
carefully as further supplies from Britain were uncertain due to 
the hazards of the voyage and the resumption of the Napoleonic 
wars. Supply from Britain was further interrupted as stores 
were discharged at Port Jackson for subsequent colonial shipment 
to Van Diemen's Land. Some supplies of salt meat, meal and 
flour were obtained from New South Wales and Norfolk Island but 
frequently a large part of these was found to be rotten on 
arrival. The complaints were frequent. For example, a survey 
on 18 Aug 1804 (HRA 3/1/278-9) condemned 26,000 out of 63,000 
lbs of pork and all of 140,000 lb of flour. Collins complained 
to Castlereagh (HRA 3/1/360 17 June 1806) to no avail and it 
seems likely that the worst and oldest of the stores in Sydney 
were sent to Collins (HRA 3/1/391, Bligh to Collins, 10 Sept 
1807). Further supply was precluded by the disastrous floods 
that destroyed the New South Wales crops in 1806. A ship was 
sent to India for grain but was lost at sea and it was not until 
1810 that a second ship returned with sufficient to break the 
threat of famine. J.B. Walker, op.cit, p.172.
31. HRA 3/1/363, Collins to Castlereagh, 10 May 1806; HRA 3/1/379, 
Collins to Bligh, 18 Oct 1806.
32. The farmers took advantage of the food shortage and combined in 
an attempt to force the price to six pounds a bushel but were 
only partly successful as Collins fixed a maximum price of four 
pounds. HRA 3/1/552, General Order, 7 Feb 1807.
33. The island was not finally evacuated until 1814, but was re­
occupied in 1825. J.J. Auchmuty, '1810-30', In F.K. Crowley, A 
new history of Australia, p.49; J.B. Walker, op.cit., p.167
34. J. West, The history of Tasmania., vol.1, p.38.
35. HRA 3/1/xxix
36. J. West, op.cit,, vol.1, p.41.
37. Ibid.
38. J.L. Davies, op.cit., p.69. Coal was mined at Port Arthur by 
the convicts from 1834 and elsewhere from the 1840's and 1850's, 
but it was not until the Fingal mines were opened in the 1880's 
that coal was at all plentiful. The rise of electricity usage 
in the 1920's and oil in the 1950's almost eliminated the use of 
wood as an industrial fuel.
39. r .m . Hartwell, The economic development of Van Diemen's Land, 
pp.156-60. Ships of up to 570 tonnes were built.
The 390 vessels constructed in Tasmania in the 20 years to 1859, 
including ocean-going ones, only averaged a carrying capacity of 
60 tonnes - R.M. Hartwell, op.cit., p.156. Examples of the
40.
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sizes of ketches used in the coastal trade are:-
Weight (tonnes)
Good. Intent
33
Coral
61
Length (m) 
Beam (m) 
Depth (m )
20.9
5.3
1.5
20.9
5.7
1.8
41.
42.
43.
44.
45
46.
47
48
49
Source: Tasmanian Museum
The timber firm of Risby Bros ran a fleet of 14 sailing ships 
from Hobart in the 1880's which carried an average of 15,000 
feet of log or approximately 46 tonnes.
Rev. Knopwood took a walk to the King's Pits on 27 July 1804. 
M. Nicholls, Diary of Rev. Robert Knopwood. The location is 
identified by C. Allport, A page from the past.
HRA 3/1/545, General Order, 23 July 1806 reduced the working 
hours of convicts to ^/g;^/2 hours a day and instructed the timber 
carriage gang to bring in one piece of timber each working day 
which was presumably an equivalent labour. The transport
difficulties are also mentioned in J.T. Bigge, Report of the 
Commissioner of Inquiry into the state of the colony of New 
South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, vol.1, p.43. The timber yard 
was set up some time prior to Bligh seeing it in 1809.
HRA 3/1/399, Collins to Castlereagh, 20 April 1808 - Collins was 
reduced to three carpenters and six pairs of sawyers. In
Collins despatch to Hobart, 10 Nov 1804, (HRA 3/1/286) he 
regretted the loss of some sawyers and carpenters from
scurvy. The total number of convicts available to Collins
dropped from 279 in 1804 to 166 by 1810 from which servants were 
provided to the officers and labourers assigned to the settlers 
(HRA 3/1/xxvii).
HRA 3/3/239, Evidence Major Bell to Commissioner Bigge, 20 Feb 
1820. Bell was Acting Engineer and Inspector of Public
Works. He described the sawing station in detail and did not 
mention any bullocks for snigging.
CSO 1/17/291, Return of Artificers, Labourers, Cattle etc., 
Engineer's Office, 6 Nov 1826.
CSO 1/17/291, Principal Superintendent to Colonial Secretary, 30 
Oct 1826»
CSO 1/17/291, Mr Hamilton (Colonial Secretary) letter of 11 Nov 
1826, cited by Supt. Birch's Bay to Engineer 15 Jan 1828.
CSO 1/17/291, Supt. Birch’s Bay to Engineer, 15 Jan 1828; Supt. 
Birch's Bay to Chief Police Magistrate, 5 July 1830.
CSO 1/17/291, Principal Supt. to Colonial Secretary, 30 Oct 
1826.
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5 0 Ibid,
51. CSO 1/17/291, Civil Engineer to Private Secretary, 26 June 1829.
53. The Birch's Bay Establishment in a/c with H. Mjs. Government
during the year 1828
Dr. pounds
To 53 men being the average number employed each week
during the year @ 7/6 each man per week 1,033 10 -
To 4 bullocks 52 weeks @ 7/- each per week 72 16 -
To Paid for 134,418 feet of timber cut by the sawyers
in their own time at 5/- per 100 feet 336 0 10
To Paid for 321,000 shingles split by the labourers in
their own time @ 4/- per 1 000 64 10 -
To Boatage 371,974 feet of timber @ 2/- per 100 ft 371 18 11
" 325,000 shingles @ 2/- per 1000 32 10 -
" 48 split posts @ 3d - 12 -
" 120 split rails @ 2d 1 - -
" 820 split palings @ 2/- per 100 - 16 6
To Superintendent's salary 75 - -
" Rations for self andl family 24 17 2
Balance Cr. 112 16 2
2, 127 3 9
Cr • pounds s d
234,529 feet of timber cut by the Sawyers during the
year as their Government work @ 8/6 per 100 feet 1 009
134,418 feet of Timber cut by the Sawyers in their
own time for payment @ 8/6 per 100 feet 571
difference between Birch's Bay and Hobart Town 
measurement of Timber, say 92,987 feet
in favour of Birch's Bay @ 8/6 per 100 feet 395
321,000 shingles split by the labourers in
their own time for■ payment @ 8/6 per 1000 136 8 6
By 48 Split Posts @  1 / - 2 8 -
By 120 I I  I f @ 6d 3 - -
820 I I  I t @ 10/- per 100 4 2 -
800 I I  I I @ 9/- per 100 3 12 -
4,000 I I  I I @ 8/6 per 100 1 14 -
2, 127 3 9
53. CSO 5/239/6159, Principal Superintendent, 8 May 1840.
54. CSO 5/239/6159, Alex Cheyne, Office of Public Works, to Colonial 
Secretary, 16 June and 27 Feb 1841.
55. E. Genovese, The political economy of slavery, pp. 43-69, has 
reviewed the poor productivity of slaves working on plantations 
ip. the US South in terms of: a limited diet which led to poor
health; the primitive technology applied; the neglect of and 
the poor quality of tools used; and the inadequate skills of 
the slaves. Similar factors doubtless applied in Van Diemen's 
Land Oxley, for example, inspected the settlement at Port
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Dalrymple in 1810 and remarked that in spite of having plenty of 
convicts and a host of overseers, the settlement had never
raised corn enough for the convicts they so employed' . He 
recommended a factory to employ the women convicts in sewing 
garments but considered '... the value of their labour would not 
pay for their provisions, and cover the expense of providing the 
articles for manufacture, yet they would be kept out of harms 
way...' - HRA 3/1/758-777. E. Curr writing in 1824 estimated
that convict labour produced less than one-third of free labour 
-  An account of the colony of Van Diemen's Land, pp.9-10.
56. HRA 3/1/269, General order, 1 June 1804 - called a meeting of 
officers and settlers to fix wage rates which were published a 
few days later, HRA 3/1/270-1, General Order, 22 June 1804. As 
wages were commonly paid in commodities, the rates for meat and 
meal were set and a mark-up of 50 or 75% prescribed for any '... 
articles, tea, sugar etc purchased from shipping ...'
57 R.M. Hartwell, op.cit., p.68.
58. J.T. Bigge, op.cit. The Bigge inquiry followed a parliamentary 
inquiry conducted in London in 1812 which recommended increasing 
assignment to reduce costs and the introduction of trial by 
jury.
59. HRA 1/10/4, Bathurst to Bigge, 6 Jan 1819.
60. J.D. Ritchie, Punishment and profit, p.220.
61. k .m . Bowden, Captain James Kelly of Hobart Town. Kelly's own 
account of his voyage in a five-oared whale boat was reprinted 
in PPLC 1881/75.
62. Hobart Town Gazette, No.16, 14 Sept 1816; HRA 3/3/356-7,
Evidence T.W. Birch to Bigge, 29 Mar 1820.
63. HRA 3/3/17-20, Sorell to Goulburn, 12 May 1820.
64. J. Backhouse, A narrative of a visit to the Australian colonies, 
p. 56.
65. J. West, Op. C'L-t., vol .2, p.182.
66. CSO 1/134/3233, p.109, Wright to Sorell, 3 Jan 1822; CSO
1/13/264, p.203, Butler to Burnet, 30 June 1827; CSO
33/2/3563, p.630, Arthur to Gooderich, 24 Oct 1827; cited by W.M 
Edwards, McQuarie [sic] Harbour.
67. W.M. Edwards, op.cit., Chap.10, citing CSO 1/553/12090 Report by 
Lord Brownell and Commissariat Officer O'Niell, 24 Dec 1831.
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McQuarie Harbour
Revenue 1831 pounds s d
Pine Logs 7,616 cu ft @ 2s 6d 952 0 0
Planks and boards 58,703 ft @ 2 1/2 d 611 9 9
Shingles 20,000 9 18 0
Baskets, boots, panel doors 561 15 0
Total 2, 135 2 9
Expenses of settlement 1830 7,963 1 2
68. J. West, op.cit., vol.2/ p.182.
69. Cited by J. Backhouse/ op.cit., p.51.
70. e .r . Pretyman, Some notes on Maria Island and its penal 
settlements', J.R. Morris, 'Early convict history of Maria 
Island'.
71. W.M. Edwards, op.eit.
Maria Island
Year Revenue Expenses Profit/Loss
pounds s d pounds s d pounds s d
1830 5,240 4 4 4,363 4 5 Profit 875 19 11
1831 3,284 0 0 4,536 0 0 Loss 1,252 0 0
72. CSO 1/17/219 Supt. Birch's Bay to Engineer, 12 Dc 1827 reported 
that two distant covered pits and 4,000 feet of timber were 
burnt but most of the timber stacks in the bush had been 
saved. Aborigines were suspected of starting the fire.
73. Lt-Governor to Colonial Secretary, 3 & 20 Dec 1827 & 1 April 
1828; Walsh and Roberts to Colonial Secretary, 6 Feb 1828; 
cited by I. Brand, Penal Peninsular, pp.1-2.
74. J. West, op.cit., vol.2, p.244.
75. Hobart Town Almanack, 1837, cited by I. Brand, op.cit., pp.31-2.
76= Comptroller-General of Convicts to Lt-Governor, 1 Aug 1846, 
cited by I. Brand, op.cit., p.82.
77. Commandant, Port Arthur, to Comptroller-General of Convicts, 10 
Aug 1864, cited by I. Brand, op.cit., p.159
78. I. Brand, op.cit., pp.159-60. In 1864 for example an income of 
$112,000 a year was forecast from sales of sawn timber. Large 
poles and very heavy sawn pieces were also produced to order and 
were used to construct Melbourne's Hobson's Bay Railway.
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79. JHA 1866/13/27.
Expenditure by the Commissariat
Period Average annual 
expenditure ($)
1828-29 199 391
1830-39 274 497
1840-49 493 008
1850-59 402 022
1860-65 156 391
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1. Colonial goods could only be carried to Britain in British
shipping as the Navigation Acts prohibited vessels under 356 
tonnes from trading between New South Wales (including Van 
Diemen's Land) and Britain. This effectively precluded small
colonial ships. Even so, whale oil, for example, faced
excessive tariffs if not carried in British shipping.
2. In 1807, Bligh acted to maintain Port Jackson as the principal 
port, and thus preserve the trade of established Sydney 
merchants by forbidding overseas vessels to discharge cargoes at 
minor ports. This meant that all goods had to be received and 
despatched through Port Jackson which effectively doubled their 
cost in Hobart.
3. J. West, History of Tasmania, vol. 1, p.69. T.W. Birch and
Loane were early merchants. Kemp, Gatehouse, E. Lord and J.H. 
Reibey set up when the port was opened.
Wheat and meat exports to New South Wales 1815-1820
Year Wheat 
(tonnes)
Salt meat 
(tonnes)
Value
($)
1815 48 1,770
1816 358 5 13,634
1817 415 4 15,640
1818 218 29 11,22
1819 676 157 42,108
1820 1,284 175 66,650
4. W.G. Rimmer, 'The economic growth of Van Diemen's Land 1803- 
1821'. In G.J. Abbott & N.B. Nairn, The economic growth of 
Australia 1788-1821, p.333; J. West, op. cit., vol.1, p.51.
5. r .m . Hartwell, The economic history of Van Diemen's Land, p.193.
6. Lynda11 Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.71.
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7. Total value of fisheries and export oil
Period Average annual value ($)
1828-29 23,580
1830-39 120,370
1840-49 141,672
1850-59 89,430
1860-65 00 00 to 'J
1828-49 from Hartwell/ op. cit., p.140; 1850-65 from JHA
1866/27, Statistical summary of Tasmania from the year 1816 to 
1865 inclusive,
8. For Tasmania see: R.M. Hartwell/ op.cit. and J. West/ op.cit.
9. J. West/ op. C1st. / vol• 1 • / p.72.
10. R.M. Hartwell, Op.cit., p.112.
11. Ibid, p. 118.
Wool production and prices
Period Average annual 
Production (tonnes)
Value
($000)
Average price 
($/kg)
1828-29 329 58 0.18
1830-39 992 248 0.26
1840-49 1,093 424 0.39
12. HRA 3/1/500, 748, 777-778.
13. W.G. Rimmer, op.cit., p.335. Such as 1215 hectares to Lt-
Governor Davey when he retired, 486 hectares to the wife of
Colonel Geils, and 405 hectares to Surveyor Evans.
14. R.M. Hartwell, op.cit., pp.35-40.
15. Settlers were supposed to live on their grants for five years
and develop them before they could acquire title and sell 
them. However these regulations were flagrantly flouted and
land, developed and underdeveloped, sold openly from 1820; even 
location orders - which authorised land to be selected for a 
grant - could be bought. Many examples are given in A. McKay
(ed.) Journals of the Land Commissioners for Van Diemen's Land 
1826-28.
16. Based on official statistics in JHA 1866/27. R.M. Hartwell, 
op.cit., p.48, has estimated that official statistics may 
underestimate the area granted by 28,736 hectares.
17. Edward Lord, who came as a Lieutenant of Marines with Collins in 
1804, first received a grant of 40 hectares in 1806. In 1809 
his grant was 202 hectares on which he ran 57 cattle and 131 
sheep, and by 1821 he was reported to have estates of 14,175 
hectares with 6000 cattle and 7000 sheep. M.W. Orr had built 
up an estate of 17,415 hectares by his death in 1843. R.
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O'Connor, received a grant of 405 hectares on his arrival (with 
capital) in 1824. This was soon supplemented with a further 405 
hectares. Within five years he had 1,295 hectares and then 
received another 810 hectares in recognition of his services as 
a Land Commissioner. From this start he was able to create an 
estate of 26,335 hectares by 1856. Others who owned large 
areas in the 1820's were T. Ansty, the Henty brothers and T. 
Archer who was attached to the Commissariat. HRA 3/1/568; 
R.M. Hartwell, op.cit., pp.18,19; A. McKay, op.cit., p.xx.
18. J. West, op.cit., p.136, cites Holt's report in 1838 of the ease 
with which great landowners were able to buy small lots and 
clear their districts of the small settlers.
19. The assignment system has been widely described as slavery in
W.D. Forsyth, Governor Arthur's convict system, for example, and 
was analysed as such by M. Dunn, 'Early Australia: Wage labour
or slave society'. Dunn's analysis was refuted by P.
McMichael, 'The genesis of settler capitalism in Australia', and 
R.W. Connell and T.H. Irving Class structure in Australian
history, pp.77, because the persons of the convicts were never 
the property of their masters, their origin and destination lay 
in the proletariat, and their labour was obtained by an 
arrangement more akin to a lease.
20o W.D. Forsyth, op.cit. Ch.5; E. Curr, An account of the colony
of Van Diemen’s Land, p.71.
21. The initial settlements were almost exclusively male and it was
not until 1813 that a substantial transfer of 200 female
convicts was made. The masculinity (males per 100 females)
provided in transportations made directly from Britain was: 626 
and 687 in the 1820's and 1830's, and 296 and 273 in the 1840's 
and 1850's (overall - 1820-1859 - it was 421). This disprop­
ortion was aggravated by a similar disproportion in the 
officials and soldiers, and was most marked in the country 
districts as the females were mostly kept as domestic servants 
in the towns. As free immigration after 1816 was largely made 
up of family groups, the long-term natural reproduction of the 
population was assured. Births exceeded deaths from 1827 and 
the masculinity of the overall population gradually declined
from 293 in 1830 to 179 in 1850 and 108 in 1900. W.D. Forsyth,
op. cit., Ch. 5 Appendix Two; JHA 1866/27, Statistical
Summary; a b s , Tasmanian Year Book, 1979.
22. S.H. Roberts, History of Australian land settlement 1788-1920,
p . 44; P. Burroughs, Britain and Australia 1835-1855, pp.92-
96. Arthur opposed the entry of more free labourers to the 
labour market in competition with emancipists and ticket-of- 
leave men. Employers feared that British parishes would send 
'idlers and vagabonds' who would become a colonial liability, 
rather than the skilled and responsible workers they needed. 
Arthur made such extensive grants in anticipation of the
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regulations, and by use of an exception clause, that little 
readily accessible land of good quality was left for sale. Sale 
arrangements were altered from time to time, the minimum price 
being increased from $1.24 per hectare in 1831 to $2.96 per 
hectare in 1838, and $4.94 per hectare in 1844 - a price that 
virtually stopped sales and hence pauper emigration.
23. C.D. Rowley, The destruction of aboriginal society; j. Bonwick, 
The last of the Tasmanians.
24. CSO 1/142/3433, George Meredith to Colonial Secretary, 2 June 
1827.
25. CSO 1/142/3533 Colonial Treasurer to Colonial Secretary, 20 Dec 
1826. R.M. Hartwell, op.cit., pp.53-58. As an interesting 
forerunner of royalty negotiations a century later, we can note 
that the Treasurer recommended a rental of $0.10 per hectare but 
only $0.05 was charged!
26. The company indentured the workers it brought from Britain at 
low wages for seven years to recoup the cost of their passage. 
Not surprisingly the workers left the farms as soon as their 
indentures were completed - indeed many tried to escape 
beforehand, some being forcibly recaptured. The company's 
response was to recruit a second set of indentured workers at 
much lower wages '. .» so that the expense of sending out their 
families will soon be remunerated to the company ...'. J. West, 
op.cit., vol.1, p.113; S.H. Roberts, op.cit., pp.60-69, and 
Appendix 2 for later history of the company; J. Bischoff, 
Sketch of the history of Van Diemen's Land, illustrated by a map 
of the island and an account of the Van Diemen's Land Company.
27. The largest sale of 74,520 hectares of forest land, mainly at 
Surrey Hills, was made for the establishment of Associated Pulp 
and Paper Mills Ltd at Burnie in 1938 - see Chapter 6.
28. Sir Bede Callaghan has reported that emigration exceeded 
immigration for all inter-censal periods from 1881 to 1971 with 
the exception of 1947-1954 during which overseas migrants were 
compulsorily directed to hydro-electric, forestry and other 
post-war reconstruction projects. Inquiry into the structure of 
industry and the employment situation in Tasmania.
29. Within two years, fifty stations had been set up and a quarter 
of a million sheep shipped across Bass Strait. The early 
workers were almost all male ex-convicts brought from Van 
Diemen's land, and by 1841 probably comprised about 90% of the 
population. The 'Geelong and Portland Bay Immigration Society', 
formed by the squatters, brought some 400 men from Van Diemen's 
Land in 1845, and 500-600 in 1846. Between 1847 and 1849 about 
3000 labourers left for Port Phillip. P. Burroughs, op.cit., 
p.164; M. Kiddle, 'Vandemonian colonists in Port Philip 1834- 
1850'.
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30. Cited by B. Fitzpatrick, The British Empire in Australia, 
p.156. Increases in the male population are not shown in the 
official statistics until 1857.
31. Ibid, p.344. This was far from the last example of state 
concessions to capital development that failed to provide 
employment or benefit wage-earners.
32. A.P. Davidson, 'A skeleton in the cupboard: Master and Servant
legislation and the industrial torts in Tasmania'. The first 
attempt at legislation in 1837 was disallowed in London and was 
replaced by 4 Viet. No.2, Apprentices and Servants Act 1840. 
The subsequent acts were:- 16 Viet. No.23 Servants and 
Apprentices Act 1852; 18 vict. No.18 Master and Servant Act
1854; 19 vict. No.28 Master and Servant Act 1856; 46 Vict.
No. 18 Master and Servant Act 1882; and 48 vict. No.36 Master 
and Servant Act 1884. The 1854 Act was the most coercive 
Master and Servant Act in the Australian colonies. It provided 
punishments of solitary confinement for up to 30 days, 
imprisonment with hard labour for up to three months, fines of 
up to $40, and forfeiture of wages, for offences of being absent 
from work, refusing to perform a service, disobeying a command, 
not being diligent or careful with a master's property, being 
violent or abusive to a master or his family, being drunk at 
work, or 'other misconduct'. Penalties were most unevenly 
distributed, as the Act provided only monetary penalities for 
masters convicted of ill-treatment or non-payment of wages. 
About 90% of the 592 cases heard in 1855 were against employees 
who incurred punishments up to the maxima prescribed. The bias 
of the legislation was repeated in its application. Only 64 
cases were heard against masters which secured payment of due 
wages but only imposed penalities of $2-$10 in 6 cases. By 
repeatedly laying charges just prior to quarterly wage payments, 
employers were relieved of expense whenever servants and 
labourers had their wages forfeited. Employees could be kept in 
effective bondage, for the Act forbade other masters to employ 
them and ordered them to return until a contracted period of 
employment was completed. As a result of working-class 
agitation, the punishments of solitary confinement and the 
imprisonment of females, and males under sixteen years, were 
removed and other provisions slightly relaxed in 1856. However 
the penal provisions and biased treatment were retained even 
after further amendments in 1882 and 1886.
33. R.M. Hartwell, op.cit., p.165; P. Bolger, Hobart Town, pp.15-16.
34. P. Bolger, op.cit., p.13; M. Steven, Merchant Campbell,
p.202; W.G. Rimmer, op.cit., p.333. The most prominent
example is Lt Edward lord, who built a warehouse in Hobart from 
which he traded long before he left the Marines. Another is 
William Collins, the first Harbour Master, who became a 
substantial merchant and acted, even if inefficiently, as an
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agent for the Sydney merchant, Campbell. Other early merchants, 
such as Birch and Loane, did not originate from the official 
fraction but maintained close relations.
35. E. Curr, An account of the Colony of Van Diemen's Land, p.106.
36. Bank of Van Diemen's Land 1824, Derwent Bank 1828, Cornwall Bank 
1828 - R.M. Hartwell, op.cit., pp.170-172.
37. J. West, op.cit., vol.1, p.89, notes a Scottish merchant
company formed in 1823. R.M. Hartwell, op.cit., pp.121-123, 
172, 180, notes a British insurance company operating in Hobart
from 1833 and Anglo-Australian banks formed in 1836 and 1838.
38. Ibid, pp.121-123.
39. Ibid, p. 169.
40. J.T. Bigge, Report of the Commissioner of inquiry on the 
judicial establishment of Neu South Wales and Van Diemen ’s Land; 
J.D. Ritchie, Punishment and profit; J. West, op.cit., vol.1, 
pp.53-65, 98; S.H. Roberts, op.cit., p.43.
41. w. A. Townsley, The struggle for self-government in Tasmania,
p . 62.
42. R.M. Hartwell, op.cit., pp.76-77, 95. For example, the wages of 
mechanics in Hobart dropped from $0.60 - $0.90 a day in 1840 to 
$0.45 - $0.60 in 1845.
43. W.A. Townsley, op.cit., p.69-91.
44. For example, Samuel Crisp, a country sawyer transported in 1826 
for stealing sheep and later joined by his family, saved enough 
to open a timber yard in Hobart. - P. Bolger, op.cit., pp.18, 
49. The business is now Crisp and Gunn Ltd.
Thomas Risby, a master boat builder was transferred from Norfolk 
Island in 1808 and built whale boats and ships on the Derwent; 
his son later (1844) set up a timber yard and sawmill - D. 
Brownlow, Risby Bros Pty Ltd.
45. Imports of timber over 20 cm square into Britain from
Van Diemen's Land.
Year Quantity
(m3)
1827 81
1828 278
1829 346
1830 1,012
1831 1,203
J. Bischoff, op.cit.
46. J. Fenton, Bush life in Tasmania, pp.163-164.
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47. M. Rcw, The Tasmanian timber trade 1830-1930, Appendix"!.
48. J. Fenton/ op^cvt*
49. Ibid, pp.95/ 60/ 21.
50. Ibid, pp.43/ 97.
51. K. Marx, Capital, vol.1, p.520.
52. Ibid, p .521.
53. Colonial Times, 10 Feb. 1846; Britannia and Trades Advocate, 1 
Jan. 1846.
54. Colonial Times, 21 Sept 1849.
55. Government Order 10 of 27 Feb 1828 In Hobart Town Gazette, 1
March 1828.
56. CSO 1/732/15863/1, Surveyor-General to Colonial Secretary, 2
July 1834, proposed that fees should be imposed. The annotation 
reads:- 'His Excellency approves - but regrets the matter was 
not brought forward sooner'. CSO 1/732/15863/2, Surveyor-
General to Colonial Secretary, 15 July 1834 recommended a rate 
of $0.25 per week but the Executive Council set $0.10 ° CSO
1/732/15863/3, Memo. Lt-Governor to Colonial Secretary, 14 Oct 
1834: LSD 1/64/?, Colonial Secretary to Survey-General, 29 Oct
1834; CSO 1/732/15863/3.
57. CSO 1/732/15863/4, Chief Police Magistrate to Colonial
Secretary, 30 Oct 1834.
58. CSO 1/732/15863/5, Surveyor-General to Colonial Secretary, 30
Oct 1834.
59. LSD 1/32/548, Police Constable G. Palmer, Bicheno, to Surveyor- 
General, 6 August 1838.
60. S. Bennett & B. Bennett, Biographical Register of the Tasmanian 
Parliament 1851-1960; LSD 1/32/526, 528, R.C. Gunn to Surveyor- 
General, 1 May 1850, 9 June 1851.
61. LSD 1/64/1 J. Archer to Surveyor-General, Dec 1848.
62. LSD 1/32/530-2, Surveyor-General to Colonial Secretary, 2 Aug. 
1850.
63. J. Fenton, op.cit., pp.21-22, 164.
64. LSD 1/32/498, Colonial Secretary to Surveyor-General, 27 June 
1849. LSD 1/64/17 Colonial Secretary to Surveyor-General, 19 
Dec. 1848, details Laffers' appointment.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1. E.J. Hobsbawm, The age of capital, 1848-1875, pp.36-37.
2. Ibid, p.32. Between 1850 and 1880, the length of railways 
increased by almost ten times, but of this increase 286,000 km 
were built in Europe and North America compared to only 26,000 
km in the rest of the world
3. b .r . Mitchell, Abstract of British historical statistics The 
4.6 million who emigrated are not included in the census 
figures.
4. The value of agricultural output in Britain increased from $436 
to $502 million between 1840 and 1887 but employment decreased 
from 3.4 million to 2.5 million - J. Hobsbawm, op.cit., p.311.
5. By the end of the 1870's, the minimum age of employment in 
textile mills had been increased to ten, the maximum adult hours 
reduced to 57 weekly, and some safety regulations laid down for 
the most dangerous occupations. Craft unions were established 
among skilled workers from the 1850's and unions were legalised 
in 1871-76, which resulted in their becoming widely recognised 
by employers as the workers' bargaining agencies.
6. P. Koch, 'History of wood machinery'. Bentham's patents of
1791 and 1793 included planing and moulding machines; the first 
practical one with a rotating head was not available until 1850.
7. M.P. Bale, Woodworking machinery, (1880) p.16.
8. A.G.L. Shaw, Convicts and colonies, pp.350-8. The last convict
ship to Van Diemen's Land left in 1852 and arrived in 1853, and
the last to Western Australia left in 1867 and arrived in 1868.
9. From 1853 to 1880 - C. Snow, 'Migration from Great Britain'.
Between 1851 and 1881 an estimated 8.8 million left Europe for 
new lands - most America.
10. R.v. Jackson, Australian economic development in the nineteenth 
century, pp.29-31.
11. w.A. Sinclair, The process of economic development in Australia, 
pp.79-86; R.V. Jackson, op.cit., p.67, reviews different 
estimates of the rate of growth in the value of the wool clip 
(made by N.G. Butlin and A. Beaver) and shows that although they 
differ significantly, they reveal the same trends toward a 
declining rate of increase.
12. N.G. Butlin, Investment in Australian economic development 1861- 
1900.
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13. Ibid, p.29, estimated at market prices. Western Australia 
excluded prior to 1868.
Domestic capital formation and overseas borrowing 1861-1880
Period Gross domestic 
capital formation 
($ million)
Net overseas 
borrowing 
($ million)
1861-65 79.0 44.8
1866-70 90.6 36.8
1871-75 137.4 6.0
1876-80 225.0 44.0
Total 532.0 131.6
14. Ibid, p. 22.
15. N.G. Butlin, Australian domestic product, investment and foreign 
borrowing 1861-1938/39, p.266, provides estimates of capital 
formation by house construction for each State which reveal 
large fluctuations from year to year in Tasmania's main markets 
for timber.
16. Capital city populations from J.W. McCarty, 'Australian capital 
cities in the nineteenth century'. Other statistics from N.G. 
Butlin, Investment in Australian economic development, pp.220- 
221. The large number of temporary dwellings have been omitted 
from Table 4.1 as, being made mostly of canvas, bark or mud, 
they are unlikely to have had any effect on the Tasmanian timber 
trade.
17. T.H. Iving, '1850-1870', In F.K. Crowley, op. cit., pp.148-150.
18. Ibid, pp.146-7.
19. Statistics of Tasmania, Statistics of the Colony of Victoria. 
Average values. Medians taken where ranges cited.
20. Statistics of Tasmania; metropolitan populations from McCarty, 
op.cit.
21. W.A. Townsley, The Government of Tasmania, p.68. Franchise
requirements for the House of Assembly were: possession of $200 
freehold, a salary of like amount, householder rental of $20 a 
year, or professional qualifications. For the Legislative
Council, $100 freehold or professional qualifications were 
required. In comparison a farm labourer earnt $1 a week with 
rations, or a carpenter $0.70-0.80 a day without.
22. The Rural Municipalities Act was passed in 1858.
23. H. Reynolds, ' "Men of substance and deservedly good repute": 
the Tasmanian gentry 1856-1875'.
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24. Police force strengths
Year_________ Municipal police_____ Territory of police
Numbers of men
1861 116
1866 198
1874 192  ____________________
Statistics”of Tasmania. Municipal police forces varied from 5 
men (Bothwell and Brighton) to 40 (Hobart). The Territory (ie. 
State wide) police force was mostly posted to the rural police 
districts.
25. H. Reynolds, 'Men of substance...', op.cit.
26. Anthony Trollope, Australia and New Zealand,
27. H. Reynolds, '"That hated stain": the aftermath of
transportation in Tasmania'.
28. Statistics of Tasmania. The value of Tasmanian exports was:
1860 $1,924 million; 1870 $1,296 million; 1879 $2,602
million.
29. N.G. Butlin, Investment in Australian economic development, 
p.229.
30. J. Reynolds, Launceston, pp.105-7; Tasmanian Year Book, 1979.
31. Statistics of Tasmania.
32. The first proposal to build a sawmill was made in 1818 by Messrs
Florence and Barnard who wanted to cut stands of Huon Pine that 
had just been discovered at Port Davey and Macquarie Harbour. 
Their application was refused as Sorell wanted Macquarie Harbour 
for a penal settlement. At the same time Sorell did not extend 
the concession to cut Huon Pine at Macquarie harbour that had 
been granted to the merchant T.W. Birch (in recognition of his 
sending a small expedition, led by James Kelly, to the south­
west coast in 1815) - HRA 3/2/334-5, Sorell to Macquarie, 29
June 1818; HRA 3/2/352, Macquarie to Sorell, 24 Sept 1818.
Equipment for the first sawmill was brought out from England by 
two immigrants, Peter Degraves and his brother-in-law Major 
McIntosh. They had secured the 'favourable notice of the
British government', expressed in a letter of recommendation to 
Arthur who granted them 800 acres [320 ha] of forest on the 
slopes of Mount Wellington in an area known as the Cascades. 
An overseer and 20 convicts were supplied to clear the site and 
dig a race that brought water to power the mill. Degraves and 
McIntosh brought very little other capital, but after initial 
difficulties managed to run the mill profitably enough to 
accumulate capital for other ventures. Cecil Allport, A page 
from the past.
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The second sawmill was probably that built on Dr Gaunt's 
property (by Gaunt ?) on the Tamar River in the north of the 
colony. It was powered by the first steam engine (12kW) in the 
north which drove both frame and circular saws. Launceston 
Advertiser, 26 Jan 1837. It probably operated for only a few 
years.
A third sawmill (water-powered) is recorded from 1828.
Statistical returns for Van Diemen's Land 1824-39.
The fourth sawmill was 'The Franklin Wharf Steam Sawmill and 
Bark Mills'/ built by the Risby family in 1844. The capital
for this must have been accumulated in the flourishing boat­
building business of the emancipist/ Thomas Risby. His son, 
J.E. Risby/ ran the mill and operated as a timber merchant
supplying the local demand in Hobart. The origin of the mill 
has been ascribed to J.E. Risby but he was only 18 in 1844 when
the mill was opened. It is assumed that the capital
accumulated by Thomas Risby financed it. D. Brownlow, Risby 
Bros Pty Ltd
33. The value of timber exported was recorded as : 1837-39 $54,984/
1840-49 $293/436. No classification between sawn, split and
other products is available prior to 1854. The earliest
classifications, in 1854 and 1857-59, show that sawn timber 
comprised 50% of the value of timber exports. M. Row, The
Tasmania timber trade 1830-1930<.
Year Number of sawmills Year Number of sawmills
1850 2 1869 18
1853 7 1874 26
1855 22 1879 52
Statistics of Tasmania.
Year
Wage rates for selected occupations 1870's
Index 
1870=100)
Daily rates (s/d)
Carpenters Millers Day Labourers (Mean
1861 8/8 n.a. n.a.
1865 7/4 n.a. n.a.
1870 7/1 5/11 4/7 100
1 6/9 6/- 4/2 96
2 6/10 6/4 4/5 100
3 7/1 6/5 4/6 102
4 7/6 6/6 4/10 107
5
C.
7/7 6/11 4/11 110
o
7 8/1 6/4 5/2 111
8 8/1 6/9 5/1 113
9 7/10 7/10 5/1 113
Statistics of Tasmania, Fractions of pennies ignored.
36. See note 34.
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37. M. Rd w , The Tasmanian timber trade. The category 'hewn, logs, 
etc.' includes piles, beams, logs and pieces (shaped and 
bent). Average annual values for 'sawn', 'split', and 'hewn, 
logs, etc' for the period 1855-59 were calculated from the years 
1857-59 only.
38. Statistics of Tasmania. Average number of hands and average
capital calculated on 59 mills, average value of sawn timber on 
56 mills.
39. Ibid.
Sawmills classified by municipal and police districts
Year Hobart Launceston
1861 3 4
1881 4 5
40. J. Fenton, Bush life in Tasmania, pp.89, 106-109; C. Ramsay,
With the pioneers, pp.62-71, 102-114, 135, 206-208; J.R. Skerap,
'Early development of Devon'. R. Pike, Pioneers of Burnie, 
p .68; P.G. Mercer, Gateway to progress, pp.23-24, 44.
41. H.M. Whittington, 'The timber industry on the Huon'.
42. Wells & Leavitt, The Jubilee history of Tasmania, p.7-8; S.
Stewart, 'Development of Launceston and J. & T. Gunn', Mss., 
pers. comm.; D. Brownlow, op.cit; Newspaper cuttings and 
scrapbooks kept by Risby Forest Industries; P. Bolger, Hobart 
Town; Mercury, 5 July 1924.
43. Statistics of Tasmania, 1870. In the 1870 census, 'sawyers'
and 'sawmill owners' are shown separately. Sawmill workers
were probably included under general labourers. In the 1881 
census an overall class of 'sawyer, sawmill owner, worker' is 
used which appears to continue to recognise sawyers as manual 
workers outside sawmills. Bailliere’s Tasmanian Gazeteer
(1877) notes 7 districts where pit sawing was being conducted: 
Castra, Cygnet Port, Franklin, Gordon, Kettering, Oyster Cove 
and Snug River.
44. jha 1862/14, Mr Tully, Huon tramways.
45. JHA 1862/13, J.E. Calder, Surveyor-General, Fort Esperance and 
Southport.
46. JHA 1862/14, op.cit..
47. jha 1871/84, Petition for the reduction of licence fees of 
sawyers and splitters - there were 269 signatures.
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Fees were:
licences to cut timber 
persons cutting for a sawmill 
carters using government slab roads 
at Esperance and Southport 
and where more than 2 horses used 
for a cart or dray
48. Government Notice 173, 16 Dec 1873.
49. JHA 1856/67, Waste Lands Bill, Report of Select Committee; 
21 Viet.33, Waste Lands Act, 1858
50. LSD 1/64/569, A. Graham, Warden of Sorell, to Surveyor-General, 
16 May 1861, noted that '...Many leases of Crown Land claim the 
right to all timber on it and will not allow persons with sawing 
or splitting licences on to their runs...'
51. JHA 1867/35.
52. LSD 1/32/60, letter J.E. Risby, 4 Oct 1860.
53. The LSD series files contain a mass of correspondence generated 
by this system; some examples for 1864 can be found in LSD 
1/64/613-27 o
54. In Northern Tasmania, William Moore, of Moore and Quiggin,
became MHA (1871-77), MLC (1877-1909), and was at various times 
Minister of Lands and Works, Colonial Secretary and President of 
the Legislative Council. Dr W.L. Crowther, with mills on the 
Huon, became MHA (1866), MLC (1869-85) and briefly Premier 
(1878-79). Dr W. Crooke, who entered into a tramway
partnership in the Huon district, was MLC (1855-56) and MHA
(1856-57). J.E. Risby, who ran the Franklin Wharf sawmill in 
Hobart, became MHA (1877-82). S. Bennett & B. Bennett,
op.cit. C. Ramsay, op.cit., Appendix. C. Fenton, op.cit. 
gives several accounts of how road trusts operated.
NOTES ON CHAPTER 5
1. Lenin, in his essay 'Imperialism the highest stage of 
capitalism' written in 1917, considered that the peak of the 
competitive stage, reached in 1860-70, was followed by a 
transitionary period that lasted from the economic crisis of 
1873 to 1900-03, by which time '... Cartels become one of the 
foundations of the whole economic life. Capitalism has been 
transformed into imperialism ...'. In V.I. Lenin, Selected 
works, p. 181.
2. E.J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: an economic history of
$0.25 per week per man 
$0.50 " " "
$0.26 " " " "
$0.50 " " " "
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Britain since 1750, p.110.
3. Austria, Russia and Spain increased tariffs in 1874-77.
Germany passed an important tariff law in 1879 which was
followed by increases in Italy in 1887 and France in 1892, while
the US which had generally increased tariffs since 1816
continued to do so. Ibid, p.113; T. Kemp, Historical patterns 
of industrialisation, pp.102-104; D.s. Landes, The unbound 
Prometheus, pp.244-245.
4. T. Kemp, op»cit., p.102.
5. E. Mandel, Marxist economic theory, pp.401-402.
6. William Lever, later Lord Leverhulme (1851-1925), cited by
Mandel, Marxist economic theory, p.399.
7. E. Mandel, Marxist economic theory, p.403-406.
8. I. Turner, In union is strength, p.31.
9. L.S. Woolf, 'Imperialism'.
10o E. Mandel, Late capitalism, pp.186-188.
11. By 1885/ Britain had 4 million tonnes of steam ships registered
and 3.4 million tonnes of sailing ships - L. Girard,
'Transport', In H.J. Habakkuk, and M. Postan, Cambridge Economic 
History of Europe, vol.6(1), p.267.
12. Ibid - The world average size of ship in 1873 increased to 1,611
tonnes by 1898. For example the freight on wood fell 50%
between 1873 and 1896 - P. Cochrane,. Industrialisation and
dependence, p.19. Comparative freights on timber have not been 
located prior to 1928:
Sea freights on timber c.1928
3Route__________________________ Average cost ($ per m )
Tasmanian ports to Melbourne 2.22 - 2.44
Baltic " " Australia 1.87
American ______ ”_____________________2.54
C. E. Lane-Poole, 'Hardwoods and their markets (Australia)',
Proc. 3rd British Empire Forestry Conference, 1928, pp.97-140.
13. For example, North America was linked east to west by several 
lines in the 1880's and the Trans-Siberian line was completed in 
1903. L. Girard, op.cit., p.251.
D. S. Landes, op.cit,, p.221. Approximate estimates of the
world capacity of all steam engines are cited as:
14 .
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Year Capacity 
(kW 000)
1840 1,231
1860 6,997
1880 25,476
1896 88,606
15. Ibid, p . 281.
16. Ibid, pp.281-286.
17. Ibid, p.259. Production rose from 0.39 million tonnes in 1870 
to 32 million tonnes by 1913.
18. P. Koch, 'History of wood machining'; C. Singer, A history of 
technology, p.437; B. Thunell, 'History of wood sawmilling'; 
G.R. Wilkins, 'History of circular saws'.
19. For example, after the introduction of electolytic manufacture 
in 1890, world aluminium production increased from 40 tonnes in 
1886 to 743,600 tonnes by 1946.
20. T. Kemp, Historical patterns of industrialisation, p.106.
21. '... a great opening battle for the construction of a real merit
system. „ * ' occurred in the USA when Congress passed the Civil 
Service Act in 1883 - E.N. Gladden, A history of public
administration, vol.2, p.318. In Britain, a series of
improvements in imperial and internal administration were made 
from 1853-54 on - E.N. Gladden, Civil services of the United 
Kingdom, pp.19-3 0.
22. Cochrane, P., op.cit., pp.8-10, 32-6.
23. The debate is partially reviewed by W.A. Sinclair, The process
of economic development of Australia, pp.15-18, who (while 
acknowledging the importance of domestic manufacturing and 
construction as stressed by N.G. Butlin) emphasised the 
leadership of exports in promoting economic growth. 
Subsequently, R.V. Jackson, Australian economic development in 
the nineteenth century, focussed primarily on events within 
Australian in his account of development. P. Cochrane,
op.cit., like B. Fitzpatrick, The British empire in Australia, 
placed Australian development within the imperial context and 
has examined many of the links between external and internal 
factors. e .a . Boehm, Prosperity and depression in Australia 
1887-1897, dealing only with a short period, was able to show 
the important differences between States and sectors.
24. Notable finds were a rich lode of tin at Mt Heemskirk in 1879, 
silver and lead near Zeehan in 1882, gold in several places and 
above all large deposits of copper at Mt Lyell in 1883 and zinc- 
lead at Roseberry in 1893. Tasmanian Year Book, 1971, 1976.
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25. G. Blainey, The peaks of Lyell, p.164 et passim.
26. HRA 3/4/356-7, Evidence T.W. Birch. Birch received an
exclusive permit to cut Huon Pine for 1 year as a reward for 
having sponsored Kelly's voyage of discovery to Port Davey and 
Macquarie Harbour - See Chapter 2.
27. Apart from a scheme which provided lighting for Launceston in
1895, the initial schemes were developed (1895-1914) by the 
mining industry to meet local needs. (The Mt Lyell Company 
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4 7 .
316
Notes to Chapter 5
Minister of Lands and Works, 3 March 1903. It was even pursued 
by the Premier in writing to the Prime Minister of Natal, 16 Mar 
1903, with replies 7 Oct 1903 and 5 Dec. 1905. Tasmanian 
sleepers were also sent to Egypt, India and China in a trade 
organised through London - eg: LSD 6/6346m, H. Jones to 
Secretary for Lands, 11 Jan 1909. There was much less official 
corespondence about trade with Britain, and it was mostly 
concerned with smaller items - such as the spokes for gun 
carriage wheels - or requests for timber samples.
48. Sawn timber 1902-1909: average annual production - 88,163m , 
average exports - 45,815 m3. Statistics of Tasmania.
49. Estimated cutting of mills South of Hobart
oLargest mill (McDougallBros, Recherche) 94 m /week 
Gray Bros., Adventure Bay 37 " "
J. Geeves, Geeveston 59 " "
Average of 11 mills 59 " "
LSD 6/9227e, Charles Dearden, Timber Inspector, to Surveyor- 
General, 15 Dec 1897. Mercury, 8 June 1903; Cyclopedia of 
Tasmania, vol.1, p.587.
50. Rev. J.E.T. Woods, 'Tasmanian forests: their botany and econom­
ical value'o
51 o w. Epps, Land systems of Australasia (London, Swan
Sonnenschein), 1894, p.59.
52. Ibid.
53. JHA 1875/77, George Innes (District Surveyor, Franklin), Report, 
Huon, 6 July 1874.
54. Ibid.
55. JHA 1875/80, Huon Sawmill Owners, Petition for amendment of land 
laws.
56. JHA 1878/132, Report from the Select Committee to inquire and 
report upon the necessary steps to be taken for the Preservation 
from utter destruction of the valuable indigenous Forest Trees 
known as Huon Pine and Blackwood.
57. 45 Viet.5, The Waste Lands Amendment Act, 1881.
58. LSD, Annual report, 1884.
59. JPP 1887/59, Conservator of Forests, Woods and Forests of 
Tasmania, 1886-7; JPP 1889/80, Conservator of Forests, Annual 
report, 1889.
60. 49 Viet. 36, The State Forests Act, (1885).
317
Notes to Chapter 5
61. 54 vict. No. 8, The Crown Lands Act, 1890.
62. 59 Vict. 31, The Crown Lands Amendment Act, 1895 was altered by 
64 vict. 21, The Crown Lands Amendment Act, 1900, to permit 
leases not exceeding 100 acres [40 ha] for no longer than 10 
years. LSD, Annual report, 1895.
63. LSD, Annual report, 1896.
64. Significant developments were: the discovery of gold in the
Transvaal in 1886, the formation of Rhode’s British South 
African Railway Company in 1889 at the Natal-Transvaal Railway 
agreement of 1895. M. Row, The Tasmanian timber trade, appendix 
4A. Tasmania had 3.8% of the Australian timber export trade 
1898-1900.
65. LSD, Annual report, 1898-1899.
66. The trade was probably more significant ideologically and 
photogenically than economically, although it was important to 
some businesses such as the Gray Bros who promoted it well by 
printing a booklet written by D.W. Lewin, The eucalypti: 
hardwood timbers of Tasmania..
67. LSD 6/1770c* A.G.D. Bernacchi, Commission and Finance agent of 
Hobart to Secretary for Lands, 2 March 1897. In the event the 
sawmill never eventuated and the cement works was not built 
until 1924 and then only operated for 5-6 years - E.R. Pretyman, 
Some historical notes on Maria Island and its penal settlements, 
p . 29.
68. 62 Vict.38, The Crown Lands Amendment Act, 1898.
69. Government Notice 347, 25 Nov 1898.
70. Government Notice 59, 20 Jan 1899.
71. Government Notice 210, 21 June 1900.
72. JPP 1901/70, Report of Select Committee on The Geeveston 
Tramways and Timber Leases Bill, 1901 (Private); 1 Ed.vn 
(Private), The Ge&veston Tramways and Timber Leases Act; M. 
Row, 'The Huon Timber Company and the Crown'.
73. JPP 1902/44, Report of Select Committee on The Tasmanian Timber
Corporation Bill, 1902 (Private); 2 Ed.vil (Private), Tasmanian
Timber Corporation Act, 1902; LSD 6/111h, General Manager, 
Tasmanian Timber Corporation Ltd, to Minister Lands and Works, 
21 April 1902; LSD, Report 1900-01.
74. LSD 6/9490f, Surveyor-General to Minister for Lands, 8 June 
1900; Government Notice 210, 21 June 1900.
318
Notes to Chapter 5
75. LSD 6/6346m, H. Jones to Minister for Lands and Works, 15 June 
1908, gives a better estimate of the company’s expenditure:
Assets Value ($) 
Log getting and hauling machinery 4,442 
Tramway capital and construction 26,352 
Rolling stock and locomotives 5,702 
Sawmill machinery 13,546 
Wharf and jetty 4,476 
Buildings 9,438 
Miscellaneous 19,378 
Sub-total 89,840 
Properties Leasehold 25,154 
Properties Freehold 5,800 
Total 170,794
The balance sheet appears to have valued the assets (excluding 
properties) at cost, but placed greatly inflated values on the 
freehold properties.
76. The purchasers were reported to be an Indian syndicate, but in 
the usage of the time this is taken to mean British capitalists 
who had accumulated their wealth in India. In 1902, the head 
office of the Tasmanian Timber Corporation was at 85 Gracechurch 
St., London, EC. - LSD 6/4457h, letterhead 1902. By 1907, the 
head office of the Tasmanian Hardwood Corporation was at 27 
Austin Friars, london, EC ~ LSD 6/8704p, letterhead 1907. The 
balance sheet at 31 March 1908 for the Tasmanian company shows 
liabilities of $141,870 to the Tasmanian Timber Corporation 
Limited 'Purchase Account’ and $20,868 pounds to the Tasmanian 
Hardwood Corporation Ltd, London - LSD 6/6346m, H. Jones to 
Minister for Lands and Works, 15 June 1908.
77. Mary Calder, Big Timber Country, pp.70-80. Millars bought the 
Huon Timber Company in which $210,000 had been spent for $73,500 
and the Tasmanian Hardwood Corporation in which about $100,000 
had been spent for $20,000.
78. The International Exhibition held in London in 1862 provided an
opportunity for the recently independent Tasmania to show off 
the plenty and quality of her resources to the 'Mother 
Country'. Parliament appointed worthy Commissioners to mount 
the state's exhibits. They gave prominence to timber and showed 
large specimens of planks and ships timbers as well as wooden 
manufactures and a whale boat. Although '... their efforts 
were almost continuously directed to ... bringing ... the almost 
unlimited supply of hard woods in the Tasmanian forests 
under the notice of ship-builders and others ...', their large 
samples were badly cracked not having been seasoned prior to 
shipping. At the exhibition '... unfortunately the ... ship's 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
1. By 1929, hydro-electricity accounted for 40% of the world's
electricity - D.S. Landes, The unbound Prometheus, p.286. In 
Tasmania, Electolytic Zinc (EZ) expanded production from 10 to 
100 tonnes a day in 1923. Confectionery and textile factories
were built in the 1920's and a cement works in 1930. The paper 
mills were built in 1938 and 1941.
2. P. Cochrane, Industrialisation and dependence, p.27.
3. Ibid, pp.107-109.
4. JPP 1926/52, The case for Tasmania. See also JPP 1926/53 for 
the Commonwealth's reply, and P.Cochrane, op.cit., p.113.
5. H.W. Gepp, 'Foreword', Electrode, No.1, Aug 1920. Electrode is 
the company magazine of Electrolytic Zinc (EZ).
As early as 1892, Risby Bros in Hobart had built kilns to dry 
timber artificially by the patented 'Reiser' process. Risby's 
probably used these kilns to prepare timber already partly air
6 .
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dried for their joinery and moulding business. D. Brownlow, 
Risby Bros Pty Ltd. The need for artificial seasoning was 
discussed at successive Interstate Forestry Conferences from
1916.
7. E.A. Holden, 'Paper making in Australia'; R.B. Jeffreys, 'A
brief historical review of pulp and paper making in
Australia'; L.R. Benjamin, 'The challenge of the eucapypts'; 
J. Rawson, A history of the Australian paper making industry, 
A . J . Watson and W.E. Cohen, 'Pulping of eucalypts - an
historical survey' (with an extensive bibliography).
8. Apart from one small test, the first investigation of the
pulping qualities of Australian eucalypts was carried out at the 
instigation of the Tasmanian government in 1914-15. The
possibility of making pulp from Tasmanian woods was first
mentioned by the Conservator of Forests in 1912. In 1914, a
scientist from the Forest Products Laboratory in the US was 
brought to Hobart. He tested three local species by the soda 
process but concluded that although suitable pulp could be made 
it was unlikely to be a commercial success. The investigation 
was expensive ($1,000) by Tasmanian standards of the time. It 
is understandable in relation to the government's surplus of 
electricity, for which paper production might have provided a 
market. - JPP 1915/8, H.E. Surface, Possibility of making paper 
pulp from Tasmanian timbers. The next investigations were
initiated by the State governments in response to shortages
during the First World War. Victoria sent samples of wood to 
Norway in 1917, but the report on the mechanical pulp made was 
not encouraging. New South Wales considered the prospects in 
1916 and sent samples of wood to Canada, but lost interest when 
the War ended. In Western Australia, pulp was made for
munitions in 1915-16 and for paper in 1917-18, but again the
studies were discontinued at the end of the War. The paper 
pulp was made by the soda process from young trees at the 
instigation of the Conservator of Forests who was interested in 
having young stands of regrowth thinned. - A.J. Watson and W.E. 
Cohen, op.cit. These slender responses were typical and
neither governments nor capitalists initiated research for long­
term ends during the First World War and few industrial or
scientific advances were made. I. Turner, '1914-19',In F.K. 
Crowley, A new history of Australia, p.356.
9. For example, the first test of Australian woods on a commercial 
scale was carried out by L.R. Benjamin, of the Institute of 
Science and Industry, and D. Avery, an industrial chemist who 
worked as a consultant to and later director of Collins House 
companies. L.R. Benjamin, 'The challenge of the eucalypts'.
10. See for example, J.R. Robertson, '1930-39', In F. Crowley,
op.eit., pp.416-418.
11. E.R. Walker & D.L. Anderson, The Tasmanian Economy in 1938-39
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12. E.R. Walker, Australian economy in wav and reconstruction, 
pp.20, 133-137, et passim.
13. Controls of the production and distribution of timber were set
up by the Commonwealth in 1942. They were administered by the 
Timber Control Organisation staffed largely from the government 
forest services. S.L. Kessel, 'Timber Control', which cites 
National Security (Timber Control) Regulations, 23 March 1942, 
and Declaration of [sawmilling as a] Protected Industry, 7 March 
1942. Controls were applied through trade organisations. For 
example, the distribution of plywood was arranged by the 
Australian Plywood Board through local trade associations - in 
Tasmania, one had to be formed hastily for the purpose. Each
State and distributor was supplied in proportion to past 
business. The Northern and Southern Plywood Distributors
Association were formed in Tasmania by August 1942 following the 
Timber Controller's appointment of one firm only, Brewster & 
Norman, to act as Tasmanian agents. FC 4/ASS4/14, Controller 
of Timber, circular 'Control of Plywood', 4 July 1942.
14. Overseas destinations absorbed 51% of the value of Tasmanian 
timber exports in 1903-09, 6% in 1922/23-1928/29, and 4% in 
1929/30-1938/39, and 2% in 1939/40-1948/49. M. Rd w, The 
Tasmanian timber tradey 1830-1930; Statistics of Tasmania.
15. FD, Annual report, 1922,1925,1926.
16. CPP 1930/99, Tariff Board, Report and recommendations on 
proposals for embargo and increased duties cm timber. Only 
72,000 m^ of timber were sawn in 1930/31 and 85,000 m^ in 
1931/32.
17. D. Brownlow, Risby Bros Pty Ltd cites profit and loss figures 
for three firms of sawmillers and timber merchants.
Year Risby Bros. Kemp & Denning Crisp & Gunn
Profit ($) Profit ($) Profit($) Loss($)
1936 1,204 13,436 17,386
1937 392 8, 200 12,422
1938 282 14,410 21,808
1939 1,340 15,576 20,426
1940 1,796 16,796 20,336
1941 2,242 19,200 2,370
1942 2,938 14,390 11,254
1943 2,100 14,078 2,556
1944 616 8,916 9,232
1945 2,330 12,588 17,450
1946 2,394 11,348 4,506
18. Statistics of Tasmania.
19. Ibid.
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20. G.J. Rodger, 'Forest survey of Tasmania', Proc. 3rd British 
Empire Forestry Conferenae, pp.841-842.
21. Tasmania, lands Department, Tasmanian forestry: timber products 
and saumilling (1905).
22. LSD, Annual report, 1912-13. By making the conservative
assumption that productivity in the general sawmills did not 
increase, and that the number of case mills in the 1900's was 
negligible, the total number of mills in later periods can be 
separated into general and case mills. By comparing data for 
1900-09 with 1930-39, an estimate of 82 case mills is obtained 
for the 1930's. By comparing data for periods of peak
production, 1905-1907 versus 1912-21 or 1923/24-1925/26 the 
number of case mills at the end of the 1920's is estimated at 
about 75.
23. P. Cochrane, op.cit., p.106; ATWU-T, Minutes of Management 
Commiteee, 13 Nov 1920.
24. ATWU-T, Minutes of Management Committee, 17 Nov. 1924.
25. Interview, Mr.W. Leitch, former General Manager Henry Jones IXL 
Timbers Pty Ltd, Hobart, 15 Nov 1979; The World, 23 June 1922.
26. Ibid, W. Leitch. For example, Henry Jones' mill at Leprena on
Recherche Bay could only be approached by foot or sea. A
worker who moved his family and belongings there in the company 
boat could only take his furniture away again if it suited the 
manager.
27. 11 Geo.v No. 51, The Wages Board Act, 1920.
28. Even if the ATWU-T felt little had been achieved, the Health
Dept. Inspector did visit the Leprena mill after a typhoid
outbreak at the settlement and did order the owners to make 
various improvements at the settlement. The World, 13 Feb
1922.
29. For instance, the union was still struggling in the 1940's to 
have tailguards, or riving knives, fitted to circular saws long 
after they were compulsory in Victoria - ATWU-T, Minutes of
Managing Committee, 16-17 Dec 1939, State Executive Committee, 
17 July 1942.
30. For example, a 9 week strike at Mt Lyell in 1924. AWTU-T, 
Minutes of Management Committee, 17 Nov 1924.
31. The union's Membership register for 1911 records so many names 
from the Huon Timber Company mill that virtually every worker 
seems to have been a member. LSD, Annual report, 1911-12, 
records two instances of 'labour difficulties' at Millar's [ie.
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Huon Timber Co.] mills. ATWU-T, Minutes of Management
Committee/ 20 Sept 1919, reports request of Geeveston members 
’re the non-unionists working the band [Huon Timber Co.] 
mill'. The Secretary was despatched to Geeveston and no
further difficulties reported.
32. ATWU-T, Minutes of Management Committee, 4 May 1921. Workers 
spent up to 3 hours' a day travelling to and from their work, 
half in their own time.
33. ATWU-T, Minutes of Executive Committee, 16 Sept 1922, Management 
Committee, 4 April 1922; The World, Nov 1921.
34. ATWU-T, Minutes of Management Committee, 2 Feb 1922, and 
acknowledgements of donations in The World, Feb-Sept 1922.
35. ATWU-T, Minutes of Management Committee, 4 Apr, 16 Sep 1922; 
The World, 3,4,11,14,16 Nov 1921, 1,2,4, Feb, 23 June 1922; 
Mercury, 6,9,10,11,,13,15,20 Feb, 20,23 May, 16,19,21 June, 8 
Aug 1922.
36. M. Dixson, ’The timber strike of 1929’; ATWU-T, Minutes of 
Management Committee, 9 Feb. 1929.
37. The minute book of the ATWU-T has no entries between 9 Feb 1929 
and 5 Mar 1936.: . . .
38. ATWU-T, Minutes of Management Committee, 5 Mar 1936, 15 May
1937, 3,4 Dec 1938, 10-11 June 1939.
39. Reads to isolated forest mills were fearfully bad and impassible 
to cars in winter, so that ’ ... in many instances the womenfolk 
[going to shop] were in danger of being killed by riding loads 
of timber ...’ Ibid, 10-11 June 1939.
40. ATWU-T, Minutes of Executive Committee, 20 Aug 1939, records 
sawmillers being fined $2-20 for breaches of the award. 
However the uselessness of prosecuting brankrupt millers was 
clearly recognised as in the case of Gather cole's mill at Port 
Arthur where workers not paid for 5 weeks only received half 
their wages when the mill bankrupted.
41. 2 Geo.VI No. 47, Forestry Act, 1938. The Federal Council, ATW, 
passed a resolution of congratulation, sent to the Minister for 
Forestry, 7 Nov. 1938, and the ATWU-T sent a letter of 
appreciation, 9 Nov. 1938.
42. The overall trend in Australia can be guaged from an index of 
real wages based on normal weekly wages for adult males deflated 
by the 'C' series of retail prices:
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Year Index of real wages
1939 1211
1940 1190
1941 1194
1942 1196
1943 1231
1943 1246
1945 1252
1946 1263
Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1951.
The union commended the attitude of Crisp and Gunn in supplying 
these - ATWU-T, Minutes of Executive Committee, 29 Aug 1941.
FC 4/ASS 4/19, Timber Industry Advisory Committee, Minutes, May 
1943 to Nov 1945.
ATWU-T, Minutes of Executive Committee, 15 May, 7, 17 July 1942.
For example, the Huon sawmillers pressed for better tenure in 
the 1870's and lobbied for lower royalties in the 1900's. The 
Sawmilling Association was first mentioned in official reports 
in FD, Annual report, 1922/23. The three associations were:
The Southern Tasmanian Sawmills and Hardwood Merchants 
Association,
- The Northern Tasmanian Sawmillers and Timber Merchants 
Association, and
The North-West Sawmillers Association.
FC 4/2138B/28, Minutes of conference between Minister for 
Forestry and Tasmanian Timber Organisation, 20 Aug 1929 
statement by A. McGaw, Manager of Van Diemen's Land Company and 
President TTO.
FC 4/2138a/27, Minutes of Timber Industry Conference held in the 
Executive Council Chambers, Hobart, 16 Aug 1927.
Tasmanian Timber Organisation Limited, Memorandum and Articles 
of Association (Burnie), 1928.
FC 4/ASS2/2 Tasmanian Timber Organisation, 'Statement reviewing 
history of the organisation', Burnie, 23 Oct 1928.
18 Geo.V No.95, Forestry Act, 1927. Case timber was excluded.
G.J. Rodger, 'Forest survey of Tasmania' op.cit., p.846, 
C.E. Lane-Poole, 'Forest survey in Tasmania', p.10.
FC 4/2138a/27, Acting Conservator of Forests to Honorary 
Minsiter for Forestry, 16 Aug 1928.
FC 4/2138B2/28, Minutes of conference held between Minister for 
Forestry and TTO, 20 Aug 1929; 20 Geo. V No. 34, Forestry Act,
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1929.
55. TTO, Account books. The Forestry Department forwarded 'Timber 
Toll Collections' from June 1928 to April 1931 and then grants 
at the rate of $2,000 per annum until June 1944. The Audit 
Department scrutinised the budget and expenditure each year to 
ensure that the government contribution was not spent on 
industrial matters.
56. FC 4/POL1/2, Conservator of Forests to Minister for Forestry, 19 
March 1941.
57. TTO, Account books. It sent samples of flooring to Canada, 
distributed small sums to the district associations and
subscribed to the Australian Federal Sawmillers Association, 
founded in 1935. It floundered about for years trying to set 
grading standards and have them approved by the Standards 
Association. Timber inspections were only carried out when
requested by foreign buyers and then 50% was commonly 
rejected.
58. FC 4/ASS2/2, Memo J.M. Firth, District Forester to Minister for 
Agriculture, [Feb] 1932 and comments by C.G. Ryan.
59. TTO, Account books-, Minutes .of directors meetings, 1941-43, 
Annual report, 1940/41, 1941/42.
60. TTO, Minutes of meeting with Minister and Conservator, 5 Aug.
1943. FC5/2200, Minutes of Conference of Sawmillers,
Launceston, 20 Oct. 1943.
61. TTA, Annual report, 1945, 1946, 1947.
62. FC 4/ASS5/6, J.M. Firth, 'Note on the Forester settlement and Mt 
Horror milling areas', Forestry Conference, 25 May 1938. Henry 
Jones built their Warentinna mill in the north-east in 1933 and 
added 4 drying kilns and 1 reconditioning chamber in 1934, pers. 
comm., W. Leitch, Hobart, 15 Nov 1979.
63. FC 1/1534/27, Conservator of Forests to Minister Controlling
Forestry, 6 Feb 1925, 21 March 1929; Conservator of Forests to
Chairman, Joint Committee', 16 Feb 1927; M. Garrett, 'Report on 
exploration and prismatic compass survey of Crown Lands south of 
the Arthur River', Forest Office, Burnie, 12 Nov 1927 - this 
details a heroic journey in the Hellyer style of a survey party 
led by Garrett which lasted for 33 days and was completed on 
very limited rations; it located some 20,000 hectares of timber 
with a volume of approximately 900,000 cubic metres.
JPP 1927/15, Report of Joint Committee, Timber Industry 
Encouragement Bill, 1926; 18 Geo.v No.99, Timber Industries
Encouragement Act, 1927. The provisions of the Act included:
- The nominal capital was to be at least $2 million, and at 
least 100,000 shares were to be applied for within 1 year.
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The company's head office was to be in Tasmania and the 
company's name was to include the word 'Tasmanian'.
Within three years the company was to erect a furniture 
factory in Tasmania at a cost of at least $20,000 in which 
at least 50 people were to be employed.
The company was to keep its principal works and factories in 
the State.
- Normal royalties were to be paid plus a levy of $0.05 per
cubic metre to cover the regeneration and fire protection of 
the forests.
An Exclusive Forest Permit would be issued over 52,610
hectares of forest for 99 years at one-half the normal 
rental.
64. Australia, Development and Migration Commission, Report on 
afforestation and reforestation in Tasmania.
65. See note 16.
66. The Kauri Timber Company built a sawmill in South Melbourne in
1933 to cut logs they imported from the Solomon Islands. In
1936, they added kilns and processed Victorian and Tasmanian
timbers. Jobson’s Investment Digest, 3 June 1933; Stock
Exchange Research Service, 1936.
67. The Gunnersens started in the Australian timber trade in 1879
when Captain Gunner Gunnersen emigrated from Norway and set up 
as a timber merchant in Adelaide. In 1887, he entered into
partnership with another Norwegian to import timber from the
Baltic into Melbourne under the name of Romcke Gunnersen & 
Co. From 1897, the Melbourne business was run rolely by the
Gunnersens as G. Gunnersen & Co., and incorporated as a private 
company in 1915. The firm then started to market plywood
imported from Queensland and overseas. Plywood sales grew and
became a major part of the business. In 1934, the firm was
renamed Gunnersen Nosworthy Pty Ltd when a member of the 
business entered the board.
In Adelaide, the Le Messuriers had established a customs house, 
shipping and general agency business in 1853. In 1915-16, they 
formed a joint timber merchant company, Gunnersen-Le Messurier 
Pty Ltd, to operate in Adelaide, and joined with Gunnersens and 
a Sydney merchant, J. Crockett, to set up Gunnersen-Crockett 
companies in Sydney and. Brisbane. In Melbourne, the Le
Messuriers invested in Gunnersen Nosworthy.
E.A. Alstergren established Altergren Pty Ltd as timber brokers 
and agents in Melbourne in 1925. The Gunnersens and the Le 
Messuriers invested in Altergren Pty Ltd when the latter was in 
financial difficulties during the depression, and W.G. Nosworthy 
became a director of the Altergrens in 1936. Australian Timber 
Journal, 6(2), 1940, pp.83,135; Jobson's Investment Digest, 2 
June 1950; Australian Forest Industries Journal, 45(5) June
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1979, p.67; Australian Timber Journal, 2 Oct 1936, p.406 - I am 
most grateful to Benita Carter for drawing this last to my 
attention.
68. Dunkleys had operated a sawmill on the west coast since at least 
1906 and had moved to Stanley and built a mill there just before 
the end of the First World War. They had amalgamated with a 
sawmill owned by E. Hugh Fenton in Smithton about 1920. Fenton 
acted as manager for Circular Head Amalgamated Timbers and 
developed a number of operating improvements. H. Trethewie 
(ed.), Back to Circular Head; Circular Head Chronicle, 2 Mar 
1960; Obituary, E.H. Fenton, Australian Timber Journal, 32(2), 
March 1972, p.75; interview with Mr L. Beckett, Forest Manager, 
Kauri Timber Co. (Tas) Pty Ltd, Smithton, 22 May 1979.
69. Jobson's Investment Digest, 1 Sept 1947; interview, Mr J. 
Waddington, Manager, Kilndried Industries Ltd., Launceston, 17 
May 1979.
70. Australian Timber Journal vol. 21(8), Sept. 1955, pp.706-13;
Interview Mr Kieth Dunham, Plymill Manager and Director, 
Tasmanian Plywood Mills Pty Ltd, Somerset (Tasmania), 23 May
1979.
71. Statistics of Tasmania. Although paper making is not shown as 
a separate statistical category, the size of the two mills can 
be estimated from the difference in category 'Newspapers, 
printing and binding and paper making' between the years 1937/38 
and 1941/42, as no other developments of comparable magnitude 
occurred.
Newspapers, paper, Paper Sawmills
etc . estimated
1937/38 1941/42 1941/42 1941/42
No of establishments 28 28 2 208
Power of engines (kW) 592 20,049 19,000 5,535
Average no. of workers 783 1,778 1,000 1,754
72. E.A. Holden, op.cit.
73. Bureau of Census and Statistics, Overseas Trade. Official
statistics did not separate imports into the types shown in 
Table 6.1 until 1922/23. By the 1920's, the annual value of 
imports reached $9.2 million for paper and $0.4 million for 
pulp.
74. P. Cochrane, op.cit., p.92.
75. J. Rawson, op.cit., ch.4; APM, 'A brief history of paper making 
in Australia'; L. Benjamin, 'The challenge of the eucalypts', 
op.cit.; R.B. Jeffries, op.cit.
76. The number of proprietors of capital city dailies fell from 21 
to 12 in the 1920's - H. Mayer, The press in Australia, p.31.
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77. Gerald Müssen was an industrial consultant to Broken Hill 
Amalgamated Smelters at Port Pirie and to EZ, as well as one of 
the founders of the News in Adelaide - Who's who in Australia, 
1938.
78. JPP 1924-25/37, Report of Select Committee on Wood-Pulp and
Paper Industry Encouragement Bill, 1924. An address by G.
Musssen reported in the Advocate, 22 Feb 1939, gives the date of 
the agreement as 1921, but 1923 is more likely given the dates 
for the research and development of pulping methods.
79. Lewis was a barrister. As Minister for Mines, he had greatly 
assisted EZ to establish in Tasmania. J. Reynolds, 'Premiers 
and political leaders'.
80. JPP 1924-25/37, op.cit.; 15 Geo.V No.21.
81. L.R. Benjamin, 'The challenge of the eucalypts'. Two hundred 
tonnes of logs were shipped to Britain, but the only sulphite 
mill there refused to test them. Moreover all the English mills 
kept their doors shut to the Australian investigators. This 
seems to have been part of a general secretiveness in the paper 
mills, which still relied on quite a lot of craft skill, rather 
than a specific counter to the potential threat to British sales 
in the Australian market.
82. Ibid.
83. JPP 1926/14, Report of Select Committee, Kermandie Wood-Pulp and
Paper Industry Bill, 1926. 16 Geo.V No.13. Rights under the
Act were granted to David Avery as Promoter. Avery was already 
a director of Amalgamated Zinc according to the Australian 
dictionary of biography, vol.7, 1979, when he obtained the 
concession. Müssen assigns a more entreprneeurial role to
Avery and thought he was 'joined by Amalgamated Zinc' after he 
had the concession - Advocate, 22 Feb 1939.
84. Tasmanian Paper Pty Ltd was formed in May 1927 with an 
authorised capital of $200,000. AZ took 70% of the shares and 
the remaining 30% was split between EZ, North Broken Hill, 
Austral Development Ltd (London), Edward Lloyd Ltd (London), 
National Metal and Chemical Bank Ltd (England), Estate Sir 
Alfred Ashbold, and APM - J.Rawson, op.cit., p.73.
85. L.R. Benjamin, 'The challenge of the eucalypts'; APM, Port Huon 
mill, brochure, 1975.
86. JPP 1925-26/49, Report of Select Committee, Wood-Pulp and Paper
Industry Encouragement Bill, 1926; 16 Geo.V No. 82, The Wood-
Pulp and Paper Industry Encouragement Act, 1926; J.Rawson, 
op.cit., pp.74-75; Advocate, 22 Feb 1939.
87. L.R. Benjamin, 'The challenge of the eucalypts'. A
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Commonwealth inquiry also recommended a joint venture in
Tasmania - H. Gepp and I.H. Boas, 'General report to
Commonwealth on proposed paper industry in Tasmania', 9 Dec
1930, cited by J. Rawson, op.cit., p .76.
a p p m , Prospectus, registered Melbourne, 18 April 1936. The
firm subscriptions of one pound ($2) shares were:
North Broken Hill Ltd 75,000 
Broken Hill South Ltd 75,000 
Zinc Corporation Ltd 50,000 
Electrolytic Zinc Co. of A/sia Ltd 75,000 
Australian Glass Manufacturers Co. Ltd 25,000 
Amalgamated Zinc (de Bavay's) Ltd 150,000 
W.H. Smith (Sharebroker) 175,000
625,000
89. 1 Ed.vill No.35, Associated Pulp and Paper Mills Act3 1936. in 
addition to the forest concession, the government was prepared 
to allow pulpwood to be cut from any Crown Land forest within 19 
kilometres of government railways west of Westbury and north of 
the Arthur River. However the company never did cut there and 
the provision lapsed. Although the additional provision almost 
doubled the area of forest available to the company, no estimate 
of the forest area seems to have been available and there was no 
assessment of the quantity of pulpwood conceded. There seems 
to have been no need for this huge area, indeed it is doubtful 
if the concession area itself was needed for the size of the 
mill proposed. The mill, which was planned to be only half the 
size of that proposed in 1924, expected to use 20,000 cords of 
wood a year and had bought an estimated 1 million cords of 
eucalypt wood on the Woolnorth and Ringwood forests from Van 
Diemen's Land Company. In addition it had rights to 50,000 
cords from the Surrey Hills Block. In the event very little 
wood from any of these sources was used in the first ten years 
of the mill's operation, supplies being drawn from closer and 
more accessible privately owned land. 1 Ed VII No35., first 
schedule; APPM, Prospectus; a p p m, Chairman's address, Proc. 
Annual General Meeting, 1945, 1948.
90. FC 5/5459, Conservator of Forests to Minister controlling 
Forestry, 25 Nov 1924.
91. Robert Woodhead was the British manager brought out to build and
start the mill. APPM, Prospectus, Annual reports, various 
years. The company purchased and built homes for the new
workers and persuaded the government to build more. This was 
achieved through the State-owned Agricultural Bank of Tasmania 
which purchased enough land from APPM to build up to 40 
houses. APPM kept firm control by appraising the designs and 
costs, encouraging workers to buy them, by guaranteeing bank 
loans and prudently deducting repayments from their wages. 
2 Geo.VI No.32, Homes (Burnie Paper Mills) Act 19383
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92. With considerable optimism/ the directors even contemplated 
exporting pulp - a p p m , Report of Annual General Meeting, 1937.
93. See R.B. Jeffreys, op.ait., for examples mainly in APM. APPM 
conducted laboratory research at Burnie from 1937.
94. APPM, Report of Annual General Meeting, 1939.
95. APPM, Annual Report, 1939-1946. I.M. Kelly and D.M. Hocking,
'Paper industries in war-time', pp.218-230, state that a maximum 
profit rate of 10% was first agreed with the Prices 
Commissioner. The Chairman stated that it was 6% - APPM,
Report of Annual General Meeting, 1948.
96. APPM, Annual Report, 1944.
97. APPM, Annual Report, 1947,1948. This did not deter the
Chairman from complaining that the continuation of Price Control 
was threatening the company !
98. L.R. Bejamin, 'The challenge of the eucalypts'.
99. FD, Annual report, 1923.
100. JPP 1932/4, Report of Joint Committee on The Florentine Valley
Wood-Pulp and Paper Industry Bill, 1932. 23 Geo.v No.10, The
Florentine Valley Wood-Pulp and Paper Industry Aat, 1932.
101. T. Fink, Report on ooerseas tests (Derwent Valley Paper Co. Pty 
Ltd), Nov 1934.
102. 26 Geo.v No.27, Florentine Valley Paper Industry Aat, 1935.
103. Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Overseas Trade. 
Only includes newsprint in rolls over 10 inches wide. Other 
categories of newsprint were trivial.
104. T.Fink, op.ait. The suggestion of testing the Florentine wood 
in Crown Zellerbach's Ocean Falls mill in British Columbia was 
first made in 1933 and approved by the board in 1934.
105. R.A. Henderson (Chairman ANM), 'The beginning of a further phase 
of development'.
106. The only reference to this contract that I have found was given 
by W. Bunston in ANM's house journal, Newsprint Log, in 1945. 
Bunston was joint manager of the Newsprint Pool which rationed 
paper in war-time and was requested to write the article by 
ANM's General Manager.
107. Commonwealth of Australia, No.64 of 1938, Newsprinting Paper 
Bounty Aat, 1938.
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108. 1&2 Geo.VI No.79, Florentine Valley Paper Industry Act, 1937.
109. Within the range $0.05 to $0.15 per cubic metre.
110. The war-time delays and shortages increased costs so that an 
extra $320,000 had to be raised '... by the dilligent scrounging 
of Sir Keith Murdoch [Chairman of the Herald] ...' - W. Bunston, 
op.cit.
111. Sir Lloyd Dumas, 'Difficulties that had to be overcome'.
112. W. Bunston, op.cit.
113. At the top a No.1 machineman making paper received 60% over a 
labourer, but most workers received some margin. Paper and Pulp 
Manufacturing Industry Award, 25 Feb 1948, cited by J. Rawson, 
op.cit.
114. J. Rawson, op.cit., ch.16. The mainland union for paper
makers, the Australian Paper Mills Employees' Union (APMEU), 
later to become the Pulp and Paper Makers' Federation of 
Australia (PPMFA), was an 'in-house' union representing APM 
workers. When APPM started, it was loathe to come to Tasmania 
or be associated with another company.
115. Go Müssen, The humanizing of industry and commerce. The gospel 
was first expressed by Broken Hill Amalgamated Smelters at the 
company town of Port Pirie (SA) with a company store (designed 
to keep down the cost of living and hence wages), contributory 
health funds, a holiday camp, and company assistance in 
constructing a town park.
117. ATWU-T, Minutes of Executive meeting, 21 April, 29 Sept 1940.
118. Ibid.,
119. Ibid.,
120. Ibid.,
121. Ibid.,
122. Ibid.,
21 April 1940.
20 Nov 1941.
10 Sept 1942.
2 April, 21 May 1940.
19 June, 3,17 July, 24 Oct 1942.
123. Proc. [5th] Interstate conference on forestry, 1920. The 
matter was refered to a Premiers conference and subsequently 
considered by an Empire Forestry Conference in London.
124. 11 Geo.V No. 60.
125. FD, Annual report, 1927, 1928, 1939.
126. One scheme envisaged setting up boys' homes where migrant youths
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would divide their time between planting and schooling. 
Although the Consevator implored the British authorities to '. . . 
let the waste children of the Empire reclaim the waste lands of 
the Empire and in reclaiming those lands arrive at their own 
reclamation ..., the British were not prepared to pay. - L.G. 
Irby, 'Forestry legislation in Tasmania', delivered to an 
Interstate Australian Forestry Conference. See also: L.G.
Irby, Forest plantation scheme; Government of Tasmania,
Tasmanian forest plantation scheme; Tasmania, State Forestry
Department and State Development Board, Forest plantation homes.
127. Australia, Development and Migration Commission, Report on 
afforestation and reforestation in Tasmania. The major part of 
this was the report 'Forest survey in Tasmania' by G.J. Rodger, 
Op. cit., which had been presented to the 3rd British Empire 
Forestry Conference.
128. From 1931 to 1935, unemployment relief funds averaged $6,654 a 
year. In 1935, a Commonwealth grant of $50,000 was matched 
with a state grant of $10,000 to create a Forestry Tust Fund to 
be used for plantation establishment and youth training. FD, 
Annual report, 1931-38.
129. The EFP system commenced on 1 Jan 1922. A new applicant had to
start building a mill within 6 months and start cutting within 1 
year. Government Notice 566 of 16 Dec 1921, Tasmanian
Government Gazette, 20 Dec 1921.
130. FC 1/F8/20, Conservator of Forests to Commissioner of Police, 30 
April 1920.
131. FD, Annual report, 1920/21.
132. LSD, Annual report, 1919/20. The royalty rate for eucalypt logs 
was increased from $0.04 to $0.21 per cubic metre.
133. FD, Annual report, 1922/23.
134. 21 Geo.V No.55, Forestry Act, 1930, with efect from 1 July 1930.
135. Rates for 1920 to 1942 were tabulated by the Forestry Department 
in FC 4/ASS2/2, memo to the Minister for Forests, 18 May 
1943. See also, Government Notice 566, 567, 16 Dec 1921.
136. FD, Annual report, 1919/20-1938/39.
137. Ibid. Timber inspection fees are included under 'Other'.
138. C.E. Lane-Poole, 'Forest Survey of Tasmania'.
139. S.W. Steane, 'State forestry in Tasmania'.
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140. FC 4/POL3/3, S.W. Steane, Conservator of Forests, Evidence to 
Federal Grants Commission hearing, Hobart, 30 Oct 1935.
141. S.W. Steane, 'State forestry in Tasmania'.
142. FC 4/ASS2/2A, Minutes of conference with Minister for Forestry, 
[August or September] 1935.
143. FC 1/F26/20 details a prosecution launched against Cumming & Co 
Ltd of Burnie for an apparently careless mistake reported by the 
police in October 1920. Cummings were prosecuted because the 
Conservator was prosecuting many others at the same time.
144. For example, a man caught cutting government brands off logs
that had been seized, 'recaptured', and taken to a sawmill 
illegally, was only fined $2, and a sawmiller convicted of
putting in returns for only one-third of the logs taken was not 
fined at all - FC 1/552/22, Acting Forester, Smithton, to
Conservator of Forests, 21, 23 Sept 1922. FC 1/558/22 gives 
details of the case against J.H. Mackay in Oct 1923.
145. FC 4/ASS5/5, M.R. Garrett, Divisional Timber Inspector,
Smithton, 'Comments on intensive checking system of sawmilling 
operations in the North-West Division', paper to conference of 
forestry officers, Hobart, 3 May 1937. Five assistant
inspectors were recruited. The royalty collected in the
Division jumped from $8,890 in 1933/34 to $16,284 in 1935/36,
while salaries only increased by $ 2,268.
146. S. w. steane, A brief note on the principles of state forest 
policy, p .25.
147. FC 4/POL1/2, Conservator of Forests to Minister for Forestry, 
'Note on the Government Forest Policy and Departmental 
Procedures', 18 July 1939. FD, Annual report, 1935/36.
148. FC 4/ASS4/14, Conservator of Forests to Controller of Timber, 25 
May 1942.
149. t t o , Annual report, 1940/41.
150. TTO, Minutes of directors meeting, 12 Oct. 1943.
151. ATWU-T, State Executive Committee, Minutes, 18 July, 26 Aug.
1940. The Union reported problems in the Mathinna and
Deloraine Districts to the Conservator, and asked the Minister 
to report the affairs of Cumming Bros.
152. FD, Annual report, 1939/40, 1940/41.
153. JPPP 1943/10, Auditor-General, Report for the financial year 
ended 30th June 1943; JPP 1943-44/43, Select Committee of
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Legislative Council, Report on statements in Auditor-General’s 
report for 1942/43. JPPP 1945-46/20, S.C. Burbury,
Investigation into alleged irregularities in the Forestry 
Department.
154. JPPP 1946-46/39, JPPP 1946/1, Royal Commission, Report on 
Forestry Administration.
155. P. May, Problems in the analysis of political corruption.
156. JPPP 1944-45/45, S.L. Kessell, Preliminary report on the 
forestry and forestry administration of Tasmania; jppp 1944- 
45/42, S.L. Kessell, Report on the forests and forestry 
administration of Tasmania.
157. From a Ministerial Department to a Departmental Corporation 
according to Wettenhall's classification - R.L. Wettenhall, A 
guide to Tasmanian government administration.
158. t t a , Annual report, 1945.
159. 10 Geo.VI. No.42, Forestry Acty 1946. The initial appointment
was B.O. Plummer who, in 1938-39, had managed to combine the 
position of TTO organiser with membership of the House of 
Assembly - S. Bennett and B. Bennett, op. cit. In this period 
much of his work appears to have been related to 'coordinating' 
production by Tasmanian sawmillers with logging operations 
salvaging burnt forests in Victoria. TTO, Account books;
ATWU-T, Minutes of Managing Committee, 10-11 June 1939;
160. FC, Annual report, 1947/48; TAA, Annual report, 1946.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
1. E. Mandel, Late capitalism.
2. Anthony Brewer, Marxist theories of imperialism, has provided a 
critical overview of major theories.
3. E. Mandel, Late capitalism, pp.336. The proportions of the
capitalist world's foreign investment held by other powers in 
1971 was: Britain 15%, France 6%, West Germany 4% and newer
investments by Japan, Canada and several countries of the 
European Economic Community of 2-4% each.
4. e .r . Walker, The Australian economy in war and reconstruction, 
Ch.14. The Commonwealth started to plan for reconstruction as 
early as 1941 and, for example, looked at the possibility of 
using unskilled returning soldiers in forestry work. In 
Tasmania the Conservator envisaged having ' ... enormous numbers
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to re-instate ...' and made plans to employ 1,600 men on
plantation projects, tending natural forests, building forest 
roads and logging. With some element of Rousseauesque idealism 
he proposed a scheme of 40 forest settlements, each of 20
houses, that would enable seasonal forest work to be balanced 
with small holding and would be:
. . . something like ideal rural communities .. . healthy and 
contented ... with sufficient interests and amenities to 
counteract the attractions of towns.
5 Geo.VI No.58, Forestry Act, 1941, allowed the Conservator to 
let the necessary leases and make regulations. It also
strengthened the Forestry Department's finances by allowing them 
to retain all the royalties received instead of only two-
thirds. See also FC 4/EPI/5A, Conservator to Minister for
Forestry, 29 Dec 1942, and Conservator to Secretary, Grants 
Commission, 10 Feb 1943, proposing that the Tasmanian government 
borrow $12 million for polantations.
5. w .a . Sinclair, The process of economic development in Australia, 
pp. 221,225. The Australian rate of increase of GNP was higher 
than in either the UK or US but less than the exceptionally high 
rates achieved in the reconstructing economies of Japan, West 
Germany, Italy and France.
6. N.G. Butlin, 'Some Perspectives of Australian Economic
Development, 1890-1965', In c. Forster, Australian Economic 
Development in the Twentieth Century, p.290.
7. W.A. Sinclair, op.cit., p.214; C. Forster, 'Economies of Scale 
and Australian Manufacturing' In C. Forster, op.cit, pp.162-164.
8. K. Windschuttle, Unemployment, p.13, showing unemployment rates 
from 1907 to 1977.
9. W.A. Sinclair, op.cit., p.225.
10. r .m . Martin, Trade Unions in Australia, pp.11-17.
11. J. Collins, 'The political economy of post-war immigration'; and 
'A divided working class'.
12. W.A. Sinclair, op.cit, p.248.
13. K. Rowley, 'The political economy of Australia since the War'.
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Apparent consumption of paper products
Australia 1950 - 1969
Average annual consumption (kg)
Period Newsprint Printing Other Paper Total
& Writing Paper -board
1949/50-1953/54 20.8 9.3 10.6 15.3 56.0
1954/55-1958/59 28.8 10.5 14.4 18.7 72.4
1959/60-1963/64 30.9 12.6 19.4 24.5 87.4
1964/55-1968/69 33.2 15.4 27.1 30.2 105.9
Compendium of Australian forest products statistics 1935-36 to 
1966-67; Australia, Forestry and Timber Bureau, Annual report,
1969.
15. United Nations, Transnational Corporations in world development,
pp.265, 270-273, cited by E.L. Wheelwright, 'The age of the
trans-national corporations'.
16. Important links between Australia and the US were: the Bretton
Woods and other international agreements for reconstruction; 
the International Monetary Fund, which Australia joined in 
1947; and the ANZUS defence treaty of 1951 - M. Beresford & P. 
Kerr, 'A turning point for Australian capitalism 1942-1952';
K. Tsokhas and M. Simms, 'The political economy of United 
States' investment in Australia'.
17. a b s , Foreign control in manufacturing industry : Study of large 
enterprise groups 1975-76.
18. K. Tsokhas and M. Simms, op.cit; ABS, Foreign control of 
registered financial corporations 1976, and Foreign control of 
finance companies 1976.
19. One factory - Bowater-Scott - was started by an amalgam of US
and UK capital. The other factory at Millicent in South
Australia was initially started in 1960 as a joint venture by 
APM and a South Australian company, Cellulose. However 
Cellulose withdrew in 1961 and its share was taken up in 1963 by 
the US corporation, Kimberly Clark. Access to specialised
technology, product development, packaging and promotion appears 
to have been important in this. The mill was expanded and 
Kimberly Clark's 'Kleenex' brand products manufactured and 
distributed in Australia. APM, Annual Report, 1960-1964.
20. a b s , Foreign control of manufacturing industry.
21. Ibid. The Kauri Timber Company and Tasmanian Board Mills in 
Tasmania, described later, were exceptions. By 1975-76, foreign 
investment in the wood, wood products and furniture sector was 
estimated (again from the largest 20 companies) at only 7% and 
some of this, particularly in the export trade from Western 
Australia, dated from the turn of the century.
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22. R.W. Connell and T.H. Irving, Class Structure -in Australian 
History, pp.293-294,307, provide a brief summary; APM Annual 
Report 1975.
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12,000 m3 a year; in 1981, they had 3 sawmills and were
producing 30,000 m3 a year - Australian forest industries
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
1. Anthony Brewer, Marxist theories of imperialism, pp.181,272.
2. Ibid, Chapters 8,11.
See Chapter 3. James Fenton, Bush life in Tasmania, describes 
his own exploits selling timber in Melbourne in the 1850's and
3 .
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gives the impression of a free market operating on the Melbourne 
wharves. He also describes the Launceston entrepreneur, Thomas 
Drew, as having a monopoly on the Adelaide trade. J.S. Lee, 
sawmillers of Smithton (later taken over by the Kauri Timber 
Company - see chapter 8), even operated their own timber yard in 
Melbourne. Thus there is no indication of any subordination of 
Tasmanian producers in the mainland markets at this time.
4. A.G. Frank gives the example of Brazilian peasants who enter 
five structures of production during a year; i) owner of house 
and land, ii) sharecropper on anothers land, iii) tenant on a 
third's land, iv) wage worker during harvest time on one of 
these lands, and v) independent trader of his own home-produced 
commodities! Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America, 
p.272.
5. Government of Tasmania, Submission by the Government of Tasmania 
to the Senate Standing Committee on Trade and Commerce Inquiry, 
Forestry and Forestry Based Industries.
6. Comte, the most positivist of sociology's founding parents, 
predicted that there would be no more wars in the centre of 
industrial rationalism - Europe!
7. E.J. Hobsbawm, 'Looking forward: history and the future'.
8. Krishan Kumar, Prophecy and progress, Chapter 6, reviews the 
post-industrial theorists.
9. Robert Catley and Bruce McFarlane, Australian capitalism in boom 
and depression, p.1.
10. Ibid, Chapter 8.
11. Andrew C. Theophanous, Australian democracy in crisis, Epilogue.
12. APPM joined a consortium of six Japanese companies to study the 
feasibility of building a pulpmill as a joint venture. 
Australian Financial Review, 3 Oct 1980.
13. See chapter 1.
14. Sir Bede Callaghan, Inquiry into the structure of industry and 
the employment situation in Tasmania, p.94 et passim.
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STATE FORESTRY ACCOUNTS 
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GLOSSARY
Air-drying. Drying timber by more or less regulated exposure to the
atmosphere in order to season it.
Articulation. A long-lasting linkage between two or more co­
existing modes, sub-modes or structures of production.
Assessment. A survey of a forest made in order to locate timber and 
estimate its quantity by species, size, products, quality or 
other characteristics.
Billets. Pieces of split or sawn wood - typically about 1.2 m long 
by no more than 300 mm square - small enough to move by hand 
and fit into grinding or chipping machines.
Capital. The value that is increased by the accumulation of
surplus-value - 'dead labour'.
Capitals. Divisions of capital into identifiable fractions - e.g. 
merchant, banking industrial capitals.
Chips. Small pieces of wood cut by chipping machines - typically 
30-40 mm long by 20-30 mm broad and 10 mm or so thick - used 
for cooking into wood pulp.
Clear felling. Removal of the entire stand at one cut - as opposed 
to removing only selected stems.
Core. The handful of developed industrial metropolitan economies in 
strong states.
Dressed timber. Timber planed on one or more surfaces, usually 
four. Includes partly moulded timbers such as tongued and 
grooved flooring or weatherboards. Produced from rough
sawn dried timber.
Green timber. Freshly cut timber with a high moisture content.
Hardboard. A sheet or board made from wood that has been
defibrated, felted, and consolidated by the application of 
heat and pressure.
Hegemony. The leadership or predominant influence exercised by one
state over others, or by one class over others.
Infrastructure. The roads, bridges, railways, jetties, docks, power 
stations etc. needed to support production.
Integrated logging. Logging a stand to produce two or more products 
jointly, e.g. sawlogs and plylogs, or sawlogs and pulpwood.
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Hewn timber. Timber finished by broad axe or adze; the ends are 
generally sawn. Commonly used for piles, beams and railway 
sleepers.
Kiln-drying. Drying timber with heated air circulated in a closed 
chamber.
Means of production. The sum of the resources used for production 
(land, raw materials, stock etc.), the instruments of 
production (tools, machines, factories, etc. ) and the 
working capital employed.
Mode of production. The totality of the material and social
processes of production.
Old growth. A mature or overmature stand. Old growth stands in 
Tasmania generally originated prior to the European invasion 
( 1803). Many have been partially cut over and consist of 
old trees intermingled with patches of regrowth.
Paling. A narrow board. Commonly 1.5-1.8 metres long, 125-150 mm 
wide and 25-50 mm thick. Used for cladding the walls of a 
hut or house, and for fencing.
Paradigm. A set of beliefs, values and techiques shared by the
members of a particular community of scientists (including 
social scientists).
Particle board. A sheet or board made from fragments of wood
consolidated by the application of heat and pressure with 
binding materials. In Tasmania, made mostly from flakes of 
wood.
Periphery. The many underdeveloped satellite economies whose
development is hindered and distorted by their relationship 
with the core.
Piles. Long wooden poles -often squared - driven into the sea bed 
as part of wharf construction, or into the ground to provide 
foundations for a structure.
Regrowth. An immature stand regenerated after cutting, fire etc. 
Commonly stands under 60 - 100 years of age.
Relations of production. The relationship between the class of 
direct producers (workers) and the class that owns or 
controls the means of production.
Rough sawn timber. Timber as it comes off the saw - undressed.
Scantling. Timber sawn to cross sections of about 150x100 mm;
generally used for house frames.
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Shingle. A piece of wood split (or sometimes sawn) so that one end 
is thinner than the other. Commonly about 600 mm long by 
100 mm broad. Used for covering buildings and especially 
roofing.
A set of boards for making a wooden box.
To haul logs along the ground, sometimes with the front end 
lifted.
An aggregation of trees occupying a specific area and 
sufficiently uniform as to be distinguishable in the forest.
Structure of product-ion. A division of production within a specific 
concrete society that has distinct physical and social 
processes of production.
Sub-mode of product-ion. A variant of a mode of production defined 
at a lower level of abstraction and with greater historical 
specificity than a mode of production.
Superstructure. The social, political, legal and cultural
institutions of society, particularly those of the state.
Surplus. That part of production which is neither consumed by the 
direct producers (either directly or via exchanges), nor 
applied to replenishing the means of production.
Surplus-Value. The monetary form taken by the surplus. Under
capitalism surplus-value is produced by the wage-labourers 
and appropriated by the capitalists.
Thinning. Cutting a selection of trees from an immature stand to 
improve its growth, hygiene, total yield, etc.
Transnational corporations. Large companies whose ownership is
based in one country, but whose operations and labour force 
are distributed among several.
Shook.
Snig.
Stand.
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COMMON AND BOTANICAL NAMES OF TASMANIAN TREES
Common name Botanical name
Blackwood 
Blue Gum 
Huon Pine 
Ironbark 
Myrtle Beech
Pines (royalty rates notices) 
" Celery Top Pine 
" Huon Pine
" King Billy Pine
Radiata Pine
Stringybark 
Swamp Gum
Tasmanian Oak (timber only)
If II II II
II II II It
Acacia melanoxylon 
Eucalyptus globulus 
Dacvydium fvanklinii 
Eucalyptus siebevi 
Nothofagus cunninghamii
Phyllocladus aspleniifolius 
Dacvydium fvanklinii 
Athevotaxus selaginoides 
Pinus vadiata 
Eucalyptus obliqua 
Eucalyptus vegnans 
Eucalyptus delegatensis 
Eucalyptus obliqua 
Eucalyptus vegnans
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CONVERSION FACTORS
Measurement Imperial unit Metric equivalent
Dimensions 1 mile 1.609 kilometre (km)
1 foot (ft) 0.305 metre (m)
1 inch (in) 25.40 millimetre (mm)
Land area 1 acre 0.405 hectare (ha)
Log volume 100 super foot hoppus(s.ft) 0.301 cubic metre(m )
Money 1 pound 1.00 dollar ($)
1 shilling (s) $0.10
1 penny (d) $0.0083
Plywood 1 million square feet 442.45 3cubic metre(m )
('V.jg inch basis)
Power 1 horsepower 0.746 kilowatt (kW)
Pulpwood 1 *cord 3.625 m3 before 1954
2.97 m3 after 1954
Pulpwood chips 1 bone dry unit or 2.00 tonne approx.or
2,400 lbs 2.2 m3 approx, of
green wood
Sawn timber 100 super feet true (s.ft) 0.236 3cubic metre(m)
Weight 1 ton 1.015 tonne
1 pound (lb) 0.453 kilogramme (kg)
The cord is normally defined as a stack, of wood measuring 4x4x8 
feet (128 cubic feet). In Tasmanian legislation prior to 1954, 
the cord was taken to be 128 cubic feet of solid wood. The 
Forestry Act, 1954, redefined the cord as a unit of stacked 
wood. Since 1974, only metric measures of solid contents have 
been used in Tasmania.
